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ABSTRACT 
In  difficult  times,  political,  social  or  economic,  it  is  usually 
the  case  that  opportunities  for  politicians,  bureaucrats  and  men  of 
power  to  exploit  their  fellow  men  and  to  threaten  their  liberties  increase. 
No  apology,  therefore,  is  required  to  justify  a  re-examination  of  the 
nature  of  coercion,  and  the  moral  grounds,  if  any,  for  its  justification. 
These  two  concerns  constitute  the  scope  of  this  thesis. 
A  number  of  approaches  are  used  to  examine  the  concept  of  coercion 
and  issues  relating  to  it.  These  include  conceptual  analysis,  a  historical 
and  comparative  survey  and  evaluation  of  selected  relevant  idealist 
theories  of  freedom,  a  meta-ethical  analysis  of  the  logical  structure, 
of  moral  judgments  and  the  origin  and  justification  of  moral  principles, 
and  a  normative  analysis  of  the  bases  upon  which  coercion  might  be 
justified  in  particular  cases  in  the  light  of  established  and  agreed 
basic  moral  principles.  Philosophizing,  which  is  not  just  analytic 
but  prescriptive  too,  should  not  be  limited  to  metaphysical  reasoning 
but  grounded  firmly  in  the  empirical. 
The  first  two  chapters  comprise  a  linguistic  analysis  of  the 
concept  of  coercion.  In  Chapter  1  R.  F.  Nozick's  excessively  refined 
concept  of  coercion  is  supplemented  by  the  notion  of  coercion  posited 
in  this  thesis.  Whereas  Nozick  intentionally  limits  the  notion  of 
coercion  to  a  reactive  relation  between  two  individuals  thereby  stressing 
the  cause  of  individual  liberty,  it  is  proposed  in  this  thesis  that 
institutions  representing  the  collective  will  of  individuals  may  also 
properly  be  regarded  as  agents  capable  of  coercing  and  being  coerced. 
Additionally,  it  is  proposed  that  coercion  be  not  confined  to  coercion 
by  threat,  as  Nozick  supposes,  where  the  individual  is  left  with  a  choice 
of  sorts,  but  also  include  coercion  by  irresistible  physical  and/or 
psychological  force  which  leaves  little  if  any  choice  to  the  victim  at  all. il 
In  Chapter  2a  variety  of  concepts  relating  to  coercion  in  the  context 
of  getting  a  person  to  do  or  not  to  do  something  or  other  are  analysed, 
and  the  conditions  necessary  for  the  two  kinds  of  coercion  suggested 
in  this  thesis  are  stipulated:  coercion  by  threat  and  coercion  by 
irresistible  force. 
In  Chapter  3  the  notion  of  justification  is  introduced;  the  notion 
of  coercion  as  the  antithesis  of  freedom  is  examined;  the  assumed 
presumption  in  favour  of  freedom,  which  requires  that  coercion  be 
justified,  is  explained;  and  negative,  positive/idealist  and  ccmaonsensical 
interpretations  of  the  notion  of  social  freedom  are  analysed.,  The 
relation  of  coercion  to  free  will  is  noted  and  free  will  in  the  form 
of  personal  freedom  of  choice,  assuming  men  may  responsibly  and  dutifully 
choose  to  do  things  that  their  desires  may  not  necessarily  prompt  or 
cause  them  to  do,  is  recognised  as  a  necessary  condition  in  both  agents 
in  a  coercive  relationship.  But  the  metaphysics  of  free  will  is  not 
explored  in  detail. 
In  Chapter  4  selected  idealist  theories  of  freedom  principally 
from  Rousseau,  Hegel  and  Marx  are  compared  and  evaluated  in  the  context 
of  what  might  appear  to  be  the  paradoxical  claim  that  individuals  may 
be  coerced  to  be  free.  An  analysis  of  Christian  or  other  theological 
or  divine  metaphysical  theories  as  instruments  of  coercion  in  this 
context  is  noted  but  is  not  pursued  in  detail.  The  notion  of  personal 
autonomy  is  considered  and  it  is  suggested  that  on  all  counts,  including 
Kantian  and  existentialist  views  of  autonomy,  it  presents  a  logical 
barrier  or  limit  to  the  extent  to  which  the  assertion  may  be  made  that 
a  person  can  be  forced  to  be  free. 
In  Chapter  5a  variety  of  suppositions  or  claims  of  what  coercion 
might  do  are  eliminated  on  empirical  and/or  logical  grounds,  and  it  is 
argued  that  individuals  cannot  be  successfully  coerced  to  know, 
understand,  believe,  love  or  be  moral,  though  it  is  conceded  that iii 
coercive  interference  might  be  conducive  to  the  development  of  such 
ends.  Additionally,  the  logical  possibility  of  a  person  being  able 
to  coerce  himself  is  cuestioned. 
In  Chapter  6,  in  which  the  discussion  of  limits  to  the  use  of 
coercion  is  continued,  the  investigation  returns  to  a  consideration, 
in  normative  terms,  of  grounds  for  the  justified  use  of  coercion. 
J.  S.  Mill's  essays  'On  Liberty'  and  'Utilitarianism'  are  taken  as 
starting  points.  Using  the  principle  of  utility  Mill  seeks  reasons 
to  justify  the  use  of  coercion  in  order  to  establish  circumstances 
in  which  the  use  of  coercion  in  fact  cannot  be  justified.  The  latter 
circumstances  are  his  main  concern.  It  is  argued  that  Mill's  difficulties 
indicate  the  inadequacy  of  utilitarianism  as  a  basis  for  a  definitive 
moral  theory  of  justification,  for  he  is  obliged  to  resort  to  deontological 
arguments  and  to  invoke  in  addition  the  basic  moral  principle  of  respect 
for  persons. 
It  is  argued  that  coercion  cannot  be  regarded,  as  some  would  wish, 
as  a  morally  neutral  concept.  Moreover,  at  no  level  of  ethical  reasoning 
is  there  an  apparently  adequate  philosophical  theory  of  justification 
which  in  itself  is  absolute  and  sufficient.  It  is  therefore  proposed 
finally  in  Chapter  7  that  a  pluralistic  approach  is  required  in  the  quest 
for  a  satisfactory  basis  for  the  moral  justification  of  coercion.  The 
schema  of  justification  suggested  rejects  naturalism  and  the  non-naturalistic, 
epistemological  theory  of  intuitionism  in  favour  of  transcendental 
arguments  from  which,  it  is  claimed,  basic  and  ultimate  moral  principles 
may  be  derived  and  justified.  This  kind  of  reasoning  follows  the 
initiative  set  by  Kant  in  his  Critical  Philosophy  and  is  currently 
expressed  in  the  presupposition  theories  of  contempory  philosophers  as 
A.  P.  Griffiths,  R.  S.  Peters,  R.  S.  Downie  and  E.  Telfer. 
It  is  further  argued  that  ultimate  moral  principles,  and  subsidiary 
principles  and  values  derived  from  them,  require  substance  and  content 
w ýý 
and  must  be  applied  to  particular  circumstances  in  everyday  life  if 
the  activity  of  philosophizing  is  to  be  related  to  practice.  This 
inevitably  re-enforces  the  opportunity  for  moral  disagreement,  but  is 
in  accord  with  a  persistent  empiricist  tradition  in  philosophy  evident 
in  Aristotelian  and  Greek  ethical  theory,  in  Mill,  and  currently 
exemplified  in  the  ethical  theories  of  philosophers  like  J.  Rawls 
and  R.  F.  Nozick. 
Within  the  context  of  stipulated  ultimate  moral  principles,  three 
areas  are  proposed  in  which  it  is  claimed  the  use  of  coercion  by  the 
state  may  be  justified,  namely,  in  the  promotion  of  the  welfare  of 
others,  in  the  preservation  of  supposed  shared  values  of  society,  and 
for  the  good  of  the  individual  himself.  A  distinction  is  made  between 
the  interpretation  of  basic  moral  principles  in  the  domains  of  public 
and  private  morality,  but  it  is  submitted  that  where  the  two  clash 
the  latter  must  prevail  lest  the  use  of  coercion  be  abused,  to  the 
detriment  of  individual  freedom. 
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Coercion  is  regarded  as  a  particular  form  of  constraint  on  a 
person's  freedom.  It  is  also  regarded  as  providing  a  reason  for  or  a 
cause  of  action.  In  both  cases  an  element  of  compulsion  is  involved 
when  for  instance  one  person  is  compelled  by  another  to  do  or  not  to  do 
a  particular  thing.  Because  the  notion  of  coercion  is  closely  related 
to  the  notion  of  freedom  and  frequently  presented  as  its  antithesis, 
it  has  acquired  an  unpleasant  connotation  and  is  often  used  in  a 
pejorative  sense  as  representing  something  to  be  avoided  if  possible 
rather  than  encouraged.  This  seems  to  represent  the  sum  total  of 
agreement  regarding  the  notion  of  coercion.  Philosophers  differ  in 
their  views  regarding  its  nature  and  consequently  in  their  views  with 
regard  to  the  grounds  upon  which  it  may  be  justified. 
This  disagreement,  it  is  suggested,  centres  around  two  principal 
issues,  (i)  the  nature  of  the  agents  of  coercion  or  who  may  coerce  and 
be  coerced,  and  (ii)  whether  the  notion  of  coercion  is  limited  to  cases 
of  coercion  by  threat  or  whether  coercion  by  force  in  a  more  compelling 
sense  may  be  included. 
In  the  first  case  some  including  R.  Nozick  take  the  view  that 
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coercion  involves  essentially  an  interpersonal  interaction  between  two 
individuals  where  P  (an  individual)  coerces  Q  (an  individual)  to  do  or 
not  to  do  a  particular  act  A.  This,  it  will  be  argued,  represents  too 
narrow  a  view  for  there  is  a  case  for  recognising,  as  capable  of  coercing 
and  being  coerced,  agents  which  may  be  seen  to  represent  the  collective 
or  agreed  will  of  a  group  of  individuals  together.  Such  agents  may 
be  of  two  kinds,  institutionalised  groups  of  individuals  of  an  informal 
and  formal  nature,  or,  institutionalised  man-made  rule-systems  which 
regulate  human  behaviour  like  the  law  of  the  land,  the  prevailing 
moral  code,  established  customs,  traditions,  ideologies  and  public 
opinion. 
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In  the  second  case  there  are  those  who  again  like  Nozick  seeking 
a  too  refined  notion  of  coercion  argue  that  the  central  core  concept  of 
coercion  rests  upon  the  notion  of  threat  leaving  the  coercee  with  a 
reluctant  choice  between  two  undesirable  alternatives.  This  too  it 
will  be  argued  represents  an  unduly  narrow  interpretation  centred  upon 
the  notion  of  choice  and  excludes  the  possibility  of  force  itself  being 
regarded  as  coercive,  as  when  the  coercee  is  left  with  no  choice  at  all 
when,  for  example,  P  detains  Q  forcibly  in  a  locked  room  and  prevents  Q 
against  his  will  from  enjoying  his  freedom. 
Since  Nozick's  study  of  coercion  represents  in  each  case  what  has 
been  referred  to  as  the  narrow  point  of  view  with  regard  to  the  two  main 
issues  of  disagreement  we  have  distinguished,  it  is  taken  as  a  starting 
point  for  discussion,  providing  a  platform  for  an  argument  in  favour  of 
a  wider  interpretation  of  the  notion  of  coercion.  Some  implications  of 
Nozick's  analysis  will  be  considered  and  three  kinds  of  coercion 
provisionally  distinguished,  namely,  coercion  by  threat,  coercion  by 
irresistible  threat,  and  coercion  by  force. 
In  Chapter  2  the  notion  of  coercion  will  be  compared  to  related 
concepts  in  the  context  of  getting  people  to  do  or  not  to  do  something 
or  other  in  order  to  clarify  what  are  taken  to  be  the  basic,  necessary 
conditions  for  all  three  foams  of  coercion  distinguished,  namely,  that 
the  coercer  should  intend  harn  to  the  coercee,  that  there  should  be  a 
clash  of  wills  between  the  coercer  and  coercee,  that  the  coercee  should 
be  aware  of  what  is  happening  to  him,  that  a  degree  of  compulsion 
amounting  to  force  should  be  executed  by  the  coercer  on  the  coercee, 
that  the  coercee  should  comply  to  the  coercer's  desires.  The  infliction 
of  harm,  it  is  argued,  in  itself  is  not  necessarily  coercive,  and  the 
notion  of  choice  only  serves  to  distinguish  coercion  of  a  particular 
kind.  Finally,  the  three  kinds  of  coercion  are  reduced  to  two,  coercion 
by  threat  and  coercion  by  force,  and  the  conditions  for  each  stipulated. 
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R.  Nozick  proposes'  certain  conditions  representing  what  he  calls  the 
central  core  of  the  concept  coercion  which  he  says  he  has  formulated  from 
a  consideration  of  what  H.  L.  A.  Hart  and  A.  ji.  Honore  have  to  say  on  the  notion 
of  getting  someone  to  do  something  in  their  book  on  'Causation  in  The  Law' 
and  from  Hart's  brief  discussion  of  coercion  in  the  'Concept  of  Law'.  These 
conditions  are  as  follows: 
Pa  person  coerces  Qa  person  into  not  doing  act  A  if  and  only  if 
(1)  P  threatens  to  do  something  if  Q  does  A  (and  P  knows  he  is  making 
this  threat) 
(2)  this  threat  renders  Q's  doing  of  A  substantially  less  eligible  as 
a  course  of  conäuct  than  not  doing  A 
(3)  P  makes  this  threat  in  order  to  get  Q  not  to  do  A  with  the  intention 
that  Q  realizes  he  is  being  threatened  by  P 
(4)  Q  does  not  do  A 
(5)  Pt  s  words  or  deeds  are  part  of  Qt  s  reasons  for  not  doing  A. 
But  Nozick  does  not  consider  these  conditions  to  be  sufficient  and 
2 
suggests  two  further  conditions  which  are  intended  to  sharpen  the  concept 
and  to  eliminate  misunderstandings  between  P  and  Q. 
(6)  That  Q  lciows  that  P  has  threatened  to  do  the  something  in  (1)  if 
he  Q  does  A. 
This  condition  is  considered  necessary  in  order  to  exclude  cases  where 
Q  may  take  a  threat  from  P  as  a  warning  as  regards  what  might  or  could  happen 
not  realising  that  P  can  and  does  intend  to  make  it  hap?  en  if  Q  does  not  do 
as  P  intends.  Such  would  be  the  case  says  Nozick  when  P  threatens  Q  saying 
that  if  Q  perfoms  a  certain  action  a  rock  will  fall  on  him  and  P  thinks  Q 
knows  of  his  (P's)  infamous  procedure  for  murdering  people  but  in  fact  Q 
just  thinks  P  is  referring  to  some  strange  natural  law  that  holds  independentl; 
of  human  action  namely  that  whenever  someone  pursues  this  particular  action 
he  gets  killed  by  a  rock.  A  simpler  example  perhaps  would  be  when  a  teacher 
P  threatens  a  pupil  Q  with  failure  should  he  continue  to  write  essays  in  a 
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particular  style  believing  that  Q  is  aware  of  his  (P's)  position  as  examiner 
and  of  his  habit  of  failing  students  for  this  fault  whereas  Q  is  unaware  of 
this  fact  and  simply  sees  P's  intended  threat  as  a  warning. 
(7)  Q  believes  and  P  believes  that  Q  believes  that  P's  threatened 
consequence  (and  not  some  circumstances  attendant  upon  the  making  of 
the  threat)  constitutes  Q's  reasons  for  not  doing  A  and  would  leave 
Q  worse  off  having  done  A  than  if  Q  didn't  do  A  and  P  didn't  bring 
about  the  conseauerce. 
This  condition  is  considered  necessary  in  order  to  exclude  cases  in 
which,  unknown  to  P,  Q  does  not  do  A  not  because  of  the  threat  itself  which 
Q  does  not  mind  but  because  of  additional  consequences  that  P's  threat  has 
revealed.  P  for  example  might  be  upset  if  Q  does  A  and  Q  might  not  wish  to 
hurt  P's  feelings  out  of  affection  for  him.  So,  for  example,  Q  the  pupil 
might  alter  his  style  of  essay  writing  not  because  he  minds  whether  he  Q 
passes  his  examinations  or  not,  it  being  unimportant  to  him,  but  simply  out 
of  affection  or  respect  for  his  teacher  P,  not  wishing  that  is  to  displease 
the  teacher  or  to  challenge  his  position.  Of  course  an  alternative  argument 
in  cases  of  this  kind  might  be  that  there  is  no  clash  of  wills  between  P  and 
Q  for  in  effect  Q  wants,  for  reasons  of  his  own  unknown  to  P.  to  co-operate 
with  and  help 
.P  and  therefore  r  cannot  be  said  to  be  coercing  Q  nor  does  Q 
feel  coerced  by  P. 
These  seven  conditions  says  Nozick  are  necessary  and  sufficient  and 
constitute  the  central  core  of  the  concept  coercion  which  in  effect  seems  to 
hinge  on  three  basic  assumptions  namely,  the  existence  of  an  interpersonal 
relationship  between  two  individuals  in  which  each  understands  the  outward 
apparent  intentions  of  the  other  as  affecting  himself,  the  notion  of  threat 
grounded  in  the  idea  of  the  coercee  having  a  choice,  success  in  so  far  as  the 
coercee  acts  as  desired.  But  Nozick  recognises  that  the  seven  conditions 
represent  a  narrow  and  refined  notion  of  coercion  and  suggests  two  ways  in 
which  the  concept  may  be  widened  to  include  what  he  calls  non-central  cases 
of  coercion  for  example  by  (i)  widening  the  notion  of  threat  and  by  (ii) 
including  cases  of  indirect  coercion  in  which  for  example  Q  the  coercee  is 6 
coerced  not  to  do  or  to  do  an  action  not  specified  by  P  the  coercer  in  order 
that  he  Q  will  not  do  or  do  some  other  action  that  is  specified  by  P. 
Although  it  is  the  intention  to  argue  that  these  extensions  are  inadequate 
because  they  do  not  widen  the  concept  of  coercion  sufficiently  it  is  proposed 
first  to  consider  the  notion  of  threat  which  is  central  to  Nozick's  idea  of 
coercion  together  with  the  two  extensions  he  suggests  before  considering  more 
fully  the  possibility  of  widening  the  concept  to  include  (i)  agents  other 
than  individuals  and  (ii)  the  idea  of  coercion  by  force  of  a  more  direct  kind 
than  that  implied  by  a  threat  on  the  grounds  that  force  itself  may  impose 
upon  another's  will  just  as  a  threat  might  and  so  be  a  means  of  coercing  him. 
A  threat  presupposes  that  the  coercer  P  has  the  power  to  harm  Q  the 
coercee  in  some  way  so  that  Q's  position  would  be  worse  should  P  carry  out  his 
threat  and  that  Q  acts  or  does  not  act  in  order  to  avoid  this  happening  that 
is  to  preserve  his  original  position  which  is  more  favourable  to  him.  Adults 
in  charge  of  young  people  constantly  resort  to  such  devices.  Parents  and 
teachers  threaten  their  charges  in  a  variety  of  ways,  with  the  withdrawal  of 
anticipated  privileges,  the  osition  of  some  unpleasant  event,  the 
deprivation  of  normally  expected  rewards  enjoyments  and  rights.  A  parent 
might  threaten  to  decrease  his  child's  pocket  money  End  a  teacher  to  withdraw 
his  goodwill  and  support  which  a  pupil  may  be  depending  upon  in  his  search 
for  employment. 
It  is  coinnon  practice  for  those  in  authority  to  back  up  their  requests 
and  orders  with  threats.  But  orders  and  commands  are  not  to  be  confused  with 
threats  in  so  far  as  they  presume  that  the  person  co  nding  has  some  right 
to  be  obeyed  by  virtue  of  his  position  of  authority  as  for  instance'does  the 
schoolmaster,  amofficer  in  the  services  or  a  parent.  It  is  only  when  the 
recipient  resents  and  objects  to  doing  as  he  is  commanded,  that  is  when  he  no 
longer  recognises  the  legiti-.  mcy  of  the  commander's  authority  and  only  obeys 
out  of  fear,  that  he  is  coerced. 
Similarly,  posing  a  threat  must  be  distinguished  fron  coercion  in  so  far 7 
as  it  may  only  amount  to  a  case  of  intimidation  or  an  atteit  to  frighten 
whereas  coercion  implies  that  the  threat  is  acted  upon  and  is  intended.  An 
incompetent  surgeon  for  ex.,  mple  may  pose  a  threat  to  his  patients  but  it  is 
not  likely  that  he  could  be  conceived  through  his  incompetence  as  intending  to 
threaten  them.  Threats  are  conditional  that  is  to  say  they  are  not  executed 
so  long  as  the  coercee  confozmi  to  the  coercer's  recraest. 
To  be  effective  a  threat  must  be  communicated  and  this`  may  be  achieved 
in  a  niber  of  ways,  by  acts  and  gestures  as  well  as  the  spoken  word.  In  the 
latter  case  a  variety  of  expressions  not  literally  threatening  may  become  so 
depending  upon  the  tone  of  voice  or  manner  in  which  they  are  spoken  and  the 
implication  conveyed.  A  threat  may  take  the  form  of  a  suggestion,  'If  you  want 
to  be  successful,  do  as  I  say',  or  a  plea,  'Do  as  I  say  please  (or  else)';  or 
a  question,  'Till  you  do  as  I  say  or  shall  I  decide  for  you?  '  Sometimes  a 
threat  is  concealed  in.  the  form  of  information  as  when  a  wear,,  mother  or  tutor 
tells  her  charge  she  is  not  feeling  very  well  and  is  not  in  the  mood  to  suffer 
tantrums  so  implying  her  intention  to  punish  any  misbehaviour  that  might 
infringe  her  tranquility. 
Similarly,  so  long  as  the  threat  is  cc=mnicated  it  may  be  embodied  in 
an  act  or  gesture.  A  teacher  for  example  night  place  the  instrument  of  correct 
belt  or  cane.,  ostentatiously  in  a  prominent  position  on  her  desk  or  again  the 
local  bully  noted  for  his  aggression  might  assert  his  point  of  view  by  the 
simple  gesture  of  pretending  to  remove  his  coat  when  he  appears  to  be  getting 
the  worse  of  the  arg  ment.  An  act  or  gesture  intimating  a  threat  of  intended 
harm  will  suffice  in  such  cases  in  place  of  words.  This  is  particularly  so 
in  cases  where  violence  is  threatened.  Imagine  for  example  that  members  of 
a  street  gang  capture  a  member  of  a  rival  gang  and  ask  him  where  his  gangs' 
weapons  are  hidden.  He  refuses  to  tell  and  they  beat  him.  They  ask  again,  he 
refuses,  and  again  they  beat  him.  Eventually  he  tells  and,  says  Nozick,  is 
coerced  even  though  his  captors  did  not  say  'If  you  don't  tell  us  we  will 
continue  to  beat  you  up  or  perhaps  eventually  do  something  worse'.  In  this 
case  the  infliction  of  violence  was  well'  understood  by  all  parties  to  imply 
the  thre?  t  of  further  violence  if  there  was  no  compliance  with  the  coercers' 
wishes. 8 
The  notion  of  threat  in  Nozick's  analysis  presupposes  the  involvement  of  a 
compelling  agent  of  a  par,  icular  kind,  of  a  coercer  P  who  is  an  individual  with 
the  rational  capacity  to  think,  judge  and  intend.  Naturally  this  rules  out 
the  possibility  of  agents  without  these  abilities  such  as  human  beings  who  for 
one  reason  or  another  are  deemed  incapable  of  making  rational  and  responsible 
decisions  and  animals  such  as  the  mouse  which  may  compel  a  woman  in  fear  to 
leap  on  a  chair  but  does  not  coerce  her.  It  also  excludes  compelling  agents 
of  a  circumstantial  and  inanimate  kind  such  as  accidents  and  events,  acts  of  God., 
changes  in  the  weather  and  so  on.  In  all  these  cases  a  person  may  be  compelled 
through  fear  to  do  what  he  does  not  want  to  do  but  the  compulsion  is  causally 
induced  without  the  aid  of  human  intention.  Nozick  offers  an  appropriate 
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example:  Q  walks  into  a  room  and  uniazown  to  him  there  is  a  tape-recorder  in 
the  next  room  playing  part  of  the  soundtrack  of  a  movie.  Q  hears  'Put  all 
your  money  on  the  table  and  then  leave  or  I'll  kill  you'.  Q  puts  his  money  on 
the  table  and  leaves.  Q  is  not  coerced  for  as  Nozick  observes  there  is  no 
plausible  person  to  consider  as  a  coercing  agent. 
If  there  is  no  intention  therefore  there  is  no  threat  and  coercion  is  not 
present.  And  this  rule  presumably  would  apply  in  cases  where  a  rational  hinan 
being  did  not  intend  the  consequences  of  his  act  or  words  or  where  the 
consequences  were  so  remote  as  to  bear  no  rational  or  logical  relationship  to 
his  act  or  words.  Two  examples  may  illustrate  these  points  respectively: 
(i).  A  gatekeeter  at  a  factory  who  allows  his  guard  dog  to  exercise  in 
part  of  the  factory  grounds  because  there  is  no  available  space  elsewhere 
cannot  be  said  to  coerce  employees  who  are  deterred  from  making  a  short  cut 
to  and  from  their  work  because  of  the  dog  for  there  is  no  intent  to  cause  haha 
on  the  gatekeeper's  part.  If  however  he  was  just  a  disagreeable  old  man  who 
simply  let  loose  his  dog  to  deliberately  annoy  and  to  inconvenience  the  workers 
and  to  deter  them  from  using  his  particular  gate  he  could  be  said  to  have 
coerced  them  for  this  was  his  specific  intent. 
(ii)  A  schoolmaster  threatens  a  boy  with  disciplinary  action  if  he  persisis 
in  calking  across  a  particular  lawn  in  order  to  take  a  short  cut  between  lessons. 
The  boy  annoyed  by  the  stupidity  of  the  rule  and  in  anger  throws  a  brick 9 
through  the  headmaster's  window.  It  cannot  be  said  in  this  case  that  the 
schoolmaster  coerced  the  boy  to  break  the  window  for  the  boy'  s  act  is  only 
remotely  related  to  the  schoolmaster's  threat  and  cannot  be  taken  to  have 
been  a  reasonable  consequence  of  it. 
Tyro  further  qualifications  rest  be  made  in  relation  to  the  intention  of 
the  coercer.  Firstly,  it  need  not  be  necessary  that  P  the  coercer  should 
intend  to  carry  out  his  threat.  He  may  for  example  be  just  bluffing.  But  it 
is  necessary  that  P  convinces  Q  the  coercee  that  he  P  does  intend  to  carry 
out  his  threat  and  that  P  believes  that  Q  believes  that  he  P  will  so  execute 
his  threat.  If  Q  falls  for  the  bluff  then  P's  intent  to  influence  Q's  action 
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has  succeeded  and  Q  is  coerced.  This  is  what  is  likely  to  happen  in  cases 
of  blackmail  when  for  instance  P  threatens  to  reveal  details  of  Q's  shady 
past  and  Q  is  influenced  by  the  `threat  thought  unknown  to  Q,  P  has  no  intention 
of  revealing  the  information.  '  Bluffing  is  a  fact  of  life  and  in  one  of  its 
more  acceptable  forms  is  an  acknowledged  means  by  which  those  in  charge  of 
young  people  seek  to  direct  the  latters  energies  in  a  paternalistic  way 
towards  desirable  courses  of  action  and  to  discourage  their  interests  in  other 
less  desirable  pursuits.  Secondly,  P  the  coercer  need  not  intend  that  Q 
should  do  the  act  demanded  but  it  is  sufficient  if  Q  believes  it  is  P's 
intention  and  P  knows  that  Q  believes  this.  In  certain  institutions  for 
example  in  schools  there  will  be  found  disciplinarians  who  enjoy  punishing 
people  but  who  feel  constrained  to  find  excuses  for  their  punishments.  Such 
a  person  might  threaten  a  pupil  to  do  something  which  he  believes  the  pupil 
cannot  do  as  a  means  of  finding  an  excuse  to  punish  him.  That  is  to  say  the 
disciplinarian  does  not  intend  the  pupil  to  obey  but  if  the  pupil  does  then 
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he  is  coerced.  Both  these  situations  are  covered  by  condition  (7)  of 
Nozick's  analysis. 
Threats  lust  be  distinguished  from  warnings.  A  threat  must  entail  what 
P  the  coercer  himself  is  able  to  do  and  if  necessary  will  do  or  cause  to 
happen;  otherwisepit  constitutes  a  warning,  that  is  a  statement  or  report 
of  a  matter  of  fact  of  what  is  most  likely  to  happen  in  the  normal  course  of 
events,  or  an  intimation  of  what  some  other  person's  reaction  might  be  if  Q 10 
does  not  do  as  required.  If  a  lecturer  for  exople  should  say  to  a  college 
student  'Do  your  harnesrork  or  I'll  report  you  to  the  Principal',  this  could  be 
interpreted  as  a  warning  for  two  reasons,  firstly  because  it  could  just  be  a  .. 
matter  of  fact  statement  of  the  normal  routine  of  the  college  and  secondly 
because  the  lecturer  might  have  no  control  over  nor  any  idea  of  the  action 
the  Principal  would  be  likely  to  take. 
In  cases  then  where  P  refers  truthfully  to  a  state  of  affairs  which  is 
not  likely  to  arise  or  result  simply  from  an  action  of  P  himself  we  do  not 
say  that  P  coerces  Q  into  anything.  So  if  the  lecturer  indicated  to  the 
student  that  if  he  the  student  did  not  follow  a  particular  course  he  would  be 
excluded  from  the  college  examinations  and  this  in  fact  was  the  rule  and  was 
true  then  the  student  would  not  have  been  coerced  but  warned..  If  however  the 
information  given  was  not  true  and  the  lecturer  knew  this  to  be  the  case  then 
the  student  would  have  been  coerced. 
Similarly,  statements  of  a  factual  kind  explaining  P's  future  actions 
T-- 
should  Q  do  or  not  do  a  particular  act  A  may  be  construed  as  warnings  rather 
than  threats  if  they  represent  matter  of  fact  predictions  of  inevitable 
consequences.  Nozick  calls  such  statements  non  threatening  warnings  or 
warnings  for  short  and  instances  the  case  of  the  employer  who  faced  with  the 
possibility  of  his  employees  voting  for  the  establishment  of  a  labour  union, 
which  he-does  not  want,  simply  declares  his  intention  to  close  the  factorf 
and  go  out  of  business  rather  than  face  the  anticipated.  aggravation  that  the 
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existence  of  a  union  would  entail.  The  employer  intends  no  halm  to  his 
employees  in  this  case,  he  is  simply  protecting  his  own  interests  and 
explaining  the  consequences.  So  when  a  lecturer  or  teacher  says  to  his  class 
'If  you  do  not  behave,  I  shall  have  to  stop  teaching'  we  may  have  not  a  threat 
but  a  warning  aamttedly  acting  as  a  deterrent  but  stated  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
as  a  prediction  of  an  inevitable  outcome. 
Coercion  by  threat  involves  a  sort  of  negative  incentive  in  the  form  of 
a  threatened  harm  to  the  coercee.  It  represents  something  unpleasant, 
disliked  and  unwanted  by  the  coercee  presenting  him  with  a  choice  of  evils 
namely  to  do  reluctantly  what  the  coercer  wants  or  not  to  do  it  and  to  suffer 11 
the  consecuences.  But  since  people  differ  the  harm  involved  in  a  threat 
may  be  infinitely  various;  for  what  might  constitute  a  threat  for  one  person 
might  not  do  so  for  another  for  many  variables  are  involved  such  as  to  oerament 
maturity,  personality,  emotional  stability,  tolerance  rate  and  so  on.  Even 
the  threat  of  physical  torture  might  not  influence  certain  religious  and 
ideological  fanatics.  All  one  can  say  is  that  anything  which  adversely 
jeopardises  the  coercee's  wishes,  interests,  plans  or  rights  may  be  seen  as 
harmful  so  that  harry  becomes  conceptualised  in  terns  of  the  coerceets 
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frustrated  desires. 
It  follows  that  it  is  not  necessary  for  P  to  threatenwith  ham  in  the 
sense  of  it  ury  rather  it  is  suf.  °icient,  as  TNozick  suggests,  that  Q  must  believe 
and  P  must  believe  that  Q  believes  that  P's  threatened  consequences  would 
leave  Q  worse  off  if  Q  does  not  corrmly  with  P's  wishes.  The  view  that  P  mist 
threaten  Q  with  harn  is  only  understandable  if  harn  is  interpreted  in  terms 
of  Q's  desires  being  frustrated,,  for  Q  may  in  fact  be  coerced  (i)  into  doing 
something  that  is  eventually  not  haim±'ul  to  him  but  for  his  own  good  and  (ii) 
to  do  something  he  always  intended  to  do  anyway.  In  the  case  of  (i)  if  P 
knew  there  was  something  that  Q  would  prefer  not  to  happen  P  can  threaten  Q 
with  bringing  it  about  and  thereby  coerce  Q  even  though  what  Q  fears  is 
actually  for  his  own  good.  ,  Then  a  parent  or  teacher  for  example  says  to  a 
child  'Learn  your  verbs  or  I  will  make  you  write  them  out'  the  effect  of  the 
threat,  whether  carried  out  or  not,  is  to  the  child's  advantage.  It  is  on  these 
grounds  that  parents  and  teachers  justify  paternalistic  attitudes  towards 
the  young.  In  the  case  of  (ii)  if  P  say  uses  a  combination  of  threats  and 
persuasion  but  increases  his  threats  unaware  that  Q  would  have  been  persuaded 
anyrray  then  Q  is  coerced  by  these  additional  threats  into  doing  something 
he  intended  to  do.  This  would  be  the  case  for  example  if  Q  was  made  to  do 
something  sooner  than  he  would  have  preferred. 
It  is  obviously  impossible  to  for=late  an  objective  standard  regarding 
the  strength  and  power  of  a  threat  that  is  required  to  establish  a  case  of 
coercion  because  it  would  ultimately  depend  upon  the  u=npredictable  responses 
of  indivictials  in  every  case.  But  the  degree  to  which  coercion  is  exercised 12 
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may  be  said  to  depend  upon  tvo  main  factors,  namely  (i)  the  extent  to  which 
Q  the  coercee  is  motivated  by  a  desire  to  avoid  the  consequences  P  threatens 
(and  the  greater  Q's  desire  is  in  this  case  the  greater  is  the  degree  to 
Which  he  is  coerced),  and  (ii)  the  extent  to  which  Q  has  the  ability  to  avoid 
the  coercion  either  by  refusing  to  do  the  act  that  P  demands  and  suffering 
the  sanctions,  or  by  escaping  fron  the  coercive  situation  altogether  (and  the 
greater  are  Q's  abilities  in  these  two  respects  the  less  he  is  coerced). 
Also  central  to  tiozick's  idea  of  coercion  is  the  notion  of  choice. 
The  notion  of  coercion  by  threat  must  presuppose  a  choice;  otherwise,  if  there 
is  no  threat  but  just  brute  force  the  victim  has  no  choice  but  is  just 
forced  or  compelled.  In  the  case  of  coercion  by  threat  the  coercee  has  a 
choice  either  to  do  as  the  coercer  wishes,  though  he  may  not  wish  to  do  so, 
or  to  take  the  consequences  of  the  threat  being  carried  out,  which  presumably 
he  also  does  not  want.  Nozick  makes  no  distinction,  however,  between  threats 
of  a  minor  kind,  leaving  the  coercee  with  an  effective  and  not  impossible 
choice,  and  overwhelming  or  irresistible  threats  such  as  threatened  violence 
to  one's  person  or  family  which  it  is  suggested  appear  to  be  more  compelling 
and  to  eliminate  effective  choice  altogether.  When  a  man  points  a  gun  with 
a  clear  intent  to  shoot  if  necessary 
., 
there  does  not  seem  to  be  such  choice 
left  and  only  a  fool  would  resist.  One  is  to  all  extent  and  purposes 
compelled  against  one's  will  but  Nozick  would  say  you  are  threatened. 
Coercion  by  direct  force,  as  when  a  man  makes  you  by  means  of  physical  force 
do  what  he  wants  you  to  do  against  your  will,  Nozick  does  not  discuss.  In 
this  respect  Nozick's  analysis  of  the  concept  of  coercion  differs  from 
that  of  others  who  would  distinguish  between  at  least  two  kinds  of  coercion, 
namely  coercion  by  force  and  coercion  by  threat.  Joel  Feinberg  explains 
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it  in  this  way: 
"Coercion  takes  two  main  forms:  direct  forcing  or  preventing,  such  as 
by  prodding  with  bayonets  or  imprisoning,  and  a  threat  of  harm  clearly 
backed  up  by  enforcement  power.  In  cases  of  coercion  via  threat,  there  is  a 
sense  in  which  the  victim  is  left  with  a  choice.  He  can  comply  or  he  can 
suffer  the  (probable)  consequences.  But  if  the  alternative  to  compliance 13 
is  some  unthinkable  disaster  -  such  as  the  death  of  a  child  -  then  there  is 
really  no  choice  but  to  comply.  In  intermediate  cases,  between  the  extremes 
of  overrhelming  coercive  threats  and  mere  attractive  offers,  the  threat,  in 
effect,  puts  a  price  tag  on  non-compliance  and  leaves  it  up  to  the  threatened 
person  to  decide  whether  the  price  is  worth  paying.  The  higher  the  price 
of  non-compliance,  the  less  eligible  it  will  seem  for  his  choice.  For  this 
intermediate  range,  threats  are  like  burdens  on  a  man's  back  rather  than 
shackles,  or  bonds,  or  bayonets.  They  make  one  of  his  alternatives  more 
but  not  i=ossible.  "  difficult 
Finally  for  coercion  by  threat  to  be  effective  in  Nozick's  sense  the 
threat  reust  be  successful.  Only  if  the  threat  is  effective  is  the  victim 
coerced.  Nozick  regards  the  verb'coerce'  as  a  success  or  achievement  verb 
like  'win',  'arrive',  'roersuade',  'convince'  and  not  like  verbs  such  as  'run', 
'fish',  ':  Tim'  which  denote  an  activity  or  task  without  the  necessity  of 
achieving  any  goal.  One  may  fish  without  catching  a  fish  but  one  cannot 
successfully  convince,  persuade,  win,  coerce,  without  achieving  something. 
For  a  threat  to  be  successful  then  the  coercee  must  do  as  the  coercer  desires. 
But  a  threat  with  intent  to  coerce  may  of  course  be  frustrated  in  a 
variety  of  ways: 
(i)  if  the  supposed  coercee  just  happens  to  want  to  do  what  his  coercer 
desires  hin  to  do  anyway; 
(ii)  if  the  supposed  coercee  is  able  to  avoid  the  threat  in  some  way 
like  the  child  who,  threatened  by  his  father  unless  he  does  a 
particular  task,  gets  his  younger  brother  to  do  it  for  him; 
(iii)  if  the  supposed  coercee  simply  chooses  to  take  the  consequences  of 
the  threat  and  not  to  do  as  his  coercer  wishes; 
(iv)  if  the  supposed  coercee  simply  complies  with  his  coercer's  wishes 
because  he  is  syaroathetic  towards  hire.  This  case  is  similar  to  (i) 
in  so  far  as  the  intended  coercee  wants  the  same  thing  as  his  would 
be  coercer. 14 
The  conditions  then.  for  a  successful  threat  may  be  si  rmarised  as 
follows: 
P  the  coercer  successfully  threatens  Q  the  coercee  if  and  only  if 
(1)  P  intentionally  makes  Q  aware  that  he  P  will  bring  about  a  certain 
state  of  affairs  X  (or  allow  X  to  hat  en)  unless  Q  does  (or  does 
not  do)  score  action  A 
(2)  Q  does  not  want  P  to  bring  about  X  (or  to  allow  X  to  happen)  nor 
does':  Q  want  to  do  A 
(3)  q  believes  he  cannot  avoid  P's  bringing  about  X  (or  his  allowing 
it  to  happen)  nor  can  he  Q  avoid  doing  A. 
So  far  discassion  has  been  confined  to  an  analysis  of  the  notion  of 
coercion  by  threat  according  to  Nozick's  seven  conditions  which  he 
considers  are  necessary  and  sufficient  to  establish  what  he  refers  to  as 
the  central  core  of  the  concept  of  coercion.  But  Nozick  is  aware  of  the 
narrowness  of  the  refined  cone-pt  of  coercion  which  he  has  presented  and 
suggests  that  the  notion  of  coercion  might  be  extended  by  including  within 
it  what  he  refers  to  as  non-central  cases  which  he  regards  as  being  related 
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to  the  central  core  concept  itself.  This  he  suggests  might  be  achieved 
in  two  ways:  (i)  by  vrideninc-  the  notion  of  a  threat  to  include  for  example 
certain  kinds  of  offers,  and  (ii)  by  including  cases  of  indirect  coercion 
for  ex  mole  where  the  coercee  is  coerced  to  do  a  certain  act  which  entails 
his  having  to  do  some  other  act,  in  which  case  he  =-y  be  said  to  have  been 
coerced  into  doing  the  latter. 
In  the  first  case  Nozick  raises  the  question  of  distinga'_shing  bet',  7een 
threats  and  offers  and  the  possibility  of  certain  kinds  of  offers  being 
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construed  as  coercive,  that  is  as  threats.  Although  it  has  been  argued 
12 
elsewhere  that  all  threats  may  be  construed  as  offers  and  vice  versa, 
it  does  not  seem  to  be  a  very  profitable  argument  to  hold  that  when  Pmakes 
a  voluntary  offer  to  Q  to  q's  benefit  in  return  for  a  sa11  favour  that  P 
threatens  Q  7±t_i  not  affording  Q  the  benefit  unless  Q  per:  ores  the  favour 15 
requested  by  P.  If  this  gras  taker.  to  be  the  case  then  clearly  any  offer 
would  be  a  threat  and  offers  and  threats  would  äe  quits  indistinguishable, 
and  everybody  offering  goods  and  services  for  sale  for  ex.  u-male  could  be 
deemed  to  be  coercing  their  customers  and  clients  respectively. 
Nozick  suggests  therefore  that  an  offer  only  involves  a  threat  when 
the  package  offered  by  P  falls  short  of  what  Q  might  expect  according  to  the 
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prevailing  moral  code  and  in  the  normal  course  of  events.  Parents  for 
example  are  expected  both  morally  (they  have  a  duty)  and  customarily  (in  the 
normal  course  of  events)  to  feed  their  children.  If  then  a  parent  should 
say  to  his  child,  'Clean  your  room  and  I  will  give  you  your  supper',  he  may 
appear  to  be  issuing  a  threat  because  the  offer  falls  short  of  what  the  child 
might  expect  according  to  the  prevailing  moral  code  and  in  the  nomal  course 
of  events.  If  instead  the  parent  should  say,  'I'll  doable  your  pocket-money 
if  you  clean  your  room',  then  he  makes  an  offer  because  he  is  offering  more 
than  is  expected  of  him.  To  put  it  another  way,  the  child's  position  is 
worsened  in  the  first  case  and  he  is  threatened  but  is  improved  in  the 
second  case  in  which  an  offer  is  made  to  him  which  is  to  his  benefit. 
Complications  arise  if  the  t-7o  kinds  of  expected  outcomes,  the  morally 
e:  mected  and  the  customarily  expected,  diverge.  In  which  case  argues  Nozicic 
the  one  of  these  two  expected  outcomes  which  is  to  be  used  to  decide  whether 
a  conditional  announcement  of  an  action  constitutes  a  threat  or  offer  is  the 
course  of  events  (i.  e.  either  moral  or  normal)  that  the  recipient  of  the 
Action  prefers.  Nozick  instances  two  cases  to  illustrate  this  point. 
The  first  case  is  that  of  the  slave-owner  who  for  no  reason  habitually 
beats  his  slave  daily  but  who  proposes  to  his  slave  one  day  that  he  will 
cease  to  beat  him  if  he  in  return  performs  a  certain  act.  The  slave  no 
doubt  in  this  case  would  prefer  the  morally  expected  solution  (no  punishment, 
no  act)  to  the  normal  course  of  events  (punis-went  and  no  act)  or  the  slave- 
owner's  offer  (no  punishment  with  requested  act).  Since  then  the  slave-armer' 
offer  leaves  the  slave  in  a  worse  position  than  he  rrould  be  in  were  the 
morally  expected  situation  to  prevail  his  offer  must  be  regarded  as  a  threat. 
The  second  case  is  that  of  the  d  -a;  -supplier  who  tells  his  client  (a  drug  addic. 16 
that  he  ;  gill  only  continue  to  supply  him  with  drags  if  in  return  as  a  favour 
he  agrees  to  bent  un  a  certain  person  for  him.  In  this  case,  presumably,  it 
is  the  normal  course  of  events  :  rhich  the  client  prefers  (i.  e.  the  supply  of 
drugs  ithcut  the  requested  favour;  rather  than  the  morally  erected  course 
of  events  (no  drags  and  no  favour)  or  the  supplier's  offer  (drags  in  return 
for  the  favour).  Since  the  client's  position  like  that  of-the  slave  is 
worsened,  as  a  result  in  this  case  of  the  supplier's  offer,  he  like  the  slave 
must  be  deemed  to  have  been  threatened. 
Naturally  in  cases  like  these  difficulties  may  arise  in  respect  of 
disagreements  about  what  night  in  fact  constitute  the  normal  moral  expectation 
and/or  the  normal  course  of  events.  As  a  general  rule  Nozick  suggests  that 
arovided  the  offeree  is  put  in  a  worse  position  by  the  offeror's  offer  than 
he  might  e:  c;  ect  to  be  in  if  the  offeror  just  did  his  duty  by  hin  in  the  normal 
way  then  the  offeror  may  be  regarded  as  pressuz-izing  him  to  the  extent  of 
threatening  and  coercing  hin.  It  is,  for  e  rinrole,  pro'olematical  whether  in 
all  cases  a  man  has  a  duty  to  risk  his  own  life  to  save  another  ,  say  to  take 
a  boat  out  or  to  dive  in  to  rescue  a  droning  man,  but  a  life-saver  ;  rho 
upon  reaching  his  droning  svi±a  zer  recognises  him  and,  knowing  him  to  be  an 
honest  man  and  wishing  to  take  advantage  of  hin,  says  11111  save  you  if  you 
will  let  me  marry  your  daughter',  seems  to  be  issuing  a  threat  rather  than 
making  an  offer  for  it  is  his  duty  by  virtue  of  his  office  to  effect  the 
rescue  in  any  case. 
One  final  example  will  serve  to  support  Nozick'  s  argent  that  a  broader 
interpretation  of  the  nature  of  a  threat  should  be  aa^aitted  to  include 
particular  kinds  of  offers,  namely,  cases  in  which  P  pressurizes  Q  into  a 
particularly  hard  bargain.  This  could  arise,  for  example,  when  both  P  and  Q 
know  that  P  could  offer  X  to  Q  on  easier  terms  (say  without  Q  having  to 
surrender  Y)  but  Y  knows  Q  really  wants  X  though  he  Q  is  reluctant  to  give 
uo  Y  in  return  and  would  not  in  normal  circumstances  be  expected  to  have  to 
do  so.  If  Q  accepts  P's  terms  then  he  would  seem  to  have  been  coerced  into 
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giving  up  Y. 17 
The  second  way,  other  than  by  widening  the  notion  of  threat,  in  which, 
says  Nozick,  the  central  core  concept  of  coercion  may  be  extended  is  to 
include  within  it  cases  of  indirect  coercion  which  he  says  may  take  two  forms. 
Firstly,  indirect  coercion  may  arise  when  the  coercee  is  coerced  to  do  an  act 
not  specified  by  the  coercer  in  order  to  accomplish  some  other  act  that  is 
specified  by  the  coercer.  This  would  be  the  case  when  say  P  coerced  Q  to 
retrieve  a  ball  which  had  fallen  in  a  forbidden  area,  in  which  case  Q  would 
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be  deemed  to  have  been  coerced  into  entering  the  forbidden  area  for  he  would 
have  had  no  option  but  to  do  so  in  order  to  retrieve  the  ball  and  comply  with 
P's  wishes.  Secondly,  indirect  coercion  may  arise  when  P  coerces  Q  to  do 
one  of  a  set  of  actions  say  AI  A2  A3  ---  Ah  without  specifying  one  action 
in  particular.  In  this  case  should  Q  do  one  of  them  he  may  be  said  to  have 
been  coerced  indirectly  provided  there  remained  no  act  in  the  set  less 
harmful  than  the  one  he  chose  to  do.  If,  for  exammle,  P  coerces  Q  to  obtain 
a  particular  article  from  Z,  leaving  Q  to  find  the  means,  Q  would  be  deemed 
to  have  been  coerced  into  purchasing  the  article  from  Z  (if  Q  so  chose  to  do 
so)  but  not  into  beating  Z  up  in  order  to  obtain  it,  because  in  this  latter 
case  a  less  harmful  way  of  ca=  plying  with  P's  threat  would  have  been  open 
to  him. 
Despite  these  extensions  to  the  central  core  concept  it  is  proposed  to 
argue  thet  Nozick's  analysis  is  still  deficient  in  so  far  as  it  limits  (i)  the 
agents  of  coercion  to  individual  persons,  and  (ii)  the  idea  of  coercion  to 
the  notions  of  threat  and  choice  excluding  the  possibility  of  force  itself 
being  considered  coercive.  In  this  latter  case  some  confusion  ensues  for 
Nozick  includes  in  his  idea  of  coercion  by  threat  cases  of  threats  of  an 
irresistible  hind  which  seem  to  preclude  any  idea  of  choice  and  to  amount 
virtually  to  force  alone.  Then,  for  example,  a  gang  of  youths  threaten  a 
member  of  another  gang  with  bodily  harm  amounting  to  violence  unless  he  tells 
them  what  they  rant  to  Y.  nor;,  it  does  not  -  seem  that  the  victim  is  left  with 
any  choice  at  all. 18 
b'ut,  bef  ore  these  arguments  are  developed,  it  is  fitting  first  that  the 
main  points  of  agreement  with  i  ozick'  a  analysis  be  emphasised.  They  may  be 
summarized  as  follows:  that  the  agents  of  coercion  should  represent  a  rational 
capacity  to  understand  and  to  intend;  that  the  coercer'a  desires  must  be 
met  at  the  coercee's  expense  or,  in  other  words,  -  the  coercer  Wust  succeed; 
that  the  coercer  grast  believe  that  the  coercee  believes  that  the  coercer  will 
do  as  he  threatens  even  if  he,  the  coerce;  secretly  does  not  intend  to  do  so 
and  is  really  bluffing.  In  other  words,  it  is  proposed  to  argue,  as  Nozick 
seems  to  imply,  that  the  coercer  and  coercee  must  both  be  aware  of  the  other's 
apparent  intentions  and  desires.  This,  it  is  suggested,  is  essential  if  a 
situation  of  a  clash  of  wills  is  to  be  established  betv7een  the  coercer  and 
coercee  and  this,  a  clash  of  wills,  it  is  proposed,  is  a  necessary  condition 
for  all  cases  of  coercion. 
It  is  important  to  establish  these  points  of  agreement  with  Nozick's 
analysis  in  order  to  reply  to  to  one  objection  which  some  might  wish  to 
make  against  it,  nanely,  that  it  does  not  allow  for  cases  in  which  (i)  P  might 
coerce  Q  without  P  being  aware  of  it,  and  (ii)  in  which  Q  might  be  coerced 
by  P  without  Q  being  aware  of  it.  To  examples  might  serve  to  illustrate 
these  po^lnts: 
(i)  P,  some  might  wish  to  argue,  may  coerce  Q  though  P  may  not  be  aware 
of  doing  so.  A.  teacher  for  exile  in  order  to  get  his  students  to  work 
harder  might  make  his  subject  appear  more  difficult  than  it  is  and  consequently 
Q  one  of  his  class  might  decide  to  drop  it.  Q  might  feel  he  was  made  to  , 
had  to,  or  otherwise  face  an  impossible  task,  even  failure,  whereas  P  was 
totally  unaware  of  the  counter  productive  effect  of  his  actions. 
In  response  to  this  objection  it  may  be  argued  that  P  and  Q  were  not 
aware  of  each  others'  apparent  intentions.  P  had  no  intent  to  coerce  Q  into 
dropping  his  subject,  on  the  contrary  his  intent  was  probably  to  encourage. 
There  is  no  clash  of  will  between  P  and  Q  in  this  case  but  siarply  a 
misunderstanding. 
s=e  may  wish  to  argue,  may  be  coerced  by  a  warning  without 
}mowing  it  though  if  he  h.  -id  lrnorm  the  full  circwnstances  of  the  case  he 19 
would.  have  been  threatened.  This  might  occur  for  em-mole  -aren  a  teacher  P 
intending  not  to  allow  qa  student  to  sit  a  particular  examination  discourages 
him  telling  him  that  he  might  fail  whereas  P  in  fact  as  the  examiner,  though 
a  does  not  know  this,  intends  to  fail  Q  anyway.  If  q  is  warned  off,  is  he 
coerced  ? 
This  too  it  is  submitted,  is  not  a  case  of  coercion  though  it  would  have 
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been  if  Q  had  been  aware  of  P's  power  to  fail  him.  In  both  these  cases  (i)  and 
(ii)  it  would  seem  that  Nozick's  view  prevails,  that  coercer  and  coercee  must 
be  aware  of  and.  believe  in  the  apparent  intentions  of  the.  other  for  a  case 
of  coercion  to  be  established. 
The  first  major  objection  which  it  is  suggested  may  be  sustained  against 
Nozick's  analysis  is  that  his  conception  of  the  nature  of  the  agents  of 
coercion  is  unrealistically  narrow.  He  seems  to  restrict  his  analysis  to  that 
of  an  interpersonal  reactive  relationship  between  two  rational  individuals 
ignoring  the  possibility  of  informal  groups  of  individuals  being  capable  of 
of  coercing  other  similar  groups  of  individuals  or  individuals  on  their  own 
singularly  or  vice  versa  in  each  case.  This  would  seem  to  be  a  point  of  minor 
imortance  for  there  would  seem  to  be  no  obvious  difficulty  in  recognising 
the  power  of  such  gros  of  individuals,  sharing  a  common  intent,  to  coerce 
and  to  be  coerced  in  return.  Considerable  sociological  interest  has  been 
shovm  for  example  in  the  social  interaction  of  informal  groups  in  society 
and  particularly  within  institutions  in  society  such  as  prisons,  hospitals, 
factories,  offices  and  places  of  work,  churches  and  religious  organisations, 
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and  schools.  In  the  latter  case  studies  of  suo-cultures  in  schools  have 
revealed  how  informal  groups  amongst  pupils  sharing  a  common  focus  of  interest,, 
say  social  class,  education,  ethnic  background,  place  of  residence,  ability, 
religion,  can  and  do  react  and  conflict  with  groups  with  an  antithetical  point 
of  view  to  the  extent  of  coercing  and  being  coerced  in  return.  Pupils  as  a 
group  say  a  class,  =ay  coerce  their  teachers  simply  by  refusing  or  threatening 
to  refuse  their  co-operatioa,  and  may  dictate  the  pace  of  learning  and  teaching 
17 
contrary  to  their  teacher's  vishes.  Even  Nozick  it  seems  tends  to  accent 
the  possibility  of  a  group  oý  individuals  acting  as  a  coercing  agent  in  his 20 
exaTr  le  of  members  of  a  street  gang  coercing  a  member  of  another  gang 
with  threats  of  further  physical  har:  unless  he  revealed  where  his  gang's 
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weapons  were  hidden.  Nozick  in  reply  might  wish  to  argue  of  course  that 
in  his  example  the  intent  of  each  individual  could  be  separately  identified, 
that  it  was  not  the  group  that  was  coercing  but  a  number  of  individuals  whose 
intents  just  happened  incidentally  to  coincide  .  In  response  it  is  submitted 
that  the  group  in  this  case  shared  a  common  will. 
Similarly,  it  seems  logical  and  not  impossible  to  extend  this  argument 
to  more  formal  groups  of  a  more  imroersonal  kind  and  more  formally 
institutionalised  with  officials  and  officers  representing  and  presenting 
the  agreed  policies  of  the  members  according  to  constitutionally  agreed  rules 
and  procedures.  Certainly  it  is  not  possible  always  in  such  cases  to  discern 
a  particular  individual  or  even  individuals  who  are  the  particular  coercing 
agents  for  it  is  the  institution  as  an  organised  or  corporate  body  which 
coerces  or  is  coerced  and  which  is  taken  to  represent  the  collective  will  or 
interest  of  the  group  which  may  clash  with  that  of  another.  Soy  interest 
groups  and  pressure  groups,  and  all  kinds  of  social,  economic,  political, 
religious  and  educational  associations  in  society,  even  the  state  itself, 
legitimately  constituted  by  their  members  in  each  case,  may  be  considered  as 
candidates  for  the  role  of  agents  capable  of  coercing  and  of  being  coerced 
in  so  far  as  they  represent  the  will,  intent  and  interests  of  their  members 
which  may  foresee-ably  conflict  with  the  interests  and  intent  of  another  group 
or  of  individuals  within  society.  Nozick's  analysis  makes  no  provision  for 
these  kinds  of  groups,  and  in  this  respect,  it  is  suggested,  it  is  deficient. 
It  is  more  debateable,  though  one  would  wish  to  argue  that  it  is  the  case 
nevertheless,  that  human  intent  and  human  will  may  be  ascribed  to  systems  of 
rules,  laws  and  customs  which  are  recognised  by  men  as  representing  a 
consensus  of  their  will  and  intent  and  ids  governing  their  behaviour. 
C.  B.  Macpherson  for  instance  suggests  that  the  cumulative  fabric  of  society 
in  so  far  as  it  is  a  consequence  of  the  actions  and  will  of  previous  members 
may  be  regarded  as  limiting  the  social  freedom  of  members  of  society.  So  the 21 
positive  law  of  the  land  may  be  regarded  as  representing  the  will  of  citizens 
and  so  also  may  the  prevailing  moral  code,  customs,  traditions,  ideologies 
and  public  opinion.  If  this  is  so,  eve  may  argue  that  it  is  possible  to  be 
coerced  by  arangements,  laws,  regulations  and  opinions  formulated  by  other 
human  beings. 
The  law  of  the  land,  for  instance,  may  be  regarded  as  representing  the 
general  will  of  all  those  who  recognise  it  and  submit  themselves  to  it. 
Its  publication,  it  is  suggested,  constitutes  a  permanent  standing  threat 
backed  by  a  variety  of  sanctions  such  as  fines,  retribution  and  i  riso..  nment 
for  those  who  for  reasons  of  their  own  may  be  tempted  to  ignore  it.  As  such 
it  would  seen  that  the  law  of  the  land  acts  as  a  deterrent;  it  intimidates, 
but  becomes  coercive,  acting  as  a  coercive  agent,  when  those  who  wish  to 
avoid  it  feel  forced  or  co  gelled  to  obey  it  against  their  will  or  otherwise 
submit  themselves  to  its  sanctions.  The  la:  v  is  coercive,  argues  Jeremy 
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Bentham,  because  at  some  time  or  other  it  carries  sanctions  which  are 
sufficient  to  nake  men  feel  it  is  so,  but  we  may  qualify  this  by  adding  that 
it  only  acts  as  a  coercing  agent  when  these  sanctions  force  men  to  obey  it 
when  they  do  not  wish  to  do  so.  So,  the  laws  enforcing  compulsory  education, 
for  example,  backed  by  the  sanctions  of  fine  and  imprisonment,  may  be  regarded 
as  coercing  those  parents  and  pupils  who  feel  obliged  to  conform  to  them 
though  they  would  really  prefer  to  be  free  to  make  their  own  arrangements. 
It  is  not  suggested  of  course  that  all  laws  are  coercive,  for  clearly  not 
all  laws  are  backed  by  sanctions,  some  are  simply  permissive  or  declaratory 
and  are  intended  to  guide  and.  advise  citizens  of  their  benefits  and.  rights. 
just  as  the  law  of  the  land  may  be  regarded  as  a  coercing  Similarly, 
agent,  representing  the  general  will,  it  is  suggested  that  it  may  also  in 
return  be  coerced  by  pressure  being  brought  to  bear  upon  those  people  and 
organisations  responsible  for  its  development  and  proper  functioning  such 
members  of  parliament,  political  parties,  goven=ent  officers  and  lawyers. 
In  this  way  individuals  and  pressure  groups  of  all  kinds  such  as  trade  unions, 
employers'  associations,  teachers'  and  parents'  organisations  and  organised 
public  opinion  may  act  as  coercing  agents  influencing  those  who  interpret  the 22 
will  of  the  coirnunity  and  forrsu1ete,  interpret  and  execute  the  lags  of  the 
land. 
In  like  fashion,  it  is  suggested  that  the  arguments  used  to  establish 
the  claim  of  the  institution  of  positive  law  to  be  regarded  as  capable  of 
coercing  and  of  being  coerced  may  also  be  applied  to  other  man  made  systems 
of  rules  governing  htmnan  conduct  and  behaviour  with  the  exception  of  rules 
of  habit  which  are  not  taken  as  being  intentionally  and  rationally  determined. 
Such  rules,  which  would  include,  for  example,  customs,  conventions  and  the 
prevailing  moral  code,  would  seem  to  differ  from  the  rules  of  positive  law  in 
that  they  are  not  normally  backed  by  recourse  to  the  ultimate  sanction  of 
physical  force  which  is  the  preserve  of  the  state.  Instead  such  rules  rely 
on  sanctions  of  a  different  kind  but  on  sanctions  nevertheless  including, 
for  example,  the  fear  of  becoming  unpopular,  of  social  disapprobation,,  of 
being  excluded  from  the  group,  of  being  ostracised  and  of  becoming  a  social 
outcast.  The  point  is  that  sanctions  are  characteristic  of  all  rule 
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observing  systems  of  all  kinds  of  social  order.  The  notion  that  any 
social  order  could  exist  without  any  sanctions  at  all  would  seem  to  entail 
either  an  unrealistic  looking  backward  to  some  imagined  and  elusive  'Golden 
Age'  or  alternatively  an  equally  unrealistic  looking  forward  to  some  equally 
unobtainable  and  elusive  'Utopia'. 
Consequently  it  seems  plausible  to  argue  that  coercion  may  be  regarded 
as  one  aspect  of  moral  obligation  in  so  far  as  sanctions  of  blame,  shame  and 
feelings  of  guilt  may  exert  pressure  of  a  kind  on  some  people  who  would  rather 
not  otherwise  conform  to  the  prevailing  moral  code  .  So,  in  effect,  when  a 
person  does  not  wish  to  but  feels  obliged  to  do  or  not  to  do  some  particular 
act,  it  may  be  that  he  is  coerced  by  the  thought  or  fear  of  feelings  of  shame 
to  fulfil  his  obligations  and  to  do  his  duty.  H.  L.  A.  Hart  puts  it  as 
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follows:  The  coercion  characteristic  of  moral  obligation  takes  the 
form  not  of  the  infliction  of  harn  or  the  use  of  force  but  primarily  of  the 
exposure  of  the  individual  to  reminders  that  he  has  failed  to  comply  with 
rules  regarded  by  the  social  group  as  a  matter  of  serious  importance  and  to 
demand  that  he  should  comply......  the  assumption  inherent  in  such  criticism 23 
is  the.  t.....  the  guilt  or  shame  engendered  by  the  contemplation  of  their 
breach  will  suffice  or  at  least  tend  to  inhibit  future  or  continued  failure 
to  caniply.  " 
Similarly  rules  embodied  in  social  customs,  traditions,  conventions  and 
established  tenets  of  public  opinicn  which  were  the  particular  concern  of 
J.  S.  Mill  in  his  essay  'On  Liberty'  may  also  be  regarded  as  expressing  the 
public  will  backed  for  instance  by  sanctions  of  fear  of  shame,  blame, 
ridicule  and  of  being  excluded  from  the  group.  Mill  regarded  such  rules 
as  coercive  when  they  clashed  with  an  individual's  intent  and  prevented  him 
from  fulfilling  his  individuality  and  doing  what  he  really  wanted  to  do, 
provided  of  course  in  Hill's  case  what  he  wanted  to  do  was  of  no  harn  to 
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others  or  to  the  commonwealth. 
In  practice  both  kids  of  rules  the  legal  and  the  non-legal  exist 
together  intertwined  in  the  daily  routine  of  life.  In  the  case  of  schools, 
for  example,  established  traditions,  conventions,  customs,  values,  ideologies 
and  attitudes  function  alongside  the  positive  law  of  the  land  and  become 
coercive  in  each  case  when  those  subject  to  them,  say  the  pupils,  no  longer 
appreciate  their  usefulness  or  relevance  but  nevertheless  feel  they  must 
conform  to  them,  though  reluctantly,  rather  than  experience  the  consequences 
of  threatened  sanctions  if  they  do  not.  So,  systems  of  institutionalised 
rules,  it  is  suggested,  may  play  the  role  of  coercing  agents  when  the  general 
will  which  they  represent  is  opposed  to  the  will  of  those  who  would  rather 
ignore  them  were  it  not  for  the  fear  engendered  by  the  imminent  threat  of 
sanctions  of  various  kinds. 
The  second  principal  objection  vh  ich  it  is  suggested  may  be  sustained 
against  Nozick's  analysis  is  that  he  makes  no  provision  for  the  possibility 
of  coercion  by  direct  physical  force  as  when  for  example  a  kidnapper 
physically  bundles  his  victim  into  his  car.  Nozick  limits  his  analysis  to 
the  notion  of  coercion  by  threat.  In  this  latter  case  the  coercee  i"s-supposed 
to  have  a  choice  whereas  in  the  former  case  he  obviously  has  no  choice  at  all. 
But  force,  it  is  suggested,  is  not  just  a  question  of  physical  force,  of 
being  physically  prevented  or  constrained,  prodded  with  bayonets  or  tied  up, 24 
it  is  not  merely  a  case  of  force  of  arras,  so  to  sneak,  but  may  be  of  a 
psychological  nature  too.  Forcing  a  person,  for  ex2nrple,  to  experience 
particular  mental  states,  as  when  one  forces  another  to  think  about  things 
vchich  he  is  trying  to  forget  or  does  not  wish  to  have  to  think  about,  seems 
to  represent  the  application  of  force  of  a  psychological  kind.  Likewise, 
threatening  another  with  the  fear  of  reprisals  against  his  wife  and  family 
unless  he  does  or  tells  you  what  you  want  seems  to  represent  psychological 
pressure  too.  Nozick  includes  cases  such  as  this  within  his  concept  of 
coercion  by  threat  though  it  does  not  seem  justified  in  so  far  as  in  cases 
of  this  kind  the  coercee  has  no  choice,  for  the  threat  may  be  taken  to  be 
of  such  an  overwhelming  kind  as  to  force  the  coercee  to  comply  with  the 
coercer's  wishes  willy  hilly. 
It  is  suggested  then  that  coercion  by  direct  force  may  be  of  two  kinds, 
physical  or  psychological,  and  that  Nosick  whilst  ignoring  the  possibility 
of  coercion  by  direct  physical  force,  as  when  a  man's  arm  is  forcibly 
raised  by  another  in  order  to  strike  a  third  person,  unhappily  includes 
cases  of  psychological  force,  that  is  cases  of  irrestible'threats,  within 
his  concept  of  coercion  by  threat,  whereas  such  cases  would  seem  to  have  a 
closer  affinity  with  a  separate  notion  of  coercion  by  force  from  which 
choice  is  eliminated  altogether. 
By  force  it  is  not  meant  force  in  the  colloquial  sense  as  for  example 
when  we  say  'She  forced  him  to  give  up  his  job  by  refusing  to  harry  him 
unless  he  did'.  Here  we  have  merely  a  threat,  as  indeed  would  be  the  case 
should  we  say,  also  colloquially,  'She  compelled  him  to  give  up  his  job..  etc. 
Force  as  we  understand  it  may  be  distinguished  from  ccx  mulsion.  One  may 
be  compelled  willingly  or  accidentally  or  unknowingly  but  in  the  case  of 
force  one  is  compelled  against  one's  will  with  no  option  and  one  is  perfectly 
aware  of  what  is  happening.  Ifs  for  example,  a  parachutist  is  pushed  out 
of  an  aeroplane,  then,  if  he  is  willing  to  be  pushed  or  is  pushed  accidental 
we  would  argue  that  he  is  compelled  but  if  he  is  pushed  neither  willingly 
nor  accidentally  but  against  his  Trill,  then  we  would  say  that  he  is  forcibly 
coerced  into  juming.  The  degree  of  coercion  exercised  in  such  cases 25 
increases,  it  is  presi:,  med,  in  proportion  to  :,  rhich  the  force  used  exceeds 
that  which  is  necessary  which,  in  turn,  depends  upon  the  extent  to  which  the 
coercee  resists  and  the  extent  to  which  he  tries  to  prevent  himself  being 
forced.  So,  in  the  case  of  coercion  by  force  we  may  say: 
P  forces  Q  to  behave  in  a  certain  gray  A  when 
(1)  P  causes  Q  to  do  or  not  to  do  A,  and 
(2)  A  is  not  an  intentional  act  of  Q,  and 
(3)  Q  does  not  consent  to  P's  use  of  force,  which 
(4)  may  be  physical  or  psychological. 
It  has  already  been  suggested  that  agents  of  coercion  may  include  not 
just  individuals  but  any  group  of  individuals  with  an  identifiable  comaon 
will  and  even  systems  of  rules  regulating  human  behaviour  and  representing 
the  will  of  those  individuals  who  submit,  themselves  to  them.  In  this 
context  considerable  support  may  be  found  amongst  politicpl  philosophers 
and  theorists  for  the  idea  of  the  State  being  the  ultimate  agent  of  coercion 
whose  authority,  as  a  last  resort,  resides  in  the  use  of  direct  force  which 
may  take  many  different  forms  including  various  kinds  of  deprivation,  of  life 
and  property,  imprisonment  and  even  forcible  feeding  in  the  case  of  prisoners 
endeavouring  to  make  capital  out  of,  say,  a  hunger  strike.  ";  7e  have  to 
remember",  says  J.  Laird,  "that  the  device  of  gover  er.  t  immlies  the  use  of 
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force".  And  Thomas  Hobbes  would  argue,  of  course,  that  coercion  by  force 
is  an  inevitable  aspect  of  law,  for  law  itself  only  exists  because  of  the 
possibility  of  disobedience,  and  in  the  last  resort  the  laws  of  the  State  are 
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upheld  by  the  direct  force  of  the  Sovereign.  J.  R.  Lucas  in  'The  Principles 
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of  Politics'  argues: 
"We  therefore  define  force  in  terms  of  bloody-mindedness,  of  what 
happens  irrespective  of  how  recalcitrant  a  man  is,  of  what  happens  to  him 
Willy  nilly.....  Force  is  thus  the  ultimate  means  of  enforcement  and  ccercion 
the  ultimate  sanction  .......  Te  maintain  that  some  people  are  sometimes  suffic- 
iently  selfish  and  sufficiently  unreasonable  to  be  bloody-minded  and 
recalcitrant  to  reason  and  unamenable  to  atgtunent.  "With  them  there  can  be 
no  argument  but  only  non-arg=ent  which  Icall  coercion,  force  and  the  threat 26 
of  force........  the  State  must  have  at  its  disposal  not  only  sanctions  but 
some  sure-fire  sanctions  or  methods  of  enforcement.  And  this  is  what  we  mean 
by  coercion.  " 
So,  the  State  acting  as  an  agent  of  coercion  may,  it  is  suggested,  coerce 
individuals  and  groups  of  individuals  within  its  jurisdiction  by  threat, 
in  the  form  of  laws  backed  by  sanctions  representing  standing  threats,  and 
also  by  direct  force,  when,  for  example,  it  carries  out  a  threat  of  intprisorment 
by  implementing  it. 
The  State's  mono-poly  of  force  would  seem  to  be,  as  Lucas  suggests,  a 
consequence  of  its  being  a  non-selective  coniunity  of  individuals.  That  is 
to  say  people  do  not  normally  choose  their  state  nor  does  the  state  choose 
them,  they  are  siixaly  born  into  it.  Plato,  for,  instance  did  not  have  to 
consider  the  necessity  for  force  in  the  case  of  his  'Ideal  Republic'  for 
only  volunteers  in  the  first  place  were  to  be  members  of  it  upon  its 
foundation  and,  thereafter,  everyone  was  to  be  so  educated  as  to  be  fully 
cororiitted  to  the  idea  of  the  ideal  corm,  -unity  and  their  own  particular  role 
within  it. 
It  follows  therefore  that  con=aanities  and  associations  of  individuals 
organised  on  a  voluntary  basis  should  really  have  no  need  to  resort  to  the 
use  of  force,  for  members  opposed  to  the  will  of  the  group  have  the  option  to 
leave.  A  monk,  for  instance,  finding  his  order  too  strict  may  presumably 
leave  and  seek  an  alternative  order  with  a  more  congenial  rule.  Similarly, 
if  I  object  to  the  policy  of  my  gQlf  club,  I  may  leave.  This  does  not  mean, 
however,  that  associations  and  groups  of  individuals  of  a  voluntary  kind 
will  never  resort  to  the  direct  use  of  force  against  other  groups  or 
individuals,  but  by  so  doing  they  may  act  contrary  to  the  law.  It  is  certainly 
not  unusual  for  such  groups  in  support  of  their  beliefs,  principles  or 
particular  moral  point  of  view  to  take  the  law  into  their  ovm  hands  as,  for 
instance,  when  a  street  gang  forcibly  drives  another  from  its  territory  or 
members  of  a  union  on  strike  forcibly  prevent  fellow  workers  from  going  to 
their  work  by  blocking  the  factory  gates. 27 
In  some  cases  the  state  delegstes  the  use  of  force  to  groups  within 
society,  for  example  to  the  police,  parents  and  teachers.  In  the  latter  case 
teachers  may  forcibly  coerce  young  people  in  so  far  as  the  law  makes  allowance 
for  kinds  of  punishment,  detention,  expulsion  and  compulsory  schooling.  So 
coercion  by  force,  it  would  seem,  may  be  witnessed  not  just  between  one 
individual  and  another  but  between  groups  and  associations  of  individuals  too, 
ally  the  prerogative  though  it  is  traditionally  recognised  as  being  fundament 
of  the  state. 
So,  between  the  notions  of  coercion  by  threat  and  coercion  by  force, 
thich  are  distingaished  by  the  fact  that  in  the  former  case  the  coercee  has 
an  effective  choice  and  is  presumed  to  intend  the  course  of  action  he  chooses 
whilst  in  the  latter  he  cannot  be  Ares  tied  to  have  such  an  intention  because 
he  is  si"ply  forced,  there  exists,  it  would  seen,  a  third  fora  of  coercion,  namely 
coercion  by  irresistible  and  overrhelming  threat.  Whilst  this  form  of  coercion 
embodying  a  threat  is  obviously  related  to  the  concept  of  coercion  by  threat, 
it  is  also  related,  it  has  been  argued,  to  the  notion  of  coercion  by  force 
in  so  far  as  the  threat  is  of  such  an  irresistible  kind  that  no  rational  man 
in  his  right  senses  would  be  expected  to  do  other  than  to  corzoly  with  it  and 
do  as  the  coercer  requires  without  choice. 
Irresistible  threats,  it  is  suggested,  may  be  of  two  kinds,  (i)  physical, 
as  when  members  of  a  gang  threaten  one  of  another  rival  gang  with  grievous 
physical  bodily  harm  unless  he  corm  lies  with  their  wishes,  or,  (ii)  psycho- 
logical,  as  when  the  same  gang  threaten  the  victim  instead  with  injury  to  a 
member  of  his  family  to  whom  he  is  intimately  attached,  so  causing  him 
considerable  mental  anguish.  Nozick  would  consider  both  these  examples  as 
instances  of  coercion  by  threat  for  he  does  not  distinguish  a  separate  notion 
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of  coercion  by  force.  Another  philosopher,  M.  D.  Bayles,  similarly 
includes  such  cases  within  the  notion  of  coercion  by  threat,  or  dispositional 
coercion  as  he  calls  it,  but  unlike  Nozick  recognises  coercion  by  force,  or 
occurrent  coercion,  which  he  restricts  to  cases  of  physical  force  only. 
The  positions  taken  by  both  these  philösophers  may,  it  is  suggested,  be 
questioned,  and  it  has  been  argued:  that  the  notion  of  co'  cion  by 28 
irresistible  threat  cannot  be  logically  included  in  the  notion  of  coercion 
by  threat  because  the  coercee  is  not  left  with  an  effective  choice;  that 
coercion  by  force  is  not  only  possible  but  includes  force  of  a  psychological 
as  well  as  of  a  physical  kind;  that  irresistible  threats  which  cannot  be 
avoided  would  seem  to  have  a  closer  affinity  to  the  notion  of  coercion  by 
force  and  may  possibly  be  included  within  it  in  so  far  as  the  coercee  has  no 
real  choice,  and  consequently  cannot  intend  the  course  he  has  to  follow  but  on 
the  contrary  is  just  forced. 
The  main  points  made  in  relation  to  P%zick's  analysis  of  coercion  may 
now  be  s  arized. 
(1)  The  seven  conditions  considered  by  Nozick  as  being  necessary  to 
establish  a  case  of  coercion  (that  is  by  threat)  are  valid  and  may 
be  sustained  against  the  suggestion  that  the  coercer  might-coerce 
without  being  aware  of  it,  or,  like:  vise,  that  the  coercee  may  be 
coerced  without  knowing  it.  This  is  so  because  both  coercer  and 
coercee  must  be  aware  of  or  believe  they  are  aware  of  the  apparent 
intentions  of  the  other,  otherwise  a  conflict  of  will  which  is 
necessary  to  establish  any  case  of  coercion,  including  coercion  by 
force,  could  not  exist  between  them. 
(2)  Nozick's  analysis  does  not  allow  for  the  distinction  that,  it  is 
subm:  i.  tted,  may  be  made  between  three  kinds  of  coercion,  namely, 
(a)  coercion  by  threat  leaving  the  coercee  with  an  effective  choice, 
if  a  reluctant  one,  so  that  he  may  be  said  to  intend  the 
consequences  of  the  course  of  action  he  chooses, 
(b)  coercion  by  direct  force  of  either  a  physical  or  psychological 
kind  leaving  the  coercee  with  no  choice  whatsoever  so  that  he 
cannot  be  said  to  intend  the  course  of  action  he  is  forced  to 
f  ollov, 
(c)  coercion  by  irresistible  or  overwhelming  threat  involving  either 
threats  of  direct  physical  harm  to  the  coercee  or  threats  of 
ham  say  to  a  loved  one  causing  mental  anguish  to  the  coercee. 
In  either  case  the  coercee  is  left  with  no  real  choice  but  to 29 
follow  the  course  of  action  forced  upon  him  as  any  reasonable 
rian,  other  than  a  fool  or  a  saint,  would  in  the  circumstances 
be  exaected  to  do. 
(3)  The  notion  of  coercion  by  irresistible  threat  cannot  be  logically 
included  within  the  notion  of  coercion  by  threat  but  instead  may  be 
likened  more  closely  to  the  notion  of  coercion  by  direct  force  in 
*hich  the  coercee  has  no  choice  at  all, 
(4)  The  agents  of  coercion  may  include  not  just  rational  individual 
persons,  as  PTozick's  analysis  would  seem  to  imply,  but  also  groups 
of  individuals  of  an  informal  and  formal  kind  as  well  as 
institutionalised  systems  of  rules  governing  human  behaviour  in  so 
far  as  in  the  latter  two  cases  respectively  the  group  is  regarded 
as  representing  a  consensus  of  the  will  of  its  members  and  the  rules 
in  question  the  will  of  those  recognising  them  and  subjecting 
themselves  voluntarily  to  them. 1 
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Coercion  is  one  way  of  getting  a  person  or  persons  to  do  or  not  to  do 
something  either,  it  has  been  suggested,  by  means  of  a  threat  leaving  the 
coercee  with  an  effective  choice,  or,  by  means  of  an  irresistible  threat 
leaving  the  coercee  with  a  choice  of  sorts  but  one  that  is  virtually  ineffective, 
or,  by  direct  force  leaving  the  coercee  with  no  choice  at  all.  Understandably, 
therefore,  coercion  is  regarded  as  the  antithesis  of  freedom,  that  is  as  a 
form  of  constraint,  but  in  so  far  as  it  aims  to  get  people  to  do  or  to  refrain 
from  doing  what  they  would  otherwise  choose  either  not  to  do  or  to  do 
respectively,  it  may  also  be  regarded  as  a  reason  for  and  in  certain  cases 
such  as  direct  physical  force  as  a  cause  of  action. 
Not  all  forms  of  constraint  are  of  course  necessarily  coercive. 
Constraints  caused  by  factors  other  than  rational  human  agency,  such  as  those 
imposed  upon  us  by  the  interaction  of  external  physical  phenomena  as  in  the 
case  of  the  weather  or  by  our  own  individual  neurological,  psychological  and 
physical  inabilities  and  incapacities,  fall  into  this  category.  Likewise, 
not  all  ways  of  getting  people  to  do  things  are  necessarily  coercive  either 
for  people  may  be  induced  to  act  by  means  other  than  the  use  of  threats  and 
force,  for  example  by  means  of  rational  persuasion  or  enticement. 
It  is  suggested  therefore  that  a  clearer  conception  of  the  notion  of 
coercion  may  be  gained  by  relating  it  to  other  concepts  and  particularly  to 
those  Which  involve  constraint  and/or  the  inducement  of  people  to  behave  in 
a  particular  way.  Clearly  little  value  would  be  gained  from  a  consideration 
of  any  concepts  chosen  at  random  and  having  no  obvious  logical  relationship 
With  the  notion  of  coercion  itself.  An  understanding  of  the  nature  of 
political  power  for  example  would  hardly  be  enhanced  by  a  comparative  analysis 
of  the  concept  of  pourer  in  relation  to  the  internal  combustion  engine  but 
might  be  if  compared  to  related  notions  such  as  authority  or  democracy. 
So  within  the  context  of  getting  people  to  do  things  we  may  perhaps 
usefully  consider  a  selection  of  concepts  related  to  coercion  in  some  way 34 
but  fundamentally  different  from  it  in  others.  These  will  be  considered 
as  follows;  notions  of  constraint  and  compulsion,  notions  providing  a  motive 
for  action  arising  from  causal  factors  on  the  one  hand  and  from  rational  and 
irrational  means  of  persuasion  on  the  other,  notions  involving  the 
fundamental  alteration  of  a  person's  beliefs  and  attitudes  and,  finally, 
notions  involving  the  infliction  of  harne. 
Four  principal  lines  of  argument  will  emerge  in  this  chapter,  namely, 
that  it  is  neither  choice  nor  compulsion  but  force  of  various  degrees  that  is 
central  to  the  concept  of  coercion,  that  in  every  case  of  coercion  a  clash 
of  wills  must  exist  between  the  coercer  and  coercee,  that  for  such  a  conflict 
of  wills  to  exist  the  coercee  must  be  aware  of  what  is  happening  to  him, 
and  finally,  that  the  infliction  of  harm  on  another  even  by  threat  or  force 
though  a  necessary  condition  of  coercion  need  not  in  itself  be  coercive. 
Both  to  coerce  and  to  compel  is  to  constrain,  but  a  distinction  is 
frequently  made  between  the  notion  of  coercion  by  threat,  a  form  of  partial 
constraint,  and  the  notion  of  compulsion,  involving  total  constraint  either 
by  direct  force  or  say  an  irresistible  threat.  In  the  former  case  of  coercion 
by  threat  the  victim  is  left  with  an  effective  if  reluctant  choice,  whereas 
in  the  latter  cases  of  total  constraint  he  is  left  with  no  real  choice  at  all. 
This  kind  of  reasoning  suggests  that  a  distinction  may  be  made  between  what 
one  decides  to  do  and  what  just  happens  to  one,  or,  between  what  one  has  a 
reason  to  do  and  what  one  is  caused  to  do.  So  the  question  arises  whether 
it  is  possible  to  distinguish  a  concept  of  coercion  on  the  one  hand  and  one 
of  compulsion  on  the  other,  or,  whether  in  fact  the  two  concepts  overlap 
so  as  to  prevent  a  sharp  and  valid  distinction  being  drawn  between  them. 
Certain  cases  of  compulsion  are  clearly  not  cases  of  coercion  either 
because  they  are  caused  by  agencies  of  a  non-human  kind,  or,  are  caused  by 
human  agency  but  in  such  a  way  that  the  victim  is  unaware  of  what  is 
happening  to  him.  Total  compulsion  causally  induced  in  these  two  ways 
constituted  the  standard  form  of  compulsion  for  both  Plato  and  Aristotle, 35 
but  it  is  not  suggested  that  they  constitute  cases  of  coercion.  Should, 
however,  a  person  be  forcibly  compelled  against  his  will  by  another  and  is 
aware  of  what  is  happening  to  him,  as  in  the  case  of  a  man  detained  against 
his  will,  then'in  view  of  the  clash  of  wills  involved.,  it  is  suggested  that  a 
case  of  coercion  by  force,  but  not  compulsion,  is  present.  And  this  would 
also  be  the  case,  it  is  argued,  where  a  man  faced  with  an  irresistible  threat 
and  impossible  choice  is  forced  unwillingly  towards  a  particular  course  of 
action,  though  colloquially  we  might  say  he  is  compelled. 
Plato  and  Aristotle  were  principally  concerned  to  distinguish  those  kinds 
of  behaviour  for  which  the  subject  might  be  ruled  out  as  being  worthy  of 
praise  or  blame  or  responsibility,  namely,  those  caused  irrespective  of  the  9 
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subject's  wishes.  In  'The  Laws'  Plato  considers  situations  in  which 
soldiers  may  lose  their  weapons  through  no  choice  of  their  own,  for  example 
by  falling  from  high  ground  or  at  sea  or  by  being  swept  off  their  feet  by  the 
elements:  "A  man  who  is  stripped  of  his  shield  by  a  considerable  exertion 
of  force  cannot  be  said  to  have  flung  it  away  with  the  same  truth  as  one  who 
drops  it  of  his  own  act;  there  is  all  the  difference  in  the  world  between  the 
two  cases". 
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Similarly,  Aristotle  characterizes  compulsion  as:  "....  that  is 
compulsory  of  which  the  moving  principle  is  outside,  being  a  principle  in 
which  nothing  is  contributed  by  the  person  who  acts,  or  rather  is  acted  upon, 
e.  g.  if  he  were  to  be  carried  somewhere  by  a  wind  or  by  men  who  had  him  in 
their  power.  "  It  is  only  in  this  latter  case  of  the  man  taken  away  by  others 
who  have  him  in  their  power  that  we  might  argue  that  a  case  of  coercion  by 
force  could  exist,  depending  that  is  on  whether  the  victim  was  conscious 
of  the  proceedings  and  taken  against  his  will.  If  he  was  unconscious  then 
we  could  say  he  was  compelled,  but  if  he  was  aware  of  the  events  we  would  say 
that  he  was  coerced  forcibly  to  do  something  he  did  not  want  to  do  and 
preventedirom  doing  what  he  wished  to  do,  involving  that  is  a 
'clash 
of  will 
between  himself  and  his  captors.  Such  a  man  we  might  say,  colloquially,  was 
compelled  but  more  correctly  we  would  argue  that  he  was  coerced  and  forced 
just  as  a  man  would  be  who  is  imprisoned  against  his  wishes. 36 
Although  Aristotle  reserves  the  notion  of  compulsion  for  cases  of 
extreme  constraint  of  a  causal  kind  he  refers  also  to  what  we  might  recognise 
as  a  weaker  though  more  common  form  of  compulsion  when  he  distinguishes 
involuntary  and  voluntary  acts  and  raises  the  question  whether  certain  kinds 
of  choices  may  in  fact  amount  to  compulsion  in  an  extreme  causal  sense.  The 
first  example  he  gives  would  seem  to  suggest  a  case  of  coercion  by  irresistible 
and  overwhelming  threat  similar  in  fact  to  cases  that  might  be  covered  by 
the  legal  concepts  of  duress  and  coercion  in  the  criminal  law: 
"But  with  regard  to  the  things  that  are  done  from  fear  of  greater  evils 
or  for  some  noble  object  (e.  g.  if  a  tyrant  were  to  order  one-  to  do  something 
base,  having  one's  parents  and  children  in  his  power,  and  if  one  did  the 
action  they  were  to  be  saved  but  otherwise  would  be  put  to  death)  it  may  be 
debated  whether  such  actions  are  involuntary  or  voluntary.  Something  of  the 
sort  happens  also  with  regard  to  the  throwing  of  goods  overboard  in  a  storm; 
for  in  the  abstract  no  one  throws  goods  away  voluntarily,  but  on  condition 
of  its  securing  the  safety  of  himself  and  his  crew  any  sensible  man  does  so. 
Such  actions  then  are  mixed  but  are  more  like  voluntary  actions  for  they  are 
worthy  of  choice  at  the  time  when  they  are  done  and  the  end  of  an  action  is 
relative  to  the  occasion.  Both  the  terms  then  'voluntary'  and  'involuntary' 
must  be  used  with  reference  to  the  moment  of  action.  Now  the  man  acts 
voluntarily;  for  the  principle  that  moves  the  instrumental  parts  of  the  body 
in  such  actions  is  in  him,  and  the  things  of  which  the  moving  principle  is 
in  a  man  himself  are  in  his  power  to  do  or  not  to  do.  Such  actions,  therefore, 
are  voluntary,  but  in  the  abstract  perhaps  involuntary;  for  no  one  would 
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choose  any  such  act  in  itself.  "  - 
In  these  sort  of  cases  Aristotle  has  in  mind  situations  in  which 
alternative  courses  of  action  are  available  representing  a  choice  of  sorts 
but  not  the  sort  of  choice  we  might  expect  a  reasonable  man  to  have  to  make 
in  normal  circumstances.  On  the  contrary  when  a  man  jumps  fron  a  burning 
building  at  the  risk  of  serious  injury  rather  than  risk  being  burned  to  death, 
or,  jettisons  his  precious  cargo  rather  than  lose  the  lives  of  his  crew 
together  with  his  ship  we  may  wish  to  say  he  was  compelled  (i.  e.  in  the  sense 37 
that  he  had  no  real  choice)  in  the  same  way  as  the  man  who  faced  the 
overwhelming  threats  of  violence  to  his  family  at  the  hands  of  the  tyrant  or 
the  pointed  gun  of  his  attacker  who  intended  to  rob  him,  his  colleagues  and 
the  bank  in  which  he  worked.  The  fact  that  saints  and  heroes  might  elect  to 
sacrifice  their  lives  on  a  matter  of  principle  or  out  of  loyalty  to  others, 
for  which  they  may  be  posthumously  praised,  does  not  alter  the  fact  that 
they  may  have  acted  over  and  above  their  course  of  duty  and  beyond  what  might 
be  reasonably  expected  of  theca.  Indeed  should  they  not  have  so  acted  they 
would  more  than  likely  not  have  incurred  any  blame  at  all;  on  the  contrary 
by  so  acting  they  might  run  the  risk  of  being  judged  to  have  behaved  foolishly 
and  irresponsibly. 
So,  if  there  is  any.  choice  at  all,  there  is  not  literal  and  complete 
compulsion  in  a  strictly  causal  sense,  but  there  is  what  J.  Laird  would  call 
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'compulsion  in  a  courtesy  sense',  which  is  taken  to  mean  inducement  of 
such  a  kind  and  so  strong  as  to  be  presumed  irresistible,  which  is  to  say 
that  any  sensible  man  in  the  same  circumstances  would  be  presumed  to  choose  the 
course  that  is  said  to  be  'compelled'.  So  irresistible  threats  presenting 
the  victim  with  an  impossible  choice  may  be  considered  as  compelling  as 
cases  of  compulsion  directly  and  physically  applied,  and  they  are  coercive  too 
if  they  are  made  by  a  coercing  agent  and  are  contrary  to  the  will  of  the 
person  to  whom  they  are  directed  and  who  is  forced  against  his  conscious  will 
to  comply.  Compulsion  then  in  a  strictly  causal  sense  does  not  amount  to 
coercion  whereas  force  does  whenever  there  is  this  conscious  clash  of  will 
between  the  coercer  and  coercee. 
The  legal  concepts  of  duress  and  coercion  in  criminal  law  exemplify  the 
interest  of  lawyers  in  the  form  of  compulsion  of  such  a  kind  that  might  be 
considered  a  possible  means  of  explaining  and  excusing  (in  the  case  of  duress) 
or  mitigating  (in  the  case  of  coercion  in  Scottish  Law)  a  person's  conduct 
when  the  accused  claims  to  have  been  compelled  to  commit  illegal  acts  against 
his  or  her  will.  And  some  confusion  inevitably  results  because  of  the  use  of 
the  word  compulsion  instead  of  that  of  force. 38 
In  the  case  of  duress  for  a  successful  plea  to  be  admitted  it  must  be 
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established: 
(1)  that  the  defendant's  will  was  overborne  through  fear  caused  by 
either  the  actual  infliction  of  serious  bodily  harm,  or  threats  of 
death  or  serious  bodily  harm  to  his  own  person,  or  actual  or 
threatened  death  or  serious  bodily  harm  to  his  wife,  children  or 
other  immediate  kindred, 
(2)  that  the  compulsion  was  exerted  at  the  time  the  crime  was  conzaitted, 
(3)  that  the  accused  desisted  from  the  criminal  act  as  soon  as  was 
reasonably  practicable  in  the  circumstances, 
(4)  that  the  compulsion  arose  through  no  fault  of  his  own, 
(5)  that  when  any  inherently  grave  offence  is  committed  the  duress 
exerted  upon  the  accused  was  so  severe  and  so  great  in  proportion  to 
the  harm  done  or  injury  suffered  by  the  victim  as  to  excuse  from 
criminal  liability. 
A  leading  case  is  that  of  R.  v  Steane  (1947)  B.  B.  in  which  the  accused  a 
British  subject  living  in  Germany  at  the  outbreak  of  war  was  interned  and 
compelled  (we  would  prefer  to  say  forced)  to  broadcast  for  the  Germans  on 
pain  of  threatened  bodily  harm  to  himself  and  possible  reprisals  against  his 
family. 
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By  contrast  the  criminal  law  concept  of  coercion  is  applicable  only 
to  a  married  woman  who  argues  that  she  acted  under  pressure  from  her  husband 
and  in  his  presence.  Additionally  it  differs  from  duress  in  another  respect 
in  that  it  imports  something  less  stringent  than  threats  of  physical  injury 
in  the  form  of  threats  of  a  spiritual  and  moral  nature  but  amounting 
nevertheless  to  the  dominance  of  the  husband  to  such  an  extent  that  the 
exercise  of  the  wife's  free  will  is  rendered  impotent. 
So,  in  the  legal  cases  of  duress  and  coercion  the  victim  may  be  said  to 
be  overwhelmed  by  threats  of  such  a  kind  as  to  amount  to  a  form  of  compulsion, 
but  in  so  far  as  the  victim  is  induced,  -made  to  act  against  his  or  her  will  and 
is  aware  of  being  so  forced  to  act  by  another,  it  is  suggested  we  may  say  from 
a  philosophical  point  of  view  that  he  or  she  is  coerced.  In  the  case  of 39 
duress  this  awareness  seems  to  be  implied  for  condition  (3)  above  specificall 
stipulates  that  the  accused  must  desist  from  the  criminal  act  at  the  first 
reasonable  opportunity,  and  this  he  would  not  be  able  to  do  or  choose  to  do 
ifs  for  examples  he  was  just  being  causally  compelled,  that  is  manipulated  or 
deceived  in  some  mechanical,  causal  way  and  was  not  aware  of  what  was 
happening  to  him. 
So,  within  the  general  notion  of  constraint,  the  concepts  of  coercion  and 
compulsion  would  appear  to  overlap  to  such  an  extent  as  to  prevent  a  sharp 
distinction  being  drawn  between  them.  This  would  seem  to  be  the  case  for 
two  main  .  reasons:  (i)  because  all  threats  whether  trivial  or  of  an  irresistit 
and  overwhelming  nature  contain  an  element  of  compulsion  upon  which  the 
notion  of  coercion  is  dependent  in  the  form  of  a  compelling  agent  or  coercer, 
and  this  we  recognise  in  common  parlance  when  we  say  we  are  'made.  to', 
'have  to'  or  'feel  compelled  to'  do  something  when  we  are  inconvenienced  or 
our  choices  or  freedom  is  infringed  even  in  the  most  trivial  fashion;  and  (ii) 
because  we  can  distinguish  compulsion  of  three  distinct  kinds,  namely,  being 
compelled  against  one's  will  to  do  something  one  is  aware  of  but  does  not 
want  to  do,  secondly,  being  causally  and  mechanically  compelled  unwittingly 
as  when  a  person  who  has  been  stunned  by  a  blow  is  led  or  carried  away,  and 
thirdly,  being  willingly  compelled  of  one's  own  choice  as  when  a  person 
hesitant  about  jumping  into  the  swimming  bath  or  of  parachuting  from  a  plane 
invites  help  in  the  form  of  a  gentle  push. 
In  the  first  of  these  three  cases  distinguished  in  (ii)  it  is  significant 
that  the  person  is  compelled  against  his  wishes  and  he  is  aware  of  it.  He 
does  not  have  a  choice  but  he  is  all  the  more  unfree  and  constrained.  His 
interests  are  affected  for  the  worse  or  at  least  are  ignored.  He  is  harmed; 
his  desires  are  frustrated  and  he  resists.  In  short,  it  is  submitted,  it  is 
more  correct  to  say  that  he  is  forced,  that  is  against  his  will,  rather  than 
just  compelled  and.  additionally,  is  coerced  if  these  conditions  are  present. 
It  is  only  in  the  first  of  the  three  senses  of  compulsion  that  we  have 
distinguished  that  compulsion  amounts  to  coercion.  -It  would  seem  improper, 
therefore,  to  stipulate  arbitrarily  between  coercion  by  threat,  say  in 
Nozick's  sense,  on  the  one  hand  and  cases  of  compulsion  on  the  other 40 
for  in  the  latter  case  we  would  wish  to  distinguish  between  those  cases  of 
compulsion  accepted  willingly  or  experienced  unwittingly  or  accidently  fron 
those  of  which  we  are  aware,  which  restrict  our  freedom,  harm  us.  and  infringe 
our  interests  against  our  will  and  which,  for  these  reasons,  are  considered 
coercive.  It  is  argued,  therefore,  that  it  is  the  more  refined  concept  of 
force,  implying  awareness  and  unwillingness  and  resistance  on  the  part  of 
the  affected  party,  and  not  just  compulsion  which  is  a  wider  concept5that 
constitutes  a  necessary  condition  for  the  philosophical  concept  of  coercion. 
Compulsion  apart  there  are  a  variety  of  means  by  which  one  might  get 
people  to  do  things  and  provide  a  motive  for  their  actions,  for  example,  by 
the  stimulation  of  their  senses  and  feelings  as  in  the  case  of  conditioning, 
or,  by  rational  means  of  persuasion  as  in  cases  of  pleading,  advising  and 
warning,  or,  by  inducement  resorting  to  less  rational  techniques  of  a 
manipulatory  kind  as  in  the  cases  of  enticement  and  seduction.  In  some  way 
some  but  not  all  of  the  concepts  discussed  within  these  categories  will  be 
seen  to  relate  to  the  notion  of  coercion. 
The  notion  of  conditioning  would  seem  to  be  more  closely  allied  to  that 
of  compulsion  causally  induced  rather  than  to  the  concept  of  coercion  in  so 
far  as  the  subject  or  victim  does  not  react  intentionally  or  rationally  but 
mechanically  and  automatically  and  without  thought  in  response  to  sensations 
of  pain/pleasure  induced  by  some  form  of  punishment/reward.  And  this  applies 
with  regard  to  the  two  main  forms  of  conditioning  which  may  be  distinguished 
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namely:  (i)  classical  conditioning  involving  a  reflex  action  such  as 
salivisation  as  in  the  case  of  the  dog  which  is  trained  to  saliver  at  the 
ding  of  a  bell  by  associating  the  sound  with  food;  and  (ii)  operant  and 
instrumental  conditioning  involving  the  performance  of  a  voluntary  movement 
such  as  the  pressing  of  a  lever  as  when  for  example  an  animal  learns  to 
press  the  lever  which  produces  food  and  to  avoid  those  levers  which 
administer  an  electric  shock. 41 
When  conditioning  involves  negative  reinforcement  (that  is  punishment) 
it  seems  to  bear  a  simularity  to  coercion  in  that  the  cause  of  the  subject's 
action  in  both  cases  is  the  avoidance  of  harm,  but  it  is  different  from 
coercion  in  that  the  subject  is  not  aware  of  the  fact  that  he  is  acting  in 
accordance  with  the  intention  of  his  manipulator.  Indeed  in  neither  case  of 
conditioning,  classical  or  operant,  is  the  subject  conscious  of  the 
connection  between  the  response  and  the  reinforcement.  Conditioning,  unlike 
coercion,  does  not  recognise  the  ability  of  the  subject  to  reason,  so  not 
surprisingly  it  is  a  term  mainly  used  in  referring  to  animals  and  their 
training  rather  than  to  human  learning. 
Sometimes  we  use  the  term  'conditioned'  when  we  refer  to  a  particular  kind 
of  human  behaviour  when,  for  example,  we  observe  that  a  person's  habits 
or  attitudes  have  become  habitual.  Then  we  may  be  inclined  to  say  that  such 
a  person  has  been  'conditioned'  to  react  in  a  particular  way,  say  to  regard 
strangers  with  suspicion  or  to  conform  to  a  particular  belief,  religion  or 
ideology.  But  these  examples  we  might  also  argue  may  be  more  akin  to 
instances  of  particular  kinds  of  persuasion  such  as  indoctrination  and 
brainwashing  which  do  take  account  of  the  existence  of  the  human  consciousness, 
as  the  notion  of  coercion  does,  whereas  the  concept  of  conditioning  does  not. 
The  notion  of  reward  then  is  closely  related  to  the  idea  of  conditioning 
but  it  is  wider  in  scope  than  its  relation  to  conditioning  might  imply  for 
it  is  manifested  not  merely  in  the  form  of  causally  induced  pleasant 
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sensations  but  as  a  form  of  rational  persuasion  involving  a  dialogue 
between  equals.  Rewards  induce  potential  recipients  to  avoid  those 
situations  from  which  they  might  fail  to  obtain  them  and  to  conform  to  those 
conditions  necessary  to  obtain  them,  which  conditions  are  laid  down  and 
intended  by  the  reward  giver.  Rewards  in  this  sense  like  coercion  are 
intended  to  influence  a  person's  conduct  and  when  such  rewards  are  within 
the  normal  expectation  of  the  potential  recipient  in  the  normal  course  of 
events  but  are  withheld  unless  the  would  be  recipient  complies  with  a 
stipulated  course  of  action  then  they  become  part  of  a  threat  and  may  be 42 
regarded  as  constituting  a  case  of  coercion  by  threat. 
In  other  respects  the  notion  of  reward  bears  little  relationship  to 
the  idea  of  coercion.  Coercion  is  a  form  of  constraint  whereas  rewards  are 
an  inducement  to  action.  Rewards  do  not  constrain  in  a  negative  sense  but 
promise  more  in  a  positive  sense;  they  do  not  threaten  but  encourage. 
Additionally,  whereas  rewards  may  be  given  for  services  rendered,  that  is 
for  past  deeds  that  have  satisfied  an  accepted  standard  and  with  no  intent 
on  the  part  of  the  reward  giver  to  induce  the  recipient  to  do  anything 
at  all,  coercion  aims  to  produce  future  action  only  and  to  influence 
future  conduct. 
Offers  like  rewards  may  be  used  as  a  form  of  rational  persuasion  and 
as  an  inducement  to  action.  Rewards  and  offers  alike  imply  benefits  rather 
than  harm  for  the  recipient  and  as  such  are  nor  coercive  though  as  in  the 
case  of  coercion  they  can  constitute  a  motive  for  action.  The  word  'offer' 
may  be  used  in  a  variety  of  ways  as  when  I  might  say,  'I  offer  resistance', 
or,  'I  offer  to  punch  someone  in  the  face',  but  in  neither  of  these  cases 
is  there  an  offer  to  a  person's  benefit,  nor  is  there  a  motive  for  action 
unless  a  condition  requiring  the  offeree  to  do  something  is  implied,  in 
which  case  there  would  be  a  clear  case  of  coercion  by  threat. 
When  a  proposal  promises  to  make  someone  better  off  than  he  was  before 
it  was  made,,  we  have  simply  a  tempting  offer  and  a  powerful  inducement  to 
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comply.  Indeed  it  is  the  anticipated  possibility  of  improving  one's 
status  by  accepting  such  proposals  that  provides  the  motive  force  behind 
all  our  ordinary  economic  transactions  of  bartering,  buying  and  selling. 
On  the  other  hand,  proposals  made  in  the  form  of  offers  but  which  promise 
to  render  the  offeree  substantially  worse  off  if  he  does  not  accept  and 
at  least  mildly  worse  off  if  he  does  accept,  are  clearly  coercive.  In 
the  case  for  example  of  'Your  money  or  your  life'  the  recipient  of  the 
proposal  loses  either  way  and  is  coerced. 
It  may  be  argued,  of  course,  though  it  is  a  circular  and  not  very 
profitable  argument  that  all  offers  are  threats  and  threats  offers  on 
the  grounds  that  a  threat  carries  with  it  the  implied  benefit  of  not 43 
being  implemented  if  the  victim  complies  and  every  offer  the  implied  threat 
of  not  being  implemented  unless  the  offeree  complies.  But  offers  may  be 
compelling  and  irresistible  and  in  this  respect  likened  to  coercion,  though 
they  need  not  necessarily  for  this  reason  be  coercive  for  offers  may  be 
compelling  but  desirable  and  to  one's  benefit,  as  in  the  case  of  a  person 
who  is  offered  a  knighthood  or  some  other  equally  desirable  manifestation 
of  public  honour  and  recognition. 
Whether  offers  are  coercive  or  not  or  appear  as  disguised  threats  will 
naturally  depend  upon  the  circumstances  of  particular  cases,  but  those 
conditions  necessary  to  establish  a  case  of  coercion  by  threat  will  require 
to  be  satisfied.  An  offer  made,  for  example,  by  a  casual  acquaintance  to 
look  after  a  person  of  indifferent  health  and  to  conduct  her-personal  and  bus- 
iness  affairs  for  her  in  return  for  certain  favours,  say  for  a  share  in 
her  business,  may  be  such  as  to  make  the  invalide  feel  coerced,  unable  to 
refuse,  compelled  to  accept  for  fear  of  being  alone,  but  it  does  not 
constitute  a  case  of  coercion  and  is  not  a  threat,  for  a  casual  friend  or 
acquaintance  would  not  be  presumed  to  have  an  obligation  in  any  sense  either 
morally  or  legally  in  the  normal  course  of  events  to  help  another  in  such 
circumstances. 
Situations  in  which  offers  are  inclined  to  appear  coercive  arise 
when  P  the  offeror  tries  to  take  advantage  of'Q's,  the  offeree,  state  of 
affairs,  for  instance  in  cases  when  either, 
(1)  Q's  position  will  become  worse  (without  P  doing  anything)  unless 
Q  does  act  A  in  order  to  get  P  to  prevent  his,  Q's,  position 
getting  worse, 
or,  (2)  Q's  position  will  not  improve  (without  P  doing  anything) 
unless  Q  does  act  A  in  order  to  get  P  to  help  improve  his,  Q's, 
position. 
But  for  an  offer  to  become  a  threat  in  such  circumstances  P  would  have  to 
be  supposed  to  have  an  obligation  to  help  Q  and  then  a  clear  case  of  coercion 
would  ensue,  for  Q  would  be  supposed  to  have  a  right  to  P's  help  and  would  be _-.  -  ýýM! 
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worse  off  whatever  choice  he  had  to  make  after  P's  offer  is  made. 
If,  therefore,  I  say,  'I'll  make  you  an  offer.  Give  me  your  money  and  I'll 
promise  not  to  beat  you  up',  I  am  not  making  an  offer  but  issuing  a  threat, 
for  presumably  a  person  has  a  right  not  to  be  beaten  up  anyway  in  normal 
circumstances. 
Other  forms  of  rational  persuasion  which  are  calculated  to  get  people 
to  do  things  but  which  are  not  prima  facie  coercive  include  cases  of 
guiding,  advising  and  warning  in  which  responsibility  for  choosing-  the 
ultimate  course  of  action  rests  with  the  subject  himself  who  decides 
rationally  and  independently  on  the  basis  of  arganents  and  factual 
information  presented  to  him.  To  guide,  advise,  or  warn  is  to  influence 
without  compulsion.  To,  guide  is  to  attempt  to  lead  others  to  do  only  what 
they  will  eventually  acknowledge  they  have  a  reason  for  doing.  Guiding  is 
not  a  case  of  direct  pleading  whereby  one  subjectively  attempts  to  get 
a  person  to  act  in  a  way  one  personally  desires  but  is  an  example  of 
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indirect  pleading,  as  also  are  advising  and  warning,  in  which  one 
avoids  imposing  one's  will  but  rather  looks  objectively  at  possible  courses 
of  action  from  the  other  person's  point  of  view  and  interests  and  tries 
to  make  him  realize  what  in  all  probability  he  would  want  to  do  and 
would  have  the  incentive  to  do  were  he  aware  of  all*the  relevant  facts. 
That  is  to  say  in  effect  that  guiding  like  advising  and  warning  but  unlike 
all  cases  of  coercion  has  an  other-regarding  orientation. 
Advising  is  similar  to  guiding  but  may  be  distinguished  from  the 
latter  in  being  less  urgent  and  more  a  matter  of  offering  information.  To 
say  to  one's  guest  for  example,  !  your  last  train  leaves  at  10.30  p.  m.  ', 
offering  the  information  just  a  few  minutes  before  the  time  of  departure, 
might  be  construed  as  an  intent  to  guide  and  lead  him  with  some  urgency 
to  decide  to  leave  promptly,  assuming  that  he  does  not  want  to  miss  it,  but, 
if  offered  as  a  matter  of  fact  when  one's  guest  is  arriving  , 
it  might  be 
construed  simply  as  a  piece  of  useful  information  or  unsolicited  advice. 
In  both  cases  of  course  it  might  be  construed  as  a  warning  too. 45 
It  is  not  always  easy  to  distinguish  between  guiding,  advising  and 
warning  for  the  difference  may  depend  upon  the  intent  which  may  be  conveyed 
in  the  same  words  in  each  case  but  with  differences  in  expression,  tone  of 
speech  and  gestures.  In  reply  to  a  request  from  you.,  for  example,  I  might 
say,  'Try  that',  meaning  in  effect  'My  advice  to  you  in  the  circumstances, 
if  I  were  you,  would  be  to  do  that',  which  could  be  interpreted  as  advice  or 
guidance  or  a  warning. 
But  warnings  differ  from  guiding  and  advising  in  that  they  always  involve 
an  element  of  deterrence,  though  they  are  primarily  intended  to  influence 
and  not  to  threaten.  Warnings  are  based  on  the  facts  as  they  are  and  have 
the  interests  of  the  subject  in  mind,  though  this  does  not  mean  that  the 
interests  of  the  person  giving  the  warning  are  necessarily  excluded.  This 
would  be  the  case  if,  for  example,  the  aged  head  of  a  family  business,  not 
feeling  capable  of  facing  the  new  pressures  the  institution  of  an  official 
union  amongst  his  employees  would  likely  bring,  simply  informed  his  workforce 
of  his  intent  to  retire  and  close  his  business  should  they  persist  in  forming 
an  official  union  branch.  If,  however,  a  warning  is  issued  with  a  purely 
self-regarding  intent,  not  that  is  in  the  context  of  an  assessment  or  of  a 
report  of  what  someone  else  might  do  or  of  what  might  just  happen,  but  rather 
in  terms  of  what  the  person  issuing  the  warning  can,  will  or  may  do,  then 
a  case  of  coercion  by  threat  ensues. 
In  some  cases  the  recipient  of  advice,  guidance  or  of  a  warning  might 
feel  he  is  constrained  when)for  example)he  might  have  preferred  not  to 
have  been  given  knowledge  of  the  facts  but  rather  to  have  remained  in 
ignorance  and  to  have  taken  his  chance.  Unsolicited  infozmation  or  advice 
about  one's  friends  for  example  is  not  always  welcomed  especially  if  it 
undermines  one's  trust  and  induces  one  to  prejudge  their  characters.  Indeed 
a  person  might  consider  such  unsolicited  advice,  guidance  or  warning.,  to  be 
compelling  though  there  may  have  been  no  such  intent  on  the  part  of  the  author. 
Such  cases  then  are  not  cases  of  coercion  though  the  recipient  may  feel  his 
position  is  worsened  and  his  freedom  curtailed  and  his  interests  jeopardized. 46 
Direct  pleading  differs  from  indirect  pleading  in  that  in  the  case  of 
the  former  a  person  is  inclined  to  indicate  or.  to  voice  his  personal  wishes 
in  the  expectation  that  it  will  add  weight  to  his  cause,  making  it  more 
persuasive  by  resorting  to  less  rational  techniques  of  a  more  personal 
and  subjective  nature  and  employing  his  personal  charm,  wiles,  skills  and 
attraction  as  aids  to  argument.  Here  there  would  seem  to  be  a  suggestion 
of  coerciveness  in  so  far  as  the  gentlest  'Please'  or  'Would  you?  '  may 
make  the  person  to  whom  it  is  directed  feel  compelled  in  some  way  to  comply 
or  do  something  he  would  not  usually  do  as  a  matter  of  course.  So  I  might 
say  'I  did  it  only  because  he  asked  me',  meaning  that  I  am  not  allowed 
to  consider  the  matter  on  its  merits  but  feel  pressurised  to  bend  to 
another's  will.  This,  however,  does  not  amount  to  coercion  for  there  is  no 
threat,  and  one  may  assume  that  I  acted  voluntarily,  say  out  of  sympathy 
or  to  please  or  simply  to  avoid  unpleasantness. 
But  some  cases  of  direct  pleading  would  seem  to  be  of  a  more  compelling 
nature,  such  as  persistent  nagging,  plaguing  and  badgering,  as  to  amount 
to  cases  of  goading  or  prodding.  According  to  the  Oxford  English  Dictionary, 
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to  goad  is  to  assail  or  prick  as  with  a  goad,  to  irritate  or  impel  by 
some  form  of  mental  pain  or  annoyance,  to  drive  by  continued  irritation 
into  or  to  some  disparate  action  or  uncontrolled  state  of  mind.  Goading, 
it  is  suggested,  is  a  mild  form  of  compulsion  which  may  be  coercive  and 
constitute  a  case  of  coercion  should  the  victim  feel  impelled  or  provoked 
to  avoid  the  threat  of  its  continuance  by  choosing  reluctantly  to  do  what 
his  antagonist  desires,  as  for  example  in  the  case  of  the  husband  who  conforms 
reluctantly  to  avoid  his  wife's  nagging,  or  vice  versa  of  course. 
A  further  example  of  direct  pleading  which  is  not  prima  facie  coercive 
is  bribing.  Bribes  like  offers  and  rewards  seek  to  induce  action  not  by 
fear  but  by  offering  a  benefit.  The  use  of  bribes  may  seem  to  suggest  an 
artful  even  deceitful  means  of  persuasion,  but  to  bribe  is  not  to  manipulate 
or  deceive  in  the  way  a  person  enticing  or  seducing  another  may.  A  person 
offering  a  bribe  need  not  necessarily  have  previously  studied  his  victim's 47 
weaknesses  in  order  to  exploit  him  and  to  bribe  him  most  effectively,  on  the 
contrary  he  may  just  'try  it  on'  so  to  speak  and  quite  possibly  might  not  get 
the  reaction  he  expected.  Money  bribes  to  strangers,  for  example,  offered  on 
the  spur  of  the  moment,  may  not  always  obtain  the  reception  the  offeror 
hoped  for.  It  may  for  instance  be  contrary  to  the  victim's  moral  code. 
Bribes  may  be  used  by  the  manipulator  of  course  but  in  themselves  they  are 
not  manipulative;  they  tempt  but  it  would  seem  unreasonable  to  suppose  that 
a  bribe  of  any  kind  could  make  it  impossible  for  a  person  to  do  his  duty. 
So  bribes  are  really  rewards  but  of  a  particular  kind  given  that  is  in 
return  for  some  service  which  is  discreditable  such  as  the  revealing  of 
confidential  information  or  for  'telling'  on  someone.  But  bribes  like  offers 
and  rewards  are  not  usually  considered  coercive  because  they  offer  benefits 
rather  than  threats.  If,  for  example,  a  soldier  is  made  prisoner  and  in  the 
process  of  his  interrogation  is  offered  every  comfort  and  the  cessation  of 
his  torture  provided  he  agrees  to  reveal  certain  information,  he  is  made  an 
offer,  and  is  bribed  too  if  it  is  assumed  that  it  is  his  duty  not  to  tell;  if 
instead  he  is  threatened  with  even  more  severe  torture  then  he  is  coerced. 
Sometimes  a  bribe  and  a  threat  may  be  made  together.  This  would  be  the  case 
if  an  employer  for  instance  suggested  to  one  of  his  employees  'If  you  tell 
me  who  instigated  this  strike  I'll  give  you  promotion  but  if  you  don't  I'll  see 
that  you  lose  your  job'. 
When  a  person  is  induced  to  a  course  of  action  by  artful  and  deceitful 
means  so  that  he  is  unaware  of  what  is  happening  to  him  we  cannot  say  he  is 
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coerced,  but  we  might  say  he  has  been  manipulated  or  used,  that  is  made 
a  convenience  of  and  treated  as  an  object  of  minimal  intelligence  rather  than 
in  a  respectful  manner  as  one  would  normally  treat  another  rational  human 
being.  Manipulation  may  be  manifested  in  two  ways,  (i)  in  a  causal  sense 
when  for  instance  one  is  said  to  manipulate  the  functioning  of  some  inanimate 
artefact  or  system  or  some  animate  being  as  in  the  case  of  conditioning 
when  the  existence  of  a  rational  will  in  the  case  of  the  being  manipulated 48 
is  denied,  and,  (ii)  in  the  context  of  some  cases  of  irrational  persuasion 
other  than  simple  pleading  when  an  attempt  is  made  to  undercut  or  bend  the 
will  of  the  victim.  In  the  latter  case  the  person  who  manipulates  makes 
a  study  of  his  victim's  character  and  dispositions  in  order  to  find  and  to 
exploit  his  victim's  weaknesses  and  to  use  them  to  induce  his  victim  by 
deceitful  means  to  unwittingly  follow  a  course  of  action  predetermined  but 
concealed  by  him  his  manipulator.  Advertisers  resort  to  such  manipulatory 
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practices  when  for  example  they  seek  to  exploit  a  natural  interest  between 
the  sexes  by  suggesting  a  relationship  between  sex  appeal  and  say  a  particular 
kind  of  tobacco  or  perfume.  Alternatively  they  may  seek  to  exploit-our 
inherent  snobbishness  by  advertising  a  pedigree  pram  for  instance  against 
the  background  of  a  Rolls  Royce  car.  "  If  we  are  taken  in  by  these  techniques 
we  might  say  we  have  been  enticed  and  our  normal  rational  consciousness 
undermined,  but  we  are  not  coerced. 
To  entice,  according  to  the  Oxford  English  Dictionary,  is  to  attract 
by  the  offer  of  pleasure  or  advantage,  and  especially  to  allure  insidiously 
or  adroitly.  Children  particularly  are  adapt  at  enticing  each  other  away 
from  more  serious  tasks  by  exploiting  each  others'  weaknesses.  Similarly, 
a  man  may  entice  another  man's  wife  to  leave  the  matrimonial  home  by 
resorting  to  such  devices  as  flattery,  charm  and  affectionate  attention, 
whilst  concealing  his  real  aim,  relying  on  his  attentions  to  so  influence 
the  woman's  feelings  towards  him  that  she  is  induced  to  decide  to  leave 
her  husband,  which  is  what  her  enticer  really  desires. 
Closely  related  to  enticement  is  the  notion  of  seduction.  To  seduce 
someone  is  to  lead  them  astray  or  more  particularly  to  entice  them  from 
rectitude  or  duty.  In  this  respect  seduction  is  more  morally  reprehensible 
than  enticement  for  one  may  be  enticed  presumably  to  do  good  as  well  as 
bad  things.  The  act  of  seducing  in  particular  normally  refers  to  the  act 
of  persuading  a  woman  to  surrender  her  chastity  by  making  her  feel  she 
wants  to  despite  her  basic  belief  that  to  do  so  is  wrong. -ýr.  o 
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So  in  both  cases  of  seduction  and  enticement  our  choices  are  rigged 
by  skilful  operators,  who  make  us  feel  we  want  what  they  want  us  to  want 
by  resorting  to  psychological  means  of  exploiting  our  weaknesses,  but  in 
neither  case  does  coercion  exist  for  no  threat  is  involved  and  there  is  no 
clash  of  will  between  he  who  entices  or  seduces  and  his  victim. 
An  alternative  way  of  getting  people  to  act  in  desired  ways  and  in 
accordance  with  one's  wishes  is  to  try  to  alter  and  to  undermine  their 
fundamental  beliefs,  values  and  attitudes.  And  this  may  be  achieved  in  ways 
other  than  those  we  have  already  considered,  for  instance  by  those  processes 
and  techniques  associated  with  the  notions  of  propaganda,  indoctrination  and 
brainwashing,  which  rely  upon  methods  of  a  particularly  deceitful-and 
manipulatory  kind,  predominately  persuasive  in  the  case  of  propaganda  and 
indoctrination,  but  causal  also  (as  in  conditioning)  in  the  case  of 
brainwashing. 
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The  word  propaganda  derives  fromm  the  Latin  'propagare'  which  refers 
to  the  gardener's  practice  of  pinning  the  fresh  roots  of  a  plant  into  the 
earth  in  order  to  produce  new  plants  which  will  eventually  take  on  a  life 
of  their  own.  The  Roman  Catholic  Church  adopted  this  word  to  describe  one 
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of  its  Congregations  founded  in  1633  for  the  purpose  of  spreading  the 
beliefs  of  the  Catholic  faith.  Originally  propaganda  was  regarded  by  the 
Church  as  a  beneficient  process  leading  the  heathen  to  faith,  but  in  modern 
times,  as  a  result  of  its  association  with  certain  processes  used  as  apolitical 
weapon,  particularly  in  times  of  war,  it  is  now  used  to  refer  in  a  pejorative 
sense  to  the  use  of  sinister,  deceitful  and  underhand  practices  of  a 
manipulatory  kind  aimed  to  influence  and  to  distort  public  opinion, 
allegiances  and  morale  with  the  purpose  of  affecting  the  eventual  outcome 
of  wars,  civil  conflicts  and  political  disagreements.  Nowadays  the 
propagandist  does  not  confine  his  energies  simply  to  the  spreading  of  doctrines, 
but  seeks  at  times  to  arouse  feelings,  emotions,  passions  of  hatred  and 50 
approval  for  or  against  particular  groups  of  people  or  causes. 
Propaganda  may  be,  but  ought  not  to  be,  confused  with  other  forms  of 
persuasion  of  a  more  rational  kind  such  as  exhortation,  in  the  form  of 
speeches  and  appeals  of  an  emotional  nature,  which  involves  the  urging  of 
a  person  to  do  his  duty  or  something  he  is  not  particularly  willingly 
inclined  to  do.  Propaganda  differs  from  exhortation  in  its  deviousness. 
The  propagandist  eliminates  choice  so  far  as  the  victim  is  concerned  though 
his  presence  cannot  fail  but  to  acknowledge  the  existence  of  alternative 
points  of  view,  for  were  his  views  already  universally  held  by  everybody 
then  his  role  and  presence  would  naturally  be  superfluous.  In  this  context 
it  may  be  interesting  to  note  that  the  Catholic  Propaganda  Congregation 
only  emerged  when  Catholic  doctrines  were  being  severely-questioned. 
What  therefore  makes  certain  behaviour  propaganda  is  not  so  much  the 
nature  of  the  material  or  content,  which  may  be  true  or  false,  but  the 
manner  in  which  the  material  is  presented.  The  basic  technique  used  is  that 
of  suggestion,  the  aim  being  to  induce  belief  without  evidence  either  logical 
or  otherwise.  Usually  the  procedure  takes  the  form  of  an  appeal  to  basic 
instincts  frequently  of  a  most  primitive  kind  such  as  the  subject's  greed, 
anxiety,  fear  or  aggression.  This  is  then  followed  either  by  a  suggested 
solution  to  a  proposed,  imaginary  and  hypothetical  problem,  or  by  a  message 
delivered  in  a  variety  of  deceitful  ways,  such  as  by  labelling  or 
characterizing  types  in  emotive  terms,  by  misinterpreting  and  misrepresenting 
the  facts,  by  persistently  and  continuously  repeating  the  message,  by 
appealing  to  loyalty  and  unity  and  authority,  or  by  claiming  quite  falsely 
that  everybody  agrees  anyway.  Nevertheless  persuasion  by  suggestion  is 
only  effective  if  the  propagandee  sees  it  as  complementary  to  his  own 
existing  beliefs  or  perhaps  as  an  extension  of  them.  So,  the  propagandist 
does  not  coerce,  he  does  not  invite  a  conflict  of  wills,  he  does  not 
threaten,  for  his  aim  is  not  to  overrule  the  contrary  intentions  of  his 
victim,  not  to  compel  by  force,  but  to  persuade  and  to  induce  and  achieve 
if  possible  an  enthusiastic  and  popular  accord. 51 
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Indoctrination  differs  from  propaganda  in  that  it  is  concerned  firstly 
with  the  teaching  and  passing  on  of  ideologies,  doctrines,  beliefs  and 
values  of  say  a  political,  religious,  or  moral  kind,  which  are  not  capable  of 
verification,  and  secondly  with  presenting  such  doctrines  as  necessary 
substantive  truths  without  question.  Indoctrination  is  a  process  whereby 
people  are  induced  to  regard  as  certain  and  true  beliefs  that  are  not  certain. 
The  distinguishing  mark  of  an  indoctrinated  man  is  that  he  holds  such  beliefs 
without  questioning  them,  without  evidence  and  with  a  closed  mind.  So  an 
atheist,  or  religious  believer,  or  say,  for  example.,  a  Marxist  who  believes 
that  economic  forces  are  the  fundamental  forces  in  economic  change,  which 
fact  cannot  be  proved  or  disproved  one  way  or  another  just  as  the  non-existence 
or  existence  of  God  cannot  be  either,  may  be  regarded  as  indoctrinated  if  he 
accepts  uncritically  the  propositions  of  his  particular  belief  but  not  if  he 
accepts  them  on  rational  grounds,  for  example  in  terms  of  their  utility,  say 
for  their  contribution  towards  the  well  being  of  society1or  towards  the 
personal  development  of  the  individual. 
The  use  of  non-rational  techniques  of  persuasion  certainly  constitutes 
a  necessary  condition  for  indoctrination  but  is  not  sufficient  for  it  is  the 
nature  of  the  beliefs  imparted  that  is  significant  and  which  distinguishes 
indoctrination  from  propaganda.  Those  who  have  been  successfully  indoctrinated 
may  be  able  to  give  reasons  for  their  beliefs  but  it  is  these  reasons  which 
they  do  not  care  to  question.  Like  the  propagandist  the  indoctrinator, 
whether  he  is  conscious  of  it  or  not,  undercuts  the  victim's  will  by 
persuasive  and  deceitful  means,  but  he  does  not  invite  conflict,  he  seeks 
instead  a  willing  acquiescence.  The  person  who  has  been  successfully 
indoctrinated  is  not  aware  of  having  been  so,  and  certainly  does  not  feel  he 
has  been  coerced. 
The  notion  of  brainwashing  suggests  no  fresh  or  further  mysterious 
processes  peculiar  to  itself  but  rather  encompasses  a  combination  of 
whatever  means  are  deemed  suitable  at  the  time,  which  may  range  from  rational 52 
and  irrational  means  of  persuasion  to  compulsion  and  causally  induced  - 
responses,  even  to  the  infliction  of  harm,  with  the  principal  aim  of 
changing  the  victim's  pattern  of  thinking  and  feeling.  Whilst  indoctrination 
is  possible  with  say  young  and  inexperienced  children  and  gullible  adults, 
and  indeed  can  even  happen  by  default  in  cases  where  parents  or  teachers, 
by  example  and  force  of  their  personality,  manage  to  transmit  values  and 
attitudes  unwittingly  to  their  charges,  brainwashing  amounts  to  a  recognition, 
of  the  fact  that  once  a  person  becomes  a  rational  thinking  adult  it  is 
more  difficult  to  indoctrinate  him.  Something  more  fundamental  than 
indoctrination  may  be  required  to  change  his  beliefs. 
The  term  'brainwashing'  was,  it  seems,  first  used  by  an  American 
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journalist,  one  Edward  Hunter,  as  a  translation  of  a  Chinese  colloquialism 
(hsi  nao,  literally  'wash  brain')  which  became  current  in  common  parlance 
after  the  Communist  take-over  in  China.  It  involves  a  much  more  rigorous, 
systematic  and  forceful  onslaught  upon  a  person's  belief  system  than 
indoctrination  implies.  The  aim  of  the  brainwasher,  who  is  a  conscious  and 
deliberate  manipulator,  is  to  break  the  victim's  will  so  that  weakened 
and  exhausted,  mentally,  emotionally  and  physically,  he  is  reduced  to  a 
state  of  indifference,  even  anomie,  and  is  ready  to  believe  whatever  he  is 
told.  The  techniques  used  by  the  Chinese  interrogators  in  the  Korean  Rar 
were  not  new,  punishment,  kindness,  rewards,  lectures,  social  isolation, 
the  award  and  suspension  of  privileges,  self-confession,  forced  confessions, 
forceful  interrogation,  self-criticism  and  so  on.  What  was  new  in  the 
methods  of  the  Chinese  was  the  sustained  way  in  which  these  techniques 
were  alternated  or  a  selection  of  them  was  used  in  appropriate  circumstances 
as  a  package  in  a  combined  assault  upon  the  victim's  consciousness  and 
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physical  endurance.  Brainwashing,  it  would  seem,  is  a  system  whereby 
some  seek  to  reduce  others  totally  to  become  instruments  of  their  will,  as 
is  the  intention,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  hypnotic  suggestion.  So 
far  as  the  victim  is  concerned  his  choice  is  eliminated  by  a  combination 
of  persuasive  and  causal  techniques  which  are  deliberately  employed  to 53 
compel  him  to  a  particular  end. 
Propaganda,  indoctrination  and  brainwashing  are  clearly  not  identical 
to  the  notion  of  coercion  in  any  of  the  three  senses  in  which  we  have 
distinguished  the  concept.  This  is  so  because  it  is  simply  not  possible 
to  alter  a  person's  beliefs  and  attitudes  by  coercing  him,  for  a  person 
cannot  unwillingly  take  attitudes  as  part  of  himself,  that  is  to  say  he 
cannot  consciously  unwillingly  believe,  though  if  coerced  by  threats  or 
force  he  might  pretend  to  believe  or  appear  outwardly  to  adopt  certain 
attitudes  say  for  the  sake  of  an  easier  life,  or  to  avoid  hastle,  or  to 
please  his  interrogators.  Many  soldiers,  for  example,  captured  by  the 
Chinese  in  the  Korean  War  adopted  this  course  in  order  to  survive.  It  was 
commonly  referred  to  as  'playing  it  cool'.  Consequently  the  wills  of  these 
men  were  never  broken,  nor  were  they  deceived  or  manipulated,  they  simply 
went  along  with  their  captors,  broadcasting  for  them  and  apparently  doing 
as  their  captors  wished,  but  upon  their  release  they  immediately  re-assumed 
outwardly  as  well  as  inwardly  their  own  former  true  beliefs  and  values. 
So,  they  could  have  argued,  and  no  doubt  some  of  them  did.,  that  they  were 
compelled  reluctantly  or  coerced  into  doing  what  they  did.  Certainly  they 
were  not  deceived  nor  were  they  brainwashed,  but  whether  infact  they  were 
compelled,  threatened.,  forced,  bribed  or  enticed  would  in  the  circumstances 
be  difficult  to  determine.  So  to  be  coerced  is  not  the  same  as  being 
subjected  to  propaganda,  or  to  being  indoctrinated  or  brainwashed,  but 
coercive  techniques  and  threats  may  be  employed  by  people  in  the  implementation 
of  such  processes,  as  a  means  or  aid,  that  is,  to  the  achievement  of  their 
particular  ends. 
Finally,  coercion  involves  the  infliction  of  harm  on  the  coercee, 
though  the  notion  of  harm  is  generously  interpreted  in  this  context  to 
include  not  just  physical  injury  but  the  infringement  of  a  person's 
freedom  or  interests,  the  frustration  of  his  desires  or  a  general  worsening 
of  his  position.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  the  infliction  of  harm  by 
one  person  upon  another  in  every  case  necessarily  amounts  to"a  case  of 54 
coercion,  for  this  would  depend  upon  the  state  of  mind  of  the  two  parties  con- 
cerned.  Just  as  there  are  some  people  who  seem  to  enjoy  the  infliction  of 
pain  upon  themselves  and  may  even  seek  it,  so  there  are  others  who  enjoy 
inflicting  pain  on  other  people,  but  the  infliction  of  pain  on  another  in 
itself  does  not  amount  to  coercion  for  in  the  latter  case  a  person  inflicts 
harn  in  the  form  of  a  threat  or  by  force  with  the  specific  intent  to..  mäke 
the  coercee  behave  in  a  way  he  the  coercer  desires.  All  cases  of  intimidation, 
sadism,  punishment  involve  the  infliction  of  harm  in  some  way  or  other, 
but  not  necessarily  are  they  always  accompanied  by  the  specific  intent  to 
motivate  the  victim  towards  a  particular  course  of  action. 
To  intimidate  a  person  is  to  frighten  him,  to  make  him  fearful,  to 
dishearten  him,  and  in  so  far  as  it  describes  the  relationship  between  one 
person  and  another,  it  implies  the  threat  of  or  the  actual  infliction  of 
harm.  But  a  person  may  be  intimidated  by  agencies  other  than  those  capable  of 
coercing,  for  instance  by  objects  and  events  of  the  physical  world  such  as 
storms  and  earthquakes,  and  by  animals.  Colloquially,  it  is  true,  the 
term  intimidation  is  applied  in  cases  in  which  a  person  is  influenced  or 
made  to  act  in  a  particular  way.  We  might  say,  for  example,  'Don't  allow 
yourself  to  be  intimidated  by  him,  do  as  you  wish'.  But  in  these  cases 
the  act  of  intimidation  becomes  part  of  an  attempt  to  coerce  constituting 
a  threat  or  some  forceful  act  calculated  to  impel  the  victim  to  respond  in 
a  particular  way.  So,  intimidation  may  be  distinguished  from  coercion  in 
two  respects,  firstly  in  that  one  can  be  intimidated  by  things  and  events 
which  cannot  be  considered  as  coercing  agents,  and  secondly  in  that 
intimidation  does  not  necessarily  imply  an  intent  to  motivate  another 
person  towards  a  desired  course  of  action  as  coercion  does,  that  is  to  say 
I  can  be  frightened  and  intimidated  without  being  coerced.  This  is  the  case 
when  someone  intends  to  coerce  me,  threatens  me  and  frightens  me,  but  I 
manage  to  escape  from  his  control  or  to  resist  his  pressure.  I  may  be 
frightened  and  intimidated  but  I  do  not  allow  myself  to  be  coerced  into 
doing  what  my  antagonist  desires. 55 
In  general  we  try  to  avoid  the  actions  of  others  or  situations 
created  by  others  which  we  anticipate  might  cause  us  pain  or  unpleasantness, 
and  this  would  undoubtedly  be  the  case  if  the  intentions  of  others  towards 
us  appeared  to  be  particularly  sadistic.  The  terns  'sadism'  derives  its 
origin  from  the  activities  associated  with  the  career  of  the  infamous 
Marquis  de  Sade  (1740-1816),  a  French  soldier,  adventurer  and  writer  who 
pursued  a  life  of  sexual  perversion,  characterized  by  a  passion  for  cruelty, 
which  eventually  led  to  his  becoming  insane. 
Nowadays  we  apply  the  tern'sadist'  to  those  people  who  inflict  pain 
on  other  sentient  beings  for  their  own  personal  gratification,  desiring 
that  is  the  suffering  of  others  and  the  experience  of  inflicting  pain  on 
others,  causing  them  to  suffer,  for  their  own,  the  sadists',  perverted 
enjoyment.  But  a  person  who  coerces  another  may  but  need  not  do  so  in  a 
sadistic  manner.  If  he  did  coerce  sadistically  then  he  would  be  deemed  to 
have  caused  pain  and  suffering  to  another  for  his,  the  coercer's,  own 
pleasure  and  over  and  above  what  other  desires  and  intentions  he  had  with 
regard  to  the  behaviour  of  the  coercee.  So  teachers  and  parents  who  severely 
punish  the  young  in  their  charge,  in  order  say  to  make  them  work  or  to 
conform  to  certain  rules  of  conduct,  however  senseless  and  inhuman  their 
actions  may  seem,  may  not  necessarily  be  acting  sadistically.  On  the 
contrary,  they  may  just  be  compelling  and  coercing  the  children  to  do  things 
the  latter  do  not  want  to  do,  for  provided  the  teachers  and  parents  do 
not  seek  personal  gratification  in  inflicting  pain  and  suffering  on  others 
they  are  not  acting  sadistically  though  they  may  be  acting  unreasonably 
and  cruelly,  that  is  if  the  fear  and  suffering  they  cause  is  excessive. 
The  intention  of  the  sadist  then  is  not  identical  to  that  of  the  person  who 
attempts  to  coerce  or  who  coerces  successfully  but  the  two  concepts  of 
coercion  and  sadism  may  overlap. 
Similarly,  in  punishing  a  person  one  does  him  harm  but  one's  intention 
in  punishing  is  not  necessarily  identical  to  that  of  the  person  who  sets 
out  to  coerce,  and  the  infliction  of  punishment  does  not  necessarily  amount 
to  a  case  of  coercion.  In  three  ways,  however,  the  notion  of  punishment T 
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may  be  related  to  coercion. 
Firstly,  punishment  in  particular  forms  such  as  detention,  imprisonment 
are  clearly  cases  of  coercion  by  force  if  they  prevent  and  compel  the 
victim  from  doing  things  against  his  will,  and  one  would  not  in  the  normal 
course  of  events  expect  a  person  to  agree  willidgl.  y  to  be  incarcerated. 
Secondly,  the  threat  of  punishment,  say  for  the  infringement  of  rules, 
is,  it  has  been  argued  in  the  previous  chapter,  frequently  used  as  a 
deterrent.  The  positive  laws  of  the  state  for  example  prescribe  punishments 
for  stipulated  acts  and  omissions  and  such  laws,  it  has  been  suggested,  are 
more  than  warnings,  for  the  state  that  makes  them  will  see  that  they  are 
carried  out  and  enforced.  Similarly  judicial  precedents  enshrined  in 
established  cases  are  part  of  the  law  of  the  land  as  well.  So  long,  therefore, 
as  subjects  have  no  wish  to  infringe  such  laws  embodied  in  either  cases  or 
statutes  then  the  laws  in  question  remain  just  as  standing  threats  backed  by 
the  sanction  of  punishment,  but  should  subjects  become  so  opposed  to  them 
that  they  comply  simply  for  fear  of  punishment  itself  then  the  laws  become 
coercive  to  them  and  the  subjects  in  question  we  may  say  are  coerced. 
Thirdly,  punishment  may  be  used  like  coercion  as  an  instrument  of  reform. 
Prisoners  and  schoolboys  for  example  may  be  made  to  do,  as  part  of  their 
sentence  or  punishment  respectively,  tasks  which  are  considered  to  be  for 
their  own  good  or  in  their  own  interests  and  necessary  for  their 
rehabilitation  or  improvement.  Such  examples  may  be  considered  as 
paternalistic  and  as  illustrative  too  of  examples  of  coercion  imposed 
on  the  coercee  for  the  latter's  benefit. 
But  punishment  is  not  in  every  case  administered  with  the  intention 
of  motivating  the  victim  to  any  particular  kind  of  behaviour  or  action, 
on  the  contrary  it  may  be  inflicted  for  revenge,  or  to  satisfy  an  outrage, 
or  as  a  form  of  retribution,  in  which  cases  it  would  seem  to  relate  more 
to  the  notion  of  justice  than  coercion.  Only  if  punishment  in  the  form  of 
revenge  or  retribution  is  seen  as  a  means  of  deterring  the  victim  personally 
from  repeating  the  act  for  which  he  is  likely  to  be  punished  can  punishment 57 
in  these  senses  be  related  to  the  concept  of  coercion. 
In  short,  harm  may  be  inflicted  upon  another  in  a  variety  of  ways 
and  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  as  an  examination  of  the  notions  of 
intimidation,  sadism  and  punishnent  has  shown,  but  in  itself  it  does  not 
amount  to  a  case  of  coercion  unless,  that  is,  it  is  imposed  with  the 
additional  intent  of  influencing  the  victim's  action  in  some  way  and  it 
succeeds  in  doing  so. 
It  has  been  argued  that  central  to  the  concept  of  coercion  is  not 
the  concept  of  choice  but  the  notion  of  force  involving  compulsion  by 
one  agent  against  the  other  contrary  to  the  latter's  will,  that  is  to 
say  that  coercion  involves  a  clash  of  wills  between  coercer  and  coercee. 
It  has  also  been  suggested  that  it  is  not  possible  to  distinguish  between 
coercion  by  threat,  in  which  the  coercee  has  a  degree  of  choice,  and 
compulsion,  in  which  the  victim  h2s  no  choice,  because  a  distinction 
is  drawn  between  on  the  one  hand  compulsion  willingly  accepted  or 
causally  induced  without  the  victim's  knowledge,  and  on  the  other  hand 
compulsion  administered  against  the  victim's  will  and  with  his  full 
awareness.  Only  the  latter  form  of  compulsion,  it  is  suggested,  whether 
in  the  form  of  a  threat  or  overwhelming  brute  force  is  coercive. 
Comparisons  with  selected  concepts  relating  to  coercion  precipitated 
the  following  conclusions: 
(i)  cases  of  rational  persuasion  including  direct  and  indirect 
pleading  are  distinct  from  coercion  in  that  there  is  no  clash  of  wills 
between  the  agents  concerned  but  rather  a  desire  for  agreement; 
(ii)  cases  of  manipulation  either  in  the  causal  sense  of  conditioning 
or  in  the  sense  of  irrational  persuasion  do  not  constitute  cases  of 
coercion  because  the  victim  is  unaware  of  what  is  happening  to  him  as 
he  is  either  machanically  compelled  or  deceitfully  induced  towards  a 
course  of  action; 
(iii)  cases  of  altering  a  person's  beliefs  and  attitudes  as  a  means --  ._r 
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to  getting  him  to  act  in  a  desired  way  are  not  cases  of  coercion  partly 
because  the  processes  of  propaganda,  indoctrination  and  brainwashing  are 
deceitful  and  manipulatory  but  also  because  it  is  basically  impossible 
to  coerce  a  person  into  a  belief  of  any  kind; 
(iv)  cases  involving  the  infliction  of  harn  on  another  are  not 
necessarily  examples  of  coercion  though  the  infliction  of  harm  in  some 
form  is  a  necessary  condition  for  coercion  to  be  established. 
Finally,  it  is  submitted  that  three  kinds  of  coercion  may  be 
distinguished,  namely.. 
(i)  coercion  by  threat  in  which  the  coercee  is  left  with  a  reluctant 
but  not  an  impossible  choice, 
(ii)  coercion  by  irresistible  threat  in  which  the  coercee  is  left 
with  a  choice  but  of  such  a  kind  as  to  virtually  amount  to  no-choice  at  all, 
(iii)  coercion  by  force  in  which  there  is  no  choice  left  to  the  coercee 
at  all. 
But  it  is  suggested  that  these  three  kinds  of  coercion  may  be  reduced 
to  two,  namely, 
(i)  coercion  by  threat,  and 
(ii)  coercion  by  force  including  cases  of  coercion  by  overwhelming 
and  irresistible  threat  where  choice  is  virtually  eliminated., 
The  conditions  relating  to  these  two  kinds  of  coercion  may  now  be 
distinguished  and  sunmiarized. 
In  the  case  of  coercion  by  threat: 
P  coerces  Q  into  doing  (or  not  doing)  act  A  when 
(i)  P  threatens  Q  unless.  Q  does  (or  does  not  do  )  some  act  A  and  Q 
knows  or  believes  that  P  is  making  this  threat  and  P  knows  or 
believes  that  Q  believes  P  is  threatening  him  (i.  e.  Q) 
(ii)  P's  threat  makes  Q's  doing  (or  not  doing)  act  A  less  eligible 
as  a  course  of  action  than  not  doing  (doing)  A  respectively 
(iii)  Q  does  (does  not  do  )  act  A. 59 
In  the  case  of  coercion  by  force  (including  irresistible  threat) 
P  coerces  Q  into  doing  (not  doing)  act  A  when 
(i)  P  compels  Q  into  doing  (not  doing)  act  A  against  Q's  will 
and  Q  is  aware  of  what  P  is  doing 
(ii)  P's  act  of  force  (or  threat)  makes  Q's  not  doing  (doing)  act  A 
ineligible  as  a  course  of  action 
(iii)  Q  does  (does  not  do  )  act  A. TT  I 
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It  is  commonly  supposed  that  coercion  is  antithetical  to  freedom  and 
that  whereas  there  is  a  negative  presumption  against  coercive  interference  in 
another  man's  affairs  there  is  a  positive  presumption  in  favour  of  freedom 
itself.  It  would  for  instance  seem  odd,  if  only  because  it  would  not  seem  to 
be  very  fair,  to  ask  the  victim  of  a  coercive  threat  or  act  to  explain  himself, 
instead  it  would  more  likely  be  the  case  that  it  would  be  the  agent  or  author 
of  coercion,  not  the  victim,  whom  we  would  wish  to  call  to  account.  Because 
coercion  implies  the  infringement  of  liberty  there  is  a  feeling,  it  seems, 
that  its  use  should  be  justified  since  freedom  is  deemed  to  be  desirable 
whereas  coercion  is  not. 
This  and  subsequent  chapters  are  concerned  with  the  justification  of 
coercion,  that  is  to  say  with  reasons  why  coercion  must  be  justified  and, 
provided  the  effects  claimed  for  its  use  are  possible,  the  grounds  upon  which 
such  a  justification  should,  if  at  all,  be  based.  Meantime,  it  is  our 
concern  to  consider  three  aspects  of  the  relation  between  freedom  and 
coercion  in  the  following  contexts,  namely,  (i)  the  nature  of  freedom  and 
the  extent  to  which  coercion  may  be  said  to  be  antithetical  to  it,  (ii)  the 
nature  of  arguments  commonly  offered  in  support  of  a  presumption  in  favour 
of  freedom  and  thereby  implying  a  presumption  against  coercion,  and  (iii)  the 
extent  to  which  freedom  and  coercion  may  be  regarded  as  being  compatible. 
It  is  not  sufficient  to  say  that  coercion  is  the  antithesis  of  freedom 
because  coercion  is  only  one  of  several  means  by  which  a  person's  freedom 
may  be  impaired.  A  person  may  be  compelled  by  another  without  being  coerced, 
or  he  may  be  constrained  by  non  human  factors  such  as  an  avalanche,  or  by 
his  own  inabilities  or  incapacities,  and  in  all  such  cases  he  may  be  said  to 
be  unfree.  So  coercion  cannot  and  does  not  exhaust  all  the  possibilities 
of  being  unfree  or,  that  is  to  say,  the  concept  of  unfreedom.  R.  Nozick 
acknowledges  this  when  he  argues  that  being  coerced  into  not  doing  an  act 63 
is  neither  a  necessary  nor  a  sufficient  condition  for  being  said  to  be  unfree. 
First,  Nozick  gives  three  examples  to  illustrate  why  being  coerced  into  not 
doing  an  act  cannot  be  considered  a  necessary  condition  for  a  person  being 
said  to  be  unfree: 
(a)  A  person  robs  a  bank  and  is  caught  and  punished.  If  he  had  known 
for  sure  that  he  would  be  caught  and  punished,  he  would  not  have  done  so,  but 
he  did  not  know  this  and  so  robbed  the  bank.  He  was,  therefore,  unfree  to  rob 
the  bank  but  was  not  coerced  into  not  doing  so. 
(b)  A  lecturer  is  not  coerced  into  not  murdering  a  member  of  his  audience 
but  he  is  unfree  to  do  so.  That  is  to  say,  he  is  unfree  by  law  and  is  only 
coerced  if  he  wishes  to  co  nit  murder  but  decides  not  to  do  so  because  of  the 
sanctions  of  the  law. 
(c)  If  a  person  lures  another  into  an  escape  proof  room  and  leaves  him 
imprisoned  there,  he  does  not  coerce  his  victim  into  not  going  elsewhere 
although  he  renders  him  unfree  to  do  so. 
Secondly,  Nozick  argues  that  being  coerced  into  not  doing  a  particular  act 
does  not  constitute  a  sufficient  condition  for  being  said  to  be  unfree  to  do 
the  said  act,  and  gives  the  following  as  an  example:  "You  threaten  to  get  me 
fired  from  my  job  if  I  do  A,  and  I  refrain  from  doing  A  because  of  this  threat 
and  am  coerced  into  not  doing  A.  However  unbeknownst  to  me  you  are  bluffing; 
you  know  you  have  absolutely  no  way  to  carry  out  this  threat,  and  would  not 
carry  it  out  if  you  could.  I  was  not  unfree  tö  do  A  (no  doubt  I  thought  I  was) 
though  I  was  coerced  into  not  doing  A.  " 
Though  the  notion  of  coercion  does  not  exhaust  the  notion  of  being 
unfree  it  is  nevertheless  very  closely  connected  to  it.  Though  it  is  wrong 
to  equate  freedom  with  the  absence  of  coercion,  since  the  latter  does  not 
exhaust  the  range  of  non  liberty  or  unfreedom,  the  loss  of  some  freedom,  of 
freedom  in  some  sense,  is  always  present  no  matter  what  form  coercion  takes, 
because  coercion  involves  the  deliberate  interference  of  another  human  being 
in  the  area  in  which  he  would  wish  to  act.  Coercion  denies  freedom  in  the 
sense  of  being  'free  from'  and  it  is  in  this  negative  sense  of  being  free 
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from  constraint  that  a  person  free  from  coercion  may  be  said  to  be  free. 
A  person  is  free,  socially  free  that  is  to  say,  to  the  degree  to  which  no 
other  person  interferes  with  his  freedom  of  action,  and  liberty  or  freedom 
in  this  sense  constitutes  simply  that  area  in  which  a  person  can  do  what  he  wants. 
Coercion  and  freedom  cannot  be  regarded  as  perfect  logical  contraries,  nor 
can  they  be  seen  as  being  perfectly  antithetical  to  one  another  in  so  far 
as  neither  one  completely  rules  out  the-other.  Even  what  might  seem  to  be  a 
most  powerful  coercive  constraint  will  not  necessarily  rule  out  come  measure 
or  degree  of  freedom,  nor  is  the  freedom  enjoyed  by  a  person  free  from  the 
restraint  of  another  necessarily  unlimited,  for  it  may  be  limited  by  other 
things.  If,  for  instance,  a  man  is  coerced  by  a  threat  of  dire  physical 
force  amounting,  say,  to  an  irresistible  threat  he  is  still  free  to  submit 
or  to  accept  the  consequences,  and  if  he  is  not  subject  to  any  threat  he 
may  still  be  unfree  in  other  respects.  Constraint  in  the  form  of  coercion 
only  approaches,  and  then  only  imperfectly,  the  contrariety  of  freedom  when 
overwhelming  force  is  used  to  achieve  those  limited  ends  or  the  eradication 
of  those  limited  freedoms  that  only  such  force  is  able  to  achieve.  To  imprison 
a  man  may  deprive  him  of  certain  limited  freedoms,  say  of  communication  and 
mobility,  but  not  necessarily  of  all  freedoms  for  he  still  may  be  able  to  think. 
Coercion  would  seem  to  have  a  relation  to  freedom  not  of  logical  contrariety 
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but  one  of  polar  antagonism.  The  relation  between  freedom  and  coercion, 
it  is  suggested,  may  be  conceived  in  terms  of  inverse  proportion,  whereby 
degrees  of  constraint  relate  in  inverse  proportion  to  degrees  of  freedom,  the 
principle  being  the  more  constraint  the  less  freedom  and  vice  versa.  We 
recognise  this  principle  when  we  assume  that  the  extent  of  freedom  enjoyed 
by  P  and  Q  respectively  is  determined  by  the  extent  to  which  the  freedom  of 
one  acts  as  a  constraint  upon  the  freedom  of  the  other.  My  freedom  to  play 
the  piano,  for  example,  is  measured  by  the  extent  to  which  my  playing 
impinges  upon  my  neighbours'  freedom  to  enjoy  peace  and  quietness.  More 
freedom  for  the  eels,  we  say,  means  less  freedom  for  the  minnows,  or  as  the 
proverbial  Irish  judge  is  said  to  have  remarked  to  a  compatriot  brought 65 
before  him  on  a  charge  of  assault  and  battery,  "Everyman'  a  freedom  is  bounded 
by  the  position  of  the  other  man's  nose.  " 
Coercion  cannot  be  considered  as  the  perfect  antithesis  or  antonym  of 
freedom.  A  person  may  be  coerced  yet  still  be  free  in  some  respects,  and 
may  be  unfree  and  constrained  though  not  coerced.  This  is  possible  because 
coercion  is  but  one  of  many  forms  of  constraint,  and  it  is  constraint  not 
coercion  which  is  the  opposite  of  freedom.  But  coercion  is  antithetical  to 
freedom  in  the  sense  that  there  is  a  decrease  in  the  amount'of  freedom 
enjoyed  according  to  the  increase  in  the  amount  of  coercion  experienced.  So 
the  co=n  assumption,  that  the  normal  reply  to  the  question  "tThat  is  it  that 
limits  a  man's  freedom  ?"  is  "Coercion",  must  be  questioned,  and  the  supposition 
that  coercion  is  simply  the  antithesis  of  freedom  qualified. 
The  principal  difficulty  with  regard  to  the  proposition  that  coercion  is 
the  antithesis  of  freedom  arises  from  the  complexity  of  the  notion  of  freedom 
itself.  In  its  simplest  form,  that*is  in  the  negative  sense  of  being  'free  from', 
the  notion  of  freedom  presents  little  difficulty,  particularly  if  it  is  limited 
to  the  non  hinan  world  of  things  animate  and  inanimate.  In  which  cases  freedom, 
in  a  purely  descriptive  and  negative  sense,  suggests  a  state  of  affairs 
implying  the  absence  of  restraint  from  external  or  internal  hindrances.  So 
one  might  refer  to  an  animal  as  free  as  opposed  to  being  in  captivity  or 
physically  incapacitated'.  in  some  way.  And  similarly,  one  might  describe  a 
piece  of  machinery  or  amechanism,  such  as  a  watch,  as  freely  working  where 
there  are  no  external  or  internal  impediments  causing  its  malfunction.  In 
similar  fashion  people  may  be  described  as  being  free  from  constraining 
circumstances,  free  from  work,  from  responsibility,  from  marriage,  or  from 
internal  inabilities  of  one  kind  or  another. 
Difficulties  arise  when  the  notion  of  freedom  is  applied  to  human  beings 
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who  are  not  just  things  subject  to  contingent  circumstances  alone  but  rational 
entities  relating  to  a  noumenal  world  as  well  as  to  the  world  of  natural 
phenomena.  Human  beings  have  the  capacity-of  thought  and  are  said  to  be 
additionally  free  in  so  far  as  they  are  'free  to'  deliberate,  choose,  and  to 66 
determine  their  future  and  self-fulfilment.  We  move,  then,  from  a  negative 
to  a  positive  sense  of  freedom,  from  talking  about  being  'free  from'  to  being 
'free  to'.  There  would  seem  to  be  a  variety  of  ways  in  which  the  term  'free' 
might  be  applied  to  human  beings.  They  may  be  said  to  be  'free  from'  external 
or  internal  constraints,  inabilities,  and  incapacities  caused  by  things  or. 
circumstances,  or,  'free  from'  physical  or  psychological  constraints  caused 
by  other  human  beings  which  might  but  not  necessarily  take  the  form  of  coercive 
threats  and  actions,  or,  free  in  the  sense  of  being  'free  to'  determine 
their  own  lives  and  destiny.  Generally  speaking  it  is  in  the  context  of  the 
second  sense  of  being  free,  'free  from'  the  interference  of  others,  that 
it  is  appropriate  to  speak  of  coercion  as  opposing  and  being  antithetical 
to  freedom,  but  in  other  respects  it  would  seem  that  coercion  depends  upon 
freedom  and  freedom  upon  coercion.  In  the  first  place,  coercion  assumes  the 
existence  of  two  autonomously  and  rationally  free  agents  free  to  coerce  and 
to  impose  their,  will  on  each  other,  and  in  the  second  place,  one  might  argue 
that  coercion  is  logically  related  to  freedom  in  so  far  as  a  person  who  is 
coerced  into  being  freed  from  undesirable  impediments  is  free  to  pursue 
more  desirable  ends.  So  coercion,  paradoxically,  might  not  just  restrict 
but  even  enhance  freedom,  might  not  just  be  antithetical  to  freedom  but 
might  actually  support  it. 
The  notion  of  being  free  in  the  human  context  poses  two  problems  for 
the  moral  philosopher,  that  of  social  freedom,  mainly  the  concern  of  the 
political  philosopher,  and  the  free-will  problem  which  is  principally 
the  concern  of  the  mental  philosopher.  The  free-will  problem  or  the 
relation  of  psychological  and  physiological  causation  to  the  human  personality 
is  not  usually  considered  to  be  especially  relevant  to  a  discussion  regarding 
the  nature  of  social  freedom  and  its  relation  to  coercion,  though  such  a 
view  might  be  disputed.  It  is,  of  course,  a  basic  assumption  in  ordinary 
moral  life  that  individuals  are  both  autonomously  free  and  predictable,, 
predictable  that  is  to  the  extent  that  they  can  be  held  responsible  for 
their  own  decisions  and  actions  and  can  trust  and  rely  upon  one  another 67 
and  anticipate  each  other's  behaviour  to  some  degree.  In  other  words,  in 
speaking  of  coercion  and  social  freedom,  one  presupposes  the  existence  of 
rationally  free  moral  beings  and  that  rational  freedom  is  a  necessary 
condition  for  coercion.  It  seems  a  nonsense  to  even  try  to  contemplate  an 
imaginary  world  of  computorised,  programmed,  human  robots  coercing  each  other. 
We  will  assume,  therefore,  that  individuals  make  choices  which,  though 
explicable  in  terms  of  causes,  are  not  predetermined  in  a  strong  deterministic 
sense.  People  are  reliable  only  to  a  degree  and  although  their  choices  may 
be  rationalised  and  explained  they  cannot  be  anticipated  precisely,  nor 
guaranteed,  nor  can  their  behaviour  be  predicted  absolutely.  Whether  a  person's 
actions  can  be  causally  explained  and/or  strictly  predicted  constitutes  the 
essence  of  the  free-will  problem  but  as  a  matter  of  fact,  in  ordinary  life, 
we  accept  that  moral  agents  are  free,  predictable,  responsible,  and  have 
feelings,  or,  in  other  words,  are  rationally  free  to  intend  and  to  attempt 
to  impose  their  will  on  each  other,  to  make  decisions  and  to  plan  their  own 
lives. 
In  a  social  context  the  term  freedom,  in  both  a  negative  and  positive 
senses  is  used  by  politicians  to  express  a  commendatory  and  prescriptive  ideal. 
Employed  in  this  way,  as  for  example  in  the  well  worn  revolutionary  slogan 
'Liberty,  Equality,  Fraternity',  it  tends  to  imply  very  little  simply  because 
it  is  intended  to  convey  so  much.  To  reify  freedom  in  an  all  embracing  ideal 
drains  it  of  its  descriptive  meaning  and  leaves  it  with  merely  prescriptive 
overtones  synonymous  with  desirable  or  good,  and  to  say  something  is  good  is 
not  to  say  very  much  at  all. 
Slogans  expressed  as  ideals  are  useful  in  so  far  as  they  tend  to  invite 
a  broad  spectrum  of  agreement,  but  equally  they  are  the  cause  of  interminable 
disagreement.  A  person  might  claim  for  instance  that  we  are  more  free  than 
we  used  to  be  whilst  his  antagonist  denies  it,  each  drawing  upon  his  own 
criteria  of  judgment.  Clearly  the  word  free  needs  a  contextual  base.  It 
is  not  like  the  word  'square',  for  example,  which  suggests  positive 
characteristics  such  as  a  figure  with  four  right  angles  and-four  equal  sides. 68 
The  word  free  is  sometimes  used  to  exclude  or  rule  out  some  suggestion 
implicit  in  the  context  in  which  it  is  being  used,  some  impediment  or  constraint 
for  example  upon  what  a  person  might  want  to  do.  If  we  say,  for  instance, 
'Smith  is  free',  the  description  makes  sense  only  if  we  have  information 
about  him,  that  he  has  been  in  prison,  say,  or  hospital.  In  common  usage  the 
suffix  '-free',  which  generally  implies  good  riddance,  illustrates  this  point. 
When  we  refer  to  a  man  being  carefree  or  a  house  rentfree,  the  suffix  '-free' 
rebuts  the  supposition  that  the  man  is  full  of  care  or  that  the  house  is 
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subject  to  a  rental  charge.  So  '-free'  is  used  to  rebut  suggestions  about 
actions  and  situations  just  as  the  word  responsible  is  used  to  rebut  the 
suggestion  that  a  man  could  not  help  doing  what  he  did  because  of  ignorance 
or  compulsion.  This  use  of  the  word  free  reflects  the  classic  tradition  of 
social  freedom  in  its  negative  sense,  implying  the  absence  of  constraints 
imposed  by  the  powers  of  other  men. 
Politicians  appeal  to  the  ideal  of  freedom  in  the  positive  sense 
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when  they  attempt  to  redefine  it  in  terms  of  opportunity.  Freedom  from 
want,  fear,  ignorance,  it  is  supposed,  enables  one  to  aspire  to  greater 
freedoms  and  all  manner  of  imagined  ends.  And  freedom  from  not  being 
prevented  from  choosing  may  even  be  justified  if  it  eventually  leads  to  the 
more  positive  freedom  of  being  one's  own  master.  We  recognise  the  possibility 
of  justifying  the  coercion  of  some,  say  in  the  name  of  justice,  welfare, 
education,  so  long  as  the  end  envisaged  is  a  greater  good  with  regard  to 
the  realisation  of  the  individual  self  or  for  society  as  a  whole.  In 
assuming  it  is  justifiable  to  coerce  people  for  their  own  sake  it  is  generally 
claimed,  as  in  the  case  of  politicians,  parents  and  teachers,  that  the  coercer 
knows  best,  and  that  the  coercees,  if  only  they  were  sufficiently  wise  and 
knowledgeable,  would  realise  this  too.  It  is  presumed  that  there  is  a  latent 
rational  self  in  everyone,  but  since  some  individuals  may  not  be  fully  aware 
of  their  own  potential  to  a  significant  degree,  others,  who  presumably  are 
so  aware,  may,  in  the  interests  of  these  unfortunate  ignorant  selves,  direct, 69 
coerce,  bully  or  oppress  them  in  the  name  of  their  'real'  selves,  the 
attainment  of  which  eventually,  it  is  supposed,  increases  their  potentiality 
for  freedom.  Clearly  the  notion  of  positive  freedom  has  inherent  dangers, 
for  it  may  be  invoked  to  justify  all  manner  of  measures  of  the  most 
authoritarian,  dictatorial  and  coercive  kind,  on  the  grounds  that  such  measures 
may  lead  to  greater  self-realisation  and  greater  freedom  for  those  being 
imposed  upon. 
Freedom  and  coercion  share  a  common  characteristic  in  being  words  of 
force  and  influence.  But  whereas  in  the  former  case  the  impression  given 
is  generally  one  of  approval  in  the  latter  it  is  usually  the  opposite,  and 
in  this  respect  they  may  seem  to  be  antithetical  to  each  other.  Both  terms 
express  distinct  attitudes  calculated  to  influence  and  to  arouse  similar 
responses  in  those  people  who  understand  them,  and  these  causal  or  dispositional 
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properties  give  each  word  a  kind  of  propositional  meaning.  When  Rousseau 
wrote  'Man  is  born  free  but  is  everywhere  in  chains'  he  was  not  describing 
men  as  he  might  have  done  had  he  said  'Man  was  born  naked  but  everywhere 
he  is  in  clothes',  rather  he  was  prescribing  that  men  ought  to  be  treated 
in  certain  ways  of  which  he  approved.  Freedom  for  Rousseau  was  commendatory 
and  worth  while. 
But  a  further  distinction  must  be  noted,  between  freedom  as  liberty 
and  freedom  as  licence.  Whereas  liberty  is  presumed  to  be  good  and  worth  while, 
to  be  free  to  do  bad  and  undesirable  things  is  not  to  enjoy  liberty  but 
licence,  which  is  presumed  to  be  bad.  Liberty  and  licence  do  not  describe 
different  things  in  so  far  as  they  both  imply  freedom  from  constraint,  but 
they  do  suggest  and  arouse  different  attitudes  by  their  use.  We  approve  of 
liberty  but  not  of  licence.  Whereas  we  might  wish  to  question  coercive  acts 
that  impugn  liberty,  we  might  feel  justified  in  using  coercive  measures  to 
contain  or  negate  licence.  Whilst  we  assume  a  presumption  in  favour  of  liberty 
we  do  not  in  favour  of  licence. 70 
In  sum,  the  following  points  have  been  argued. 
(i)  Freedom  is  a  wider  concept  than  coercion  which  is  only  one  of 
many  forms  of  constraint.  So  the  notion  of  coercion  cannot  exhaust  the 
notion  of  unfreedom  and  one  may  be  unfree  yet  not  coerced,  and  coerced  yet 
free  in  other  respects. 
(ii)  Coercion  as  a  form  of  constraint  is  antithetical  to  freedom,  but 
freedom  takes  many  forms.  Freedom  in  the  sense  of  being  rationally  free  is 
a  necessary  condition  of  coercion,  and  coercion  in  certain  cases  may 
paradoxically  be  seen  to  enhance  freedom,  as  moral  and  legal"rules  and 
sanctions  are  intended  to  do. 
(iii)  Two  senses  of  freedom  are  distinguished,  negative  or  freedom 
from  and  positive  freedom  or  freedom  to,  and  they  are  related  in  so  far  as 
the  former  may  be  seen  to  be  a  pre-condition  for  the  latter. 
(iv)  Instead  of  viewing  coercion  as  the  antithesis  of  freedom  it  is 
preferable  to  regard  both  notions  as  antagonistic  to  each  other,  the  amount 
of  freedom  enjoyed,  in  the  negative  sense,  being  related  inversely  to  the 
amount  of  coercion  applied. 
(v)  Both  terms,  freedom  and  coercion,  evince  and  arouse  a  particular 
attitude  or  feeling  as  well  as  having  a  descriptive  meaning.  Such  attitudes 
of  approval  and  disapproval  vary  according  to  whether  freedom  is  seen  in 
terms  of  liberty  or  licence,  and  whether  coercion  is  seen  in  terms  of 
limiting  liberty  or  constraining  licence.  But  in  general  terms  freedom, 
both  in  its  negative  and  positive  senses,  is  approved  of  whereas  coercion 
is  not. 
We  must  now  consider  arguments  in  favour  of  a  presumption  in  favour 
of  freedcm,  for  if  such  arguments  can  be  substantiated  the  need  to  justify 
coercion  will  follow. 71 
When  we  say  men  are  free  we  presume  they  have  a  right  to  be  free.  In 
the  past  considerable  attention  has  been  given  to  the  notion  of  man's  rights 
in  the  form  of  natural  rights,  rights  guaranteed  that  is  by  some  natural 
law  or  some  notion  of  an  eternal,  immutable,  universally  applicable  kind 
of  justice,  divine  or  otherwise.  During  the  eighteenth  century  the  notion 
of  natural  rights  was  superseded  by  that  of  inalienable  rights,  nowadays  we 
tend  to  speak  of  human  rights.  But  common  to  all  three  perspectives  on 
rights  is  the  notion  that  people  the  world  over,  regardless  of  their  local 
laws  and  customs,  have  certain  basic  fundamental  rights  of  which  one  is 
usually  recognised  as  being  the  right  to  be  free. 
Although  there  is  an  apparent  finality  expressed  in  the  view  that  man 
has  a  fundamental  right  to  be  free,  it  is  not  sufficient  in  itself  to 
establish  a  presumption  in  favour  of  freedom.  To  say  that  man  has  a  right 
to  be  free  merely  restates  the  presumption  itself;  it  does  not  explain  it 
nor  does  it  account  for  it;  it  simply  begs  the  question.  To  say  anyone 
has  a  right  to  anything  is  just  to  assert  a  point  of  view,  not  to  substantiate 
it.  We  cannot  argue  that  there  is  a  presumption  in  favour  of  freedom 
because  we  feel  we  have  a  right  to  be  free,  but  we  may  try  to  explain  and 
to  justify  why  men  should  be  free  and.  in  what  respects.  We  might  argue 
for  instance  that  there  is  a  presi  inption  in  favour  of  freedom  because 
freedom  is  conducive  to  happiness  and  enables  us  as  self-governing, 
autonomous  individuals  to  realise  our  talents  and  potentialities  and  that 
all  these  desirable  ends  are  in  turn  conducive  to  the  good  of  society. 
Freedom  is  of  value  because  people  on  the  whole  are  not  happy  if  their 
choices,  wants,  needs,  desires  and  interests  are  restricted  and  their 
satisfactions  frustrated.  In  this  context  happiness  is  taken  as  a  state  of 
being  of  which  it  is  a  necessary  though  not  a  sufficient  condition  that 
the  individual  is  pleased  with  his  life  as  a  whole,  there  being  nothing 72 
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he  wants  that  he  has  not  got.  So  a  person  who  is  coerced  or  deprived 
of  doing  what  'he  wants  to  do  is  likely  to  be  that  less  happy  and  freedom 
justified  because  it  gives  people  the  opportunity  to  promote  their  own 
interests  and  to  maximise  opportunities  that  they  consider  to  be  worth  while. 
J.  S.  Mill  believed  that  a  person's  true  happiness  was  reflected  in  the 
aggregate  of  all  the  things  that  a  person  pursued  for  their  own  sakes,  be  it 
wealth,  virtue,  power  or  fame.  "Happiness",  says  Mill,  "is  not  an  abstract 
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idea  but  a  concrete  whole;  and  these  are  some  of  its  parts.  "  A  person, 
therefore,  who  is  deprived  of  things  he  wants  or  desires  for  their  own  sake 
whether  it  be  a  job,  house,  car,  success  or  what  have  you  is  that  much  less 
happy,  whereas  a  person  free  to  exploit  such  desires  is  more  likely  to  be 
a  happy  man.  Following  this  reasoning  there  must  be  a  presumption  in 
favour  of  freedom  because  only  if  a  person  is  free  does  he  have  the 
opportunity  to  seek  happiness  conceived  in  these  terms. 
Several  reservations  may  be  expressed  regarding  this  way  of  thinking. 
It  is  frequently  assumed  that  only  people  themselves  know  what  is  good  for 
them.  This  may  be  so  in  so  far  as  only  the  individual  himself  can  really 
say  whether  he  thinks  or  feels  happy  or  not.  Only  the  drug  addict  himself 
can  say  whether  in  his  own  estimation  he  believes  he  is  happy  when  under 
the  influence.  We  might,  however,  hesitate  to  agree  that  the  sadomasachist, 
sex  deviant,  or  drug  addict  should  be  free  to  satisfy  their  respective 
desires  even  in  private.  We  might  wish  to  dispute  that  they  would  be  really 
happy  in  so  doing  and  to  argue  instead  that  to  allow  such  freedom  would  be 
to  condone  licence  not  liberty  and  to  countenance  morally  undesirable 
activities  contrary  to  the  well  being  of  the  individuals  themselves  and  to 
society  too.  We  might  argue  that  such  people  and  others  like  the  aged  and 
young  children  do  not  always  know  or  choose  to  do  what  is  good  for  them  and 
that  this  is  just  a  matter  of  fact  of  which  parents  and  teachers  and  social 
workers  are  well  aware. 
Of  course  people  like  parents,  teachers,  and  social  workers  tend  to  have 73 
their  own  idea  of  happiness  and  might  wish  to  include  such  criteria  as 
'being  fortunate'  or  'being  admired'.  People  do  claim  to  be  better  judges, 
say  from  experience  or  knowledge,  of  what  tends  to  another  person's  happiness. 
And  they  will  argue  that  there  are  some  individuals  who  have  to  be  protected 
from  their  wants  and  desires  and  others,  like  children,  who  have  to  be  made 
aware  of  thempeven  by  employing  coercive  measures  if  required.  In  response, 
others  will  argue  that  people,  and  children  particularly,  learn  from  their 
own  mistakes  and  experience  and  thereby  grow  in  stature  with  a  greater 
potential  for  happiness.  The  freedom  advocated  for  example  by  the  progressive 
school  of  educators,  it  is  supposed,  tends  to  greater  happiness  in  the  long 
run  compared  to  the  procedures  of  a  Mr.  Gradgrind.  Some  truth  rests  in  both 
these  contentions,  but  the  pesumption  in  favour  of  freedom  must  surely  stand 
for  clearly  a  normal  person  is  more  likely  to  be  happy  if  free  than  coerced 
against  his  will. 
A  second  objection  to  the  presumption,  that  freedom  is  of  value  because 
it  enables  people  to  pursue  happiness  through  the  satisfaction  of  their 
wants  and  desires,  rests  on  the  assertion  that  although  people  may  be  free 
it  does  not  follow  that  they  are  motivated  to  do  the  things  they  are  free 
to  do,  even  though  they  may  have  expressed  a  wish  to  do  them.  Freedom  does 
not  entail  that  a  person  will  actually  do  what  he  is  not  prevented  from 
doing.  People  may  express  wishes  and  wants  but  lack  the  will  to  fulfil 
them.  So  we  are  reduced  to  saying  that  a  man  is  free  in  so  far  as  no  one 
intends  to  stop  him  from  doing  what  he  might  want  to  do.  But  even  though 
freedom  cannot  guarantee  that  a  man  will  attempt  to  realise  the  wants  he 
expresses,  assuming  he  knows  what  he  wants,  we  must  concede  that  it  may 
provide  him  with  the  opportunity  and  conditions  under  which  he  may  pursue 
his  desires  and  happiness,  and  as  such  is  worth  while,  and  the  presumption 
in  favour  of  freedom  justified. 
Finally,  it  is  objected  that  freedom,  though  it  can  provide  opportunities 
for  some  to  satisfy  their  wants,  is  not  desired  by  those  who  prefer  a  more 74 
secure  environment.  Some  individuals  find  freedom  antithetical  rather 
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than  conducive  to  happiness.  Freedom  is  only  one  of  a  variety  of  factors 
that  may  be  conducive  to  a  happy  life.  Some  people  prefer  a 
. 
more  structured 
and  disciplined  life  style  supported  by  recognised  laws,  customs,  conventions 
enforced  if  necessary  by  coercive  sanctions.  Freedom  in  excess  for  some 
people  occasio  is  psychological  strain  and  stress  and  can  induce  a  desire  to 
regress  to  a  more  limited,  womb  like  kind  of  life.  Too  much  freedom  can 
bring  too  much  responsibility  and  make  people  unhappy.  However,  these 
reservations  apart,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  a  person  who  is  coerced 
against  his  will  being  a  happy  man.  Whilst  freedom  is  neither  a  necessary 
nor  a  sufficient  condition  for  being  happy,  and  there  is  no  logical  relation 
between  being  free  and  being  happy,  for  one  can  just  as  easily  be  free  and 
unhappy,  it  is  the  case  that  for  most  people  a  degree  of  freedom  is  conducive 
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to  happiness,  and  this  explains  why  a  presumption  exists  in  its  favour. 
Happiness  is  an  elusive  notion  and  may  be  conceived  other  than  in  terms 
of  the  self-interested  achievement  of  wants.  Since  Ancient  Greek  times 
there  has  been  a  tradition  in  philosophy  that  has  envisaged  the  highest 
good  for  man  to  consist  not  merely  in  enjoyment  or  self-satisfaction  or 
pleasure  or  passive  contentment  but  in  a  process  of  self-realisation  and 
the  actualisation  of  those  unique  qualities  that  man,  qua  human,  is 
considered  to  possess,  his  rationality  and  a  capacity  for  moral  consciousness. 
Aristotle  refers  to  happiness  as  a  feeling  of  well-being  supervenient  upon 
the  proper  functioning  of  man  in  accordance  with  his  true  nature  and  in  the 
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acquisition  and  exercise  of  practical  and  theoretical  wisdom.  Similarly, 
J.  S.  Mill  defends  freedom  not  just  as  a  social  good  but  as  a  necessary 
condition  for  the  realisation  of  the  individual  self,  which  he  regarded  as 
a  principal  individual  ideal,  but  which  he  feared  was  in  his  time  being 
eroded  by  the  overriding  influence  and  constraint  of  custom  and  public 
opinion  leading  to  a  pervading  mediocrity. 
Both  Aristotle  and  Mill  regarded  self-development  as  necessarily 75 
virtuous  but  neither  would  have  recommended  such  liberty  of  self-development 
for  the  uncivilised,  the  immature,  or  the  unvirtuous  lest  they  abused  it, 
for  both  subscribed  to  the  principle  of  freedom  of  responsible  choice. 
"The  human  faculties  of  perception,  judgment,  discrimination,  feeling, 
mental  activity  and  even  moral  preference",  says  Mill,  "are  exercised  only 
in  making  a  choice.  He  who  does  anything  because  it  is  a  custom  makes 
no  choice.  He  gains  no  practice  either  in  discerning  or  in  desiring 
what  is  best.  The  mental  and  moral  like  the  muscular  powers  are  improved 
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only  by  being  used.  " 
Mill  lists  the  essential  freedoms  which  he  believed  constituted 
human  liberty  and  which  he  believed  were  necessary  for  the  self-realisation 
and  self-development  of  the  individual:  (i)  those  involving  the  inward 
domain  of  consciousness  including  liberty  of  conscience,  liberty  of  thought, 
feeling;  absolute  freedom  of  opinion  and  sentiment  in  all  subjects  practical 
and  speculative,  scientific,  moral,  theological;  liberty  of  expressing  and 
publishing  opinions;  (ii)  liberties  of  tastes  and  pursuits  as  framing 
the  plan  of  one's  Own  life  to  suit  one's  own  character,  doing  what  we  like 
subject  to  not  harming  others  even  if  they  think  we  are  wrong  and  stupid; 
(iii)  liberty  of  association  among  individuals  as  freedom  to  unite  for 
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any  purpose  not  involving  harm  to  others  provided  we  are  of  full  age. 
No  society,  says  Mill,  without  these  liberties  is  free.  The  only  freedom 
that  deserves  the  name  is  doing  one's  own  good  in  one's  own  way.  Mill's 
concern  with  the  self-development  or  self-improvement  of  the  individual  is 
a  strand  in  his  philosophy  to  which  everything  else  seems  to  be  subordinate. 
It  forms  the  basis  of  his  argument  for  the  liberty  of  the  individual  and 
if  accepted  explains  why  a  presumption  in  favour  of  freedom  is  so  generally 
assumed. 
A  further  argument  in  support  of  freedom  is  that  it  constitutes  a 
necessary  condition  for  the  development  of  personal  autonomy.  A  person 
may  be  said  to  be  autonomous  in  two  respects,  morally  and  non  morally. 76 
An  extremely  self-disciplined,  confident  and  self-contained  person  might 
be  said  to  be  autonomous  but  not  necessarily  morally  so.  A  skilled  and 
expert  criminal  who  competently  plies  his  trade  might  be  said  to  act 
autonomously  within  the  confines  of  his  job  but  not  in  a  moral  sense,  for 
a  morally  autonomous  person  would  feel  responsible  for  his  actions  and  their 
effect  upon  his  neighbours'  welfare.  In  both  respects  autonomy  in  its 
moral  and  non  moral  senses  requires  freedom  from  restraint.  But  social 
freedom  is  not  a  sufficient  condition  in  itself,  for  a  person  who  is  free 
of  constraints  imposed  by  others  might  still  be  autonomous  or  heteronomous 
by  nature.  A  young  child  in  a  free  school,  a  prisoner  just  released  after 
a  lifetime  in  prison,  are  both  socially  free,  but  in  other  respects  they 
may  not  be  free,  one  because  of  the  immaturity  of  his  years,  the  other 
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because  of  the  erosion  of  his  independence  over  years  of  prison  life. 
Nevertheless,  social  freedom  is  a  necessary  condition  for  the  outward 
expression  of  autonomous  action;  if  a  person  is  constrained,  his  ability  to 
exercise  his  autonomy  is  clearly  restricted. 
In  respect  of  the  development  as  opposed  to  the  expression  of  autonomy 
coercive  measures  may  be  justified  in  terms  of  the  victim's  anticipated 
long  term  interests  on  the  grounds  that  they  may  in  a  paternalistic  way 
be  instrtm  ental  in  enhancing  the  individual's  potential  autonomy  at  a 
future  date.  Schoolteachers  coerce  their  charges  towards  literacy  and 
numeracy  in  the  expectation  that  such  acquired  skills  will  increase  their 
potential  development  as  autonomous  adults.  Similarly,  parents  coerce  their 
children  towards  desirable  and  morally  and  socially  acceptable  skills, 
attitudes  and  habits.  So  two  issues  are  in  question,  whether  freedom 
is  a  necessary  condition  for  the  exercise  of  autonomy,  and  secondly,  whether 
freedom  is  a  necessary  condition-for  its  development.  The  fact  that 
freedom  might  be  considered  to  be  a  necessary  condition  for  the  former 
does  not  necessarily  mean,  however,  that  it  may  in  every  case  be  so 
considered  for  the  latter. 77 
Some  educationalists  will  argue  that  a  disciplined  and  structured 
childhood  is  a  preferable  and  sound  preparation  for  the  development  of  the 
child  into  an  autonomous  adult,  more  progressive  educationalists  on  the  other 
hand  will  reply  that  a  child  requires  freedom  to  choose  in  order  to  develop 
autonomously.  But  this  surely  does  not  mean  that  progressive  educators, 
such  as  the  deschoolers,  assume  that  children  from  the  start  are  already 
innately  and  autonomously  able  to  choose  as  discriminating  choosers.  It 
must  surely  just  imply  that  practice  makes  perfect,  that  a  degree  of  freedom 
is  necessary  for  children  as  for  adults  to  allow  them  to  make  mistakes  and 
to  learn  to  accept  responsibility  for  their  actions  and  decisions,  that 
some  freedom  is  a  necessary  condition  for  the  successful  development  as 
well  as  the  successful  maintenance  of  a  morally  autonomous  personhood. 
Freedom  is  necessary  for  the  development  of  and  for  the  exercise  of 
autonomy  in  both  a  moral  and  non  moral  sense  in  the  case  of  both  children 
and  adults,  which  fact,  it  is  supposed,  sustains  the  presumption  in  its 
favour. 
J.  S.  Mill  takes  the  view  that  liberty  is  beneficial  not  just  for 
individuals  but  for  society  as  a  whole,  that  social  benefits  accrue  from 
allowing  individuals  the  freedom  of  self-development.  Those  not  desirous 
of  a  great  degree  of  liberty,  he  suggests,  canprofit  from  the  liberty 
allowed  to  others  and  can  learn  from  the  creativity  and  originality  that 
ensues.  "The  initiation  of  all  wise  or  noble  things  comes  and  must  come 
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from  individuals",  says  Mill,  "generally  at  first  from  some  individual.  " 
The  strong  and  talented  must  lead  and  Mr.  Average  will  presumably  follow 
but  he  must  not  be  compelled  for  this  would  infringe  his  freedom. 
In  Mill's  view,  people  should  be  allowed  to  be  eccentric  and  break  the 
the  tyranny  of  custom  and  its  sanctions  for,  according  to  Mill,  the  amount 
of  eccentricity  in  society  is  generally  in  proportion  to  the  amount  of 
genious,  mental  rigour  and  moral  courage  that  society  also  contains. 
Mill  acknowledges  that  improvement  and  liberty  may  not  always  be  identical 78 
but  comes  down  on  the  side  of  liberty  nevertheless.  "The  despotism  of 
custom  is  everywhere  the  standing  hindrance  to  hinan  advancement,  being 
in  increasing  antagonism  to  that  disposition  to  aim  at  something  better 
than  customary,  which  is  called,  according  to  circumstances,  the  spirit 
of  liberty,  or  that  of  progress  or  improvement.  The  spirit  of  improvement 
is  not  always  a  spirit  of  liberty,  for  it  may  aim  at  forcing  improvements 
on  an  unwilling  people;  and  the  spirit  of  liberty,  in  so  far  as  it  resists 
such  attempts,  may  ally  itself  locally  and  temporarily  with  the  opponents 
of  improvement;  but  the  only  unfailing  and  permanent  source  of  improvement 
is  liberty,  since  by  it  there  are  as  many  possible  independent  centres 
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of  improvement  as  there  are  individuals.  "  Individualism,  Mill  believed, 
promotes  the  well-being  and  happiness  of  society  and  mankind,  just  as  it 
promotes  the  well-being  of  those  who  practise  it.  Freedom,  for  Mill,  is 
the  absence  of  restraint  on  the  doing  of  good  actions,  for  Mill  has  an 
optimistic  view  of  human  nature.  If  one  accents  Mill's  optimism  and 
faith  in  human  progress  and  fulfilment  then  his  argument  for  freedom  is 
convincing  and  plausible. 
Similarly,  if  it  is  accepted  that  the  idea  of  a  rational  moral 
being  is  an  ideal  to  be  striven  for,  it  can  be  argued  that  a  presumption 
exists  in  favour  of  freedom  because  people  ought  to  be  allowed  to  do 
what  there  are  good  reasons  for  doing  on  the  grounds  that  any  interference 
with  the  chosen  course  of  a  ht  an  being  is  a  limitation  imposed  by  force 
on  the  extent  to  which  his  actions  may  be  rationally  determined.  "The 
central  sense  of  freedom",  writes  J.  R.  Lucas,  "is  that  in  which  a  rational 
agent  is  free  when  he  is  able  to  act  as  seems  best  to  him,  without  being 
subject  to  external  constraint  on  his  actions.  Freedom  is  a  necessary 
condition  of  rationality,  of  action,  of  achievement.  Not  to  be  free  is 
to  be  frustrated,  impotent,  futile.  To  be  free  is  to  be  able  to  shape 
the  future,  to  be  able  to  translate  one's  ideals  into  reality,  to  achieve 
one's  potentialities  as  a  person.  Not  to  be  free  is  not  to  be  responsible, 79 
not  to  be  able  to  be  responsive,  not  to  be  human.  Freedom  is  a  good  if 
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anything  is". 
R.  S.  Peters  is  of  the  opinion  that  a  logical  point  may  be  made  in 
this  context,  that  a  person  who  asks  "that  ought  I  to  do?  ",  or,  "What 
reasons  are  there  for  my  doing...?  "  must  logically  demand  freedom  from 
interference  from  others  in  two  respects,  from  interference  with  his 
freedom  to  think  for  himself  and  from  interference  with  any  subsequent 
action  he  should  choose;  otherwise,  says  Peters,  a  person's  deliberation 
has  no  point,  he  no  choice,  and  morality  no  substance.  Peter's  argument  is 
based  upon  the  notion  of  practical  reason.  Man,  it  is  assumed,  is  not  an 
island  and  does  not  operate  in  vacuo  but  depends  upon  free  intercourse  with 
others  and  the  meeting  of  minds.  So  restraint  upon  social  intercourse  and 
public  debate  is  ruled  out,  so  also  are  constraints  upon  a  person's  thinking 
for  argument  is  paramount,  not  force  or  inner  illuminative  intuition. 
So  practical  reason,  prudence  and  the  principle  of  utility  would  seem  to 
favour  a  presumption  in  favour  of  freedom  of  opinion,  of  discourse  and  of 
action;  for  otherwise,  argument  and  deliberation  would  have  little  point, 
being  merely  theoretical  and  solitary  contemplative  exercises. 
Of  course,  if  a  person  who  asks  "What  ought  I  to  do?  "  is  required  to 
be  free  to  act,  then  so  should  all  others.  If  a  person  is  necessarily 
involved  with  other  rational  beings  in  trying  to  answer  questions  of 
practical  policy,  and  demands  freedom  of  thought  and  action  for  himself, 
he  can  hardly  deny  it  to  others.  Peters  concludes  his  argument  for  freedom 
as  follows:  "Because,  therefore,  in  the  sphere  of  practical  reason  there 
is  such  a  close  link  between  discussion  and  action,  in  the  sense  that  a 
rational  man  who  asks  the  question  "What  ought  I  to  do?  "  must  demand 
freedom  to  do  what  there  are  good  reasons  for  doing,  freedom  of  action 
as  well  as  freedom  of  thought  can  be  shown  to  be  a  general  presupposition 
of  practical  discourse  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  public  activity  to  which 
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rational  beings  contribute.  "  So  reasons  must  be  given  for  interfering 
with  people  rather  than  for  allowing  them  to  do  what  they  want,  the so 
presumption  being  that  people  are  free  to  do  what  they  want  to  do  because 
basically  we  respect  each  other  as  rational  beings. 
The  arguments  so  far  considered  in  support  of  the  assumed  presumption 
in  favour  of  freedom,  with  the  exception  of  Peters'  transcendental  argument, 
have  been  of  a  consequentialist  kind  based  on  the  assumption  that  freedom 
is  a  good  because  it  leads  to  desirable  outcomes  such  as  happiness, 
self-fulfilment,  the  improvement  of  self,  society,  mankind,  and  the 
sustenance  of  a  rational  morality.  They  have  also  assumed  that  man  is  by 
nature  good  and  therefore  entitled  to  be  free  to  do  good  things,  a  view 
which  many  might  think  is  more  wishful  than  realistic.  Indeed,  if  one 
believes,  as  Thomas  Hobbes  didIthat  man  by  nature  is  not  necessarily 
naturally  good,  then  one's  idea  of  freedom  and  one's  attitude  to  it  is 
likely  to  be  different  in  some  respects. 
In  its  negative  sense  freedom  as  absence  of  restraint  is  maximised, 
presumably,  in  a  society  where  there  are  no  laws  or  moral  rules  exerting 
coercive  sanctions.  Hobbes  conceived  of  such  a  state,  his  state  of  nature, 
and  regarded  liberty  as  the  absence  of  all  external  impediments.  His  laws 
of  nature  are  not  rules  in  the  normal  sense,  they  do  not  oblige,  they  are 
maxims  of  prudence  rationally  arrived  at  by  the  individual  himself.  Hobbes 
believed  that  man  in  a  state  of  nature  had  a  'right  of  nature',  that  is  "the 
liberty...  to  use  his  own  power  as  he  will  himself  for  the  preservation 
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of  his  own  Nature;  that  is  to  say  his  own  Life.  "  The  condition  of  man 
in  a  state  of  nature  is  described  by  Hobbes  as:  "..  a  condition  of  Warre  of 
everyone  against  everyone;  in  which  case  everyone  is  governed  by  his  own 
Reason;  and  there  is  nothing  he  can  make  use  of,  that  may  not  be  a  help 
unto  him,  in  preserving  his  life  against  his  eremyes;  It  followeth,  that 
in  such  a  condition,  everyman  has  a  Right  to  every  thing;  even  to  one 
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anthers  body.  "  In  Hobbes'  state  of  nature  men  have  maximum  liberty 
in  so  far  as  they  are  free  from  the  coercive  power  of  the  Sovereign  to 
whom  they  are  obliged  to  enchain  themselves  in  order  to  obtain  peace i1 
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and  security.  "The  Liberty  of  a  Subject  lyeth  therefore  only  in  those 
things,  which  in  regulating  their  actions,  the  Sovereign  hath  praetermitted: 
such  as  is  the  Liberty  to  buy,  and  sell,  and  otherwise  contract  with  one 
another;  to  choose  their  own  aboad,  their  own  diet,  their  own  trade  of  life, 
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and  institute  their  children  as  they  themselves  think  fit;  &  the  like.  " 
The  greater  liberty  of  subjects  depends  upon  the  silence  of  the  law, 
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when  the  Sovereign  prescribes  no  rule. 
The  acceptance  of  this  Hobbesian  view  of  liberty  coupled  with  Hobbes' 
pessimistic  view  of  human  nature  would,  it  is  submitted,  weaken  the 
presumption  in  favour  of  freedcm  which  relies  also  upon  the  more  positive 
supposition  that  freedom  leads  to  desirable  ends.  Hobbesian  liberty  is 
also  self-contradictory  because  in  Hobbes'  state  of  nature  or  'warre' 
individuals  are  not  really  free  but  rather  are  subject  continually  to  the 
coercive  threats  and  force  of  each  other,  which  restricts  their  freedom. 
"For  as  amongst  masterlesse  men,  there  is  perpetuall  war,  of  every  man 
against  his  neighbour;  no  inheritance  to  transmit  to  the  Son,  nor  to 
expect  from  the  Father;  no  propriety  of  Goods,  or  Lands;  no  security; 
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but  a  full  and  absolute  Libertie  in  every  Particular  man.  " 
For  most  men,  surely,  it  is  the  quality  of  life  that  is  of  paramount 
importance,  and  consequently  the  quality  of  freedom  must  at  times  take 
precedence  over  its  quantity.  Hobbes  was  not  unaware  of  this  and  recognised 
man's  desire  for  peace  and  his  need  of  a  Sovereign,  so  that  he  might 
conduct  his  affairs  profitably  and  with  safety.  Even  Hobbes,  in  effect, 
could  not  and  did  not  subscribe  absolutely  to  freedom  in  a  purely 
negative  sense. 
An  analysis  of  Hobbes'  view  of  liberty  reveals  the  fallacy  in 
arguments  for  freedom  which  follow  the  anarchistic  principle  that  society 
or  the  state  should  allow  everybody  to  do  as  they  please.  That  is  to  say, 
in  practice,  that  everyone  should  be  allowed  to  turn  up  their  wireless, 
or  help  themselves  to  each  others  possessions,  or  punch  each  other  on  the on-NNW  - 
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nose,  whenever  they  might  wish.  It  is  possible,  of  course,  to  conceive 
of  a  logical  world  in  which  everyone  is  free  to  do  just  as  they  may 
choose,  in  which,  for  example,  P  is  dispositionally  free  to  do  A  and 
24 
q  is  disoositionally  free  to  prevent  P  from  doing  A.  If  for  instance  P 
exercises  his  freedom  and  Q  decides  not  to  exercise  his  (but  could  if  he 
so  wished)  both  may  be  said  to  be  dis-positionally  free.  But  for  this  to 
be  the  case  in  the  actual  world  conflict  between  choices  would  clearly 
have  to  be  eliminated,  for  once  two  men  desire  the  same  object,  then 
one  man's  freedom  to  fulfil  his  desire  can  only  be  realised  at  the 
expense  of  the  other. 
The  anarchistic  principle  obviously  can  only  apply  to  a  world  in 
which  human  desires  and  choices,  through  a  miracle  of  pre-established 
harmony,  can  never  conflict.  Kant  perhaps  may  have  had  such  a  world  in 
mind  when  he  represented  the  categorical  imperative  idealistically  in 
the  Formula  of  the  Kingdom  of  Ends:  "So  act  as  if  through  one's  maxims 
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as  a  law-making  member  in  a  universal  Kingdom  of  Ends.  "  But  such  an 
imaginary,  ideal  world  of  harmony  would  in  practice  be  impossible  to 
achieve,  and  would  certainly  be  an  impractical  guide  to  conduct,  for  no 
person  in  his  right  senses  would  be  so  foolish  as  to  try  to  conduct  his 
affairs  on  the  presumption  that  his  neighbours  would  always  act  in  a 
scrupulously  honest  way. 
In  our  imperfect  and  practical  world  conflict  and  competition  are 
facts  of  life,  and  cries  of  absolute  liberty  for  all,  according  to  some 
anarchistic  formal  principle,  would  in  practice  only  mean  greater  freedom 
for  the  strong  and  less  for  the  weak,  and  would  guarantee  no  secure 
freedom  for  anyone,  not  even  the  strong  and  powerful,  for,  as  Hobbes 
observed,  even  the  most  tyrannical  of  persons  must  sleep  and  thereby 
render  his  person  vulnerable  at  some  time.  Jeremy  Bentham  may  have  had 
-  this  in  mind  when  he  distinguished  between  two  aspects  of  liberty, 
liberty  as  against  the  law  and  liberty  as  against  wrongdoers,  and 
concluded:  "As  against  the  coercion  applicable  by  individual  to  individual 33 
no  liberty  can  be  given  to  one  man  but  in  proportion  as  it  is  taken 
away  from  another.  All  coercive  laws,  therefore,  and  in  particular  all 
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laws  creative  of  liberty  are  as  far  as  they  go  abrogative  of  liberty.  " 
In  reality  to  imagine  living  in  a  state  of  absolute  liberty  entails 
incurring  the  constraints  imposed  upon  one  by  one's  neighbours.  - 
Philosophers  who  have  addressed  themselves  to  this  problem  have  recognised 
this  in  one  way  or  another.  We  have,  therefore,  the  restraining  influence 
of  Hobbes'  Sovereign,  Locke's  magistrates,  Bentham's  law-giver,  and  Mill's 
harm  principle. 
Statements  based  on  foetal  principles  are  of  limited  value.  The 
notion  that  each  person  should  be  granted  full  liberty  to  do  what  he 
pleases,  provided  only  that  he  does  not  interfere  with  the  like  liberty 
of  another  is  one  such  example.  It  simply  implies  that  liberty  should 
be  distributed  impartially.  "Each  person",  says  John  Rawls,  "participating 
in  a  practice  or  affected  by  it  has  an  equal  right  to  the  most  extensive 
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liberty  comparable  with  a  like  liberty  for  all.  "  So  there  is  "a  presumption 
against  distinctions,  classifications  made  by  legal  systems  and  other 
practices  to  the  extent  that  they  infringe  on  the  original  and  equal 
liberty  of  the  persons  participating  in  them.  "  This  formal  principle 
may  represent  a  sound  maxim  of  justice,  but  insists  merely  on-an  impartial 
procedure  which  may  be  applied  to  any  kind  of  law,  rule,  custom,  coercive 
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or  otherwise,  regardless  of  its  content.  A  general  law  permitting  nose 
punching  could  meet  this  criterion  of  impartiality  just  as  one  prohibiting 
nose  punching  would. 
Rawls'  formal  principle,  like  the  anarchistic  principle,  does  not 
distinguish  the  quality  of  freedom  that  is  to  be  allowed  and,  although 
it  assumes  a  presumption  in  favour  of  freedom,  it  does  not  represent  an 
adequate  substantive  principle  of  freedom  distribution.  My  right,  for 
instance,  to  keep  my  neighbour  awake  playing  my  wireless  set  all  night 
may  not  be  fully  counterbalanced  by  his  keeping  a  howling  dog  which  does 
the  same  to  me.  Each  party,  in  this  example,  according  to  the  principle -  -- 
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in  question,  can  use  his  freedom  to  the  detriment  of  the  other  under  a  law 
which  recognises  a  like  liberty  for  the  other  to  do  the  same  if  he  can. 
But  this  law,  though  non-discriminatory,  provides  little  consolation 
for  either  party  if  it  so  happens  that  their  interests  are  seriously 
harmed.  For  these  reasons  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  principle  that 
each  should  be  allowed  a  full  liberty  to  do  as  he  pleases,  provided  he 
does  not  interfere  with  a  like  liberty  of  another,  constitutes  a 
substantive  argument  in  support  of  freedom,  though  it  does  assume  a 
presumption  in  its  favour. 
A  general  presumption,  it  is  submitted,  may  justifiably  be  held 
in  favour  of  freedom.  This  implies  that  constraints  may  be  justified 
only  in  so  far  as  they  remove  impediments  to  freedom,  for  it  is  supposed 
that  we  ought  to  be  free  to  exploit  our  talents  and  personhood  as  human 
beings,  since  only  by  so  doing  can  we  aspire  to  a  happy  life.  and  a 
prosperous  society. 
But  the  presumption  in  favour  of  freedom  cannot  be  stipulated  in 
terms  of  absolute  freedom.  Man  can  never  be  absolutely  free.  He  is 
subject  to  his  own  inabilities.  He  cannot  talk  to  rabbits  or  walk  on  the 
sea.  He  is  subject  to  constraints  imposed  upon  him  by`the  natural 
environment  and  by  his  fellow  men.  It  is,  therefore,  more  sensible 
to  speak  in  terms  of  degrees  of  freedom,  and  of  the  maximisation  of 
"  freedom  in  relation  to  other  desirable  principles  such  as  equality  and 
justice.  Most  societies  recognise  certain  fundamental  rights  or  liberties 
as  more  deserving  than  others  and  duly  protect  them  against  liberties 
they  consider  to  be  of  a  morally  inferior  kind.  So  whilst  a  presumption 
lies  in  favour  of  freedom  the  use  of  coercive  laws  and  sanctions  is  not 
ruled  out,  so  long  as  they  are  used  to  maintain  a  state  of  liberty, 
as  say  opposed  to  licence,  and  to  ensure  a  fair  distribution  of  valued 
freedoms  for  all. 
We  suppose,  as  rational  beings,  that  reasons  ought  always  to  be 85 
given  for  treating  people  differently  or  for  interfering  with  their 
freedom.  This  is  because  we  accept  the  fundamental  moral  principle  of 
respect  for  persons  upon  which  our  presumptions  in  favour  of  justice  and 
freedom  are  firmly  based.  Our  presumption  in  favour  of  freedom,  or  as 
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Mill  expressed  it  "All  restraint  qua  restraint  is  an  evil",  implies 
that  the  justification  for  any  restraint  lies  with  the  restrainer.  This 
seems  to  be  the  accepted  practice  in  law  where  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus 
requires  that  the  jailer  show  good  reason  why  the  prisoner  should  not 
be  released;  it  is  not  considered  to  be  the  prisoner's  responsibilty 
to  make  a  case  for  his  liberty.  Similarly  it  is  submitted,  in  moral  law, 
it  is  always  he  who  interferes  with  the  liberty  of  another  person  who 
must  justify  his  action  and  not  the  victim. 
We  acknowledge  legal  and  moral  rules  supported  by  coercive  sanctions 
as  protection  from  the  arbitrary  constraints  and  anti-social  behaviour 
imposed  upon  us  by  others,  as  protection  from  molestation  be  it  by 
tyrants,  terrorists,  street  gangs  or  play  ground  bullies.  In  so  doing, 
we  set  a  constraint  to  catch  a  constraint  so  to  speak,  and  limit  freedom 
in  one  sense  in  order  to  increase  it  in  another.  The  evolution  of 
democratic  life  seems  to  follow  this  pattern.  First  one  law  is  passed 
then  another  is  fashioned  to  supersede  it.  First  one  then  another 
constraint  is  imposed  to  weaken  the  grip  of  previous  constraints  as 
society  readjusts  its  values,  and  presumably  seeks  to  maximise  freedom 
whilst  at  the  same  time  ensuring  that  it  is  more  equally  distributed. 
In  a  paradoxical  way,  unfree,  constraining,  coercive  measures  become 
instruments  for  preserving  freedom  and  of  enhancing  it.  We  are  free 
because  we  are  protected  by  the  coercive  sanctions  of  the  law  both 
legal  and  moral. 
Most  political  philosophers  acknowledge  the  paradox  of  freedom 66 
though  the  interpretation  they  give  to  it  may  vary  according  to  their 
view  of  human  nature.  Even  Hobbes,  as  we  have  indicated,  who  regarded 
freedom  basically  as  being  free  from  all  constraint,  felt  obliged  to 
concede  that  the  restraining  influence  of  the  Sovereign  was  a  necessary 
condition  for  the  realisation  of  those  additional  freedoms  obtainable  only 
in  a  state  of  peace  and  security. 
John  Locke  did  not  share  Hobbes'  pessimistic  view  of  human  nature. 
He  writes  of  a  state  of  nature  in  which  men  are  not  wholly  selfish  but 
share  a  limited  concern  for  one  another  and  live,  safe  for  a  minority, 
in  a  state  of  comparative  peace  in  which  laws  are  required  which  are 
agreeable  to  all.  The  end  of  law,  says  Locke,  "..  is  not  to  abolish  or 
restrain  but  to  preserve  and  to  enlarge  freedom 
....  For  liberty  is  to  be 
free  fron  restraint  and  violence  from  others,  which  cannot  be  where  there 
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is  no  law.  "  Locke  distinguishes  'laws  of  nature',  such  as  respect 
for  property,  respect  for  persons,  and  respect  for  freedom,  and 
considers  those  who  reject  such  laws  to  be  irrational  and  deserving  of 
punishment.  And  these  'laws  of  nature',  the  product  of  man's  reason, 
are  coercive,  each  man  having  the  right  to  visit  punisiTnent  upon  an 
offender.  But  though  coercive  these'laws,  Locke  states,  do  not  limit 
freedom  but  increase  it,  for  everybody  as  a  rational  being  is  obliged 
to  recognise  them.  "And  Reason,  which  is  the  law,  teaches  all  mankind 
who  will  but  consult  it  that  being  all  equal  and  independent  no  one 
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ought  to  harn  another  in  his  life,  health,  liberty,  or  possessions.  " 
Similarly,  Locke  suggests  that  civil  laws,  like  the  'lays  of  nature', 
may  also  be  regarded  as  coercive  yet  also  as  protecting  the  liberty  of 
individuals.  The  sort  of  coercion  that  Locke  sees  as  limiting  freedom 
is  that  of  being  subject  to  the  "inconsistent,  uncertain,  arbitrary 
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will  of  another  man",  as  in  a  Hobbesian  state  of  war,  whereas  rational 
'laus  of  nature'  and  legitimately  agreed  civil  laws  enhance  freedom 
and  in  so  doing  justify  an  element  of  coercion  in  this  respect.  In 87 
Locke's  vie°,  v,  men  are  really  free  when  they  are  not  coerced  into  not 
doing  actions  that  will  promote  the  general  good. 
Jeremy  Bentham  shared  with  Hobbes  the  notion  of  a  'state  of  nature' 
in  which  men  indiscriminately  coerced  each  other,  but  whereas  Hobbes 
considered  it  to  be  the  Sovereign's  task  to  impose  harmony,  a  harmony  of 
interests,  so  that  each  individual  could  better  pursue  his  own  selfish 
dessires,  Bentham  envisaged  his  'lawgiver'  as  reconciling  conflicting 
interests  in  order  to  achieve  the  greatest  possible  amount  of  happiness 
for  all.  Bentham  distinguished  two  kinds  of  liberty,  liberty  as  against 
the  law  or  being  free  of  laws  and  liberty  as  against  wrongdoers,  and 
concluded:  "These  two  sorts  of  liberty  are  directly  opposed  to  one 
another  and,  in  so  far  as  it  is  in  favour  of  an  individual  that  the 
law  exercises  its  authority  over  another,  the  generation  of  the  one  sort 
is-astar  as  it  extends,  the  destruction  of  the  other.  In  the  same 
proportion  and  by  the  same  cause  by  which  the  one  is  increased  the  other 
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is  diminished.  "  So,  whilst  Bentham  regarded  the  free  interplay  of 
individuals  to  be  conducive  to  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest 
number,  he  regarded  the  coercion  of  the  minority  of  wrongdoers  by 
the  civil  law  as  necessary  in  order  to  ensure  the  maximisation  of  the 
wishes  of  the  majority.  The  coercion  of  deviants  he  regarded  as  being 
compatible  with  the  attainment  of  a  greater  freedom  for  the  rest. 
J.  S.  Mill  like  Hobbes  takes  the  stronger  view  that  basically  coercion 
of  any  kind  is  opposed  to  liberty,  that  a  man  is  free  only  when  his 
desires,  choices  and  actions  are  determined  by  himself  alone.  Mill 
did  not  have  Hobbes'  pessimistic  view  of  human  nature  but  believed 
that  each  individual  should  live  his  life  as  he  saw  fit,  provided  that 
in  so  doing  he  did  not  harm  other  people.  In  particular  cases,  however, 
when  an  individual's  freedom  of  self-fulfilment  is  impeded  by  certain 
undesirable  actions  on  the  part  of  others,  Mill  wishes  to  justify  the 
use  of  coercion.  In  cases  of  threatened  physical  injury,  offences 88 
against  decency,  when  a  parent  neglects  the  education  of  his  children, 
for  example,  Mill  approves  of  the  use  of  coercion  as  a  preventive  measure 
on  the  grounds  that  every  individual  ought  to  be  free  of  such  restrictions 
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if  he  is  to  be  free  to  realise  his  full  potential. 
Mill's  intent  was  to  liberate  his  fellow  men  by  initiating  them.  into 
his  own  rational  state  and  understanding:  "The  uncultivated  cannot 
be  judges  of  cultivation.  Those  who  most  need  to  be  made  wiser  and 
better  usually  desire  it  least,  and  if  they  desired  it  would  be  unable 
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to  find  their  way  to  it  by  their  own  lights.  "  So  Mill,  like  Hobbes, 
distinguishes  two  kinds  of  freedom  and  concedes  that  coercion  is 
conrpetible  with  freedom  in  so  far  as  in  certain  circumstances  it  frees 
a  person  from  undesirable  restraints  preventing  him  from  realising  freedom 
in  a  more  positive  sense.  Mill's  individual  is  not  to  be  left  entirely 
free  but  subjected  when  necessary  to  Mill's  own  brand  of  Victorian 
intellectual  paternalism,  which  is  justified  by  Mill  so  long  as  it  is 
calculated  to  ensure  a  greater  freedom  and  a  more  desirable  freedom  for 
the  individual  in  the  long  run. 
All  four  philosophers  arrive  at  their  own  particular  analysis  of 
freedom  from  a  consideration  of  the  kind  of  constraints  that  each  sees 
as  being  fundamentally  opposed  to  it;  in  Hobbes'  case  it  is  the  fear  of 
physical  force  of  one  person  upon  another;  in  Lockets  case,  the  fear  of 
the  arbitrary  will  of  tyrants;  in  Bentham's  case,  the  fear  of  law-breakers 
and  wrongdoers;  and  in  Mill's  case,  fear  of  the  debilitating  constraints 
imposed  by  custom  and  public  opinion. 
All  four  philosophers  subscribe  to  the  view  that  we  are  free  in 
the  negative  sense  of  being  free  from  constraints  imposed  upon  us  by 
others.  But  freedom  in  the  negative  sense  is  of  limited  significance; 
it  does  not  seem  to  matter  what  we  are  expected  to  do  with  it;  we  are 
simply  free  if  not  constrained  in  any  way.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore, 
that  all  four  philosophers  move  in  one  way  or  another  towards  a  more -rF 
89 
positive  concept  of  freedom  and  recognise  that  constraint,  say  in  the 
fora  of  coercive  laws,  can  enable  people  to  be  freed  from  less  desirable 
constraints,  leaving  them  free  to  do  more  worth  while  and  desirable  things. 
Obviously,  we  are  only  free  to  do  something  when  we  are  free  from  any 
impediments  that  might  prevent  us.  Also,  logically  speaking,  we  might 
argue  that  to  deprive  a  person  of  the  positive  freedom  of  self-fulfilment 
is  to  infringe  his  negative  freedom,  or  right  to  be  free  from  the  interference 
or  coercion  of  others.  Clearly  the  two  concepts  of  freedom,  the  negative 
and  the  positive,  are  related  and  interdependent. 
To  argue  that  constraints,  such  as  the  coercive  sanctions  of  the  law 
or  moral  opinion,  can  free  people  from  constraints  of  a  less  desirable 
kind  is  to  imagine  or  have  in  mind  a  kind  of  controlled  or  preferred 
freedom  that  is  both  demanding  and  prescriptive.  It  is  a  view  that  can 
take  many  forms,  and  which  can  be  abused.  It  acknowledges  the  compatibility 
of  freedom  and  constraint  in  so  far  as  the  latter  is  swallowed  up  or 
justified  by  the  realisation  of  the  former,  and  freedom  itself  is  seen 
in  terms  of  not  being  free.  The  Christian  faith,  for  example,  claims 
to  offer  the  greatest  freedom  of  all  in  return  for  the  supreme  sacrifice 
of  becoming  the  prisoner  of  Christ;  as  the  poet  John  Donne  puts  it  in 
his  address  to  God:  "Take  me  to  you  imprison  me  for  I 
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Except  you  enthrall  me,  never  shall  be  free.  " 
Just  as  Christians  labour  under  the  coercive  threat  of  deadly  sin, 
so  the  atheistic  Marxist  toils  under  the  threat  of  alienation  lest  he 
refute  the  Marxist  creed  that  claims  to  relieve  him  of  the  constraints 
of  capitalism  and  to  set  him  free  so  that,  like  the  Christian,  he  can 
realise  his  human  potential  to  the  full.  Similarly,  there  are 
educationalists  who  will  argue  that  the  truly  free  mind  is  the  disciplined 
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mind,  whereas  the  undisciplined  mind  is  unfree.  This  kind  of  reasoning 
appears  in  many  contexts,  for  example  in  Rousseau's  notion  of  the 
general  will  and  in  Hegel's  conception  of  the  state.  It  has  been  and  is 90 
adopted  by  many  social  and  political  institutions  in  society  ranging 
from  the  family  to  political  parties,  including  all  sorts  of  social 
groups,  and  individuals,  appealing  to  all  kinds  of  loyalities  and 
ideologies.  If  abused,  such  appeals  in  the  name  of  freedom  can  be 
the  means  of  supporting  institutions,  policies,  ideologies  of  the 
most  authoritarian,  totalitarian  and  tyrannical  sort  imaginable  to  the 
detriment  of  freedom  in  every  sense. 
To  suggest  that  freedom  can  be  realised  by  rendering  people  less 
free  suggests  some  trick  of  logic,  an  attempt  that  is  to  conceal  the 
evident  inconsistency  or  contradiction  in  claiming  that  p  is  not  p, 
that  freedom  is  not  really  freedom  in  fact  but  restraint.  But  this 
apparent  confusion  can  be  resolved,  it  is  suggested,  if  a  distinction 
is  retained  between  freedom  in  the  particular  and  freedom  in  the  formal 
sense  of  being  free,  and  so  long  as  we  do  not  confuse  empirical 
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manifestations  of  freedom  with  the  formal  meaning  of  the  word  'free'. 
In  the  formal  sense  to  be  free  is  simply  to  be  free  of  all  constraint. 
Any  constraint  must  obviate  the  formal  principle  of  freedom  if  the 
word  'free'  is  to  have  any  meaning  at  all.  This  is  not  to  deny  the 
significance  of  the  qualitative  and  quantitative  assessment  of_particular 
freedoms  in  the  empirical  world,  of  the  idea,  for  instance,  that  a  child's 
freedom  might  be  justifiably  limited  by  disciplined  learning  calculated 
to  free  his  mind  from  ignorance  and  lead  him  to  a  fuller  life.  But  the 
distinction  between  the  formal  principle  of  freedom  and  freedom  in 
the  particular  must  be  retained,  for  if  we  relinquish  entirely  the 
formal  principle  that  any  restraint  whatever  is  a  limitation  of  freedom, 
we  remove  at  once  the  onus  on  those  arguing  for  constraints  in  the 
name  of  freedom  to  justify  them,  and  we  leave  the  way  open  for  limitless 
claims  for  all  kinds  of  coercive  threats  and  actions  in  the  name  of 
freedoms  of  one  kind  or  another. 
So,  the  paradox  of  freedom  may  be  explained.  It  is  when  we  confuse 91 
freedom  in  its  formal  and  particular  senses  that  we  appear  able  to 
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argue  that  we  can  coerce  people  into  a  more  valuable  or  greater  freedom. 
Freedom  essentially,  it  is  submitted,  means  being  free  of  all  constraints 
whatever;  and  in  this  respect  both  Hobbes  and  Mill  were  right;  and  the  onus 
of  justifying  coercive  measures  on  the  grounds  that  they  will  lead  to 
a  greater  freedom  or  freedoms,  however'  desirable,  must  rest  with  those 
who  make  such  claims  and  propositions.  It  is  for  these  reasons  that  we 
speak  of  the  presumption  in  favour  of  freedom. 92 
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It  is  generally  accepted  that  coercion  is  antithetical  to  freedom. 
It  is  a  more  contentious  claim  that  freedom  can  be  realised  through 
coercion,  that  instead  of  limiting  freedom  coercion  might  actually 
enhance  or  create  it,  that  a  person  might  become  free  through  being 
coerced.  Such  assertions  are  better  understood  if  we  recall  certain 
distinctions  commonly  made  in  relation  to  the  complex  notion  of  freedom. 
First,  we  may  note  the  distinction  between  being  personally  free,  having 
a  free  will  and  the  ability  to  think  for  oneself  and  to  make  one's  own 
choices,  and  being  socially  free  or  having  freedom  of  action  from 
interference  by  others  to  execute  one's  choices.  These  two  concepts 
of  freedom,  we  have  already  indicated,  are  not  unrelated  and  are  relevant 
to  any  discussion  involving  coercion.  Secondly,  we  may  note  the 
distinction  between  negative  and  positive  concepts  of  freedom  which  are 
also  related,  though  the  notion  of  positive  freedom  must  be  qualified 
for  it  can  take  different  forms.  Thirdly,  in  deference  to  ordinary 
language  use  and  everyday  experience,  a  distinction  must  be  drawn 
between  what  might  be  called  a  commonsensical  notion  of  freedom, 
embodying  both  a  negative  and  positive  perspective  of  freedom,  and 
distinctly  idealistic  ideas  of  freedom  that  are  exclusively  positive, 
normative  and  prescriptive.  Since-it  is  largely  in  the  context  of  the 
latter  that  claims  are  made  that  people  may  be  coerced  to  be  free, 
several  idealist  theories  of  freedom,  that  is  to  say  theories  of  freedom 
grounded  in  metaphysical  reasoning,  will  be  considered.  Finally, 
assuming  that  an  autonomous  person  is  in  some  respects  a  free  person 
and  conversely  that  a  free  person  must  in  some  respects  be  autonomous, 
the  relation  between  coercion  and  autonomy  will  warrant  some  attention. 
If  we  assume  that  to  say  IF  wants  to  do  x'  is  really  to  say  'All 
other  things  being  equal  P  would  do  x  if  he  could'  then  we  can  conclude 
that  a  person  is  free  only  in  so  far  as  he  is  not  restrained  from  doing 96 
what  he  wants  to  do,  or  what  he  might  choose  to  do  if  he  knew  that  he 
could,  or  as  Rousseau  says:  "..  man  is  truly  free  who  desires  what  he  is 
1 
able  to  perform  and  does  what  he  desires.  "  So,  leaving  aside  the 
question  of  restraints  upon  a  person's  abilities  and  means  imposed  by 
the  constrictions  of  the  physical  world  and  contingent  circumstances, 
a  free  person  is  essentially  a  person  who  is  personally  free  in  the  sense 
of  having  a  free  will,  whose  choices  are  caused  but  not  predictably 
determined  and  who  is  socially  free  being  free  from  the  interference 
of  others.  These  two  aspects  of  freedom,  personal  freedom  and  social 
freedom,  must  be  related  for  there  would  be  little  point  in  being  socially 
free  if  one  had  not  the  means  to  enjoy  it,  if  one  did  not  have  a  degree 
of  autonomy,  self-control  and  determination  to  profit  from  it. 
Those  who  deny  the  existence  of  free  will,  as  scme  behaviourists  do, 
seem  unable  to  ascribe  any  value  at-all  to  such  important  notions  as 
social  and  political  freedom.  B.  F.  Skinner  and  his  followers,  for 
example,  regard  the  notion  of  autonomous  man  simply  as  a  fiction  of  our 
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ignorance  of  what  really  determines  human  behaviour.  We  reject  this 
view,  and  argue  that  an  understanding  of  the  notion  of  coercion  depends 
upon  the  recognition  of  the  co-existence  of  two  opposing  autonomous  wills, 
and  that  coercion  is  manifested  when  one  is  threatened  and  prevailed 
upon  by  the  other.  It  seems  strange,  therefore,  to  want  to  argue  that 
coercion  can  make  a  person  free,  for  coercion  inevitably  restricts  a 
person's  options,  impedes  his  freedom  of  action,  limits  his  choices, 
and  makes  him  do  what  he  does  not  really  wish  to  do. 
The  distinction  between  negative  and  positive  freedom  has  historical 
antecedents  as  Sir  Isiah  Berlin,  who  popularized  this  dichotomy  in  his 
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seminal  treatise  'Two  Concepts  of  Liberty',  admits.  Berlin's  discussion 
of  freedom  or  liberty,  which  terms  he  uses  interchangeably,  so  far  as  an 
analysis  of  freedom  and  coercion  is  concerned,  is  helpful  but  confusing. 
Berlin  wants  to  argue  that  freedom  is  freedom  and  cannot  be  redescribed 97 
in  terms  of  the  acquisition  of  other  desirable  goods  that  man  might 
habitually  seek.  Consequently,  he  adopts  a  strict  and  inflexible 
interpretation  of  the  notion  of  negative  freedom  amounting  in  effect 
to  a  formal  principle  of  non-interference  and  absence  of  restraint, 
from  which  it  follows  that  coercion  always  infringes  freedom.  More 
helpfully,  Berlin  offers  a  critique  of  those  assumptions  which  he  argues 
underly  idealistic  notions  of  freedom,  or  positive  freedom  in  terms  of 
his  own  vocabulary,  and  reveals  the  dangers  that  such  theories  entail, 
indicating  that  their  effects  can  be  counter-productive  in  inhibiting 
freedom  instead  of  promoting  it. 
Berlin's  analysis  is  confusing  in  two  respects;  firstly,  because 
he  strips  the  notion  of  negative  freedom  of  any  meaning  or  significance 
by  isolating  it  from  more  positive  notions  of  freedom;  and  secondly, 
because  he  offers  a  narrow  and  singularly  idealistic  notion  of  positive 
freedom  itself.  Alternatively,  the  notion  of  positive  freedom,  it  is 
suggested,  might  be  interpreted  in  a  variety  of  ways,  for  example,  as 
being  free  from  restraint  and  therefore  free  to  do  or  not  to  do 
whatever  one  desires,  as  freedom  that  is  realised  in  the  acquisition 
of  other  desirable  ends  such  as  knowledge,  justice,  or  law  and  order, 
as  freedom  conceived  in  some  ideal  sense,  in  terms  of  some  metaphysical 
theory  divorced  from  the  empirical  world.  So,  philosophers  who  are 
critical  of  Berlin's  two  concepts  of  liberty  might  be  temapted  to  draw 
a  distinction  between  a  commonsensical  notion  of  freedom  based  on 
ordinary  experience  on  the  one  hand,  and  an  idealistic  notion  of  freedom 
grounded  in  metaphysical  reasoning  on  the  other.  By  so  doing,  some  of 
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the  inadequacies  in  Berlin's  analysis  might  seem  to  be  accommodated. 
Commonsense  seems  to  indicate  that  freedom  can  be  conceived  as  a 
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triadic  relation.  when  the  freedom  of  someone  is  in  question,  it  is 
seemingly  always  a  case  of  being  free  from  some  constraint  or  restriction, 
interference  with  or  barrier  to  doing,  not  doing,  becoming  or  not 98 
becoming  something  or  other;  in  other  words.  freedom"  is  always  of  something, 
from  something,  to  do,  not  do,  become  or  not  become  something.  And  this 
makes  sense  for  if  a  person  is  actively  struggling  against  some  lack  of 
freedom,  he  must  be  doing  so  for  one  reason  or  another.  He  must  be 
struggling  for  the  liberty  not  to  do  or  to  do  something  or  other;  otherwise, 
freedom  in  its  negative  sense,  being  free  from,  would  have  no  apparent 
significance,  because  a  person  wishing  to  be  free  from  some  inconvenient 
restraint  must  surely  believe  he  would  be  better  off  without  it. 
To  be  free  from  has  no  meaning  unless  it  is  related  to  some  positive 
desire  or  consequence.  The  principle  of  negative  freedom  relentlessly 
pursued  suggests  an  arid  regression  to  the  final  solution  when  all 
restraints  are  relinquished,  paradoxically  by  the  final  restraint  of 
death  itself.  So  commonsense  would  seem  to  dictate  that  freedom,  whilst 
fundamentally  implying  freedom  from  restraint  in  a  negative  sense,  entails 
being  free  in  a  positive  sense  too.  Absence  of  restraint  is  not  a 
sufficient  condition  for  freedom  because  one  must,  if  freedom  is  to  have 
meaning  and  value,  have  some  positive  reason  for  desiring  it.  Nor  is 
absence  of  restraint  a  necessary  condition  for  freedom,  because 
commonsense  tells  us  that  a  degree  of  restraint  is  sometimes  necessary 
in  both  a  personal  and  a  social  sense  in  order  to  attain  freedom  in 
other  respects.  This  is  just  so,  it  is  a  matter  of  empirical  fact  and 
simile  observation. 
Idealists'  theories  of  freedom  differ  fundamentally  from  this 
commonsensical  point  of  view.  It  is  one  thing  to  argue  that  some  balance 
must  be  pursued  between  the  absence  and  presence  of  restraint,  that 
freedom  in  a  negative  sense  is  related  to  a  positive  perspective  in 
some  logical  or  consequential  way,  but  quite  a  different  thing  to 
postulate  that  obedience  to  authority,  in  terms  of  some  ideology,  theory 
or  faith,  actually  entails  freedom  itself  and  does  so  whether  one  submits 
to  it  willingly  or  not,  because  if  one  objects  it  is  assumed  that  it  is 1 
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only  because  one  does  not  really  understand  what  is  the  case.  This  is 
to  postulate  a  positive  view  of  freedom  of  a  very  special  kind  grounded 
in  metaphysical  reasoning  that  is  regarded  as  'real'  in  the  idealistic 
sense  as  opposed  to  commonsensical  reasoning  associated  with  the  everyday 
world  of  experience.  Idealist  theories  of  freedom,  are  at  one  in  positing 
an  exalted,  worth  while,  normative,  prescriptive  and  categorical  view 
of  freedom.  Each  theory  sees  freedom  as  right  and  good.  Freedom  is 
not  doing  as  you  like  or  'apparently'  think  is  right  but  what  is  'really' 
right.  Since  it  is  not  possible  for  people  to  know  all  the  time  what  is 
'really'  right  and  what  is  good  for  them  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  say 
lack  of  knowledge  or  intelligence  or  experience,  idealists  will  argue 
that  is  is  only  fitting  that  those  who  lack  such  wisdom  should,  if 
necessary,  be  coerced  to  be  free  by  those  who  are  wise  and  knowledgeable 
until  such  time  as  they,  the  uninitiated,  attain  such  wisdom  themselves. 
Since  in  different  ways  commonsensical  and  idealistic  views  of 
freedom  admit  the  possibility  of  a  person  being  coerced  to  be  free,  that 
coercive  force  may  be  a  factor  in  enhancing  or  realising  a  person's 
freedom,  these  two  notions  of  freedom  deserve  further  consideration. 
Sir  Isiah  Berlin  argues  that  his  notion  of  negative  freedom  is  the 
basis  of  the  liberal  tradition  in  political  thought  that  regards  a  person 
as  being  free  to  the  degree  to  which  no  other  man  or  body  of  men  interferes 
with  his  activity.  Negative  liberty,  for  Berlin,  has  intrinsic  value, 
is  of  value  in  itself.  And  this  explains  why  he  seeks  to  discredit 
the  views  of  those  who  advocate  a  positive,  by  which  he  means  idealist, 
notion  of  freedom.  Clearly  coercion  is  antithetical  to  Berlin's  strict 
notion  of  negative  freedom  and  in  no  sense  can  make  a  man  free.  It  is, 
says  Berlin,  because  the  ends  that  men  seek  conflict,  are  diverse, 
incompatible,  and  unattainable  by  any  single  magical  solution  that 
freedom  in  a  strict  negative  sense  must  be  regarded-as  intrinsically 100 
valuable:  "The  necessity  of  choosing  between  absolute  claims  is  then 
an  inescapable  characterisic  of  the  human  condition.  This  gives  its 
value  to  freedcm....  as  an  end  in  itself,  and  not  as  a  temporary  need  arising 
out  of  our  confused  notions  and  disordered  lives,  a  predicament  which 
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a  panacea  could  one  day  put  right.  "  So  in  Berlin's  view  the  principle 
of  non-interference,  in  terms  of  social  freedom,  is  of  paramount 
importance,  and  this  is  substantiated  by  the  fact  that  we  must  have 
unrestricted  freedom  of  choice,  leaving  alternative  courses  of  action 
open  to  us,  so  long  as  the  ends  that  we  seek  impinge  upon  one  another. 
Freedom,  says  Berlin,  is  freedom  and  nothing  is  to  be  gained  by 
confusing  it  with  other  desirable  ends,  that  is  to  say  by  attempting  to 
redescribe  it  in  terms  of  some  other  value.  Berlin  concedes  that  some 
people  may  be  willing  to  sacrifice  a  portion  of  their  freedom  to  enable 
less  fortunate  souls  to  increase  their  share,  to  attain  that  is  a  greater 
equality  of  freedom  in  society  as  a  whole,  but  denies  that  such  a 
sacrifice  can  possibly  amount  to  an  increase  in  what  is  being  sacrificed, 
namely  freedom  itself:  "Everything  is  what  it  is,  liberty  is  liberty  not 
equality  or  fairness  or  justice  or  human  happiness  or  a  quiet  conscience. 
If  the  liberty  of  myself  or  my  class  or  nation  depends  upon  the  misery 
of  a  vast  number  of  other  human  beings,  the  system  which  promotes  this  is 
unjust  and  immoral.  But  if  I  curtail  or  lose  my  freedom  in  order  to 
lessen  the  shame  of  such  inequality,  and  do  not  thereby  materially 
increase  the  liberty  of  others,  an  absolute  loss  of  liberty  occurs. 
This  may  be  compensated  for  by  a  gain  in  justice  or  happiness  or  in 
peace  but  the  loss  remains,  and  it  is  nothing  but  a  confusion  of  values 
to  say  that  although  my  'liberal'  individual  freedom  may  go  to  the  board 
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some  other  kind  of  freedom  -'social  or  economic'-  is  increased.  " 
Berlin  recognises  the  inevitability  of  a  degree  of  restraint,  but 
at  the  expense  of  freedom,  and  observes  that  being  free  is  not  everyone's 
primary  need,  for  a  starving  man  does  not  need  freedom  so  rauch  as  food, 
a  sick  man  medicine,  an  uneducated  man  schooling,  and  children  security. 101 
Recognition  of  the  necessity  of  restraint,  however,  does  not  in  Berlin's 
view  suggest  an  alternative  absolute  principle  of  interference,  for  given 
that  freedom  from  interference  is  of  intrinsic  value  there  can  be  no 
such  absolute  principle  to  the  contrary.  "  Berlin  regards  freedom  much 
as  one  might  regard  peace.  Peace  like  freedom  may  be  regarded  as  a 
pre-condition  for  all  manner  of  other  goods  which  are  in  themselves 
indisputably  positive  and  substantial,  but  peace  is  peace  and  need  not 
be  confused  or  indentif  ied  with  such  goods,  nor  does  it  necessarily 
guarantee  their  realisation.  Berlin  argues  for  a  strictly  negative 
concept  of  freedom  because  it  is  his  principal  concern  to  establish  the 
limits  of  coercion  in  order  to  safeguard  freedom  for  individuals  to 
function  as  human  beings.  Even  the  most  autocratic  of  regimes,  he  observes, 
must  preserve  a  degree  of  non-interference,  and  in  Berlin's  view  the  onus 
must  rest  on  those  who  would  interfere  with  a  person's  freedom  no  matter 
how  expedient  such  interference  in  teams  of  other  values  may  appear  to  be. 
But  it  may  be  objected  that  Berlin's  reasoning  does  not  settle 
any  real  questions  about  freedom  at  all.  He  argues  that  to  decide 
whether  a  man  is  free  one  must  ask  what  he  is  free  from,  though  this  kind 
of  enquiry  simply  edges  one  back  to  a  re-evaluation  and  discussion  of  the 
nature  of-freedom  itself;  whether,  for  example,  human  nature  being  as 
it  is,  being  free  from  the  protection  of  the  law  really  constitutes 
a  state  of  freedom  or  not.  And  this  in  turn  seems  to'suggest  that  the 
recognition  of  a  positive  dimension  to  freedom  is  unavoidable. 
Berlin's  refusal  to  associate  the  concept  of  freedom  with  other 
desirable  ends  leaves  the  question  of  the  nature  of  freedom'  unresolved. 
A  commonsensical  view  would  suggest  that  any  analysis  of  freedom  must 
relate  to  the  satisfaction  of  particular  desirable  wants,  needs  and 
interests.  Once  this  move  is  made,  coercion  may  be  regarded  as  being 
instrumental  in  the  realisation  and  maximisation  of  desirable  ends  for 
individuals  and  society  as  a  whole.  Everyone,  be  they  scholars,  lifemen, 102 
games  players,  artists  of  any  kind,  must  needs  submit  to  the  discipline 
of  the  materials  and  the  rules  of  the  sphere  in  which  they  operate,  if 
they  are  to  realise  their  potential  and  fully  exercise  their  competencies 
and  abilities.  Similarly,  the  coercive  influence  of  customs,  laws, 
opinion,  distinguishes  for  us  a  hierarchy  of  values  in  the  attainment 
of  which  we  express  our  freedom.  We  lose  freedom  in  one  respect  to 
gain  it  in  another  form,  like  the  prisoner  who  refuses  to  leave  his 
cell  preferring  the  security  it  affords  to  the  hazards  of  life  outside. 
Freedom  is  not  just  a  question  of  unlimited  choice,  but  depends  upon 
the  quality  as  well  as  the  quantity  of  choice,  which  entails  the 
inevitable  choice  of  having  to  renounce  certain  desires  if  accepted 
norms  and  standards.  are  to  be  followed.  So,  a  degree  of  coercion,  one 
might  argue,  is  necessary  for  the  sustenance  of  freedom,  though  the 
nature  of  such  coercion  and  the  extent  to  which  it  might  be  justified 
in  the  name  of  freedom,  and  the  values  in  which  freedom  might  be 
redescribed,  are  issues  that  will  always  be  debated. 
It  is  not  surprising  that  philosophers  of  freedom  distinguish 
between  good  and  bad  laws.  A  good  law  for  Hobbes,  for  instance, 
is  one  that  does  not  impose  useless  restrictions  or  burdens:  "For  the 
use  of  law...  is  not  to  bind  the  people  from  all  voluntary  actions, 
but  to  direct  and  keep  them  in  such  a  motion  as  not  to  hurt  themselves 
by  their 
, 
own  impetuous  desires,  rashness  or  indiscretion;  as  hedges  are 
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set,  not  to  stop  travellers,  but  to  keep  them  in  their  way.  "  Locke 
also  refers  to  the  analogy  of  hedges  but  in  a  more  positive  way, 
suggesting  that  laws  are  the  condition  of  liberty:  "...  since  that  ill 
deserves  the  name  of  confinement  which  hedges  us  in  from  bogs  and 
precipices.  So  that,  however  it  may  be  mistaken,  the  end  of  law  is 
not  to  abolish  but  to  preserve  and  to  enlarge  freedom...  For  liberty  is 
to  be  free  from  restraint  and  violence  from  others,  which  cannot  be 
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where  there  is  no  law.  " 103 
Locke's  notion  of  negative  freedom,  which  is  associated  with  the 
liberal  concept  of  the  state,  differs  from  Berlin's  concept  of  negative 
freedom.  Locke  makes  room  for  a  positive  dimension  to  the  notion  of 
freedom  based  upon  three  principal  requirements,  the  removal  of  obstacles 
and  hindrances,  the  assurance  of  a  sphere  of  individual  independence, 
and  the  restriction  of  state  interference  within  prescribed  limits. 
And  these  requirements  recognise  two  distinct  elements  to  the  concept  of 
liberty,  freedom  from  frustration  and  inhibition  and  freedom  for  achievement 
and  fulfilment.  This,  it  is  submitted,  represents  a  co=nonsense  view 
of  the  notion  of  freedom  and  its  relation  to  coercion.  Freedom  is  viewed 
positively  in  terms  of  being  free  to  do  or  not  to  do  desirable  things 
or  being  free  to  achieve  other  desirable  ends,  and  coercion  is  implicitly 
acknowledged  as  a  fora  of  constraint  instrumental  in  enlarging  and 
apportioning  freedom  in  such  terms  for  individuals  and  for  all  members 
of  society  in  aggregate. 
Idealist  theories  of  freedom  on  the  other  hand  rely  upon  reasoning 
of  a  special  kind  that  differs  from  the  commonsense  notion  of  reasonableness 
as  applied  to  ordinary  men.  Reasonableness  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the 
word  recognises  the  willingness  to  listen  to  critical  arguments,  to  learn 
from  experience,  that  one  cannot  expect  too  much  from  reason,  that 
argument  rarely  settles  questions  but  is  simply  a  means  to  learning  by 
enabling  one  to  see  things  more  clearly.  Rationalism  in  the  context  of 
idealist  theories  of  freedom  is  quite  different.  It  is  objective  rather 
than  subjective  and  can  take  a  variety  of  forms  ranging  from  the 
intellectualist  theory  of  Plato,  which  regarded  reasoning  as  a  faculty 
that  only  the  wise  and  gods  shared,  to  more  collectivist  socially  and 
empirically  based  theories  such  as  Hegelianism  and  Marxism  which  acknowledge 
the  social  context  of  reason  but  which  seek  to  discover  or  intuit  a 
logic  or  theory  or  scheme  of  things  governing  the  condition  of  man. 104 
Idealist  theories  of  freedom  are  grounded  in  reason  and  faith,  a 
mixture  of  both,  and  constitute  figments  of  the  mind  that  are  not 
verifiable  by  empirical  observation  of  the  human  condition,  though 
empirical  evidence  of  a  kind  may  be  invoked  to  support  such  theories, 
as  miracles  are  invoked  as  evidence  of  the  existence  of  a  benevolent 
and  omnipotent  deity.  Idealist  theories  of  freedom  identify  obedience 
to  authority  with  freedom.  A  free  person  is  one  who  understands  and 
conforms  to  the  theory  or  creed,  and  a  free  society  one  that  recognises 
the  assumed  truths  that  such  theories  are  deemed  to  reveal.  Reality 
for  the  idealist  exists  not  in  the  here  and  now  but  in  ideas,  in 
contents  of  the  mind.  In  general  such  theories  tend  to  suggest  that 
there  is  some  kind  of  single  harmonious,  Utopian  and  logical  solution 
to  the  problem  of  human  conflict.  To  describe  freedom  in  such  terms 
is  to  depart  from  ordinary  language  philosphy  and  to  make  assumptions 
based  upon  reasoning  of  a  metaphysical  rather  than  of  an  empirical  kind. 
Those  who  subscribe  to  idealist  notions  of  freedom  reject  freedom 
as  a  formal  principle  of  non-interference  because  the  latter  fails  to 
distinguish  between  liberty  and  licence.  And  to  allow  a  person  to  do 
as  he  wishes  does  not  necessarily  guarantee  his  being  free,  for  he  may 
still  be  a  slave  of  uncontrollable  personal  desires  and  impulses. 
Such  a  person,  it  is  supposed,  might  enjoy  a  kind  of  social  freedom 
but  remain  in  personal  bondage  like  the  alcoholic,  drug  addict, 
kleptomaniac,  schizophrenic.,  or  lay  about,  none  of  whom  we  may  wish  in 
normal  circumstances  to  regard  as  being  free  if  left  to  his  own 
particular  desires.  The  idealist  will  argue  that  licence  may  be  a 
kind  of  freedom,  but  is  not  'true'  or  'real'  freedom,  that  a  man  who 
is  free  to  do  evil,  like  a  man  who  has  no  control  over  his  desires, 
is  not  'really'  free  at  all.  Freedom  for  the  idealist  entails  being 
in  control  of  oneself  and  doing  what  is  right,  and  making  the  right 
choice  which  is  the  only  choice. 105 
So,  a  free  person,  following  this  reasoning,  is  a  person  who  acts 
from  a  sense  of  duty  and  not  a  person  who  simply  does  as  he  wants  and 
follows  every  whim.  And  in  this  respect  idealists  share  common  ground 
with  Kant  who  also  regards  choice  as  rational  and  right,  though  derived 
from  practical  reason,  and  those  ruled  by  their  desires  as  making  choices 
that  are  wrong.  And  this  makes  sense  in  ordinary  reasoning  too  for 
there  are  times  when  we  have  to  admit  we  have  to  will  ourselves  to  do 
things  we  do  not  wish  to  do.  Sometimes  our  wants  clash  and  we  may  want 
things  that  will  restrict  our  freedom.  We  resist  our  desires  and  choose 
to  act  out  of  a  sense  of  duty,  and  in  such  circumstances  it  is  presumably 
the  strong  willed  person  who  aspires  to  freedom.  But  the  idealist  will 
argue,  if  no  man  is  free  in  doing  wrong,  to  coerce  him  from  such  action 
towards  morally  approved  and  dutiful  behaviour  is  to  ensure  his  freedom, 
to  set  him  free,  and  this  is  what  he  truly  needs,  is  truly  in  his 
interests,  and  what  he  would  really  want  were  he  sensible  enough  to 
realise  it. 
A  man  is,  therefore,  only  'apparently'  free  to  gamble  his  money 
to  the  detriment  of  his  family,  he  is  not  'really'  free,  but  he  would 
be  free  if  he  had  the  will,  reason  and  good  sense  to  overcome  such  a 
base  impulse.  If  then  such  a  person  is  forced  or  coerced  into  acting 
in  a  dutiful  manner  he  is  in  a  sense  forced  to  be  free  or  at  least,  it 
can  be  conceded,  he  is  forced  into  a  position  from  which  he  might  come 
to  realise  where  his  freedom  lies.  It  is  better,  the  idealist  assumes, 
to  be  coerced  rather  than  to  be  left  to  the  mercy  of  one's  desires  in 
which  state  one  is  neither  master  of  one's  destiny  nor  a  morally 
autonomous  being. 
The  assumption  is  that  conduct  based  on  desire  is  bad  and  necessitated 
whilst  that  resulting  from  choice  is  based  on  reason  and  is  free.  Choice 
implies  a  free  will.  Being  free  entails  more  than  being  left  free  of 
the  interference  of  others,  it  means  being  free  of  irrational  desires 106 
10 
and  being  free  to  make  proper  choices  out  of  a  sense  of  duty.  It 
follows  that  a  person  who  feels  his  duty  to  be  burdensome  to  him  is 
already  in  danger  of  becoming  enslaved  by  his  desires,  but  is  not  unfree 
so  long  as  he  has  the  will  to  exercise  a  proper  moral  and  rational  choice 
from  a  sense  of  duty.  Idealist  notions  of  freedom  assume  the  existence 
of  free  will,  marry  it  with  the  notion  of  social  freedom,  and  set  both 
in  a  moral  context. 
This  kind  of  reasoning  relies  on'what  is  variously  called  the 
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doctrine  of  the  two  selves,  or  the  two  worlds  concept.  Two  selves 
are  envisaged,  the  lower,  baser  self  representing  a  person's  lower 
nature,  one's  heteronomous  self  subject  to  wordly  desires  and  pleasures, 
and  one's  true,  ideal,  higher  or  'real'  self,  one's  morally  autonomous 
self,  representing  one's  self  at  its  best,  rational,  disciplined,  moral, 
knowing  and  wise.  If  then  my  baser  self  is  predominant  it  simply  implies 
that  I  am  ignorant,  inexperienced,  and/or  incapable  of  recognising  my 
true,  latent,  rational  self  which  as  a  rational  being  I  would  recognise 
were  I  made  aware  of  it,  for  this  rational  self  is  the  only  self,  it  is 
presumed,  that  deserves  my  serious  consideration. 
The  notion  of  the  two  selves  encapsulates  a  positive  ethical 
doctrine  of  self-realisation,  the  realisation  of  the  ideal  self  that  is 
identified  with  being  really  and  truly  free.  This  constitutes  what 
Berlin  calls  a  positive  doctrine  of  liberation  by  reason;  freedom  is 
not  doing  as  one  likes  but  what  is  right,  is  not  to  follow  one's  desires 
but  reason. 
Of  course  it  is  the  case  in  life  that  the  majority  of  people  either 
have  to  or  are  content  to  be  told  what  to  do,  for  if  left  to  themselves 
they  would  tend  to  squander  their  abilities,  their  opportunities,  lacking 
a  sense  of  duty  to'either  themselves  or  to  others.  If,  however,  the 
idealist  will  argue,  we  can  be  made  to  understand  the  true  nature  of 
things  we  would  not  wish  to  behave  so,  for  to  want  something  to  be 107 
other  than  it  must  necessarily  be  is  to  be  ignorant,  irrational  and 
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unwise.  Berlin  states  the  argument  as  follows: 
"To  understand  why  things  must  be  as  they  must  be  is  to  will  them 
to  be  so.  Knowledge  liberates  not  by  offering  us  more  open  possibilities 
amongst  which  we  can  make  our  choice  but  by  preserving  us  from  the 
frustration  of  attempting  the  impossible.  To  want  necessary  laws  to  be 
other  than  they  are  is  to  be  prey  to  an  irrational  desire  -a  desire 
that  what  must  be  X  should  also  be  not  X.  To  go  further  and  believe 
these  laws  to  be  other  than  what  they  necessarily  are  is  to  be  insane. 
That  is  the  metaphysical  heart  of  rationalise.  The  notion  of  liberty 
contained  in  it  is  not  the  'negative'  conception  of  a  field  without 
obstacles,  a  vacuum  in  which  I  can  do  as  I  please,  but  the  notion  of 
self-direction  or  self-control.  I  can  do  what  I  will  with  my  own. 
I  am  a  rational  being;  whatever  I  can  demonstrate  to  myself  as  being 
necessary,  as  incapable  of  being  otherwise  in  a  rational  society  -  that 
is  a  society  directed  by  rational  minds  towards  goals  such  as  a  rational 
being  would  have  -I  cannot,  being  rational,  wish  to  sweep  out  of  my  way. 
I  assimilate  it  into  my  substance  as  I  do  the  laws  of  logic,  of 
mathematics,  of  physics,  the  rules  of  art,  the  principles  that  govern 
everything  of  which  I  understand,  and  therefore  will  the  rational 
purpose  by  which  I  can  never  be  thwarted,  since  I  cannot  want  it  to  be 
other  than  it  is. 
Once  the  premise  is  accepted  that  people  have  to  learn  to  be  good 
and  to  do  the  right  thing,  the  question  arises  as  to  how  and  from  whom 
they  will  learn.  Thereupon  the  notion  of  self-realisation  through 
reason  is  transposed  and  grounded  in  a  political  and  social  context. 
The  uninitiated  will  have  to  be  told  what  to  do  and  if  necessary  forced 
to  behave  accordingly.  But  this,  the  idealist  argues,  is  not  to  enslave 
people,  for  if  reason  seeks  truth  then  it  will  be  the  same  for  all,  and 
what  is  reasonable  for  one  cannot  conflict  with  what  is  reasonable  for 108 
another.  Harmony  in  any  society  is  discoverable  through  reason,  through 
getting  to  know  the  necessity  of  things.  Only  irrational  men,  it  is 
presumed,  conflict  with  each  other,  rational  men  respect  reason  in  each 
other  and  thereby  ensure  that  all  true  solutions  to  genuine  problems  are 
compatible. 
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Berlin  explains  the  assumptions  made  by  people  who  think  in  this  way: 
"..  the  rational  ends  of  our  true  natures  must  coincide,  or  be  made  to 
coincide,  however  violently  our  poor,  unreflective,  desire  ridden,  - 
passionate,  empirical  selves  may  cry  out  against  this  process.  Freedom 
is  not  freedom  to  do  what  is  irrational,  or  stupid,  or  bad.  To  force 
. 
empirical  selves  into  the  right  pattern  is  not  tyranny  but  liberation... 
Liberty  so  far  from  being  incompatible  with  authority,  becomes  virtually 
identical  with  it.  This  is  the  thought  and  language  of  all'the 
declarations  of  the  rights  of  man  in  the  eighteenth  century  and  of  all 
.  those  who  look  upon  society  as  a  design  constructed  according  to  the 
rational  laws  of  the  wise  lawgiver,  or  of  nature,  or  of  history,  or  of 
the  Supreme  Being.  " 
The  idea  that  wrongdoing  is  the  result  of  ignorance  is  normally 
associated  with  early  Greek  philosophy  and  more  particularly  with  the 
Socratic  intellectualist  theory  of  ethics  that  equates  virtue  with 
knowledge  and  ignorance,  with  vice.  Plato  gave  a  practical,  political 
and  social  dimension  to  this  notion  in  the  'Republic'  when  he  suggested 
that,  since  wisdom  is  inevitably  limited  to  a  few,  the  majority  of  people, 
being  ignorant  and  therefore  incapable'  of  attaining  virtue  and  freedom 
by  their  own  efforts,  must  necessarily  be  guided  by  the  knowledgeable, 
the  wise,  the  guardians  who  alone  understood  the  'Forms'  including  the 
'Form  of  Goodness'. 
But  not  all  who  adhere  to  an  idealist  notion  of  freedom  or  indicate 
sy=athies  in  that  direction  need  necessarily  subscribe  to  this  kind  of 
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intellectualist  theory  of  ethics;  neither  Rousseau,  nor  Hegel,  nor  Marx 1C9 
did,  though  all  three  acknowledged  the  role  played  by  reason  in  the  search 
for  freedom  and  the  need  to  coerce  the  uninitiated  and  irrational  for 
their  own  and  everyone's  good.  Even  J.  S.  Mill  whose  view  of  freedom 
was  grounded  in  terms  of  freedom  from  restraint  did  not  allow  his 
inclination  towards  the  notion  of  an  intellectual  elite  to  influence 
him  in  this  respect.  Mill  argued,  as  an  idealist  would,  that  a  man 
might  justifiably  be  forcibly  prevented  from  crossing  a  bridge  if  there 
was  no  time  to  warn  him  that  it  might  collapse.  For  whatever  such  a 
person's  behaviour  might  indicate  to  the  contrary,  Mill  assumed  that 
no  reasonable  man  would  wish  to  risk  his  life  in  such  circumstances 
were  he  fully  aware  of  all  the  facts. 
Idealists  ass  e  that  rational  people  normally  would  want  to  do 
what  their  'real'  or  'true'  selves  really  want  and  what  their  irrational 
or  empirical  selves  would  deny  them.  This  is  to  postulate  a  particular 
notion  of  reasonableness  based  on  the  theory  of  their  being  only  one, 
right  choice.  Idealists  posit  a  positive  and  prescriptive  concept  of 
freedom  implying  self-mastery,  that  suggests  that  man  is  divided 
against  himself,  between  some  transcendent  self  and  some  empirical 
bundle  of  desires.  And  this  notion  of  the  divided  self  is  translated 
into  religious  or  social  or  political  terms  in  imagining  some  transcendent 
controller  for  society  embodied  in  the  understanding  of  some  special 
kind  of  knowledge  in  the  Divine  or  Platonic  sense,  or  some  kind  of 
general  will  as  in  the  case  of  Rousseau,  or  some  notion  of  the  ideal 
state  as  in  Hegel's  case,  or  some  Marxian  dialectic  leading  to  a 
Utopian  classless  society,  with  which  the  individual  through  reason  and 
understanding  is  obliged  to  identify  himself  or  alternatively  be 
coerced;  for,  only  by  so  identifying  himself  can  the  individual  aspire 
to  be  socially,  politically,  morally  and  personally  free. 110 
Rousseau  did  not  subscribe  to  an  intellectualist  theory  of  ethics 
and  did  not  share  Plato's  political  sympathies  either.  Rousseau  on  the 
contrary  is  usually  considered  to  have  been  one  of  the  most  dedicated 
champions  of  democracy  in  the  development  of  political  thought.  But 
Rousseau's  positive  and  idealist  notion  of  freedom  is  similar  to  that 
of  Plato,  he  merely  substitutes  for  Plato's  notion  of  obedience  to  the 
rule  of  the  wise  his  own  idea  of  obedience  to  the  general  will.  In 
two  respects  Plato's  influence  upon  Rousseau  is  recognisable,  firstly 
in  Rousseau's  conviction  that  political  subjection  is  essentially  an 
ethical  matter  and  not  simply  a  case  of  law  and  order,  and  secondly  in 
his  presumption  that  the  community  represents  the  chief  moralising 
agency  and  is  therefore  of  the  highest  moral  significance.  Freedom 
for  Rousseau  is  not  the  negative  freedom  of  not  being  interfered  with 
by  others,  whether  individuals  or  rulers  or  agents  of  representative 
democratic  majorities,  but  implies  that  all  members  of  society  have  a 
share  in  government  and  in  the  exercise  of  public  power  and  as  such 
have  the  right  to  interfere  in  any  aspect  of  each  other's  individual 
lives. 
Whilst  Rousseau's  m=ediate  predecessors  in  political  philosophy 
preoccupied  themselves  with  the  contract  theory  of  government,  in 
practice.  many  subjects,  of  course,  found  themselves  having  to  obey 
some  sovereign  authority  or  other  even  though  they  may  never  have 
explicitly  consented  to  do  so.  And  presumably  they  would  continue  to 
do  so,  so  long  as  there  was  no  one  willing  to  suggest  that  such  an 
obligation  was  unwarranted.  That  is  to  say  it  was  assumed  that  those 
who  accepted,  reluctantly  or  not,  the  benefits  of  society  automatically 
tacitly  consented  in  some  way  to  accept  reciprocal  obligations. 
Rousseau's  notion  of  the  general  will  is  an  attempt  to  resolve 
this  inconsistency.  Rousseau  argues  that  subjects  always  consent  to TT  111 
the  actions  of  their  rulers  and  in  so  doing  attain  perfect  freedom,  and 
those  who  through  lack  of  understanding  may  not  be  inclined  to  consent 
must  be  made  to  do-so.  And  this  is  necessary  because,  when  an  individual 
seems  to  want  something  different  from  that  allowed  by  the  social  order 
or  the  community  which  reflects  the  general  will,  he  is  deemed  not  to 
know  what  he  really  wants  or  what  is  in  his  true  interests.  "In  order 
then  that  the  social  compact  may  not  be  an  empty  formula,  it  tacitly 
includes  the  undertaking...  that  whosoever  refuses  to  obey  the  general 
will  shall  be  compelled  to  do  so  by  the  whole  body.  This  means  nothing 
less  than  that  he  will  be  forced  to  be  free....  This  alone  legitimises 
civil  undertakings  which  without  it  would  be  absurd,  tyrannical,  and 
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liable  to  the  most  frightful  abuses.  " 
Rousseau's  principal  concern  was  to  discover  a  formula,  some  way  of 
reasoning,  some  means  or  some  kind  of  association  that  could.  justifiably 
defend  with  conmion  force  each  individual's  rights  and  property  whilst  at 
the  same  time  allowing  each  person  in  unison  with  everybody  else  to  seem 
to  be  obeying  himself  and  so  to  be  retaining  his  original  freedom  and 
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autonomy.  And  this,  Rousseau  argues,  is  realisable  through  a  proper 
understanding  of  the  twin  notions  of  the  social  contract  and  the  general 
will.  Through  the  former  man  is  said  to  renounce  his  'natural  liberty' 
to  find  his  'true  liberty',  civil  and  moral,  when  he  enters  a  state  of 
obedience  to  law  since  only  then  is  he  free,  that  is  when  he  becomes 
master  of  himself  obeying  laws  which  he  has  prescribed  for  himself. 
Rousseau  with  arg  rents  anticipating  Kantian  notions  of  autonomy 
and  freedom  divests  the  notion  of  contract  of  its  normal  meaning,  its 
preoccupation  with  individual  rights  and  duties,  and  presents  it  as  a 
positive  'idea'  rather  than  an  act,  implying  not  the  sacrifice  or 
bargaining  of  rights  and  duties  but  their  positive  sustenance  and 
attairnnent.  Liberty  becomes  in  this  positive  sense  self-government 
and  autonomy.  The  social  contract  becomes  a  kind  of  mystical  experience 112 
through  which  the  individual  is  reborn  in  society  and  emerges  from  a 
limited  and  unimaginative  existence  to  an  intelligent  and  mature 
personhood.  When  Rousseau  says  man  is  everywhere  in  chains,  he  is,  of 
course,  implying  that  'a  bad  society  is  a  burden  from  which  citizens 
can  realise  their  true  natures  through  acceptance  of  the  social  contract 
and  the  general  will,  as  members  that  is  of  a  special  kind  of  community 
sharing  a  common  ideal  of  the  common  good. 
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Rousseau's  notion  of  the  general  will  is  complex,  and  perplexing. 
It  is  regarded  as  the  source  of  sovereignty  and  power  and  also  of  moral 
value;  it  alone  is  always  right  and  only  through  obedience  to  it  can 
man  fulfil  his  moral  life.  It  is  a  truism  of  course  to  claim  the  general 
will  is  always  right,  for  if  it  is  supposed  to  represent  the  social  and 
common  good  then  it  surely  must  be  right,  and  what  is  not  right  must 
simply  not  be  the  general  will.  It  must  not,  however,  be  confused  with 
the  vier  of  the  majority,  nor  does  it  imply  that  the  majority  is  always 
right.  The  object  of  the  general  will  is  the  common  good  which  does  not 
imply  that  it  is  simply  the  sum  of  particular  wills  of  particular  people. 
It  is  the  will  each  man  has  as  a  citizen  and  moral  agent,  not  the  sum  of 
particular  individuals'  desires  and  interests  taken  in  isolation.  Nor 
does  it  represent  the  will  of.  all  as  opposed  that  is  to  the  will  of  the 
majority,  for  should  we  all  be  assumed  to  desire  the  same  thing  there 
would  be  no  raison  d'  etre  for  creating  the  fiction  of  the  general  will 
in  the  first  place.  And  the  same  would  apply  if  we  supposed  we  could 
wait  till  everyone  reached  agreement,  assuming  this  is  possible,  for  our 
good  sense  must  tell  us  that  in  practice  few  decisions  would  ever  be 
made.  The  notion  of  the  general  will  suggests  some  kind  of  association, 
but  not  an  aggregation  of  wills  rather  some  fiction  of  the  mind  that  is 
given  a  moral  and  collective  personality. 
Rousseau  insists  that  the  object  of  the  general  will  is  the  common 
good,  and  argues  from  the  presumption  of  a  common  good  to  the  assumption 113 
of  a  general  will  though  the  latter  does  not  seem  to  necessarily  follow 
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from  the  former.  It  does  not  seem  possible  to  argue  that  the  assumed 
existence  of  a  common  good  shared  by  several  people  necessarily 
presupposes  that  there  exists  a  common  will  also  shared  between  them. 
The  unity  of  the  general  will,  therefore,  must  lie  in  its  object  rather 
than  in  a  unity  of  the  wills  it  is  supposed  to  represent.  Any  attempt 
to  analyse  the  notion  of  the  general  will  seems  to  lead  to  the 
evaporation  of  the  notion  altogether.  It  is  not  a  will  in  the  normal 
sense  of  the  term,  but  a  notion  representing  a  multiplicity  of  wills 
each  of  which  attains  and  shares  some  cannon  chäracteristic  in  aspiring 
to  the  common  good.  A  common  goal,  then,  is  reified  and  personified 
in  terms  of  a  general  will.  This  is  a  practice  not  uncommon  amongst 
men  who  from  time  to  time  have  reified  all  sorts  of  things,  individuals, 
animals,  ideas,  nations,  attributing  to  them  a  personality  with  its  own 
intentions. 
T.  H.  Green  in  his  'Lectures  on  Political  Obligation'  conceives 
the  idea  of  the  general  will  slightly  differently  as  "that  impalpable 
congeries  of  the  hopes  and  fears  of  a  people  bound  together  by  common 
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interests  and  sympathy.  "  In  no  sense  did  Green  regard  the  general 
will  as  an  individual  will  in  itself  but  as  a  collection  of  the  unselfish 
wishes  of  individuals  forming  a  community  for  a  common  object  or  objects. 
But,  like  Rousseau,  Green  suggests  that  the  uniqueness  of  the  general  will 
is  deduced  from  the  singleness  of  its  object;  othervise,  it  would  not  be 
possible  to  speak  of  a  general  will  at  all.  And  by  the  common  good, 
which  is  the  object  of  the  general  will,  it  is  not  meant  that  which  all 
men  should  aim  for  but  what  all  men  really  want  to  aim  for.  So,  in  being 
forced  to  the  common  good  people  are  merely  forced  to  do  what  they  really 
want  to  do  anyway.  Each  man's  'real'  good,  it  is  assumed,  must  be  in 
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harmony  with  that  of  every  other  because  conflict  in  any  form  is  harmful. 
And  harmony  is  achieved  if  the  interests  of  all  are  each  other's  aim 114 
and  in  so  far  as  the  general  will  is  expressed  in  the  laws  of  the  state. 
In  obeying  the  state,  subjects  discover,  it  is  supposed,  their  own  'real' 
will,  and  the  state,  in  so  far  as  it  compels  citizens,  contrary  to  their 
'apparent'  will,  to  follow  such  laws  on  pain  of  sanctions,  coerces  them 
to  be  free  and  is,  presumably,  justified  in  so  doing. 
Rousseau  believed  that  the  majority  of  people,  the  blind  multitude, 
were  in  need  of  guidance:  "0f  itself  the  people  wills  only  the  good,  but 
of  itself  it  by  no  means  always  sees  it.  The  general  will  is  always  in 
the  right  but  the  judgment  which  guides  it  is  not  always  enlightened. 
It  must  be  got  to  see  the  objects  as  they  are,  and  sometimes  as  they  ought 
to  appear  to  it;  it  must  be  shown  the  good  road  it  is  in  search  of  ....  The 
individuals  see  the  good  they  reject;  the  public  wills  the  good  it  does 
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not  see.  All  stand  equally  in  need  of  guidance.  "  And  Rousseau  is  in 
no  doubt  as  to  the  means  by  which  such  guidance  should  be  given.  His 
message  in  'Emile'  is  that  the  best  institutions  are  those  which  best 
succeed  in  denaturing  man.  And  he  repeats  in  the  'Social  Contract'  that 
the  shaping  of  a  nation  may  require  that  human  nature  itself  be  changed. 
And  this  can  only  be  achieved  by  training  and  compulsion.  Souls,  it 
seems,  as  far  as  Rousseau  is  concerned  must  be  taught  as  well  as  forced. 
to  fly. 
Rousseau  sees  no  real  conflict  between  freedom  and  authority  either 
in  a  political  or  a  social  sense  or  for  instance  in  the  relationship 
between  teacher  and  pupil.  In  his  account  of  Emile's  education,  Emile 
is  expected  to  succ=b  to  the  authority  though  benign  of  his  tutor 
whose  function  is  to  structure  the  environment  in  which  Emile  is  left 
to  learn,  when  he  is  ready  and  at  his  own  pace  but  within  the  limits  of 
the  tutor's  control  of  events.  Emile  is  placed  in  a  position  of  controlled 
freedom,  in  situations  in  which  he  must  learn  for  himself  the  necessity 
of  things  and  the  need  for  a  particular  course  of  action  before  he 
embarks  upon  it.  And  force  may  be  used  to  precipitate  this  state  of 115 
affairs.  The  tutor  is  expected  to  manipulate,  coerce,  guide  his  pupil 
until  the  latter  develops  the  required  and  desired  insight.  "Hitherto 
all  you  have  gained",  says  the  tutor  to  his  pupil,  "has  been  won  by 
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force  or  guile.  "  As  in  the  case  of  the  social  contract  the  general 
will  of  all  works  through  the  individual  so  that  he  can  become  his  'real' 
self,  so  in  Emile's  case  the  authority  of  the  teacher  works  through 
Emile  who  gradually  develops  his  own  authenticity,  self-reliance  and 
freedom. 
Rousseau's  notion  of  freedom  is  as  idealistic  and  as  improbable 
as  his  notions  of  the  general  will  and  the  social  contract  with  which  it 
is  associated.  Rousseau's  free  man  is  a  member  of  some  ideal,  imaginary, 
sterile  society  uncontaminated  by  the  ordinary  empirical  world  of  affairs. 
Similarly,  Emile  aspires  to  freedom  in  an  environment  unpolluted  by 
human  contact,  prejudices  and  feelings.  Rousseau's  claim  that  man  can 
be  forced  to  be  free  relies  upon  the  acceptance  of  a  non-normal  notion 
of  freedom  and  implicit  acknowledgement  of  the  doctrine  of  the  two  selves 
that  one's  undesirable,  natural  and  empirical  self  must  be  forced  or 
coerced,  if  necessary,  to  realise  one's  'real'  or  'ideal'  self. 
It  follows  that  in  the  empirical  world  man  can  never  be  free,  though 
on  the  other  hand  Rousseau's  free  rational  man  would  be  sadly  out  of 
place  in  the  ordinary  world  of  affairs.  Emile  would  only  be  suited 
to  a  society  such  as  the  'Social  Contract'  depicts,  that  is  to  say  where 
in  theory  all  citizens  are  rational,  understand  the  nature  of  things, 
and  live  in  complete  harmony.  Rousseau's  free  man  is  a  rather  unusual 
figure.  He  must  learn  to  control  his  desires,  to  be  submissive  to 
authority,  to  the  laws  of  necessity  and  reason,  and  to  his  teachers. 
He  would  obviously  find  the  imperfect,  material,  empirical  world  perplexing 
and  irrational. 
For  the  main  part,  smile's  education  is  non-authoritarian.  His 
tutor  implicitly  facilitates  and  manipulates  rather  than  explicitly 
coerces  him.  But  in  the  long  run  Emile  cannot  do  without  his  tutor 116 
and  Rousseau  is  loath  to  put  his  trust  in  Emile  lest  he  succumb  to  the 
corruption  of  the  world.  This  contradictory  and  authoritarian  conclusion 
to  an  otherwise  non-authoritarian  account  of  Emile's  education  is  in 
keeping  with  the  concept  of  freedom  revealed  in  the  'Social  Contract'. 
In  both  cases,  in  'Emile'  and  in  the  'Social  Contract',  the  freedom  of 
the  individual  does  not  consist  in  his  doing  what  he  may  superficially 
want  to  do,  but  in  doing  what,  it  is  supposed,  impartial  reflection 
tells  him  there  are  reasons  for  doing.  So,  in  both  cases  there  are 
grounds  for  forcing  him  to  be  free,  because  he  might  for  instance  not 
be  appreciative  of  the  necessity  for  particular  courses  of  action. 
In  the  case  of  the  general  will  we  have  the  mysterious  lawgiver 
charged  with  its  interpretation;  in  Smile's  case  we  have  the  tutor  to 
point  out  what  necessity  demands.  In  effect,  in  'Emile'  and  in  the 
'Social  Contract',  the  same  view  of  freedom  and  its  relation  to  authority 
prevails;  the  former  describes  the  education  of  the  child  towards 
freedom  and  autonomy,  the  latter  the  continuation  of  this  process  in 
the  case  of  the  adult  citizen  in  society.  Rousseau  was  loath  in  the 
final  analysis  to  admit  that  individuals  could  ever  attain  perfect 
freedom  or  autonomy  on  their  own,  or  that  they  would  be  able  to  resist 
the  temptations  of  the  heteronomous  world.  On  the  contrary  he  believed 
there  would  always  be  times  when  individuals  would  need  to  be  coerced 
for  their  own  sakes  towards  freedom. 
Rousseau  sought  to  show  that,  provided  the  state  aimed  to  the 
common  good,  subjects  were  perfectly  free  when  they  were  coerced  by  it, 
because  Rousseau  still  retained  some  allegiance  to  contract  theory. 
Hegel  sought  to  justify  man's  obligatory  subservience  to  the  state  on 
quite  different  grounds.  He  suggested  that  the  good  common  to  all 
mehbers  of  the  state  reposed  in  the  existence  of  the  state  itself, 117 
and  that  the  com^ion  good  that  both  governors  and  the  governed  sought 
was  embodied  in  the  harmonisation  of  the  interests  of  both  in  an 
atmosphere  of  trust  and  respect. 
In  the  'Philosophy  of  Right'  Hegel  reveals  how  human  activity  creates 
an  objective  order  through  which  human  freedom  is  actualized.  Man,  he 
presumes,  has  a  subjective  need  to  be  free  but  cannot  attain  freedom 
within  the  limits  of  his  own  particularity  and  subjectivity.  The 
free-for-all  of  the  bourgeois  market  place  did  not,  for  Hegel,  constitute 
true  freedom,  nor  did  the  individual  subject  to  his  natural  desires 
and  iamulses.  Hegel  postulates  a  rational  and  objective  view  of  freedom 
that  can  be  predicated  only  of  rational  men  and  which  is  opposed  to  the 
egoism,  caprice  and  competitiveness  of  bourgeois  society  and  the  personal 
desires  and  inclinations  of  individuals. 
This  freedom,  according  to  Hegel,  evolves  over  time  as  men  seek 
to  rationalise  their  subjective  need  and  implicit  rational  demand  to  be 
free.  History  in  effect,  according  to  this  view,  becomes  a  sort  of 
collective  struggle  by  men  to  create  a  world  in  which  they  are  'truly' 
free,  and  this  is  realised  in  the  development  of  the  nation  state 
and  its  institutions  which  represent  the  culmination  of  reason  and 
freedom  and  moral  goodness  in  historical  development.  From  this  it  is 
deduced  that  the  law  of  the  state  represents  more  the  product  of  reason 
than  say  the  wants  of  any  particular  individual,  and  so,  it  is  concluded, 
enforced  obedience  to  such  laws  can  only  make  a  person  better  than  he  is, 
free  and  really  what  he  wants  to  be. 
Hegel's  theory  of  freedom  rests  upon  a  metaphysical  and  logical 
dialectic  which  he  believed  represented  a  necessary  law  of  historical 
development  that  controlled  the  evolution  and  course  of  human  events. 
For  Hegel  the  term  dialectic  had  much  the  same  meaning  as  Plato  gave  it, 
a  logical  process  proceding  from  thesis  to  antithesis  and  then  to 
synthesis  combining  both.  But  whereas  in  Plato  it  was  confined  to 118 
argumentation,  for  example  in  the  Socratic  dialogues  with  Cephalus  and 
Polemarchus  in  the  'Republic',  to  what  logicians  might  call  the  method 
of  the  contrary  case,  Hegel  applies  it  to  historical  events  and  human 
development  in  an  organic  sense.  One  nation  develops,  a  thesis,  is 
opposed  by  another  nation,  the  antithesis,  from  which  there  emerges  a 
new  society  of  a  higher  order,  the  synthesis,  containing  all  that  is 
good  in  both,  which  new  society  itself  or  nation  in  turn  becomes  a 
new  thesis.  And  the  process  is  repeated  until  perfection  ensues.  This 
continual  ebb  and  flow  and  interaction  of  opposite  forces  is  seen  by 
Hegel  as  a  selection  process  from  which  the  'real'  will  or  'spirit'  of 
the  state  emerges  and  is  manifested  and  refined  in  the  law  and 
institutions  of  the  state. 
What  Hegel  intended  as  a  simple  explanatory  theory  of  historical 
development,  a  statement  of  what  is  rather  than  a  prescriptive  exhortation 
of  what  ought  to  be,  is  nevertheless  confused  with  a  presumptive  theory 
of  value.  Although  paradise  for  Hegel,  as  for  Hobbes,  is  to  be  fashioned 
by  the  sword,  through  conflict,  Hegel,  unlike  Hobbes,  considers  the  state 
to  be  not  just  an  instrument  for  preserving  peace  and  freedom  in  a 
negative  sense  but  also  the  embodiment  of  ultimate  moral  value,  rationality 
and  freedom. 
This  is  not  meant  to  imply  that  the  state  is  to  be  regarded  as  a 
separate  transcendent  entity  with  a  spirit  independent  of  its  citizens, 
-rather  that  individual  subjects  are  indispensible  parts  of  and  are 
engaged  in  a  continual  dialectic'and  interaction  with  the  state,  through 
which  process  they  themselves  realise  their  own  self-fulfilment.  "The 
state  is  the  realised  ethical  idea  or  ethical  spirit....  The  state  is 
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absolutely  rational...  (Its)  substantive  unity  is  its...  absolute  end.  " 
"It  (the  state)  is  the  objective  spirit  and  he  (the  individual)  has 
his  truth,  real  existence,  and  ethical  status  only  in  being  a  member 
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of  it.  "  "The  individuals  (citizens)  belong  to  this  spirit  (of  the 
nation);  each  of  them  is  the  son  of  his  nation,  and  also  in  so  far  as 1  119 
the  state  to  which  he  belongs  is  still  developing,  the  son  of  his  age  - 
for  no  one  can  remain  behind  the  age  he  lives  in,  let  alone  transcend 
it.  This  spiritual  being  is  his  being,  and  he  is  its  representative; 
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he  arises  out  of  it  and  exists  within  it.  " 
In  Hegel's  theory  of  freedom  the  state  represents  the  crystallization 
of  all  that  is  good  in  hinan  experience  and  individuals  are  considered 
to  be  as  dependent  upon  the  state  for  their  own  fulfilment  as  the  state 
is  upon  them.  Hegel's  idea  of  freedom,  like  Känt's,  depends  upon  a 
notion  of  rational,  autonomous  activity,  but  whereas  Kant  sees  freedom 
emerging  from  the  categorical  imperative  Hegel  envisages  it  evolving 
from  a  process  of  organic  development  and  interaction  within  human 
society.  So,  individuals  do  not  achieve  freedom  primarily  through  the 
application  of  formal  principles,  as  Kant  suggests,  but  through  their 
experience  in  society  itself.  Consequently,  whereas  in  the  Kingdom  of 
Ends  there  can  logically  be  no  disagreement  between  the  participants, 
in  Hegel's  case  there  is  room  to  suppose  that  less  perfect  souls  in 
the  course  of  their  development  might  need  to  be  coerced.  Hegel  rejects 
the  notion  of  pure  practical  reason  just  as  he  rejects  Rousseau's 
corm  itment  to  the  notion  of  contract  and  proposes  in  its  place  a 
political  and  social  doctrine  of  an  unusually  mystical  and  religious 
kind. 
Several  inadegaacies  are  detectable  in  Hegel's  scheme  of  things. 
In  Hegelian  terms  only  the  wise  philosopher  would  apparently  be  able 
to  attain  the  necessary  degree  of  self-consciousness  and  understanding 
to  enable  him  to  actualize  his  freedom  and  become  truly  free.  Hegel 
indulges  in  wishful  thinking  and  postulates  the  impossible  when  he 
insists  that  freedom  can  be  actualized  in  a  perfectly  absolute  sense, 
complete  in  and  for  itself.  And  is  inconsistent  too  in  professing 
a  dialectic  of  the  kind  he  describes  yet  insisting  at  the  same  time 
that  the  process  has  already  reached  its  culmination  in  the  existing 120 
national  state.  And  Hegel,  erroneouslyýit  is  suggested,  does  not  seem 
to  think  it  is  at-all  significant  that  if  states  can  do  evil,  as  they 
most  certainly  can,  as  well  as  good,  that  such  an  assumption  in  any 
way  might  challenge  the  validity  of  his  theory. 
A  clearer  account  of  the  relationship  in  Hegelian  thought  between  the 
individual  and  the  state,  between  the  ordinary  wills  of  subjects  and 
general  or  real  will  or  spirit  of  the  body  politic,  is  proposed  by 
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B.  Bosanquet  in  'The  Philosophical  Theory  of  the  State'.  Bosanquet 
posits  the  paradox  of  self-government:  "How  can  the  self  be  self-governing 
when  it  is  coerced  ?"  He  admits  that  when  laws  of  state  in  an  external 
sense  enforce  observance  through  sanctions  the  expression  'force  to  be 
free'  appears  as  a  simple  contradiction,  but  suggests  that  this  can 
be  overcome  by  invoking  a  doctrine  of  internal  or  implicit  consent 
whereby  an  individual  may  be  said  to  be  doing  as  he  wishes  when  he 
appears  to  be  forced  to  the  contrary.  This  implies  that  when  a  man  acts 
rationally  he  acts  freely,  but  when  he  acts  in  subservience  to  his 
impulses  and  desires  and  lower  nature  he  does  not.  It  is  only  in  the 
former  case  that  he  acts  in  accordance  with  his  'real'  will  and  'true' 
nature  that  is  identified  with  the  general  will  of  the  state. 
"Liberty  no  doubt",  says  Bosanquet,  "is  as  Rousseau  has  told  us, 
so  far  as  agreeing  with  Mill,  the  essential  quality  of  human  life.  It 
is  so  because  it  is  the  condition  of  being  ourselves.  But  now  that  it 
has  occurred  to  us  that  in  order  to  be  ourselves  we  must  be  always 
becoming  something  which  we  are  not,  or  in  other  words,  we  must  always 
recognise  that  we  are  something  more  than  we  have  become,  liberty, 
as  the  condition  of  being  ourselves,  cannot  simply  be  something  which 
we  have,  still  less  something  which  we  have  always  had  -a  status  quo 
to  be  maintained.  It  must  be  a  condition  relevant  to  our  continued 
struggle  to  assert  the  control  of  something  in  us  which  we  recognise 
as  imperative  upon  us  'or  as  our  real  s  elf,  but  which  we  only  obey  in 121 
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a  very  imperfect  degree.  " 
Two  reservations  may  be  expressed  regarding  the  Hegelian  theory 
of  freedom.  Firstly,  it  is  not  very  clear  what  is  meant  by  real,  or 
good,  or  rational,  or  their  relation  to  one  another.  If  only  what  is 
rational  and  good  is  taken  to  be  real,  that  is  to  say  that  it  exists,  then 
the  irrational  and  what  is  evil  cannot  exist  and  cannot  be  real.  But 
we  would  not  wish  surely  to  deny  the  reality  of  evil,  for  the  evil 
men  do  seems  plain  enough.  Furthermore,  it  is  equally  clear  that 
good  men  need  not  necessarily  be  rational,  but  like  saints  just  good 
by  nature,  nor  need  rational  men,  say  certain  criminals,  be  necessarily 
good.  Two  notions  of  real  are  obviously  being  confused,  one  referring 
to  a  metaphysical  objectivity  recognised  by  idealists,  another  to  the 
subjective  world  of  here  and  now,  but  to  comprehend  the  former  one 
must  surely  recognise  the  reality  and  existence  of  the  latter;  otherwise, 
it  would  be  odd  to  claim  that  the  realisation  of  the  real,  good  self 
depends  upon  the  coercion  of  another  self  that  in  fact  does  not  exist 
at  all  but  only  appears  to  do  so. 
Secondly,  a  further  reservation  is  in  order  regarding  the  very 
existence  of  a  general  will  and  the  validity  of  the  assumption  that  it 
can  be  manifested  in  the  political  institutions  of  the  state.  The  claim 
for  its  existence  would  seem  to  rest  upon  the  illogical  notion  of  the 
concrete  universal  and  the  implausible  relation  of  identity-in-difference, 
that  together  are  taken  to  entail  that  an  entity  such  as  the  general  will 
exists  only  in  its  manifestation  in  individual  wills,  and  not  merely 
as  a  representation  of  some  quality  that  is  discernible  in  each  of  them. 
It  is  possible  to  conceive  of  a  general  will  in  terms  of  an  abstract 
universal  existing  in  its  particular  wills  but  only  in  the  sense  of 
standing  for  some  qualitative  identity  that  is  perceived  in  each  and 
that  warrants  their  being  classed  as  a  whole.  But  more  than  this  is 
claimed.  The  general  will  is  not  just  regarded  in  terms  of  an  abstract 
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universal,  as  the  identification  of  a  quality  discernible  in  individual 
wills,  but  in  terms  of  a  concrete  universal,  as  an  entity  that  manifests 
itself  in  difference  in  its  particulars,  being  an  aggregate  of  wills 
änd  not  just  an  entity  representing  a  qualitative  identity. 
But,  it  may  be  objected,  this  is  not  possible,  for  though  a  whole 
must  be  composed  of  a  multiplicity  of  parts  it  does  not  manifest  itself 
in  them.  "A  unity  whose  nature  it  is  to  manifest  itself  as  multiplicity 
and  which  exists  only  because  it  is  so  manifested  is  unthinkable.  It  is 
possible  for  one  thing  to  appear  to  be  many  things  and  yet  to  exist  only 
in  its  appearance.  Only  an  abstract  universal  can  exist  in  the  multiplicity 
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of  its  particulars.  "  If  this  is  so  then  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
identity-in-difference  and  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  a  general  will 
which  is  supposed  to  be  an  instance  of  it.  And  it  is  not  possible  to 
identify  individuals'  rational  or  'real'  wills  with  the  general  will  of 
the  community  as  idealists  wish  to  do. 
It  also  follows  that  since  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  general  or 
'real'  will  that  is  identified  with  individuals'  'real'  or  rational  wills 
then  the  law  too  cannot  be  an  expression  of  a  general  will,  nor  can  it 
be  claimed  that  the  law,  representing  the  general  will,  never  interferes 
with  the  freedom  of  individuals  who  appear  to  be  coerced  by  it.  So,  the 
idealists'  theory  of  implicit  consent,  which  explains  why  it  is  the  duty 
of  subjects  to  obey  the  law  and  government,  fails.  It  is  not  established 
that  when  an  individual  does  what  the  government  comnands  against  his 
will  he  is  'really'  doing  what  he  wishes.  The  notion,  therefore,  that 
the  general  will  is  manifested  in  the  institutions  of  the  state,  and  that 
the  law  represents  what  individuals  'really'  want  and  does  not  interfere 
with  their  freedom  when  they  are  coerced  in  its  name,  must  be  challenged. 
Finally,  three  empirical  observations  warrant  some  attention. 
First,  the  as--=ption,  that  the  law  of  the  state  represents  the  embodiment 
of  reason  and  therefore  commands  citizens  to  do  what  they  would  wish  to 123  .  ýý'1 
do  were  their  motives  always  rational,  is  clearly  not  supported  by 
available  empirical  evidence.  It  is  plainly  obvious  that  the  laws  and 
customs  of  even  the  most  enlightened  of  countries  fall  short  of  being 
the  embodiment  of  reason,  many  being  outrageously  irrational,  harmful, 
and  certainly  not  calculated,  even  if  obeyed,  to  bring  into  existence 
what  rational  men  would  desire,  or  to  make  them  free.  Secondly,  it  is 
one  thing  to  claim  that  the  general  will  is  'real',  existing  as  an  idea, 
an  ideal  shared  by  individuals,  but  another  to  claim  that  it  is  realised 
and  manifested  in  practical  life  through  the  association  of  individuals. 
Men  may  have  the  will  to  share  an  ideal  but  not  necessarily  the  will  or 
means  to  implement  it;  they  may  share  a  common  aim  but  not  a  common  will 
to  action.  Lastly,  in  practical  life,  as  Berlin  indicates,  Hegelian 
reasoning  based  upon  the  doctrine  of  implied  consent  can  lead  to  the 
most  tyrannical  of  regimes,  to  the  detriment  of  individual  liberty, 
when  authority  and  freedom  are  conflated  and  considered  one  and  the  same 
thing. 
Hegel's  successors  differed  regarding  the  application  of  his  theory 
of  history  to  socio-political  development.  Some  accepted  the  personification 
of  the  Prussian  state  as  the  culmination  of  the  dialectic,  others,  like 
Marx,  rejected  the  idea  on  the  grounds  that  the  nation  state  was  far 
from  ideal  and  awaited  instead  the  next  stage  of  historical  development. 
Marx  rejected  Hegel's  romantic  idealism  but  retained  his  methodology 
through  which  he  sought  to  establish  a  necessary  law  of  historical 
development  destined  to  lead  to  a  perfect  and  ideal  society  in  which  all 
would  be  truly  free. 
Marx  believed  Hegel  had  failed  to  grapple  with  the  realities  of 
life,  that  is  to  say  the  everyday  issues  of  contemporary  society,  its 
existing  social  and  economic  divisions,  and  argued  that  the  desired 124  -7r 
free  ethical  community  could  only  be  realised  if  these  divisions  were 
eradicated.  Marx  rejected  Hegel's  brand  of  idealism  in  favour  of  an 
explanatory  theory  of  history  leading  to  the  eventual  solution  of  all 
society's  problems,  not  because  he  did  not  approve  of  the  idea  of 
universality  of  community  as  such,  but  rather  because  he  valued  it  more 
29 
highly.  He  just  did  not  think  Hegel's  nation  state  could  ever  achieve 
it.  Marx  intended  to  bring  Hegelianism  down  to  earth.  Even  so, 
the  thinking  of  both  men,  as  prophets,  is  grounded  in  a  transcendental 
understanding  of  man  and  his  destiny  and  the  belief  that  the  end  for 
man,  self-realisation,  is  attained  through  some  form  of  self-transcendence 
within  a  totally  new  kind  of  society. 
In  Marxian  terms  this  final  stage  of  freedom  and  `total  bliss  is 
encapsulated  in  the  positive  transcendence  of  the  process  and  feeling 
of  alienation  experienced  within  the  capitalist  system.  But  it  is  essentially 
a  transcendence  within  the  community  and  the  natural  world,  not 
within  an  imagined  supernatural  world  but  a  world  transformed  by  man's 
own  labour  into  a  classless  society.  Both  Hegel  and  Marx  argue  in 
metaphysical  teens  in  so  far  as  they  both  deduce  their  theories  regarding 
the  nature  of  change  from  purely  logical  and  idealist  considerations. 
Both  regarded  self-realisation  as  a  process  whereby  alienation,  a 
state  of  being  in  which  a  person  is  confronted  with  something  other  than 
or  alien  to  himself,  is  overcome.  But  whereas  Hegel  saw  the  solution  in 
the  evolution  of  an  absolute  spirit  or  will,  Marx  saw  it  in  essentially 
practical  and  economic  terms,  as  a  process  of  overcoming  the  effects  of 
man's  disassociation  from  the  means  of  production  and  the  products  of 
his  own  labour.  Marx  regards  man  as  part  of  nature,  but  also  as  a 
product  of  his  environment  which  determines  his  consciousness.  So  Marx 
is,  in  effect,  an  epiphenomenalist  taking  the  view  that  consciousness  is 
non  material  in  itself  but  is  determined  by  material  things,  rather  than 
a  materialist  holding  the  stricter  view  that  consciousness  is  itself 125 
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material.  Herein  lies  the  distinctive  feature  of  Marx's  concept  of 
man,  a  social  being  who  realises  himself  in  a  totality  of  social 
relations.  The  kind  of  person  a  man  is,  Marx  believes,  is  determined 
by  the  kind  of  society  in  which  he  lives.  It  is  not  the  consciousness 
of  men  that  determines  their  being  but  the  social  being  that  determines 
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their  consciousness. 
Man  is  distinguishable  from  other  animals  in  that  he  produces 
his  own  means  of  subsistence  and,  says  Marx,  imposing  a  value  judgment 
upon  this  matter  of  fact  observation,  it  is  right  and  proper  that  he 
should  do  so.  Alienation  and  bondage  ensue  when  man  is  divorced  from 
the  means  of  producing  for  himself  and  loses  control  over  his  own 
productivity.  Consequently,  in  capitalist  society  man  is  not  really 
free  because  he  is  denied  satisfaction  in  his  work,  he  becomes  a  thing, 
another  person's  pawn  or  tool  or  commodity.  "The  most  obvious  phenomenal 
expression  of  alienation  is  the  worker's  inability  in  capitalist  society 
to  own  the  product  of  his  work....  once  the  products  of  the  worker's 
self-realising  activity  have  been  taken  away  from  him  he  retains  only 
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his  biological  and  animal  like  functions.  "  Capitalist  society  denies 
man  his  true  being  and  instead  coerces  him  to  participate  in  a  life 
that  is  egotistical,  competitive,  anarchical  and  individualistic  to 
the  extreme  and  then,  Marx  claims,  invokes  religion  to  counteract  his 
despair  and  alienation,  precipitating  him  still  further  into  subjection. 
Although  the  alienation  of  the  wage  earner  is  regarded  as  the 
principal  form  of  alienation,  employers,  capitalists,  idle  investors, 
owners  of  enterprises  are  not  exempt:  "In  a  world  of  advanced  division 
of  labour,  of  private  ownership  of  materials,  instr=ents  and  products 
of  labour,  of  institutions  and  ideologies,  of  having  and  ruling, 
alienation  is  generalised:  not  only  the  worker  who  sells  his  labour 
but  also  the  employer  who  appropriates  the  product  of  another  man's 
work  and  the  merchant  who  takes  the  commodity  to  market,  the  'haves' 126 
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and  the  'have-nots',  the  rulers  and  the  ruled,  are  in  such  a  world 
alienated  from  their  work,  from  others  and  from  themselves.  In  many 
ways  it  is  a  world  upside-down  where  objects,  appropriated  by  man,  acquire 
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the  crazy  power  of  owning  men.  "  In  other  words,  in  capitalist  society, 
everything  becomes  a  commodity,  even  people  who  are  as  a  result  mentally 
and  physically  dehumanized,  and  the  more  goods  the  worker  produces  the 
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cheaper  a  commodity  he  becomes  in  a  world  of  things. 
The  power  of  things  over  man  in  a  society  based  on 
conmiodity  production  is  concentrated  particularly,  says  Marx,  in  the 
power  of  money.  Gold  becomes  the  commodity  of  coranodities  that  sustains 
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the  process  of  the  alienation  and  depersonalisation  of  humanity. 
"The  relations  connecting  the  labour  of  one  individual  with  that  of  the 
rest  appear  not  as  direct  social  relations  between  individuals  at  work 
but  as  what  they  really  are,  material  relations  between  persons  and 
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social  relations  between  things.  "  Marx  refers  to  the  fetishism  that 
attaches  itself  to  the  products  of  labour,  that  is  to  say  the  power 
commodities  assume  in  people's  minds  to  coerce  and  determine  the 
character  of  relations  between  men,  overpowering  the  very  people  who 
produce  them  and  consequently  objectifying  and  dehumanising  all  human 
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relationships.  This  state  of  affairs,  Marx  predicts,  will  only  be 
overcome  when  extremes  of  wealth  and  poverty,  extravagance  and  misery, 
the  power  of  the  few  to  dispose  of  the  products  of  the  many,  have 
disappeared,  and  society  has  become  a  totality,  united  by  a  communal 
spirit  and  providing  for  all. 
So  fundamentally  a  social  being  does  Marx  consider  man  to  be  that 
he  regards  any  form  of  individualism  a  betrayal  of  man's  true  nature: 
"Tan  is  a  species-being,  a  being  whose  essence  is  to  be  social,  to  live 
in  a  society  where  the  contradiction  between  the  individual  and  the 
species  will  disappear,  where  each  man  will  have  become,  in  company 
with  all  other  men,  all  that  man  is  capable  of  being,  but  so  far  has 127 
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been  prevented  from  becoming.  " 
Such  an  authentic,  truly  universal  community  is  clearly  impossible 
in  existing  society  and  unattainable  by  any  ordinary  political  revolution 
even  one  leading  to  some  form  of  democracy.  The  latter,  Marx  believed, 
could  offer  only  a  negative  and  inadequate  kind  of  freedom,  the  state 
posing  as  a  limit  to,  as  well  as  a  protection  for,  the  individual  expressing 
his  liberty  and  individualism.  "But  this  means  man  in  his  unsocial  and 
uncivilised  aspect,  in  his  fortuitous  existence,  just  as  he  is,  corrupted 
by  the  entire  organisation  of  our  society,  lost  and  alienated  from  himself, 
oppressed  by  inhuman  relations  and  elements  -  in  a  word  a  man  who  is  not 
yet  an  actual  species-being.  "  Marx  does  not  argue  against  political 
revolution  and  political  emancipation,  far  from  arguing  against  them  he 
argues  beyond  them  offering  man  a  'beyond'  where  all  men  shall  be  saved 
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and  made  anew. 
Marx's  Utopia  lies  beyond  ordinary  political  arrangements  and 
revolutions.  Men  are  liberated  through  reason,  through  understanding 
what  is  necessary.  In  the  same  way  as  the  scholar  becomes  free  through 
an  understanding  and  acceptance  of  the  logic  of  his  discipline,  so  man 
in  general  becomes  free  through  an  understanding  of  the  logic  of  history. 
Such  knowledge  liberates  by  automatically  eliminating  irrational  fears 
and  desires.  Marx  makes  two  assumptions  which  are  not  logically  connected, 
first,  that  men  are  unfree  because  they  lack  knowledge,  and  secondly, 
that  there  exists  a  body  of  rational  laws  which  bind  men  unless  they 
are  understood,  whereupon  men  of  their  ovm  free  will  accept  them  and  are 
freed  from  their  constraints. 
Marx  does  not  deny  free  will,  and  K.  Popper  is  surely  wrong  to 
suggest  that  Marx  looked  upon  the  human  actors  on  the  stage  of  history 
"as  mere  puppets  irresistibly  pulled  by  economic  wires  -  by  historical 
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forces  over  which  they  have  no  control.  "  On  the  contrary,  Marx  appeals 
to  man  and  relies  upon  hire  to  make  the  right  choices.  He  does  not  regard i 
71 
128 
man  as  a  predicate  of  historical  forces.  Men  make  history  even  if 
their  choices  are  partly  determined  by  material  limits,  presuppositions, 
and  objective  conditions  independent  of  their  will.  Circumstances  make 
men  and  men  make  circumstances.  But  it  is  important,  says  Marx,  that 
man  should  understand  the  conditions  under  which  his  free  will  operates, 
for  by  understanding  the  same  he  is  able  to  liberate  himself  from  their 
uncompromising  control.  Marx  believed  that  the  capitalist  system  and 
forces  emanating  from  it,  like  laws  of  nature,  forcibly  determined  men'  s 
lives  so  long  as  men  did  not  comprehend  them,  but  that  "when  once  we 
understand  them,  when  once  we  grasp  their  action,  their  direction,  their 
effects,  it  depends  only  upon  ourselves  to  subject  them  more  and  more 
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to  our  will  and  by  means  of  them  to  reach  our  own  ends.  " 
These  natural  and  social  forces  that  determine  human  conduct  are 
not  self-imposed  like  the  laws  of  promise-keeping  and  telling-the  truth, 
nevertheless  it  is  possible,  Marxists  believe,  to  mitigate  their 
dominance  through  understanding  them  and  making  use  of  them.  "Freed= 
does  not  co-exist  in  the  dream  of  independence  from,  but  in  the  knowledge 
of,  those  laws  and  in  the  possibility  this  gives  of  systematically 
making  them  work  towards  definite  ends.  This  holds  good  in  relation 
both  to  the  laws  of  external  nature  and  to  those  which  govern  the  bodily 
and  mental  existence  of  men  themselves  -  two  classes  of  laws  which  we 
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can  separate  from  each  other  at  most  only  in  thought  but  not  in  reality.  " 
Engels  is  not  saying  here  that  when  we  understand  what  is  the  case  we 
are  necessarily  free,  but  that  having  understood  what  is  the  case  we 
can  use  our  knowledge  if  we  wish  to  gain  control  over  nature,  whereas 
if  we  are  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  things,  or  are  not  ignorant  but 
choose  to  take  no  action,  we  cannot  achieve  our  ends  or  be  really  free. 
Marx's  view  of  the  metaphysics  of  free  will  and  determinism  is 
equivocal.  He  attributes  all  change  to  economic  and  natural  causes 
but  appeals  also  to  individuals,  whose  behaviour  presumably  is  not ýýýýý 
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predictable,  to  seek  diligently  to  know  the  direction  in  which  history 
is  heading  in  order  to  anticipate  the  desired  Utopia  more  expeditiously. 
He  exhorts  people  to  be  "the  midwives  of  history,  to  help  to  bring 
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about  the  inevitable.  "  And  the  necessary  laws  of  history  do  not 
enslave,  for  to  understand  what  must  inevitably  be  the  case  is,  it  is 
presumed,  to  will  it  to  be  so.  "To  want  necessary  laws  to  be  other 
than  they  are  is  to  be  prey  to  an  irrational  desire....  and  to  go  further 
and  say  such  laws  are  other  than  they  are  is  to  be  insane.  This",  says 
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Isiah  Berlin,  "is  the  metaphysical  heart  of  rationalism.  "  From  this 
it  is  deduced  that  those  who  are  ignorant  may  need  to  be  guided,  forced 
or  coerced  towards  the  promised  land,  to  freedom  and  their  own  salvation. 
Marx  anticipates  a  golden  age  at  the  end  of  history.  He  secularizes 
the  theological  principle  of  salvation  into  a  promise  of  worldly 
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fulfilment  within  a  free  and  classless  society.  His  notion  of  freedom 
is  not  the  negative  concept  of  freedom  from,  though  neither  he  nor 
Engels  would  deny  the  freedom  from  want  that  capitalist  technology 
such  as  the  steam  engine  has  provided,  but  rather  the  positive  notion 
of  self-control,  self-direction,  and  self-realisation. 
Marxism  follows  in  the  tradition  of  liberal  and  democratic 
philosophy  in  so  far  as  it  rejects  the  rule  of  the  few,  the  capitalist 
entrepreneurs,  for  the  interests  of  the  wage  earning  majority,  and  the 
power  of  capitalist  technology  in  favour  of  the  importance  of  human 
values.  But  objections  can  be  raised  to  the  metaphysical  aspect  of 
Marxist  theory  which  challenge  its  authenticity. 
First,  it  is  questionable  whether  it  is  possible  to  substantiate 
the  existence  of  broad,,  general  laws  of  history.  An  enquiry  along 
these  lines  can  contribute  towards  an  understanding  of  the  past  and  can 
offer  some  explanation  of  the  present,  but  it  cannot  provide  an  infallible 
means  of  predicting  the  future  with  such  certainty  as  Marx  seems  to  think. 
Marx's  conception  of  historical  development  as  an  inevitable  progress 130 
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towards  a  classless  society  is  not  supported  by  experience.  It  is  a 
claim  the  validity  of  which  is  not  established  by  empirical  observation. 
Secondly,  Marx  presumes  that  each  stage  of  historical  evolution 
is  superior  and  of  higher  moral  value  to  that  which  precedes  it,  until 
eventually  perfection  is  achieved  in  a  classless  society.  This  is,  in 
effect,  a  theory  postulating  historical  progress  rather  than  an  explana- 
tort'  theory  of  historical  develornnent  and  change.  It  is  a  theory  that 
depends  on  the  presumption  of  an  absolute  moral  criterion,  an  ideal,  the 
existence  of  which  Marx  in  other  respects  and  with  some  inconsistency 
denies.  Moral  values,  Marx  also  assumes,  are  not  expressions  of  eternal 
truths,  but  are  relative  to  the  society  in  which  they  are  held. 
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Marx's  conception  of  historical  progress  in  terms  of  objective 
ideals  is  incompatible  with  his  subjective  view  of  social  morality. 
If  it  is  questionable  whether  a  state  of  freedom  within  an  ideal 
classless  society,  such  as  Marx  envisaged,  is  at  all  attainable,  then  it 
is  not  possible  to  argue  convincingly  that  such  a  theory  can  justify 
the  coercion  of  subjects  towards  the  attainment  of  such  a  society  and 
their  own  self-fulfilment  within  it. 
Apart  Prom  reservations  that  have  been  expressed  in  respect  of  the 
three  idealist  theories  of  freedom  of  Rousseau,  Hegel  and  Marx  respectively, 
several  objections  applicable  to  all  three  may  be  noted.  Each  theory 
posits  a  notion  of  freedom  that  is  assumed  to  be  realisable  through 
reason.  Such  theories  are  useful  in  reminding  us  of  the  need  to  strive 
for  better  things  and  to  accept  the  possibility  of  having  to  be  coerced 
from  time  to  time  to  realise  our  true  potentialities,  but  can  become 
potentially  dangerous  vehicles  of  exploitation  and  oppression  if  used  to 
justify  the  coercive  influence  of  those  who  claim  to  know  over  those  who 
clearly  do  not. 
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Theories  of  this  sort,  according  to  Berlin,  propose  a  doctrine 
of  liberation  by  reason  and  have  been  utilized  to  justify  paternalistic 
interference  by  those  who  profess  to  know  into  the  affairs  of  those 
who  are  ignorant  since  ancient  Greek  times.  And  the  reasoning  behind 
such  theories,  Berlin  suggests,  is  the  same  as  that  used  to  justify 
the  conduct  of  any  petty  school  bully  or  any  would  be  political  dictator, 
or  any  authoritarian  political  system  be  it  a  reign  of  terror,  an 
omnipotent  nation  state,  or  a  supposed  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat. 
According  to  this  doctrine  of  liberation  by  reason,  the  authority 
of  reason  is,  says  Berlin,  identified  with  individual  freedom,  the 
assumpticn  being  that  only  rational  ends  can  be  the  true  objects  of 
a  free  man's  real  nature  and  that  rational  laws  are  freely  willed  in 
the  natural  functioning  of  a  person's  own  rational  activity:  "Only  the 
truth  liberates,  and  the  only  way  in  which  I  can  learn  the  truth  is  by 
doing  blindly  today  what  you  who  know  it  order  me  or  coerce  me  to  do 
in  the  certain  knowledge  that  only  then  will  I  arrive  at  your  clear  vision, 
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and  be  free  like  you.  " 
Berlin's  critique  of  this  kind  of  reasoning  ignores  such  notions 
as  'rational  law'  or  'a  rational  world'  implied  in  such  theories,  instead 
it  is  based  upon  a  direct  appeal  to  normality  and  criteria  associated 
with  the  ordinary  world  of  experience.  From  these  two  standpoints  it  is 
possible,  as  Berlin  suggests,  to  contest  particular  assumptions  associated 
with  theories  that  subscribe  to  the  doctrine  of  liberation  by  reason 
and  to  question  the  validity  of  the  claim  made  by  them  that  men  may  be 
coerced  or  forced  to  be  free. 
First,  experience  seems  to  cast  doubt  upon  the  presumption  of  there 
being  a  single  harmonious  purpose  of  rational  self-direction  i  gelling 
individuals  to  accommodate  to  a  particular  harmonious,  Utopian  kind  of 
society  devoid  of  hinan  conflict,  in  which  each  individual  respects  the 
principle  of  reason  in  the  other  without  the  desire  to  dominate,  in  which 
/ 
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everyone  wants  the  same  things  and  in  which  all  values  become  one  and 
all  good  things  compatible.  No  allowance  for  sure  could  be  made  in 
a  society  conceived  in  these  terms  for  differences  in  individual  tastes 
and  personal  preferences,  though  people  clearly  do  differ  in  their 
wants,  interests,  needs,  knowledge,  preferences,  tastes,  desires  and 
capacities.  Like:  wise,  it  makes  little  sense  to  claim  that  all  the  good 
things  people  seek  are  compatible.  Individuals  singularly  and  in  groups 
face  a  life  of  continuous  decision  making  between  alternative  ends  and 
values  in  an  ongoing  system  in  which  the  realisation  of  some  desires 
precludes  the  realisation  of  others,  the  necessity  of  choosing  being 
an  inescapable  characteristic  of  the  human  condition.  The  assumption 
that  all  the  diverse  ends  of  men  can  be  resolved  in  one  solution,  in 
some  imagined  heavenly  kingdom,  score  perfect  society  is  plainly 
demonstrably  false. 
Secondly,  it  may  be  objected  that  it  is  difficult  to  associate 
freedom  with  notions  of  harmony  according  to  which  individual  choice  is 
eliminated  and  no  alternatives  are  available.  This  suggests  an  odd 
kind  of  freedom  that  is  the  consequence  of  equating  freedom  with  virtue 
and  both  with  knowledge  and  understanding.  The  implication  is  that 
when  a  person  chooses  in  ignorance  he  does  not  choose  at  all  for  only 
the  right  and  proper  choice  is  acceptable,  and  so  in  forcing  a  person 
to  make  the  right  choice  one  is  forcing  him  to  be  free.  But  if  a  person 
has  only  one  choice  one  would  not  in  normal  circumstances  say  he  was  free. 
A  person's  freedom  one  might  wish  to  say  is  in  proportion  to  the  number 
of  choices  available  to  him,  assuming  of  course  he  has  the  ability  to 
choose  and  is  not  afflicted  by  abnormal  irresolution  or  indecision. 
Idealist  notions  of  freedom  leave  no  room  for  choice  as  we  understand 
it  in  its  normal  sense.  If  it  is  assumed  there  is  only  one  choice  open 
to  a  person  then  he  must  necessarily  make  it  whether  he  appears  to  want 
to  or  not.  This  constitutes  not  a  state  of  freedom  but  a  state  of  bondage. 133 
Consequently,  our  third  objection  must  be  to  contest  the  assumption 
that  when  a  person  chooses  in  ignorance  he  does  not  really  choose  at  all. 
This  implies  that  if  we  cannot  achieve  a  desired  end  by  the  means  we 
have  chosen  then  we  do  not  really  choose  these  means  for  we  have  no 
reason  to  adopt  them  in  the  given  circumstances.  On  the  contrary,  it 
is  assumed  we  have  simply  made  a  mistake.  So,  presumably,  a  man  would 
not  choose  to  cross  a  bridge  knowing  it  to  be  dangerous  for  it  would 
be  irrational  to  do  so.  To  prevent  him,  therefore,  is  to  preserve  his 
freedom,  for  no  man  will  choose  to  cross  a  bridge  if  he  cannot  reach 
the  other  side.  But  if  all  this  is  really  true  then  it  is  not  possible 
to  make  sense  of  the  statement  that  a  man  may  choose  to  cross  a  bridge 
not  knowing  that  it  is  dangerous,  and  even  less  sense  of  the  statement 
that  a  man  crossed  a  bridge  knowing  it  to  be  dangerous.  Everyday 
experience,  however,  tells  us  that  this  is  plainly  possible.  We  do 
decide  to  cross  bridges  for  all  sorts  of  reasons  whether  we  know  they 
are  dangerous  or  not,  say  for  a  wager,  a  challenge,  or  with  courage  to 
rescue  a  friend  or  some  person,  pet  or  animal  in  distress,  or  to  test 
the  bridge's  safety.  In  our  imperfect  world  we  are  continuously  making 
choices  for  a  variety  of  complex  reasons,  frequently  based  upon  imperfect 
knowledge.  If  this  were  not  the  case  hardly  any  action  would  take  place 
at  all.  To  suggest  that  whenever  a  person  takes  a  decision  on  imperfect 
knowledge  he  does  not  choose  at  all  is  clearly  to  misrepresent  the  nature 
of  choice. 
Fouthly,  it  is  objected  that  theories  of  freedom  based  upon  the 
principle  of  self-realisation  are  in  danger  of  degenerating  into 
solipsism  in  so  far  as  they  attribute  the  motivation  for  men's  actions 
to  prudential  rather  than  altruistic  or  ordinary  moral  reasons  and 
deny  the  possibility  of  men  choosing  to  act  out  of  concern  for  others 
or  out  of  benevolence.  If  it  is  assumed  men  basically  wish  to  do  what 
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because  to  do  otherwise,  say  to  treat  them  unfairly  or  wrongly,  would 
rebound  upon  themselves  and  be  to  their  ultimate  disadvantage,  then  a 
very  cynical  view  of  morality  is  implied.  Self-interest  or  prudence 
is  substituted  for  concern  for  others,  and  duty  to  oneself  predominates 
in  every  case  over  duties  to  others.  It  is  an  odd  kind  of  freedom  that 
does  not  recognise  the  possibility  of  men  acting  for  reasons  other  than 
their  own  narrow  selfish  interests,  for  if  the  latter  were  the  case 
men  would  seem  to  be  necessitated  to  behave  only  in  one  particular  way 
and  therefore  would  not  be  free. 
So,  fifthly,  it  is  objected  that  the  three  theories  of  freedom  in 
question  deny  what  is  ordinarily  understood  to  be  a  free  moral  choice. 
That  is  to  say  they  deny  a  person  the  freedom  to  make  a  wrong  decision, 
the  freedom  to-choose  evil  as  well  as  good.  For  idealists,  like  Kant 
in  this  respect,  choice  is  rational  and  is  to  be  distinguished  from  desire 
which  is  causal.  So,  freedom  for  the  idealist,  paradoxically,  is  seen 
to  consist  in  making  the  right  choice  which  is  the  only  choice  available, 
and  therefore  no  choice  at  all.  But,  of  course,  a  saintly  person,  say 
an  inherently  good  person  who  always  makes  the  right  choice,  need  not 
be  free  but  just  good  by  nature,  destined  to  be  good,  enslaved  just  as 
much  by  his  good  nature  as  any  other  might  be  by  baser  desires.  There 
is  a  temptation  to  equate  freedom  with  a  state  of  inner  harmony  which 
could  be  just  another  form  of  necessitation,  the  saintly  person  being 
no  more  free  of  his  own  nature  than  the  bad  man.  Our  ordinary  moral 
sense  and  our  recognition  of  duty  and  responsibility  imply  that  we  are 
capable  of  making  choices  between  good'and  evil. 
Of  course  people  may  not  always  be  aware  of  what  is  in  their  best 
interests  and  may  have  to  be  forced  to  do  what  is  for  their  ultimate 
benefit,  but  this  can  hardly  be  said  to  make  them  free,  though  it  might 
result  in  their  being  better  able  to  develop  their  capacities  and  to 
make  better  use  of  their  opportunities.  It  is  possible  to  justify lü5 
paternalism  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  but  not  on  the  grounds  that  it 
makes  a  person  free,  for  it  clearly  interferes  with  a  person's  choices 
and  actions.  It  is  a  mistake  to  confuse  right  and  good  with  freedom, 
though  we  like  to  imagine  that  good  always  triumphs  over  evil  in  the 
long  run.  A  free  man  must  surely  be,  in  normal  parlance,  one  who  is 
free  to  make  mistakes.  This  is  not  to  deny  that  some  restraint  in 
society  is  inevitable,  for  absolute  freedom  would  clearly  result  in  no 
freedom  at  all,  everyone  living  in  fear  and  suspicion  of  each  other. 
A  sixth  and  further  objection  to  idealist  theories  of  freedom 
that  rely  upon  the  notion  of  self-realisation  through  reason  is  that 
they  presuppose  an  unnatural  and  inflexible  view  of  human  motivation. 
All  desires  are  assumed  to  be  causal  and  as  such  bad  and  to'enslave 
leaving  people  with  no  real  choice.  To  act  rationally  is  good  and  is 
to  act  freely,  but  to  act  irrationally  is  to  be  constrained  by  one's 
lower  nature  or  desires.  Naturally  the  behaviour  of  some  always  and 
of  most  at  some  time  might  be  determined  by  uncontrollable  desire  and 
impulse  and  therefore  not  free,  but  there  are  desires  and  desires  and 
the  behaviour  of  the  kleptomaniac  differs  somewhat  from  that  of  the 
normal  thief,  just  as  the  overriding  desire  of  the  alcoholic  differs 
from  that  of  the  fitful  social  imbiber. 
There  is  clearly  a  difference  between  an  uncontrollable  craving 
and  a  sophisticated  taste  or  preference,  between  an  instinct  and  a 
desire  of  the  intellect.  Most  systems  of  positive  law  distinguish 
between  crimes  resulting  from  uncontrollable  impulse  and  those 
premeditated  by  people  who  are  considered  to  be  normal  in  most  respects. 
There  is  a  difference  between  irresistible  desire  and  ordinary  desire, 
that  is  to  say  a  difference  in  intensity  and  also  in  their  respective 
relation  to  human  reasoning.  Not  all  action  motivated  by  desire  is 
necessarily  determined  in  a  strictly  causal  and  predictable  sense. 
Desires  conflict  and  the  solution  is  not  merely  a  matter,  as  it  is 136 
presumably  in  the  case  of  non  thinking  animals  acting  on  instinct,  of  one 
strong  desire  simply  overriding  another  weaker  desire,  but  rather  a 
matter  of  ordinary  reasonable  choice  in  which  process  a  person's  desires 
and  feelings  naturally  play  a  part  but  are  not  necessarily  dominant. 
Our  desires  certainly  motivate  our  thinking  processes  and  actions  but 
it  does  not  follow  that  all  motivation  by  desire  is  a  form  of  bondage 
or  that  all  desires  enslave. 
Finally,  it  is  objected  that  idealist  theories  of  freedom,  which 
redescribe  freedom  in  positive  terms  of  the  realisation  of  a  true  or 
real  self,  deny  freedom  in  its  negative  sense.  The  identification  of 
self-realisation  with  freedom  is  confusing.  Normally  speaking  a  degree 
of  freedom  in  the  sense  of  being  free  from  is  recognised  as  a  necessary 
precondition  for  self-fulfilment,  but  it  is  not  possible  to  deduce  from 
this  that  self-fulfilment  itself  constitutes  the  state  of  being  free. 
Freedom  we  have  argued,  like  peace,  is  a  necessary  precondition  for  a 
variety  of  desirable  ends  other  than  self-realisation,  but  we  cannot 
say  freedom  is  identical  to  any  one  of  these  ends  though  we  would 
concede  it  is  related  to  them.  Idealist  notions  of  freedom  leave  no 
room  for  a  negative  concept  of  freedom  or  for  the  recognition  of 
particular  freedoms  dependent  upon  it  that  are  normally  regarded  as 
being  very  important  in  everyday  life,  such  as  freedom  of  speech,  of 
discussion,  of  opinion  and  freedom  of  action. 
It  is  unjustifiably  presumptious  to  identify  freedom  with  a  particular 
desired  end  such  as  self-realisation  because  such  a  move  rules  out  the 
pursuit  of  other  ends  that  freedom  in  its  negative  sense  allows. 
Idealist  theories  are  unable,  therefore,  to  provide  an  adequate  solution 
to  life's  problems.  A  degree  of  coercion  might  be  supportive  in  helping 
people  to  become  self-reliant  and  to  realise  their  potentialities,  and 
this  might,  in  some  cases,  be  preferable  to  allowing  people  to  do  as 
they  like.  It  is  not  the  same,  however,  as  allowing  people  to  exercise Ti 
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their  own  free  will  and  free  choice,  or  to  be  socially  free  to  implement 
their  own  free  decisions. 
Interference  with  another  person's  options,  for  whatever  reason, 
infringes  his  autonomy,  because  it  limits  his  control  over  his  own 
choices  and  their  execution.  The  notion  of  autonomy  is  related  to  the 
notion  of  being  free.  Just  as  there  are  different  kinds  and  degrees  of 
freedom,  so  it  is  with  the  notion  of  autonomy  also. 
Philosophers  customarily  attribute  the  formulation  of  the  notion 
of  autonomy  to  Kant,  though  the  idea  was  anticipated  by  Rousseau  who 
noticed  the  positive  connection  between  law  and  freedom  when  he  wrote: 
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"Obedience  to  a  law  which,  one  has  prescribed  to  himself  is  freedom.  " 
In  Kantian  terms  autonomy  is  a  theoretical  and  rational  construct. 
The  autonomous  man  is  free  because  he  is  in  control  of  his  desires,  and 
because  he  obeys  laws  which  he  has  discovered  through  his  own  reason  and 
of  which  he  is  the  author.  Freedom  and  autonomy,  therefore,  imply 
obedience,  but  obedience  to  laws  that  the  autonomous  man  has  legislated 
for  himself.  He  is  not  coerced,  for  no  man  is  able  to  coerce  himself. 
The  unfree,  heteronomous  man,  on  the  other  hand,  is  at  the  mercy  of 
factors  outside  himself.  To  the  negative  concept  of  being  free  from 
natural  causation  Kant  adds  the  positive  concept  of  man  as  an  authentic 
first  cause  and  self-legislator.  The  notion  of  freedom  through  authority 
that  Rousseau  pioneered  in  the  political  context  in  the  form  of  the 
general  will,  with  which  the  free  and  autonomous  man's  own  will  is 
identified,  is  borrowed  by  Kant  to  establish  his  own  notion  of  a  free 
autonomous  person,  namely,  one  who  obeys  self-discovered  and  self-imposed 
laws. 
But  here  the  comparison  with  Rousseau  ends  because  Kant's  autonomous 
man  cannot,  logically  speaking,  be  coerced  to  be  free.  He  is  free T  ýi  138 
because  he  is  the  sole  author  of  his  own  destiny  and  is,  in  Kantian 
terminology,  an  end  in  himself.  Some  philosophers  would  say  that  Kant 
assumes  a  teleological  view  of  nature  that  is  essentially  anthropocentric, 
that  he  sees  man  as  the  final  end  of  creation  without  which  the  chain  of 
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subordinate  ends  would  have  no  meaning.  Grass  exists  for  food,  food 
for  animals,  animals  for  man,  but  man  being  rational  exists,  it  is 
supposed,  only  for  himself,  being  of  supreme  value  and  having  no  value 
in  relation  to  anything  else.  Consequently,  all  other  ends  exist  and 
have  value-only  in  terms  of  man.  And  this  is  so  because  man's  actions 
cannot  always  be  fully  explained  as  motivated  by  natural  phenomena  or  in 
accord  with-causal  laws  of  nature,  but  are  explicable  in  terms  of 
distinctive  rational  motives  or  reasons  which  are  not  existences  or  events 
that  can  be  located  in  time  and,  therefore,  cannot  be  in  causal  relation- 
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ships  with  other  events. 
Human  beings  are  free,  says  Kant,  because  their  behaviour  is  explicable 
in  terms  of  reason,  and  is  not  simply  caused  as  is  the  behaviour  of  all 
other  non  rational  objects.  In  Kant's  vie--v  human  beings  are  not  slaves 
to  heredity  and  environment,  but  are  rationally  free  to  act  despite 
causal  influences  upon  them.  Man  as  a  knowing  being  is  capable  of 
attaining  knowledge  of  the  natural  laws  of  the  physical  world  of  nature, 
but  is  also  conscious  of  himself  as  an  acting  being  and  an  original  cause. 
This  must  be  so,  Kant  argues,  if  one  accepts  the  notions  of  morality, 
moral  obligation  and  the  moral  law. 
And  Kant  reverses  the  argument  when  he  argues  that  morality  is 
grounded  in  the  fundamental  concept  of  autonomy,  the  notion  of  a  rational 
agent  both  author  of  and  subject  to  the  moral  law  expressed  in  the 
principle  of  the  categorical  imperative:  "Act  only  on  that  maxim  through 
which  you  can  at  the  same  time  will  that  it  should  become  a  universal 
law":  The  notion  of  autonomy  is  related  to  the  notion  of  free  will 
which  Kant  provisionally  defines  as  follows:  "`bill  is  a  kind  of  causality --cý-ý..  ý;  ý{  ý 
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belonging  to  living  beings  so  far  as  they  are  rational.  Freedom  Would 
then  be  the  property  this  causality  has  of  being  able  to  work  independently 
of  determination  by  alien  causes;  just  as  natural  necessity  is  a  property 
characterising  the  causality  of  all  non  rational  beings  -  the  property 
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of  being  determined  to  activity  by  the  influence  of  alien  causes.  " 
Kant's  notion  of  will  involves  the  capacity  to  act  independently  of  the 
laws  of  physical  necessity. 
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The  notion  of  causality  involves  the  idea  of  law.  In  the  case  of 
physical  necessity  these  are  laws  in  accordance  with  which  something  we 
call  a  cause  necessarily  brings  about  an  event  later  in  time  which  we 
call  an  of°ect.  In  the  case  of  the  will  conceived  as  an  original  cause, 
the  notion  of  being  subject  to  immutable  laws  also  arises,  but  these  are 
'laws  of  willing'  and  are  of  a  distinctly  different  kind.  Kant  calls 
these  laws  that  express  the  principle  of  universality  in  action  'laws 
of  freedom'.  He  assn  es  that  we  are  aware  of  the  power  of  reason  within 
us  as  a  sort  of  pure  spontaneity,  and  that  we  are  therefore  justified 
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in  supposing  that  we  are  free  even  if  we  cannot  prove  that  we  are. 
So  a  free  will  is  a  will  that  acts  on  laws  that  are  legislated  by  reason 
itself  and  which  are  valid  for  rational  nature  as  such.  But  this  says 
Kant  is  how  autonomy  is  defined,  so  he  concludes  that  a  free  will  and 
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an  autonomous  will  are  one  and  the  same  thing. 
If  Kant's  argument,  that  men  are  autonomous  ends  in  themselves,  is 
accepted,  then  to  treat  them  in  any  other  way  is  to  deny  them  freedom 
and  respect  as  self-determining  autonomous  beings.  So  nobody  can  coerce 
or  compel  me  to  be  happy  in  his  own  particular  way  because  paternalism 
is  antithetical  to  Kant's  notion  of  free  autonomous  man.  Paternalism 
entails  treating  people  as  hinan  objects  to  be  moulded  in  accordance 
with  someone  else's  wishes.  "In  the  name  of  what,  "  writes  Berlin 
subscribing  to  this  view,  "can  I  ever  be  justified  in  forcing  men  to 
do  what  they  have  not  willed  or  consented  to?  Only  in  the  name  of  some 
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value  higher  than  themselves.  But......  there  is  no  higher  value  than 
the  individual.  Therefore,  to  do  this  is  to  coerce  men  in  the  name  of 
something  less  ultimate  than  themselves  -  to  bend  them  to  my  will,  or  to 
someone  else's  particular  craving  for  happiness,  or  expediency,  or 
security,  or  convenience.  I  am  airing  at  something  desired  by  me  or 
my  group  to  which  I  am  using  other  men  as  means.  But  this  is  a 
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contradiction  of  what  I  know  men  to  be,  namely  ends  in  themselves.  " 
:  pant  is  obliged  to  reject  the  notion  that  a  person  may  be  forced  or 
coerced  to  be  free. 
But  Kant's  proposition,  that  freedom  exists  in  the  individual 
legislating  for  himself,  is  realisable  only  in  a  perfect,  ideal  and 
harmonious  world,  the  Kingdom  of  Ends.  Kant  is  obliged  to  concede  that 
in  a  political  context,  in  the  normal  world,  no  law  that  one  rational 
being  approves  could  possibly  deprive  another  rational  or  irrational 
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being  of  freedom.  Thereupon  Kant,  the  protagonist  of  individual 
freedom  and  autonomy,  descends  from  the  ideal  to  the  practical  world  and 
confusing  the  two  makes  it  possible  to  argue  that  to  be  forced  to  obey 
rational  laws,  qua  rational,  even  if  made  by  another,  is  to  be  forced 
to  be  free,  since  in  obeying  rational  laws  even  irrational  men  become  free. 
And  this  is  based  upon  the  assumption,  common  to  the  idealist  philosophers 
we  have  considered,  that  all  rational  men  make  the.  same  choice  in  accord 
with  their  capacity  for  rational  self-direction.  Kant's  notions  of 
freedom  and  autonomy  are  seemingly  based  in  a  metaphysic  from  which  they 
cannot  be  extracted  without  being  transformed. 
Kant  sought  solutions  to  man's  practical  problems  in  reason.  He 
sought  general  principles  influencing  a  person's  conduct  when  faced  with 
the  ordinary  problems  of  life.  The  just  man,  Kant  assumes,  acts  in  accord 
with  the  principle  of  universality.  But  this  may  be  challenged  because 
any  fanatic  can  logically  universalize  any  rule,  however  undesirable, 
to  which  he  himself  is  willing  to  submit.  Moreover,  people  might  not 
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always  wish  to  be  treated  in  the  way  you  might  wish  them  to  treat  you. 
Kant's  metaphysics  provides,  in  duty,  a  reason  for  moral  action  but 
does  not  provide  us  with  a  satisfactory  solution  to  either  the  problem 
of  justice  or  freedom.  Existentialists  by  comparison  attempt  to  resolve 
the  condition  of  man  not  in  metaphysical  reasoning  but  in  terms  of  the 
individual's  consciousness.  They  focus  on  individuals  themselves  rather 
than  theoretical  abstractions.  In  Sartrean  theory,  for  example,  man  is 
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just  born  free  and  cannot  therefore  avoid  freedom. 
In  Satre'  s  view  nobody  is  free  to  cease  to  be  free.  We  are  free 
in  existing  and  just  have  to  decide  what  to  make  of  ourselves.  We  are 
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condemned  to  be  free  so  long  as  we  are  conscious  beings.  In  Sartre's 
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understanding  existence  precedes  essence.  Human  beings  are  not  conceived 
for  a  particular  purpose  or  function,  say  like  a  paper  knife  or  pruning 
fork,  they  just  exist  and  what  they  are  and  what  they  become  depends 
entirely  upon  themselves.  A  human  being  is  not  a  born  anything  in 
particular,  not  a  cook,  not  an  engineer,  not  a  liar,  not  anything.  He 
simply  chooses  to  become  whatever  he  becomes  in  order  to  fill  the  void 
in  his  life. 
This  means  that  our  freedom  is  a  total  freedom  entailing  responsibility 
for  everything  we  think  and  do,  for  our  emotions  and  for  our  dispositions. 
So,  if  I  am  sad,  it  is  only  because  I  choose  to  be  so.  Individually 
we  exist  in  a  state  of  anguish,  conscious  of  our  freedom,  the  unpredictability 
of  our  behaviour,  and  of  the  constant  necessity  and  obligation  to  make 
fresh  decisions.  To  try  to  escape  from  this  inevitable  state  of  freedom 
and  the  responsibility  entailed,  says  Sartre,  is  to  deceive  oneself,  is 
to  pretend  like  the  actor  playing  a  role,  and  is  to  act  in  bad  faith. 
The  waiter,  actor,  dancer,  receptionist,  host,  or  anyone  who  misrepresents 
his  true  self,  is  too  anxious  to  please,  is  too  obsequious,  is  too 
conscientious,  is  too  good  to  be  true,  denies  his  freedom  and  authenticity 
in  seeking  to  become  an  object  or,  in  Sartrean  tents,  a  being-in-itself 142 
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instead  of  a  being-for-itself.  The  girl  who  reluctantly  receives  the 
attention  of  a  would  be  admirer  lest  she  hurt  his  feelings  denies  her 
freedom  in  misrepresenting  her  real  intentions.  Tact,  apparently,  in 
existentialist  thinking  is  not  a  recognised  virtue;  any  evasion  of 
strict  responsibility  to  oneself  amounts  to  bad  faith. 
Following  this  reasoning,  it  is  not  possible  to  coerce  a  person  to 
be  free  simply  because  he  is  born  free,  his  very  existence  being  his 
freedom.  Likewise,  it  is  not  possible  to  force  a  person  to  be  autonomous. 
We  cannot  claim  we  can  coerce  a  person  into  a  state  of  self-deception 
in  order  to  avoid  the  burden  of  choosing  for  this  would  not  render  him 
free  but  simply  deny  his  freedom.  It  is  possible  to  argue  that  we  might 
coerce  a  person  into  a  position  in  which  he  is  induced  to  exercise  his 
freedom  of  choice,  though  excessive  force  could  also  deny  his  freedom 
of  choosing.  Existentialists  have  to  deny  the  possibility  of  coercing 
a  person  to  be  free  except  to  this  limited  extent. 
Some  existentialists  obviously  conscious  of  man's  painful  condition 
were  tempted  to  seek  a  positive  solution.  Kierkegaard  sought  a  solution 
not  in  the  coercive  influence  of  the  institutionalised  church,  which  he 
criticised,  but  in  faith,  which  he  regarded  as  man's  highest  passion 
and  through  which  man  supposedly  achieved  salvation  through  the  grace 
of  God.  Similarly,  Sartre  in  later  life  flirted  with  the  belief  that 
a  commitment  to  a  Utopian  Marxist  society  might  provide  a  similar  kind 
of  solution.  In  this  respect  both  writers  were  apparently  willing  to 
supplement  their  existentialist  notions  of  freedom  with  positive  notions 
of  freedom  of  an  idealist  kind. 
The  existentialist  view  of  the  nature  of  human  freedom  and  autonomy 
is  unsatisfactory  in  several  respects.  It  is  contradictory  to  suggest 
that  man  is  born  in  a  state  of  absolute  freedom  yet  at  the  same  time 
to  claim  that  he  is  bound  by  the  inevitability  of  having  to  make  choices, 
because  this  is  tantamount  to  saying  that  man  has  one  unavoidable 143 
obligation,  namely,  to  make  choices,  and  since  this  is  a  state  he 
cannot  avoid  he  really  has  no  choice  at  all. 
It  is  a  misrepresentation  of  the  nature  of  choice  and  of  responsibility 
to  claim  that  we  choose  every  aspect  of  our  characters.  This  is  clearly 
not  the  case.  It  is  not  possible  for  us  to  choose  the  chemistry  of 
our  physical  existence,  to  exercise  complete  control  over  our  physical 
enviromnent  and  physical  health,  yet  these  are  all  factors  that  affect 
the  kind  of  choices  we  make.  We  do  not  choose  in  a  vacuum  but  in 
relation  to  criteria,  values,  knowledge,  beliefs  that  we  imbibe  from 
the  social  contexts  in  which  we  live  and  have  been  nurtured.  It  is 
not  possible  therefore  to  claim  that  we  choose  all  the  criteria  by 
which  we  make  are  choices,  because  each  choice  presupposes  additional 
criteria  in  an  infinite  regression.  The  only  alternative  is  to  conclude 
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that  at  some  time  we  must  have  originated  a  choice  out  of  nothing. 
We  are  obliged  to  concede  that  all  our  choices  are  tinged  with  relativity, 
for  the  possibility  of  being  able  to  make  criteria-free  choices  seems 
to  be  patently  inconceivable. 
Consequently  it  is  not  possible  in  every  case  to  choose  what  we 
would  wish  to  be  responsible  for;  our  values,  beliefs,  attitudes, 
dispositions,  emotions  are  either  inherited  or  unconsciously  internalised 
rather  than  deliberately  chosen.  Nevertheless  we  are  responsible  for 
them  and  the  behaviour  that  ensues  from  them.  If  we  choose  them  in  any 
way  at  all  it  must  be  by  acquiescence  and  acceptance,  and  just  by  being 
aware  of  them.  Even  so  we  are  expected  as  reasonable  and  responsible 
beings  to  take  full  responsibility  for  our  respective  characters. 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  concepts  of  freedom  posited  by  Kant 
and  Sartre  are  logically  incompatible  with  the  assumption  that 
individuals  can  be  coerced  to  be  free.  It  has  been  noted,  however, 
that  both  philosophers,  conscious  perhaps  of  inadequacies  in  their 
theories,  also  entertained  notions  of  freedom  of  a  positive  and  idealist --  I  -,  --  --  ---  T,  1; 
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kind  which  of  course  do  make  it  possible  to  argue,  from  an  idealist 
point  of  view,  that  people  may  be  justifiably  coerced  in  order  to  set 
them  free. 
In  commarison,  in  the  context  of  everyday  life  and  ordinary  parlance, 
commonsense  indicates  that  we  expect  autonomous  people  to  be  independent, 
self-governing  and,  in  these  respects,  free.  We  would  not  expect  an 
autonomous  person  to  be  ruled  by  blind  impulse,  insatiable  instinctive 
cravings,  or  spontaneous  feelings,  but  by  reason  and  reasonable  beliefs. 
We  would  expect  such  a  person  to  be  master  of  himself  to  the  greatest 
possible  degree  to  which  his  natural  capacities,  as  a  rational  being, 
allowed  him  to  be.  We  would  expect  his  reasons  for  action  to  be  authentic 
in  the  sense  that  they  would  represent  and  genuinely  explain  his  behaviour, 
for  a  person  who  continually  decieves  himself  cannot  surely  be  considered 
to  be  acting  autonomously.  We  would  expect  an  autonomous  person  to  be 
committed  to  his  reasons  for  action  and  to  care  about  them  because  they 
would  reflect  his  character  and  general  way  of  thinking  and  be  truly 
his  own,  not  borrowed  or  copied  from  another  for  whatever  reason.  The 
reasoning  of  an  autonomous  person,  therefore,  has  a  distinct  quality 
and  character  and  is  expected  to  conform  to  recognised  rules  and  standards. 
We  would  expect  an  autonomous  person  to  have  a  mind  of  his  om,  to  be 
able  to  think  critically  for  himself  and  to  have  the  will,  courage  and 
tenacity  to  do  so,  and  to  be  in  these  respects  intellectually  and 
emotionally  independent  and  personally  responsible. 
It  is  not  a  plausible  objection  to  suggest  in  reply  that  those  who 
follow  rules  and  conform,  to  standards  are  less  autonomous  than  those 
who  do  not,  or  that  only  rebels  in  fact  can  be  said  to  act  autonomously. 
Often  it  is  more  difficult,  it  requires  more  courage  and  a  greater  degree 
of  self-discipline,  to  abide  by  rules  rather  than  to  reject  them.  A 
person  who  deliberately  chooses  to  follow  rules  cannot  for  that  reason 
alone  be  considered  to  be  any  the  less  autonomous. 
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Intellectual  and  personal  autonomy  is  insufficient  in  itself.  The 
intellectually  and  personally  autonomous  person  requires  a  degree  of 
social  freedom,  freedom  to  execute  his  choices;  otherwise,  he  is  not 
master  of  his  own  fate.  He  may  be  free  to  the  limited  extent  of  enjoying 
a  state  of  inner  harmony  and  the  capacity  to  think  for  himself  but 
without  being  socially  free  to  implement  his  choices. 
Coercion  presupposes  the  existence  of  two  intellectually  and 
personally  autonomous  agents  whose  wills  clash,  the  will  of  one  being 
imposed  upon  the  will  of  the  other.  As  the  force  i=osed  increases 
so  the  freedom  of  choice  available  to  the  coercee  is  decreased.  The 
notion  of  coercion  whilst  depending  upon  autonomy  in  one  sense  is  in 
another  sense  antithetical  to  it.  Coercion  may  infringe  a  person's 
freedom  of  choice  and/or  his  freedom  of  action.  Normally  we  do  not 
conceive  the  notions  of  freedom,  autonomy,  or  coercion  in  absolute 
terms  but  rather  in  terms  of  degree.  A  degree  of  coercion  is  recuired 
to  safeguard  the  autonomy  of  some  by  limiting  the  autonomy  of  others. 
A  distinction  is  made  between  the  exercise  of  autonomy,  to  which 
coercion  in  so  far  as  it  limits  a  person's  freedom  of  action  is  opposed, 
and  the  development  of  autonomy  that  might  be  facilitated  by  the  use 
of  coercion.  And  this  distinction  is  relevant  whether  autonomy  is 
regarded  as  a  moral  notion  or  as  a  morally  neutral  concept,  whether 
one  thinks  in  terms  of  a  morally  conscious  and  responsible  person  or, 
leaving  moral  consciousness  aside,  simply  in  terms  of  an  intellectually 
autonomous  and  independent  individual.  In  either  case  there  are  certain 
distinct  and  identifiable  objectives  which  must  be  attained  by  the 
aspiring  autonomous  individual,  though  the  attainment  of  such  will  not 
necessarily  guarantee  that  a  person  will  in  fact  become  autonomous.  If 
the  use  of  coercion  can  be  seen  as  an  aid  to  the  realisation  of  these 
desirable  ends  then  it  must  be  seen  as  facilitating  the  potential 
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Knowledge  is  an  essential  characteristic  of  an  autonomous  person 
because  knowledge  of  oneself,  others  and  of  the  world  in  general  is  a 
source  of  power  and  influence.  A  knowledgeable  person  is  better  equipped 
than  an  ignorant  man  to  deal  with  life's  problems,  with  people,  and  is 
potentially  more  capable  of  creating  opportunities  from  which  he  might 
benefit.  And  knowledge  can  be  acquired  under  threat,  subject  of  course 
to  the  limits  imposed  by  the  victim's  natural  ability,  capacity, 
understanding,  and  willingness  to  learn. 
Secondly,  an  autonomous  person  will  surely  have  interests-and  will 
be  interested  in  things,  for  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  an  autonomous 
individual  without  any  interests  or  concerns.  And  the  more  interests 
a  person  has  the  more  knowledgeable  he  is  likely  to  be.  An  autonomous 
person  is  curious,  interested  to  learn,  and  capable  of  sustained  interest. 
Parents  and  teachers  are  aware  of  these  basic  conditions  for  the 
development  of  personal  autonomy  in  their  charges  and  customarily  resort 
to  coercive  pressure  in  order  to  guide  young  people  towards  appropriate 
habits,  attitudes,  values  that  will  hopefully  lead  towards  the  development 
of  autonomy  at  a  future  date. 
Thirdly,  it  is  essential  that  the  individual's  basic  physical  needs 
such  as  food  and  shelter  be  adequately  satisfied  if  he  is  to  be  given 
the  opportunity  to  develop  to  his  full  potential.  In  this  respect  it 
is  possible  to  force  individuals  to  consider  and  to  recognise  and 
to  respect  their  own  basic  needs,  and  to  coerce  members  of  society  in 
general  to  provide  the  means  of  satisfying  these  basic  needs  of  survival. 
An  autonomous  person,  therefore,  is  distinguishable  in  several 
respects.  He  has  will  and  the  courage  to  make  decisions,  and  he  has  the 
courage  to  execute  his  decisions  and  to  abide  by  them  and  to  defend 
them  with  res-oonsibility  and  resolution.  In  so  far  as  these  attributes 
can  be  regarded  as  acquired  virtues,  distinct  that  is  from  being  inherited, 
and  in  so  far  as  they  may  be  regarded  as  being  socially  generated,  the 
judicious  use  of  coercive  influence  might  facilitate  their  acquisition 147ýý 
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through  enforced  practice.  States  of  character,  says  Aristotle,  like 
skills  in  the  arts  are  developed  and  fashioned.  If  this  were  not  so, 
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Aristotle  continues,  we  would  not  have  any  need  for  teachers. 
It  is  not  possible  to  avoid  making  value  judgments  in  discussions 
about  autonomy  because  it  is  necessary  to  make  decisions  about  what 
needs  have  to  be  satisfied,  on  what  grounds,  and  by  whom.  And  this  is 
so  whether  the  notion  of  personal  autonomy  is  conceived  as  being  a 
morally  neutral  concept  or  as  depending  upon  the  development  of  a  moral 
sense.  There  are  philosophers  who  will  argue  that  a  state  of  autonomy 
cannot  be  conceived  outwith  a  moral  context  and  that  a  thief,  no  matter 
how  competent  and  self-governing  he  may  appear  to  be,  is  not  really  a 
free  and  autonomous  person  because  he  does  not  act  in  a  moral  and 
socially  responsible  way.  It  is  their  belief  that  the  conduct  of 
anyone,  including  the  thief,  who  acts  without  a  moral  sense  or  concern 
for  others,  is  inclined  to  solipsism  which  is  a  state  of  enslavement 
by  self-interest.  And  people  in  this  state  are  not  considered  to  be 
free  or  autonomous  but  slaves  of  one  overriding  desire.  Kant,  for 
example,  regarded  self-interested  action,  even  if  rational,  as  heteronomous 
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and  no  better  than  action  prom-)ted  by  sheer  irrational  impulse.  Kant 
regarded  wants  as  not  chosen  but  identifiable  with  impulse,  whereas 
moral  principles,  he  argued,  were  grounded  in  reason,  a  sense  of  duty, 
respect  for  law,  and  respect  for  human  beings  as  ends  in  themselves. 
Two  vi-#s,  therefore,  may  be  taken  of  the  notion  of  autonomy,  one 
that  conceives  autonomy  as  an  intellectual  quality  and  another  which 
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imputes  a  necessary  moral  dimension  to  it.  The  former  attributes 
autonomy  to  intelligence  and  independence  of  thought  and  judgment 
involving  not  necessarily  a  particularly  high  degree  of  originality  but 
primarily  a  readiness  to  think  for  oneself  free  from  bias  and  unreasonable 
prejudices.  The  latter  conceives  autonomy  as  basically  a  moral  virtue 
comprising  intellectual  and  moral  insights  coupled  with  a  degree  of 
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temperance.  It  is  the  latter  view  that  commonsense  indicates  is 
unavoidable  on  the  grounds  that  one  cannot  as  a  general  rule  or  principle, 
or  as  a  reasonable  person,  justly  deny  others  what  one  desires  for 
oneself,  nor  may  others  deny  me  what  they  think  is  good  for  themselves. 
No  man  can  demand  unqualified  rights  to  steal,  to  kill,  or  to  break  his 
promises,  without  infringing  another's  autonomy. 
The  observance  of  rules,  moral,  legal  and  conventional,  is 
unavoidable  because  it  is  necessary  that  we  recognise  the  freedom  and 
autonomy  of  others  if  we  are  to  preserve  our  own.  In  a  social  context 
autonomy  becomes  a  moral  concept.  Even  thieves  must  subscribe  to  some 
form  or  code  of  honour  if  any  meaningful  relationship  is  to  exist 
between  them.  Autonomy  implies  the  acceptance  and  observance  of  a 
degree  of  authority.  A  person  who  rationally  and  willingly  submits  to 
a  moral  or  legal  structure  governing  human  conduct  must  not  be  considered 
to  be  any  the  less  free  or  autonomous  for  so  doing.  His  autonomy  is 
only  infringed  to  the  extent  that  he  is  forced  to  acknowledge  rules, 
customs  and  laws  against  his  will  and  better  judgment. 
The  infringement  of  an  individual's  autonomy  is  sometimes  necessary 
and  may  be  justified  if  it  serves  a  just  and  moral  purpose,  if  for 
instance  it  is  likely  to  lead-to  a  fairer  distribution  of  freedom  in 
society  as  a  whole  or  to  enhanced  opportunities  for  the  develoornent 
and  exercise  of  autonomy  by  the  individual  concerned.  In  all  societies 
the  experienced  and  the  wise  are  assumed  to  know  what  is  best  for  the 
uninitiated  and  the  inexperienced.  Parents,  teachers,  politicians, 
clerics,  doctors,  lawyers,  social  workers  and  experts  of  all  kinds 
profess  that  there  is  more  to  autonomy  than  just  leaving  people  to  do 
as  they  like. 
The  judicious  use  of  coercion,  it  is  proposed,  is  instumental  in 
and  may  be  conducive  to  the  development  of  appropriate  skills,  habits 
and  attitudes,  and,  thereby,  to  the  potential  development  of  individual 
personal  autonomy  and  the  maintenance  of  those  conditions  necessary 
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for  its  exercise  within  the  social  system.  This  is  not  to  claim, 
however,  that  being  coerced  is  identical  with  being  free.  Only  those 
who  subscribe  to  an  idealist  view  of  freedom  can  regard  freedom  and 
coercion  as  identical.  They  only  can  argue  that  forcing  people  to  do 
the  proper  thing  is  really  just  enabling  them  to  realise  their  own  true, 
autonomous,  free  selves  and  to  be  and  to  do  what  they  really  want  to  be 
and  do  though  they  may  not  be  aware  of  it  at  the  time.  But  this  kind 
of  reasoning  we  have  argued,  if  logically  pursued  to  the  extreme,  leads 
not  to  autonomy  and  freedom  but  on  the  contrary  to  the  elimination  of 
personal  choice  and  its  substitution  by  a  state  of  bondage. 
There  are  various  locutions  of  the  word  'free',  and  this  confuses 
the  issue  whether  in  fact  a  person  may  in  any  sense  be  coerced  to  be 
free  or  not.  We  speak  of  'being  free  from  something',  of  'being  free 
to  do  something',  of  'being  free  with  respect  to  something',  of  'acting 
freely',  of  'feeling  free',  and  of  'being  free  to  do  as  one  wants'. 
Freedom  can  be  and  is  represented  in  different  ways,  in  terms  for 
example  of  feeling  and  wanting. 
If  'feeling  free'  is  significant,  if  we  accept  that  it  is  desirable 
to  feel  free  and  is  important  that  we  should  feel  free,  then  it.  is 
possible  to  argue  that  a  person  who  is  coerced  into  a  situation  that 
gives  him  a  feeling  of  freedom,  who  submits  for  instance  to  a  coercive 
and  authoritarian  relationship  in  return  for  the  sense  of  security 
that  ensues,  is  in  fact  forced  to  be  free. 
Some  philosophers,  like  Oppenheim,  dismiss  the  notion  of  'feeling 
free'  as  being  relevant  to  an  analysis  of  hinan  freedom  on  the  grounds 
that  it  is  'acting  freely'  and  not  'feeling  free'  that  is  the  real  issue. 
Certainly,  'being  free'  and  'feeling  free'  are  not  identical,  synonymous 
terms.  It  is  possible  for  an  individual  to  feel  free  in  circumstances 
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in  which  a  normal  person,  an  impartial  observer,  would  not  readily 
admit  that  he  is  free.  A  person  under  the  influence  of  drugs  or 
overpowered  by  the  influence  of  some  other  person  might  imagine  and 
feel  that  he  is  free,  whereas  normal  beings  might  wish  to  say  that  he 
is  mistaken,  that  he  is  behaving  abnormally,  that  he  is  not  free  because 
he  is  not  master  of  himself  and  his  own  affairs.  Conversely,  it  is 
possible  for  a  person  to  appear  to  be  free  and  to  act  as  if  he  is  free 
without  being  aware  of  any  sense  of  freedom,  not  having  perhaps  given 
the  matter  any  serious  thought.  If  for  instance  I  am  asked  whether  I 
feel  free  I  might  reply  quite  sincerely  that  I  do  not  really  know. 
Expressions  such  as  'I  think  I  am  free',  or  'I  do  not  for  sure  know 
whether  I  feel  free  or  not',  are  not  completely  meaningless  and 
nonsensical.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  ordinary,  legitimate,  common- 
sensical  expressions  used  in  everyday  parlance  indicating  either  that  we 
have  not  given-the  matter  much  thought  or  that  we  simply  do  not  know. 
But  'feeling'  and  'being'  free  are  related.  The  relation  between 
'feeling'  free  and  'being  free'  may  be  compared  to  the  relation  between 
'feeling  happy'  and  'being  happy'.  We  cannot  deny  that  'feeling  free', 
whatever  it  entails,  is  an  ingredient  of  'being  free',  just  as  'feeling 
happy'  is  part  of  'being  happy',  or  that  it  is  important  that  we  should 
both  feel  free  and  happy.  The  drug  addict  who  presumably  feels  free 
and  happy  cannot  be  denied  his  feelings  in  so  far  as  only  he  in  his 
own  particular,  idiosyncratic  state  can  be  the  true  judge  of  his  own 
idea  of  happiness  or  freedom. 
The  distinction  between  'being'  free  or  happy  and  'feeling'  free 
or  happy  emerges  when  in  search  of  greater  objectivity  we  appeal  to 
standards  of  normality  and  everyday  experience.  We  then  invoke 
conventionally  accepted  criteria  to  describe  the  respective  states  of 
freedom  and  happiness  from  which  we  deduce  that  some  individuals  are 
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not  always  the  best  judges  of  their  own  happiness  or  freedom. 151 
We  would  not  wish  to  admit  that  either  the  drug  addict  or  the  contented 
slave  is  free,  whatever  they  might  respectively  feel,  because  no  self- 
respecting  person  would  normally  be  expected  to  want  to  be  enslaved  or 
dehumanised  by  either  the  power  of  drugs  or  by  another  person  owning 
-and  treating  him  like  a  chattel.  We  are  obliged  to  admit  that  the 
notion  of  an  average,  normal,  reasonable,  moral  human  being  is  as 
indispensable  and  as  necessary  a  fiction  in  moral  reasoning  as  that  of 
the  reasonable  average  man  on  the  Clapham  omnibus  Is  in  legal  theory 
and  practice. 
Superficially,  freedom,  expressed  in  terms  of  how  a  person  feels, 
accommodates  the  paradox  of  the  free,  contented  slave.  It  suggests 
that  freedom  from  responsibility,  anxiety  or  tension,  can  be  identified 
with  submission  to  authority.  Some  individuals  may  feel  free  when  they 
feel  secure,  but  it  does  not  follow  that  freedom  can  be  reduced  to  how 
a  person  feels.  Our  idiosyncratic  feelings,  taken  as  representing  for 
each  individual  what  freedom  really  is,  will  not  necessarily  correlate 
with  what  is  normally  recognised  as  a  state  of  being  free.  The  contented 
slave  is  neither  free  nor  normal;  any  normal  person  would  not  wish  to 
remain  in  a  state  of  bondage  subject  to  the  will  and  whims  of  another. 
Different  people  profess  a  feeling  of  freedom  for  different  reasons. 
In  a  sense  what  I  am  is  what  I  feel,  and  I  may  prefer  to  be  bullied, 
misgoverned  or  imposed  upon  by  others,  of  my  own  family,  class,  race, 
religion  or  nation,  in  return  for  a  minimum  of  understanding  and 
recognition.  This  point  is  made  by  Isaiah  Berlin  when  he  argues  that 
freedom  should  not,  indeed  cannot,  be  redefined  in  terms  of  other  values. 
"Provided",  says  Berlin,  "the  answer  to  'Who  shall  govern  me?  '  is 
somebody  or  something  which  I  can  represent  as  'my  own',  as  something 
which  belongs  to  me  or  to  whom  I  belong,  I  can,  by  using  words  which 
convey  fraternity  and  solidarity  as  well  as  some  part  of  the  connotation 
of  the  positive  sense  of  the  word  freedom  which  is  difficult  to  specify 
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more  precisely,  describe  it  as  a  hybrid  form  of  freedcm,  at  any  rate 
as  an  ideal  which  is  perhaps  more  prominent  than  any  other  in  the  world 
today  yet  one  which  no  existing  term  seems  to  fit.  Those  who  purchase 
it  at  the  price  of  their  Millian  freedom  certainly  claim  to  be  'liberated' 
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by  this  means  in  this  ardently  'felt'  sense.  "  To  conceive  freedom  in 
terms  of  feeling  entails  redescribing  freedom  in  terms  of  a  variety  of 
different  values.  This  makes  it  difficult  to  arrive  at  any  one  agreed 
account  of  what  freedom  is. 
Similarly,  it  is  no  more  helpful  either  to  redescribe  freedom  in 
terms  of  what  a  person  wants  or  to  assume  that  freedom  entails  that  a 
person  is  free  who  can  simply  do  as  he  wants.  Wanting  like  feeling  is 
equally  indeterminate.  Individuals  may  want  a  variety  of  different 
things  and  their  wants  may  be  described  in  a  variety  of  ways,  in  terms 
of  what  they  desire  or  crave  for  or  on  terms  of  what  they  will  or  intend 
as  a  result  of  responsible,  rational  thought  and  deliberation.  We 
appeal,  therefore,  to  normality  in  search  of  a  more  objective  criterion 
of  what  constitutes  a  person's  wants.  We  conceive  wants  in  terms  of 
commonly  accepted  and  socially  derived  needs  and  deduce  therefrom  the 
presumption  that  some  people  do  not  always  know  what  they  really  want 
or  need. 
The  suggestion  that  freedom  might  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  the 
satisfaction  of  individuals'  respective  wants  must  be  qualified.  In 
practical  life  we  decide  whether  a  person  is  free  or  not  by  comparing 
his  own  estimation  of  his  feelings  and  wants  with  those  of  an  assumed 
normal  person  and  do  not  rely  solely  upon  the  individual's  particular, 
subjectively  declared  feelings,  desires  or  whatever.  Commonsense 
decrees  that  any  attempt  to  say  what  freedom  is  must  refer  to  the 
existing  everyday  world  of  experience  and  be  tied  to  an  assumed 
consensus  and  criterion  of  normality.  Basically  coercion  is  a  way  of 
getting  people  to  do  what  they  do  not  want  to  do  rather  than  a  means 
of  getting  them  to  want  to  do  something  else.  In  achieving  the  former 153 
we  sometimes  achieve  the  latter  with  the  result  that  additional 
opportunities  offering  the  possibility  of  greater  freedom  are  revealed 
to  the  individual  concerned.,  In  this  process  freedom  is  not  identified 
with  the  satisfaction  of  the  individual's  immediate  wants  but  is  the 
result  of  forcing  him  to  do  what  he  does  not  want  to  do. 
The  immediate  and  obvious  response  to  the  question  posed  in  this 
chapter  -  'In  what  senses  and  to  what  extent  may  a  person  be  said  to 
be  coerced  to  be  free?  '  -  must  be  the  unexceptional  observation  that 
the  meaningfulness  of  the  enquiry  depends  upon  the  meaning  given  to 
freedom  itself,  whether  freedom  is  conceived  in  a  personal  or  social 
context  or  both,  whether  it  is  described  in  terms  of  a  formal,  negative 
principle  of  non-interference  or  some  nonnative/positive  idealist  theory, 
or  whether  it  is  conceived  in  commonsense  tezms  reflecting  normal 
practice  and  experience.  In  sum,  the  following  propositions  have  been 
argued. 
(i)  Freedom  conceived  in  terms  of  a  formal,  negative  principle 
of  non-interference  is  the  basis  upon  which  all  other  versions  of 
freedom  must  ultimately  depend  and  is  logically  incompatible,  as  Berlin 
argues,  with  the  notion  of  coercion.  It  is  not  possible  to  talk  of 
coercing  a  person  to  be  free  when  freedom  is  conceived  in  terms  of 
freedom  from  interference  and  restraint. 
(ii)  Idealist  theories  of  freedom  such  as  those  posited  by  Rousseau, 
Hegel  and  Marx,  conflating  freedom  with  authority,  present  a  positive, 
normative,  prescriptive  vier  of  freedom  which  presumes  that  individuals 
may  be  forced  to  be  free.  But  idealist  theories  are  of  limited 
relevance  to  the  ordinary  world  of  experience;  they  fail  to  provide  a 
satisfactory  moral  justification  for  the  use  of  coercion  in  this  respect. 
If  abused  such  theories  may  lead  not  to  freedom  but  to  tyranny.  The 
importance  of  idealist  theories  of  freedom,  however,  as  ideals  of 
perfection  sustaining  human  aspirations,  motivation  and  achievement  in 
iý practical  life,  is  in  no  way  denied. 
(iii)  A  commonsensical  interpretation  of  the  notion  of  freedom 
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is  to  be  preferred  which  encompasses  both  negative  and  positive/idealist 
perspectives  of  freedom.  Freedom,  it  is  conceded,  is  related  to  and 
is  redescribed  in  terms  of  other  values.  It  is  accepted  th2t  the  use 
of  coercion  can  and  may  be  instrumental  in  developing  and  maintaining 
conditions  favourable  to  the  exercise  and  development  of  personal  and 
social  freedom.  In  this  limited  sense,  it  is  conceded,  individuals 
may  be  said  to  be  coerced  to  be  free. 
(iv)  The  notion  of  personal  autonomy  is  related  to  the  notion  of 
freedom.  Neither  Kant's  nor  Sartre's  respective  concepts  of  autonomy 
can  logically  accommodate  the  proposition  that  individuals  may  be  coerced 
to  be  free.  It  is  noted,  however,  that  both  philosophers  recognised  a 
positive  concept  of  freedom,  which  might  indicate  their  awareness  of  the 
restrictions  imposed  by  their  respective  theories.  In  so  far  as  habits, 
skills,  attitudes  appropriate  to  the  development  of  personal  autonomy 
can  be  encouraged  by  enforced  practice  and  attention  it  is  possible  to 
argue  that  individuals  may  be  coerced  to  be  personally  free  and 
autonomous.  Coercion  is  also  instrumental  in  maintaining  the  conditions 
necessary  for  the  free  development  and  exercise  of  personal  autonomy 
within  the  social  system. 
In  this  chapter  it  has  been  implied  that  there  are  limits  to  the 
use  of  coercion,  first  in  the  sense  that  there  are  things  that  coercion 
cannot  do,  secondly  in  the  sense  that  there  are  things  that  coercion 
should  not  be  meant  to  do.  These  issues  are  the  concern  of  the  next 
three  chapters. 
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There  are  limits  to  what  coercion  can  achieve,  to  what  it  is 
possible  to  achieve  by  the  use  of  force.  Limits  are  imposed  as  a 
consequence  of  the  logic  of  the  concept  itself  and  its  relation  to 
other  concepts  that  form  the  bases  of  the  various  claims  made 
in  its  favour.  It  is  not  logically  possible,  for  example,  to  force  a 
person  to  be  free  so  long  as  freedom  is  understood  to  mean  freedom  from 
the  restraint  or  interference  of  another  person.  It  is  proposed  to 
argue  that  an  individual  cannot  be  coerced  to  understand  and,  since  a 
minims  degree  of  cognitive  awareness  or  understanding  is  involved  in 
a  variety  of  activities  relating  to  the  human  mind,  that  it  is  not 
possible  to  coerce  a  person  to  know,  believe,  think,  be  moral,  to  have 
particular  attitudes  or  dispositions,  feelings,  emotions,  or  to  love 
or  will  in  a  predetermined  way. 
These  entities,  it  is  suggested,  are  part  of  the  human  consciousness 
and  as  such  are  beyond  the  absolute  control  of  the  individual  himself 
or  any  other  party  seeking  to  manipulate  their  manifestation  by  coercive 
threats  or  force.  It  is  conceded,  however,  that  coercive  pressure 
might  be  conducive  to  the  precipitation  of  appropriate  behaviour  that 
could  possibly  in  turn  be  conducive  to  the  achievement  of  such  ends. 
Finally,  within  the  logic  of  the  concept  of  coercion  itself 
it  will  be  proposed  that  individuals  cannot  coerce  themselves,  or  be 
coerced  without  being  aware  of  it,  or  without  being  threatened,  or 
without  the  coercer  being  aware  of  an  intent  to  coerce,  because  all 
such  claims  would  be  contrary  to  the  conditions  of  coercion  stipulated 
and  discussed  in  the  first  two  chapters  of  this  thesis. 
The  tern  'to  know'  is  ambiguous  and  can  mean  a  variety  of  things. 
We  speak  of  'knowing',  'knowing  of',  'knowing  that',  'knowing  how'.  To 
discover  what  it  is  to  know  or  what  a  person,  as  opposed  to  an  animal  or 161 
machine,  has  when  he  is  said  to  have  knowledge,  different  senses  of  the 
word  know  must  be  distinguished  and  the  term  knowledge  disambiguated. 
And  this  could  become  a  complex  task  because  the  concept  of  knowing  is 
related  to  a  whole  family  of  concepts  including  perceiving,  remembering, 
thinking,  apprehending,  understanding,  believing  and  doubting. 
In  one  obvious  sense  'to  know'  implies  having  some  kind  of  skill 
1 
or  competence  or  ability.  To  know  French  suggests  one  possesses  certain 
linguistic  skills  and  techniques  in  the  use  of  the  language,  and  to  know 
one's  tables  suggests  a  facility  to  manipulate  and  to  apply  them.  To 
say  that  I  know  the  way  home  implies  that  I  have  confidence  in  my  ability 
to  arrive  at  my  intended  destination.  'Knowing  how'  suggests  competence 
and  ability,  but  not  exclusively  of  skills  of  a  practical  kind.  Knowing 
how  to  speak  French  presupposes  the  possession  of  skills  of  a  cognitive, 
theoretical  and  intellectual  kind,  say  of  grammar,  as  well  as  the  obvious 
physical  skills  of  diction  and  pronounciation.  Similarly,  knowing  music 
implies  having  skills  of  theorising  and  composition  as  well  as  the 
practical  and  physical  skills  of  playing  a  particular  instrument. 
In  another  sense,  knowing  'of'  or  'about'  is  associated  with  being 
acquainted  with.  If  I  say  I  know  'of'  Jim,  I  am  implying  that  I  am  just 
aware  of  him,  that  I  know  who  he  is,  something  about  him,  what  he  does, 
but  not  necessarily  that  I  fully  understand  hire  or  know  very  much  about 
him.  Likewise,  if  I  declare  that  I  know  Glasgow,  I  may  be  implying  that 
I  just  know  of  it,  where  it  is,  that  it  exists,  but  I  mint  also  be 
implying  that  I  know  Glasgow  in  the  sense  already  described,  that  I  know 
all  about  it  and  how  to  find  my  way  around  it  competently.  The  team 
'know'  can  indicate  more  than  one  meaning  at  the  same  time. 
In  another  sense  knowing  may  imply  'knowing  that'.  This  might  mean 
knowing  in  a  simple  repetitive  sense,  recall  without  understanding,  or, 
more  usually,  knowing  in  the  sense  of  full  understanding  of  propositions 
and  concepts.  But  in  all  cases  of  human  knowing  a  degree  of  understanding 162  , 
is  recuired.  Knowing  'how',  'of',  'about',  all  presume  a  degree  of 
knowing  'that'.  I  must  have  some  information  about  and  understand 
something  about  Glasgow  if  I.  am  to  be  expected  to  be  ableýto  find 
myself  around  it.  All  human  knowing  involves  an  element  of  understanding; 
it  is  this  that  distinguishes  it  from  the  kinds  of  'knowing'  that  are 
attributed  to  animals,  parrots,  comtutors,  which  can  only  'know'  by 
instinct  or  by  being  conditioned  or,  in  the  case  of  computors,  programmed. 
It  may  be  objected  that  an  examination  of  the  ordinary  language 
use  of  the  word  'know'  is  a  useful  but  not  a  conclusive  analysis  of 
what  it  is  to  know  because  it  concentrates  upon  the  word  rather  than  the 
thing  knowledge  itself.  Instead  we  might  ask  'What  does  knowledge- 
stand  for?  '  or  '.  hat  are  the  conditions  of  knowing?  '  or  'What  does  it 
mean  to  say  one  knows  instead  of  saying  one  believes,  claims,  thinks, 
guesses  or  conjectures?  '  There  are,  it  is  presumed,  four  necessary  and, 
if  taken  together,  sufficient  conditions  of  human  knowing,  namely 
adequate  evidence,  belief,  truth  and'understanding,  two  of  which,  belief 
and  understanding,  are  our  present  concern. 
Believing  and  knowing  are  not  synonymous  terms.  Even  supposing 
it  were  possible,  which  it  is  not,  to  coerce  a  person  to  believe  it 
would  not  necessarily  follow  that  he  could  be  deemed  to  know.  It  is 
possible  to  believe  without  knowing;  I  may  believe,  I  may  think,  that 
God  exists  without  really  knowing  whether  He  does  or  not.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  I  claim  to  know  that  God  exists  I  must  surely  believe  He  does. 
2 
Belief  is  a  necessary  but  not  a  sufficient  condition  of  knowing.  A 
claim  to  belief  will  not  guarantee  my  knowing.  If,  however,  I  could 
be  coerced  to  know  then  I  also  could  be  coerced  to  believe. 
A  different  relation  exists  between  understanding  and  knowing. 
3 
Knowing  presupposes  an  element  of  understanding,  at  least  in  the  form 
concepts,  notions,  basic  ideas,  symbols,  in  terms  of  which  it  is 
formulated  and  expressed.  A  person  who  claims  to  know  must  surely  be 
aware  of  and  understand  relevant  concepts,  words,  rules  of  grsnpnar, 1633 
which  are  the  tools  of  human  thought,  and  he  must  also  possess,  presumably, 
the  required  sympathy,  curiosity,  interest  and  disposition  to,  learn 
and  to  think.  Understanding.  is  a  precondition  of  both  knowledge  and 
belief  in  so  far  as  there  is  an  essential  cognitive  element  in  both 
knowing  and  believing.  We  sometimes  say  that  a  person  thinks  or  believes 
he  knows  when  in  fact  he  does  not,  because  he  may,  have  an  insufficient 
understanding  of  what  is  involved,  say  of  basic  concepts  and  their 
relation  to  one  another.  We  sometimes  say  a  person  is  not  fully  aware 
of  his  own  knowledge,  that  he  does  not  understand  the  relevance  of  the 
knowledge  he  already  has  in  relation  to  the  question  at  issue.  In  neither 
of  these  cases,  however,  can  we  say  knowledge  exists  because  a  person, 
if  he  is  to  be  said  to  know,  must  know  trat  he  knows,  because  knowing 
implies  understanding  that  one  knows. 
If  it  is  accepted  that  understanding  is  a  necessary  condition  of 
knowing  then  it  is  pertinent  to  enquire  whether  it  is  possible  to  coerce 
a  person  to  understand  and  therefore  to  know,  learn  or  believe.  People 
responsible  for  the  rearing,  teaching,  educating  of  young  people,  and 
for  the  teaching  of  adults  too,  are  obviously  concerned  to  know  whether 
coercive  procedures  can  possibly  promote  understanding  in  their  clients. 
P.  H.  Hirst,  an  ed7acational  philosopher,  writes:  'But  even  when  handing 
on  information  we  want  our  pupils  to  understand  the  information,  and,  as 
soon  as  we  say  that,  difficulties  arise  as  to  what  exactly  we  mean  by 
this  term  (i.  e.  understanding)  and  how  we  would  know  pupils  had 
4 
understood  what-was  presented  to  them.  " 
We  sometimes  refer  to  a  person  as  understanding  when  we  wish  to 
infer  that  he  is  a  person  of  sympathetic  character  or  kindly  disposition, 
but  this  is  not  to  be  confused  with  the  notion  of  intellectual 
understanding  or  comprehension  with  which  we  are  concerned.  Understanding 
does  not  exist  in  a  vacuum;  there  are  many  and  diverse  objects  of 
understanding  such  as  language,  words,  actions,  events,  artefacts,  works 
of  art,  people  as  well  as  the  disciplines  of  knowledge.  We  speak  of * 
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understanding  in  breadth  or  depth  and  of  levels  of  understanding.  We 
are  born  with  the  potentiality  to  understand  but  we  do  not  seem  to  be 
born  with  a  fully  fledged  understanding;  we  witness,  hopefully,  the 
development  of  our  understanding  throughout  our  lives.  Our  idea  of  the 
nature  of  understanding  is  inevitably  influenced  by  the  particular  view 
we  take  of  what  it  is  that  constitutes  a  mind,  of  what  is  human 
consciousness,  and  of  what  it  is  to  be  a  person. 
It  is  plainly  not  possible  to  decide  at  will  to  understand;  we  do 
not  have  a  free  choice  in  this  respect.  We  cannot  choose  to  understand 
in  the  same  way  as  we  can  choose  to  eat,  drink,  rest,  or  polish  the  car. 
Understanding  is  like  thinking  and  remembering;  we  cannot  always 
anticipate  the  results  of  our  thinking,  though  we  do  have  some  control 
over  what  to  apply  our  minds  to;  we  cannot  always  recall  what  we  may 
wish  to  recall  and  we  sometimes  remember  things  we  would  prefer  to  forget. 
We  may  try  to  understand  or  to  think  about  something,  we  may  choose  to 
dismiss  certain  thoughts  from  our  minds  and  refuse  to  try  to  understand, 
but  we  do  not  have  full  control  over  our  ability  to  understand  or  over 
the  outcome  of  our  thoughts. 
Understanding  and  thinking  are  not  the  only  things  over  which  we 
have  limited  control.  We  cannot,  for  example,  decide  to  be  creative  or 
original,  or  to  invent  or  to  discover  at  will.  We  may  attempt  these 
things  but  whether  we  are  successful  or  not.  will  ultimately  depend  upon 
our  innate  capacities,  abilities,  and  factors  outwith  both  our  own 
personal  and  anyone  else's  control.  If  all  this  is  so  then  it  follows 
that  it  will  not  be  possible  to  teach  understanding  in  the  sense  of- 
guaranteeing  absolute  success  in  one's  pupils  because  it  will  not  be 
possible  to  force  a  person  to  understand  or  to  do  any  of  these  other 
things  like  creating,  discovering,  inventing. 
A  variety  of  theories  have  been  proposed,  particularly  by  psychologists, 
which  attempt  to  identify  determinants  of  understanding  and  to  reduce 165 
understanding  to  something  other  than  it  is.  Understanding  cannot  be 
reduced  to,  nor  can  it  be  identified  with,  any  particular  physical  or 
psychological  event  or  occurrence,  or  with  any  physical  or  mental 
behaviour  or  act  that  is  observable  or  even  explicable  in  dispositional 
terms,  that  is  in  terms  of  anticipated  or  expected  behaviour  in 
hypothetical  future  circumstances.  Understanding  and  related  concepts 
like  remembering,  thinking,  believing,  perceiving,  possess  features 
that  physical  and  psychological  occurrences  do  not;  they  are  consciousness 
concepts  applicable  only  to  the  inner  world  of  human  beings  and  to  no 
other  animate  or  inanimate  thing,  neither  to  animals  nor  to  machines, 
computors,  mountains,  rivers  or  trees. 
Understanding  is  not  reducible  to  any  single  act  or  occurrence  or 
any  event  as  a  flash  or  moment  of  insight,  though  acts  or  occurrences 
may  or  may  not  be  evidence  of  understanding  as  teachers  who  test  the 
behaviour  of  pupils  are  fully  aware.  Acts,  events,  occurrences,  have 
a  time  scale  and  are  temporally  determinate  whereas  understanding  does 
not  appear  to  be  so.  I  can  possess  understanding,  an  ability,  a  skill, 
belief  or  knowledge,  when  asleep;  they  may  not  always  be  physically  and 
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continuously  manifested  but  they  still  exist  when  latent.  Understanding 
and  similar  related  concepts,  therefore,  cannot  be  the  preserve  of 
empirical  investigation  alone;  they  are  the  proper  concern  of  conceptual 
investigation  too  because  they  do  not  simply  exist  within  the  limits  of 
time  and  space.  It  is  for  these  reasons  that  G.  Pyle  has  suggested 
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that  understanding  is  more  akin  to  a  disposition. 
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Materialist  and  physicalist  accounts  of  thinking  and  understanding 
that  see  the  mind  in  terms  of  neural  circuits,  brain  processes,  changes 
in  the  physical  state  of  the  brain,  and  which  reduce  understanding  and 
misunderstanding  to  empirical  questions  regarding  the  proper  functioning 
of  the  same,  do  not  provide  an  adequate  explanation  of  human  thinking 
and  are  not,  therefore,  an  adequate  substitute  for  conceptual  enquiry. 166 
To  assume  that  brain  processes  and  understanding  are  one  and  the  same 
thing  is  like  assuming  that  lightening  is  the  same  as  an  electrical 
discharge,  which  it  is  not.  Temporal  contiguity  between  a  brain  event 
or  brain  process  and  understanding  does  not  establish  identity  between 
the  two,  or  that  a  causal  relation  exists,  or  that  understanding  is  an 
epiphenomenon;  it  merely  indicates  a  temporal/contingent  association.  In 
the  case  of  a  H-bomb  explosion,  for  example,  heat,  light,  blast,  sound 
are  all  caused  contemporaneously  when  the  explosion  occurs,  and  they  may 
all  have  a  coupon  origin,  but  it  does  not  follow  that  they  are  all  of 
the  same  substance  or  that  one  necessarily  causes  another.  Materialist 
and  physicalist  accounts  of  thinking  and  understanding  do  not  and  can 
not  provide  an  adequate  description  or  explanation  of  human  conduct 
and  human  consciousness.  The  study  of  brain  processes  cannot  tell  us 
whether  a  person  has  been  rule-following,  has  acted  rightly,  has  achieved 
anything  or  reached  any  particular  standard,  though  all  these  things 
are  associated  with  the  notion  of  understanding. 
Understanding  cannot  be  equated  to  overt  behaviour,  but  the  latter 
may  be  evidence  of  understanding  and  practised  behaviour,  over  a  period 
of  time,  might  be  conducive  to  its  development.  Nevertheless  there  has 
been  a  common  presumption  amongst  cognitive  theorists  of  educational 
psychology  to  associate  practised  behaviour  with  the  development  of 
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understanding.  Jean  Piaget  saw  understanding  as  a  process  of 
internalisation  whereby  physical  operations  were  somehow  transposed  or 
transferred  to  some  kind  of  logical  structure(s)  in  the  mind.  That  is 
to  say  that  the  mind  is  presumed  to  operate  logically  with  concepts 
which  are  formed  in  the  mind  by  some  process  of  abstraction  from  the 
physical  manipulation  of  physical  objects.  It  is  assumed  that  the 
understanding  of  concepts  arises  from  specific  behavioural  events, 
which  concepts  once  formed  exist  in  some  internal  realm  of  the  mind. 
But  this  notion  must  be  rejected,  that  the  mere  physical  manipulation 167  17 
of  physical  objects  such  as  sand  and  water  can  possibly  guarantee  the 
development  of  concepts  such  as  conservation,  volume,  reversability, 
or  some  such  logical  truths.  Behavioural  tasks  or  activities  may  or 
may  not  aid  the  development  of  understanding  but  they  can  not  be 
identified  or  confused  with  understanding  itself. 
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J.  S.  Bruner  subscribes  to  a  similar  theory  of  internalisation 
in  his  studies  of  cognitive  growth  and  the  acquisition  of  language. 
He  draws  attention  to  the  importance  of  non-physical  determinants  of 
understanding.  He  argues  that  the  growth  of  understanding  depends 
upon  the  mastery  of  skills  and  techniques  which  are  transmitted  within 
the  cultural  environment  of  the  individual,  principally  through 
language  and  the  acquisition  of  appropriate  symbol  systems.  Undoubtedly 
the  mastery  of  symbol  systems  and/or  language  must  be  regarded  as  a 
prerequisite  of  cognitive  growth  and  understanding  of'particular  kinds, 
but  it  can  not  be  identified  with  understanding  itself  unless  it  is 
intended  to  limit  the  notion  of  understanding  to  a  kind  of  prograzaning, 
say  of  a  robot,  which  reduces  understanding  to  the  acquisition,  storage 
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and  transmission  of  data  in  some  particular  language  or  symbolic  form. 
But  symbols  themselves  must  first  be  understood,  correctly  used,  and 
their  meaning  explicated.  Bruner  either  chooses  to  ignore,  or  is  oblivious 
of,  the  fact  that  he  has  not  resolved  the  question  of  understanding;  his 
theories  of  cognitive  growth  and  mastery  learning  must  ultimately  and 
inevitably  depend  upon  understanding  the  very  symbols  and  techniques 
whose  acquisition  is  supposed  to  explain  his  own  notion  of  what 
understanding  is. 
Bruner  does  not  discuss  what  is  to  count  as  understanding  or  what 
is  to  be  achieved  by  saying  that  understanding  is  present.  This 
achievement  aspect  of  understanding  is  generally  neglected  in  accounts 
of  intellectual  and  cognitive  development  although  understanding  the 
nature  of  understanding  is  clearly  not  exclusively  either  a  psychological 168 
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or  physical  problem  but  a  conceptual  one  too.  The  criteria  that 
characterise  understanding  are  complex  and  are  governed  by  the  context 
in  which  understanding  is  claimed  to  take  place,  by  the  nature  of  the 
objects  of  understanding,  and  by  the  nature  of  the  person  to  whom 
understanding  is  ascribed.  It  is  not  denied,  of  course,  that  Bruner 
is  right  to  emphasize  that  the  understanding  of  symbols  and  language 
determines  a  person's  level  of  understanding  in  many  respects  in  so 
far  as  it  makes  possible  further  dimensions  of  understanding  beyond  the 
symbols  themselves.  But  in  concentrating  on  the  task  of  developing 
certain  aspects  of  understanding  Bruner  does  not  consider  what  it 
means  to  achieve  understanding,  what  understanding  really  is;  and  the 
latter  cannot  be  described  in  terms  of  the  former  because  they  represent 
two  different  categories.  It  is  one  thing  to  describe  the  individual 
steps  in  an  ice-dancer's  repertoire  in  a  competition,  for  instance, 
but  quite  a  different  thing  to  describe  the  winning  of  the  competition 
itself.  The  latter  cannot  be  explained  simply  in  terms  of  a  description 
of  the  individual  steps  and  movements  making  up  the  competitor's 
programme  but  requires  in  addition  an  account  of  what  a  competition  is 
and  of  what  winning  means.  Similarly,  we  may  agree  about  certain  steps, 
conditions  that  may  be  conducive  to  the  development  of  understanding 
but  understanding  itself  is  quite  a  different  matter. 
Understanding,  thinking,  believing,  remembering,  differ  from 
descriptions  of  physical  events;  the  former  need  an  object  of  intention 
to  complete  their  meaning.  One  has  understanding  of,  belief  of  or  in, 
knowledge  of,  how  or  that,  whereas  when  describing  physical  events  one 
talks  of  the  wind  blowing,  the  river  flowing,  making  no  reference  to 
further  objects  for  these  latter  expressions  are  complete  in  themselves. 
Understanding  belongs  to  a  different  category  of  intentional  concepts 
which  do  not  exist  within  limits  in  time  or  space  and  do  not  refer  to 
occurrences,  or  acts,  or  ongoing  activities,  but  to  something  much  less 169 
tangible.  For  this  reason  some  thinkers,  like  G.  Ryle,  have  suggested 
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that  understanding  is  more  like  a  disposition  or  tendency  and  refute 
theories  that  suggest  it  can  be  explained  in  empirical  teens  alone,  in 
terms  that  is  of  some  physical  change  or  occurrence  taking  place  within 
the  person  to  whom  it  is  ascribed.  But  Ryle's  view  still  implies  that 
understanding  can  be  identified  with  observable  overt  behaviour;  even 
a  dispositional  account  of  understanding  fails  to  fully  explain  the 
nature  of  understanding  in  every  respect. 
Dispositions  are  ascribed  to  people  following  the  observation  of 
their  behaviour  in  particular  circumstances.  This  applies  in  the  case 
of  moral  and  emotional  dispositions  as  well  as  the  disposition  to 
understand.  What  a  person  has  said  or  done  becomes  the  basis  upon 
which  dispositions  are  ascribed  to  him.  Dispositions,  being  forward 
looking,  suggest  that  under  similar  circumstances,  at  some  future  time, 
the  individual  will  act  in  a  similar  way.  Ryle  argues  that  dispositional 
statements  are  hypothetical  rather  than  causal  or  categorical,  that  they 
are  similar  to  such  notions  as  tendency,  trait,  ability,  and  habit. 
Simple  repetition  of  particular  behaviour,  he  says,  is  not  in  itself  a 
guarantee  of  understanding;  the  behaviour  must  be  repeated  in  a  particular 
context;  understanding  is  the  tendency  to  repeat  certain  behaviour  in 
particular  and  similar  circumstances.  Teachers,  for  example,  are  wont 
to  ascribe  understanding  to  pupils  when  they  satisfy  tests  of  understanding 
in  the  form  of  successful  behavioural  tasks  indicating  their  ability  in 
particular  contexts  in  such  a  way  as  to  suggest  that  they  are  not  just 
guessing. 
But  Ryle's  theory  of  understanding  fails  to  provide  adequate 
evidence  or  proof  of  the  proposition  that  it  is  possible  to  coerce  a 
person  to  understand.  A  dispositional  account  of  understanding  reduces 
understanding  ultimately  and  wrongly  to  observed  overt  behaviour  of  one 
kind  or  another.  The  coercion  of  a  person  to  behave  in  a  particular 170 
way  will  not  in  itself  guarantee  that  understanding  will  ensue.  Like 
kindness,  understanding  can  not  be  reduced  to  observed  behavioural  acts; 
in  neither  case,  respectively,  is  my  stroking  the  cat  or  my  passing  a 
test  evidence  of  my  kindness  to  animals  or  of  my  understanding.  Simple 
performance  does  not  in  itself  imply  understanding.  Habits  and  nervous 
ticks  represent  behaviour  of  a  kind  but  do  not  necessarily  imply 
understanding.  Behaviour  may  be  feigned,  imitated  or  simply  accidental; 
it  is  not  necessarily  always  indicative  of  understanding.  A  person's 
behaviour  can  only  be  evidence  of  understanding;  it  is  not  identifiable 
with  a  person's  state  of  mind.  Passing  a  test  is  not  identical  to  the 
ability  to  understand  because,  logically  speaking,  the  ability  to 
understand  must  exist  before  the  test  is  set  or  completed. 
L.  Wittgenstein  likened  ability,  knowledge,  understanding,  to  the 
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notion  of  'fitting'.  He  asked  when  is  cylinder  C  said  to  fit  into 
hollow  cylinder  H?  Is  it  only  when  C  is  stuck  into  H?  But  the  actual 
pushing  of  C  into  H  (alternatively  the  cylinders  could  be  measured)  is, 
he  suggests,  only  the  test.  This  pushing  (or  measurement)  is  not 
identical  to  the  ability  of  C  to  fit  into  H.  Knowledge  and  understanding, 
says  Wittgenstein,  are  similar  in  this  respect  to  the  notion  of  'fitting'. 
Tests  of  knowledge  and  understanding  do  not  elicit  behaviour  that  is 
identical  to  what  they  claim  to  test. 
So,  understanding  cannot  be  considered  to  be  a  disposition  identifiable 
with  unactualised  behaviour  at  same  future  date  if  it  cannot  be  identified 
with  actual  performance  in  the  present,  for  a  person's  understanding  is 
logically  prior  to  the  ascription  to  him  of  the  disposition  to  understand, 
and  the  ability  to  understand  is  not  the  same  as  the  grounds  for  its 
ascription.  It  is  not,  therefore,  possible  to  coerce  a  person  to 
understand  by  forcing  him  to  behave  in  any  particular  way  because 
understanding  is  not  the  result  of  any  unavoidable  and  predictable 
causal  chain  of  events  or  of  any  set  pattern  of  known  overt  behaviour. -_., 
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All  that  can  be  established  is  an  apparent  contingent  relation  between 
behaviour  of  a  particular  kind  and  understanding  on  certain  occasions. 
Understanding  is  individual  and  personal,  being  part  of  a  person's 
inner  self  or  consciousness.  It  is  individual,  because  only  I  can 
understand  something  for  myself  irrespective  of  the  influence  others  may 
try  to  assert  over  me.  It  is  a  person  concept,  a  notion  we  apply  to 
people  like  learning,  thinking,  remembering  and  believing.  These  are 
concepts  we  do  not  normally  apply  to  machines,  computors,  animals  or 
incomplete  persons,  except  in  an  analogous  sense  perhaps.  They  are 
complex  concepts  like  man  whose  conduct  is  not  as  predictable  as  that  of 
a  robot  or  machine;  consequently,  a  data-processing  analysis  of  human 
understanding,  based  entirely  on  observed  overt  behaviour  or  a  theory 
of  physical  causation,  is  not  sufficient.  As  a  conscious  being  man 
feels,  thinks,  perceives,  remembers,  doubts,  believes,  intends;  chooses, 
decides,  understands  and  misunderstands;  his  consciousness  is  not 
something  over  and  above  these  things  but  the  category  under  which  they 
are  all  subsumed. 
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Some  believe  that  eventually  human  consciousness  will  not  only 
be  explained  in  causal  terms  but  will  be  predicted  and  anticipated  in 
causal  terms  as  well,  that  it  will  be  reducible  to  physical  changes  in 
the  brain  or  body.  We  have  argued,  however,  that  so  far  materialist.  - 
explanations  have  only  established  a  contingent,  concomitant  association 
with  the  various  manifestations  of  consciousness  and  that  something 
more  than  mere  temporal  association  has  to  be  established  before  identity 
between  cause  and  effect  can  be  claimed.  Understanding  remains,  therefore, 
the  concern  of  philosophical  enquiry.  Furthermore,  to  understand 
understanding  we  must  understand  what  it  is  to  be  a  person  because  the 
behavioural  functioning  of  human  beings  is  not  just  quantatively  different, 
say  more  complex  than  behaviour  in  the  non  human  world,  but  is  additionally 
urualitatively  different  too. 172 
It  has  been  necessary  to  give  some  consideration  to  the  nature  of 
understanding  because  understanding  is  related  and  is  central  to  the 
notions  of  knowing,  believing,  approving  and  disapproving,  feeling  in 
an  emotional  sense,  acting  morally,  and  willing,  which  are  the  concepts 
that  have  been  selected  for  discussion  in  this  chapter  in  relation  to 
the  presupposition  that  there  are  certain  things  that  the  use  of  coercion 
cannot  achieve.  It  has  been  argued  that  it  is  not  possible  to  make  or 
force  a  person  to  understand  or  to  coerce  a  person  to  understand  anything. 
Similarly,  it  is  not  possible  to  bribe,  entice  or  trick  a  person  into 
understanding;  a  person  may  simply  refuse  to  try  to  understand  or  to 
consider  the  evidence  or  argument  or  to  listen.  Understanding  is  not 
something  that  the  individual  has  completely  in  his  power.  Understanding 
cannot  be  predicted  or  programmed  with  certainty;  it  cannot  be  induced 
to  order  by  a  coercive  threat  or  by  physical  or  psychological  force. 
If  the  use  of  coercion  cannot  guarantee  understanding  then  it  cannot 
necessarily  harm  it  or  impede  it  in  any  way  either,  though  coercive 
measures  might  possibly  put  obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  person's" 
understanding  just  as  they  might  also  be  used  to  'aid  or  to  faciltate  it. 
It  is  conceded,  therefore,  that  it  is  possible  to  coerce  someone 
into  behaviour  that  might  aid  or  hinder  the  development  or  exercise  of 
their  understanding.  Letting  children  play  with  sand  and  water,  even  in 
a  structured  situation,  will  not  guarantee  their  understanding  of  the 
concept  of  conservation,  but  it  might  be  conducive  to  their  realising 
the  significance  of  the  principle  of  conservation  because  understanding 
depends  upon  a  familiarisation  with  the  object(s)  of  understanding  and 
their  contextual  background.  A  person  who  is  coerced  to  go  to  school, 
to  practise  skills,  to  visit  theatres  and  art  galleries,  to  travel,  to 
meet  people,  will  have  opportunities,  which  he  might  not  otherwise  have, 
to  increase  his  knowledge  and  to  exercise  his  understanding,  but  in  no 
way  will  such  experiences  guarantee  the  development  or  exercise  of 173 
understanding  itself.  Indeed,  in  some  cases,  for  some  individuals, 
such  experiences,  if  forced  upon  them  unwillingly,  might  prove  to  be 
counter-productive.  The  ability  to  understand  cannot  be  commanded  or 
forced,  though  behaviour  that  might  or  might  not  be  conducive  to  the 
development  of  understanding  can. 
Understanding  might  be  triggered  off,  prompted,  when  a  person  is 
confronted  with  some  immediate  threat,  some  danger,  causing  feelings  of 
anxiety  or  fear;  tension  and  pressure  can  certainly  persuade  a  person 
to  apply  his  mind  and  to  sharpen  his  wits.  But  threats  in  this  sense 
are  merely  aids  to  understanding;  they  may  be  instruiental  in  motivating 
the  victim's  thoughts  but  they  have  no  direct  influence  upon  his  ability 
or  capacity  to  understand.  It  is  not  possible  to  force  a  person  to 
understand  in  the  same  way  as  one  can  make  him  take  his  medicine  or  leave 
the  room  or  walk  in  a  different  direction. 
The  notier  of  understanding  is  central  to  all  kinds  of  knowing 
because  knowing  implies  a  degree  of  understanding.  It  is  not  possible 
to  force  a  person  to  know  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  possible  to  force  a 
person  to  understand.  Understanding,  is  central  also  to  a  proper 
comprehension  of  a  variety  of  related  notions  such  as  being  educated, 
learning  and  teaching.  It  is  a  contradiction  to  say  that  a  person  is 
educated  but  understands  nothing.  It  is  possible  to  understand  many 
things  without  being  educated,  but  an  element  of  understanding  is  a 
necessary  if  not  a  sufficient  condition  of  being  educated.  Similarly, 
human  learning,  as  opposed  say  to  operant  conditioning  employed  in 
animal  training,  is  dependent  upon  the  understanding  of  concepts,  words, 
symbols,  and  arguments.  To  be  engaged  in  learning  is  to  attempt  to 
become  master  of  and  knowledgeable  in  theory  and  practice,  which  involves 
an  element  of  understanding  of  the  object  of  one's  attentions.  To  be 
engaged  in  teaching,  as  opposed  to  just  informing  or  telling,  is  to  try 
to  bring  about  the  mastery  of  such  knowledge  and  skills  in  others  and 
and  to  intend  one's  students  to  develop  their  own  under  standing. 174 
Conseauently,  coercive  threats  and  procedures  are  of  limited  effect  in 
the  processes  of  educating,  learning  and  teaching  because  understanding 
cannot  be  compelled  or  commanded,  but  coercive  threats  may  be  instrumental 
in  precipitating  conditions  in  which  a  pupil's  understanding  is  facilitated 
and  in  which  educating,  learning  and  teaching  can  more  advantageously 
take  place. 
Understanding,  in  sum,  is  a  consciousness  concept  relating  to  the 
non-physical  inner  world  of  man  like  remembering,  perceiving,  doubting, 
seeing,  realising,  thinking  and  believing.  What  has  been  said  about  the 
relation  of  coercion  to  understanding  is  relevant  also  to  an  explanation 
of  the  relation  between  coercion  and  these  concepts  too;  one  cannot  force 
a  person  to  remember,  perceive,  doubt,  and  so  on,  under  threat,  for 
neither  the  individual  himself  nor  any  other  party  has  full  control 
over  his  mind  or  mental  capacity  in  these  respects. 
Belief  and  understanding  can  be  distinguished,  but  they  are  also 
related.  Belief  of  any  kind  involves  a  degree  of  conceptual  understanding; 
belief  in  God  requires  having  some  idea  of  what  the  concept  of  God  means. 
Conversely,  understanding  entails  holding  certain  true  beliefs  about 
the  object  of  understanding,  and  to  misunderstand  is  to  hold  certain 
false  beliefs.  It  does  not  follow,  however,  that  understanding  is 
identical  to  believing;  I  may  believe,  that  is  to  say  I  may  think,  I 
understand  when  in  fact  I  obviously  do  not,  say  through  ignorance  or 
lack  of  ability.  It  is  possible  to  believe  something  is  true,  and  to 
be  right  to  do  so,  without  fully  understanding  what  one  presumes  to 
believe.  Imagine,  for  instance,  that  a  pupil  is  told  that  x=4  in  the 
equation  x+3=7  and  is  then  asked  to  give  the  value  of  x  in  the  two 
equations  x+1=2  and  x+5=9.  If  he  gives  the  answer  4  in  both  cases  he  has 
clearly  not  understood  the  logic  involved,  though  in  the  case  of  the 
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second  equation  his  answer  is  right.  Expressed  belief  might  constitute 175 
evidence  of  understanding  in  some  but  not  in  all  cases,  whereas  an 
understanding  of  relevant  concepts  is  necessary  for  a  person  to  be  able 
even  to  attempt  to  formulate  any  kind  of  rational  or  intelligible  belief 
in  the  first  place.  If  it  is  the  case  that  it  is  not  within  our  power 
to  force  a  person  to  understand  then  it  must  follow  that  it  is  not 
possible  for  us  to  coerce  a  person  to  believe. 
Believing  can  take  a  variety  of  forms.  We  speak  of  believing  'that',  of 
believing  'in',  but  not  usually  of  believing  'how',  because  the  latter  can  be 
reduced  to  believing  'that  we  know  how'.  We  can  distinguish  between 
believing  in  something  in  a  factual  sense,  that  God  exists,  and  in  an 
evaluative  sense,  that  God  is  good.  In  both  cases  belief  involves  an 
object  of  understanding. 
One  view  is  that  belief  constitutes  a  state  of  mind  not  only  in 
which  propositions  are  taken  to  be  true  but  which  implies  an  attitude 
to  the  state  of  affairs  set  out  in  the  belief  in  the  sense  that  the 
believer  takes  to  be  true  what  the  belief  asserts.  This  is  a  view  that 
is  commonly  recognised  by  philosophers  and  which  is  taken  to  represent 
15 
the  paradigmatic  use  of  the  expression  'to  believe'.  Believing  that, 
in  other  words,  may  imply  an  attitude  of  approval  and  entail  a  disposition 
to  ascribe  to  propositions  of  a  similar  kind  the  value  of  being  true. 
This  raises  the  issue  whether  and  to  what  extent,  if  at  all,  the  notion 
of  belief  might  be  explicated  in  attitudinal  and  dispositional  terms, 
and  whether,  if  this  is  the  case,  it  affects  the  issue  whether  individuals 
can  be  coerced  to  believe  or  not. 
The  expression  believing  'in'  is  used  in  different  ways.  We  can 
believe  in  fairies,  free  will,  comprehensive  schools,  a  friend,  Marxism, 
or  God.  In  all  such  cases,  however,  belief  'in'  is  reducible  to  believing 
'that';  to  believe  in  something  we  must  first  believe  that  it  exists. 
Conversely,  if  I  believe  that  something  exists  then  I  must  surely  believe 
in  its  existence. 176 
When  we  express  belief  in  an  ideal,  such  as  telling  the  truth,  or 
in  a  person,  we  express  belief  in  terms  of  believing  'that'  but  in  an 
evaluative  rather  than  in  a  verifiable  logical  or  empirical  sense.  When 
we  say  we  believe  an  idea  is  a  good  thing  or  that  a  person  is  a  good  sort, 
we  evince  a'feeling  or  approval.  Believing  'in',  therefore,  may  also 
suggest  esteeming,  trusting,  or  having  confidence  in,  all  of  which 
represent  attitudes  of  mind.  Belief  can  involve,  in  addition  to  a 
cognitive  element  of  understanding,  an  element  of'feeling  and  an  attitude 
of  approval  too. 
A  person  who  believes  may  appear  to  have  a  disposition  to  say  or  do 
the  same  things  in  similar  circumstances  and  to  express  particular 
attitudes  to  the  object  of  belief  which  is  within  his  understanding  and 
which  makes  sense  to  him.  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  belief  may  be 
simply  redescribed  as  a  disposition.  Such  a  move  would  not  substantiate 
the  argument  that  it  is  possible  to  coerce  a  person  to  believe;  it  would 
sir-oly  evoke  an  argument  already  posited,  namely,  that  a  presumed 
disposition  to  understand  is  dependent  upon  observed  overt  behaviour 
which  is  only  evidence  but  not  pr3of  of  understanding. 
If  belief,  like  our  attitudes  and  dispositions,  is  dependent  upon 
understanding  and  if  we  cannot  choose  what  we  will  or  will  not.  understand 
then  we  cannot  choose  what  to  believe,  nor  can  we  choose  our  attitudes 
and  dispositions.  Belief,  like  understanding,  just  happens.  It  is  not 
possible  to  coerce  a  person  to  do  something,  believe  or  understand,  that 
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he  is  not  free  to  do.  We  cannot  will  ourselves  to  understand  or  to 
believe  because  we  do  not  have  absolute  control  over  the  outcome  of 
our  thinking.  Evidence  presented  to  us  in  the  form  of  threats  or 
otherwise  may  or  may  not  facilitate  our  understanding  or  belief,  but  its 
effect  cannot  be  predicted.  I  may  wish  with  all  my  heart  to  believe  but 
find  I  simply  cannot. 
It  might  be  objected  that  in  a  court  of  law  one  can  be  made  to  believe 177 
on  the  grounds  of  belief  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  This,  however,  is 
not  to  use  the  term  belief  in  the  sense  we  wish  to  use  it,  as  a  state 
of  consciousness,  but  rather  in  a  specialised  and  restricted  legal  sense. 
We  do  have  some  control  over  what  we  believe  in  the  sense  that  we  can 
choose  to  ignore  evidence  or  to  apply  our  minds  in  other  ways,  but  we 
must  not  confuse  the  activity  of  thinking  and  the  ability  to  apply'one's 
mind,  over  which  we  have  some  control,  with  the  notion  of  belief  itself. 
The  fact  that  we  can  choose  to  think  does  not  explain  how  belief  happens 
or  how  it  comes  upon  us  as  a  conscious  revelation  like  understanding. 
We  sometimes  speak  of  entertaining,  adopting,  or  accepting  a  belief, 
but  this  does  not  imply  that  we  are  capable  of  choosing  what  to  believe. 
We  are  not  able  to  choose  the  time  or  occasion  to  believe  or  to  understand. 
We  can  think  about  things,  but'we  are  not  autonomous  in  the  sense  of 
being  able  to-believe  or  to  disbelieve  at  will. 
Consequently,  we  cannot  argue  that  it  is  possible  to  coerce  people 
to  believe.  Coercion  implies  that  the  coercee  has  the  capacity  to  intend 
to  do  or  not  to  do  something  against  his  will.  But  if  believing,  like 
understanding,  is  not  an  activity  or  an  occurrence  or  an  event,  is  not 
something  a  person  has  full  control  of  or  can  stop  or  start  at  will,  is 
not  something  he  can  choose  to  do  but  is  a  capacity  within  him,  then  he 
cannot  be  coerced  to  do  it,  because  he  does  not  have  the  means.  This 
is  not  an  empirical  claim  that  can  be  established  from  observation  or 
experience  of  man's  behaviour;  it  is  essentially  an  'a  priori'  claim 
'  with  regard  to  the  nature  of'man's  inner  world  and  consciousness.  It 
is  simply  not  possible  to  observe  exactly  why  a  person  acts  or  behaves 
in  one  way  or  another  although  it  is  possible  sometimes  to  observe 
how  he  behaves. 
An  alternative  vie,  v  of  belief  which  shifts  the  eimhasis  from  the 
'a  priori'  to  the  'a  posteriori'  has  been  proposed  by  R.  B.  Braithwaite 
17 
in  his  exposition  of  'actual  belief'.  He  writes:  "My  thesis  is  that 178 
11  believe  one  of  these  propositions  p',  where  believe  is  used  in  the 
sense  of  actual  belief  and  not  of  a  disposition  to  believe,  means  the 
conjunction  of  the  two  propositions:  (i)  I  entertain  p  (where  entertainment 
is  similarly  used  of  an  actual  mental  state  and  not  of  a  disposition  to 
entertain),  and  (ii)  I  have  a  dispostition"to  act  as  if  p  were  true. 
And  similarly,  'I  have  a  disposition  to  believe  p'  means  both  that  I 
have  a  disposition  to  entertainp  and  that  I  have  a  disposition  to  act 
as  if  p  were  true.  In  either  case,  the  former  proposition  is  one  about 
my  mental  experience  and  the  second  one  about  my  physical  behaviour. 
The  former  is  subjective  or  phenomenological,  the  second  objective  or 
behaviouristic.  It  is  the  latter  proposition  which  on  my  view  is  the 
differentia  of  actual  belief  from  actual  entertainment  and  of  dispositional 
belief  from  dispositional  entertainment.  It  is  a  hypothetical  proposition 
about  my  present  and  future  physical  behaviour,  which  like  all  propositions 
about  physical  objects  can  only  be  known  indirectly  on  authority  or  on 
inductive  grounds.  Many  thinkers  will  admit  that  a  tendency  to  action 
is  a  criterion  of  genuine  belief:  the  doctrine  which  I  am  advocating 
states  that  not  only  is  it  a  criterion  but  it  is  part  of  the  actual 
meaning  of  believing.  "  In  the  biblical  sense  of  'by  their  works  ye 
shall  know  them',  belief  or  'actual  belief'  is  thus  presented  by 
Braithwaite  in  dispositional  terms.  Belief  or  faith,  he  argues,  must 
be  manifested-in  behaviour  to  be  real. 
Contrary  to  Braithwaite,  we  argue  that  behaviour,  verbal  or  physical, 
is  merely  evidence  and  not  conclusive  proof  of  understanding  or  believing 
or  of  any  other  related  conscious  state.  Sometimes  an  individual's 
behaviour  is  contradictory.  He  may  say  one  thing,  that  he  thinks  the 
stock  market  will  fall,  whilst  his  actions,  he  buys  shares,  may  imply 
something  quite  different.  This  leaves  some  doubt  as  to  whether  the 
person  in  question  really  believes  what  he  says  or  not.  One  explanation 
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might  be  that  he  is  not  fully  conscious  of  his  belief.  Our  explanation 179 
is  that  a  person's  behaviour  is  only  evidence,  and  not  necessarily 
reliable  evidence,  for  justifying  the  ascription  of  belief  and  that  it  is 
in  no  way  identical  to  belief  itself.  Believing,  for  example,  is  not 
like  being  obedient.  A  person's  behaviour,  either  in  speech  or  action, 
is  decisive  and  conclusive  proof  as  to  whether  the  person  in  question 
is  being  obedient  or  not.  'To  obey'  refers  to  an  occurrence,  'to  be 
obedient'  to  the  disposition  to  be  obedient,  but  'to  believe'  refers  to 
no  particular  occurrence  or  event.  So,  a  disposition  (observed)  to 
respond  favourably  to  whit  someone  says,  say  God  says  or  Marx-says,  may 
be  evidence  of  faith  or  belief  in  the  person  or  his  ideology,  or  in 
what  he  says,  but  does  not  represent  belief  itself,  for  the  response 
may  have  been  generated  by  other  causes.  Belief  is  irreducible  to  overt 
acts  or  omissions  and  cannot  therefore  be  identified  as  a  disposition. 
Braithwaite's  thesis  does  not  provide  a  fool-proof  way  of  discovering 
whether  someone  believes  p.  Having  a  disposition  to  believe  p  is  not 
the  same  as  actually  believing  p.  Behaviour  may  or  may  not  be  evidence 
of  a  state  of  believing  or  of  a  disposition  to  believe.  There  is  no 
one  particular  kind  of  behaviour  which  in  all  circumstances  represents 
'believing  as  if  p  were  true'  or  which  is  appropriate  to  'p's  being  true.  ' 
In  a  modified  version  of  his  thesis  Braithwaite  seeks  to  explain  'appropriate 
to  p's  being  true'  as  meaning  'tending  to  fulfil  the  springs  of  action 
(intentions,  desires  etc.  of  the  believer)  if  the  proposition  is  true 
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but  not  if  it  is  false'. 
But  these  'springs  of  action'  are  not  themselves  directly  observable, 
which  suggests  that  a  circular  argument  is  unavoidable.  If  I  explain 
'P  believes  p'  as  meaning  'if  P  desires  x  he  will  be  disposed  to  do  z', 
then  I  have  to  explain  'P  desires  x'  as  meaning  'if  P  believes  p  he  will 
be  disposed  to  do  z'.  There  is  no  good  reason  to  identify  belief  with 
a  disposition  to  behave  any  more  than  to  identify  desire  or  intention 
with  such  a  disoosition.  Belief  is  itself  one  of  the  'springs  of  action' 180 
which  collectively  dispose  a  person  to  believe  in  the  way  he  does. 
If  belief  and  action  are  of  separate  worlds,  forcing  a  person  to 
behave  in  a  particular  way  will  not  necessarily  result  in  his  believing, 
and  John  Locke  was  probably  right  to  say:  "Such  is  the  nature  of  the 
understanding  that  it  cannot  be  compelled  to  the  belief  of  anything  by 
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outward  force".  It  cannot  be  expected  that  belief  in  God  will  necessarily 
follow  enforced  church  attendance,  or  enforced  obedience  to  religious 
rituals,  although  such  repetitive  behaviour,  if  habitual,  might  constitute 
a  contributory  factor  towards  the  development  of  religious  belief  in 
some  people.  For  this  reason  a  variety  of  symbolic  rituals,  ceremonies 
and  special  acts  of  performance,  are  characteristic  of  all  religious 
faiths.  It  is  not  possible  to  force  a  person  to  have  faith,  to  believe, 
or  to  approve,  but  it  is  possible  to  coerce  a  person  to  behave  in 
particular  ways  in  the  expectation  that  such  enforced  behaviour  might 
precipitate  belief  or  an  adjustment  of  attitude.  It  is  possible  that  a 
man  who  lacks  faith  but  who  acts  as  if  he  believes  may  come  to  believe 
in  the  course  of  time. 
A  threat  might  constitute  such  an  impelling  reason  as  to  cause  a 
person  to  believe  instantaneously.  Suppose,  for  instance,  someone, 
waving  a  large  axe,  came  up  to  me  in  a  threatening  manner  and  said: 
"Believe  me,  I  am  not  normal.  If  you  don't  believe  me,  I  will  cut  off 
your  head".  In  such  circumstances  I  would  seem  to  have  a  very  good 
reason  for  not  doubting  him.  The  seriousness  of  the  threatened  injury 
would  probably  furnish  sufficient  evidence  for  my  thinking  my  antagonist 
really  was  mad  and  fully  intended  to  carry  out  his  threat.  In  other 
words,  it  is  possible  to  get  somebody  to  believe  something  by  making  it 
appear  to  be  the  case  that  something  is  so.  The  threat  in  this  case 
provides  both  the  the  reason  and  the  evidence  for  belief.  It  is,  however, 
the  coercee  who  has  to  decide  what  to  do,  whether  to  believe  the  coercer 
is  mad  or  not,  and  this  outcome  cannot  be  predicted  with  absolute  certainty. L 
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The  coercee  could  be  slow  witted.  He  might  misunderstand  the  situation. 
He  might  think  the  whole  matter  a  huge  joke.  Reasons  are  simply  aids, 
like  causes  of  other  kinds,  which  may  precipitate  belief  but  which 
cannot  guarantee  it. 
It  is  possible  that  I  muht  believe  something  because  I  an  told 
it,  but  I  will  not  necessarily  believe  anything  because  I  am  told  to 
believe  it.  A  threat  will  not  necessarily  provide'a  reason  for  believing 
p  in  the  sense  of  making  believing  pa  more  eligible  proposition  than  it 
might  be.  This  must  be  so  because,  if  it  is  not  within  my  power  to 
believe  p.  I  cannot  decide,  though  I  might  pretend,  to  believe  p  because, 
say,  it  will  be  more  profitable  or  because  by  so  doing  an  even  more 
unpleasant  circumstance  will  be  avoided.  Conditions  that  normally 
pertain  to  an  explanation  of  coercion  are  not  applicable  in  the  case 
of  believing. 
The  e=  irical  claira,  that  coercive  threats  can  precipitate  a  change 
in  behaviour  which  may  in  turn  be  a  contributory  cause  of  a  change  in 
attitude  or  belief,  is  not  contested.  Threats,  like  bribes  or  rewards, 
can  be  used  to  get  people  to  do  all  sorts  of  things.  Policies  of  social 
engineering  and  social  control  are  enforced  by  law  and  custom  under  the 
threat  of  coercive  sanctions.  Parents  and  teachers,  similarly,  use  their 
moral  and  legal  authority  to  elicit  acceptable  conduct  from  their 
charges.  Psychologists  have  found,  however,  that  the  effect  of  coercive 
procedures,  if  used  excessively,  is  limited  and  may  even  be  counter 
productive.  If  the  threats  imposed  are  excessively  oppressive,  little 
change  in  attitude  or  belief  can  be  expected;  on  the  contrary,  bitter 
resentment  may  result  instead. 
If  coercive  procedures  are  mixed  with  other  means  of  persuasion, 
such  as  bribes,  re:  vards  and  punishment,  leaving  the  victim  with  differing 
degrees  of  choice  and  sometimes  with  no  choice  at  all,  the  coercee  might 
in  time  evince  a  change  in  attitude  or  belief  siAmly  to  avoid  the  effect 182 
of  such  varied  procedures  upon  his  mental  state.  In  psychological  terms, 
he  will  seek  unwittingly  to  avoid  a  state  of  cognitive  dissonance,  that 
is  to  say  a  psychological  state  of  mind  in  which  he  holds  conflicting 
cognitions,  caused  by  the  brain-washing  procedures  employed  by  his 
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antagonist.  Even  if  a  change  of  belief  is  forthcoming  and  the  victim 
does  profess  a  change  in  attitude  as  a  result  of  such  procedures,  this 
will  not  be  the  result  of  coercion  alone  but  the  culminative  effect  of 
a  variety  of  rational  and  irrational  means  of  persuasion.  And  such 
professed  belief  cannot  be  regarded  as  the  victim's  bona  fide  belief;  it 
will  be  held  for  all  the  wrong  reasons,  will  have  been  precipitated  by 
all  the  wrong  means,  and  will  more  than  likely  cease  to  be  held  once 
normal  conditions  of  life  are  resumed. 
In  sum,  it  is  not  possible  to  change  by  force  a  person's  beliefs, 
attitudes,  which  are  ultimately  dependent  upon  the  individual's 
understanding  that  is  not  within  his  personal  control  and  which  cannot, 
therefore,  be  commanded  by  others.  It  is  possible,  however,  to 
influence  by  coercive  means  a  person's  overt  behaviour  and  to  change 
it  in  such  a  way  that  it  might,  but  might  not,  be  conducive  in  turn 
to  a  change  in  his  beliefs  and  attitudes. 
Emotions,  likewise,  are  not  within  our  power  to  realise  or  bring 
about  at  will.  They  too,  therefore,  cannot  be  commanded  or  brought 
about  by  the  threats  of  any  other  person.  I  cannot,  for  instance,  be 
made  or  forced  to  like  my  neighbour,  or,  as  Kant  put  it:  "...  it  is  not 
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possible  for  man  to  love  someone  merely  on  command". 
Emotions  are  manifested  and  instantiated  as  occurrences  limited 
in  time  and  space,  but  it  is  possible,  of  course,  to  have  emotional 
feelings  without  displaying  them.  A  person  is  not  outwardly  angry  or 
fearful  all  the  time,  or  in  a  constant  state  of  loving  or  shame.  I  do 
not  demonstrate  my  love,  either  in  talk  or  physical  attention,  towards 183 
my  loved  one  every  minute  of  the  day.  Nevertheless,  it  is  only  by 
observing  the  outward  signs  of  emotion  that  we  can  suppose  a  person 
to  be  disposed  to  love,  "or  anger,  or  fear,  on  particular  occasions  and 
in  particular  circumstances  and  in  relation  to  particular  objects.  A 
person  cannot  claim  to  be  emotionally  involved  without  some  obvious 
manifestation.  I  cannot  express  an  emotion  in  words  alone  as  I  might 
express  an  attitude  of  approval  or  disapproval.  Emotions  differ  from 
attitudes  in  so  far  as  they  are  grounded  in  physical  instances  which` 
testify  to  their  presence.  Some  emotions  are  described  primarily  in 
an  occurrent  sense  such  as  'being  frightened',  others  in  a  dispositional 
sense  like  'loving'  and  'hating',  and  some  in  both  senses  such  as 
'being  afraid'  or  'being  angry'.  But  in  all  cases  we  recognise  the 
expression  of  feeling  as  an  indication  of  the  presence  of  an  emotional 
state. 
But  emotions  are  not  like  tickles  that  can  be  explained  solely 
in  terms  of  physiological  causes.  Emotion  words  are  not  to  be  identified 
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with,  that  is  to  say  they  are  not  the  names  of,  particular  feelings; 
on  the  contrary,  they  are  dependent  upon  a  degree  of  cognition  and 
understanding.  Emotions  are  to  be  distinguished  from  attitudes  and 
sensations  although  they  encompass  something  of  both.  Typical  uses 
of  the  general  term  'emotion'  have  to  do  with  emotional  states  rather 
than  attitudes  or  other  general  dispositions  or  abilities.  I  am  not 
termed  an  'emotional  person'  because  I  have  a  lot  of  admiration,  contempt 
or  gratitude,  for  other  people,  but  because  I  frequently  get  into  states 
of  anger,  indignation,  grief  or  joy,  and  am  wont  to  express  such  feelings 
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freely. 
In  order  to  experience  an  emotion  I  must  be  capable  of  believing, 
-  understanding,  and  appreciating  the  object  of  concern.  I  rust,  for 
example,  be  able  to  understand  the  concept  of  guilt  and  must  believe 
that  I  am  guilty  in  order  to  experience  the  emotional  state  associated 184 
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with  the  feeling  of  guilt.  To  love  another  means  that  I  imagine  some 
other  person  to  be  good  in  him  or  herself  and  to  possess  particular 
qualities  which  arouse  in  me  emotionally  the  feeling  of  love  based 
on  my  belief  in  the  goodness  of  the  object  of  my  interest.  Likewise, 
ignorance  will  prevent  my  being  conscious  of  danger  and  therefore  aware 
of  and  sensitive  to  such  emotional  states  as  are  associated  with  it. 
A  knowledgeable  and  intelligent  person  is  better  equipped  to  recognise 
danger  and  therefore  to  appreciate  the  feelings  that  it  will  arouse. 
Only  the  knowledgeable,  it  is  prestmmed,  are  capable  of  courage. 
Not  all  emotions  are  desirable..  Jealousy  and  self-pity  are 
regarded  as  anti-social,  unprofitable,  and  contrary  to  a  positive  view 
of  living.  On  the  other  hand  love,  above  all  the  emotions,  'is  habitually 
extolled,  although  it  does  not  always  lead  to  happiness  or  well-being. 
If  it  is  unrequited,  all  sorts  of  undesirable  feelings  might,  ensue. 
I  would  not  normally  say  that  I  have  'decided'  to  love  so  and  so, 
nor  that  I  will  'decide'  to  be  afraid,  angry,  or  embarrassed,  because 
there  is  a  recognised  degree  of  spontaneity  about  the  emotions  which 
distinguishes  them  from  rational  and  deliberate  appraisals.  I  am  not 
likely  to  come  to  love  some  one  through  a  process  of  calculated  reasoning 
as  I  might  convince  myself  of  a  particular  attitude  of  approval  or 
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disapproval.  The  appraisal  that  forms  part  of  the  cognitive  aspect 
of  love  is  more  than  a  simple  calculation  of  relevant  reasons.  Love 
is  not  a  matter  of  arriving  at  some  premeditated,  deliberate  decision, 
or  a  simplistic  weighing  up  of  pro's  and  con's. 
If  a  man  decides  to  marry  a  particular  person  simply  because  he, 
thinks  she  will  be  an  asset  to  him  and  will  help  to  further  his  career 
prospects,  he  will  not  be  marrying  for  the  right  reasons,  that  is  for 
love,  but  for  selfish  instead  of  altruistic  reasons,  and  a  loving 
relationship  might  not  ensue.  No  plan,  correspondence  course,  set  of 
skills  or  attitudes,  will  necessarily  lead  anyone  to  a  state  of  loving., 
Love  cannot  be  predicted,  planned,  guaranteed,  or  anticipated.  Individuals 185 
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cannot  make  themselves  love,  nor  can  they  force  one  another  to  love. 
Love  is  not  a  goal  that  I  can  set  out  to  achieve.  An  arranged  marriage, 
therefore,  however  well  intentioned,  will  not  necessarily  lead  to  a 
loving  relationship. 
I  cannot  force  a  person  to  love  another  by  threatening  him.  Indeed, 
my  threats  could  be  counter  productive.  And  this  is  so  with  all  emotional 
states,  though  some  may  seem  to  be  more  easily  anticipated  and  more 
easily  induced  than  others.  P's  threats  of  personal  injury  might 
provide  good  reason  and  cause  for  Q's  being  either  afraid  or  angry,  but 
will  not  guarantee  either  response  in  particular.  Love  is  by  its  nature 
less  predictable  than  either  fear  or  anger  because  it  depends  upon  a 
particularly  unique  personal  relationship  with  another  human  being. 
Threats  may  induce  people  to  behave  in  certain  ways  and  to  apply  their 
minds  in  particular  directions,  which  activities  might  release,  stimulate, 
or  cause  affectionate  feelings  and  love  for  another  to  develop,  but  they 
cannot  be  used  to  make  a  person  love. 
Loving  is  not  something  which  can  be  started  and  finished  at  will, 
though  it  is  expressed  in  a  variety  of  activities  such  as  caring, 
pleasing  and  being  attentive.  It  may  even  entail  doing  harm  to  one's 
loved  one,  for  example,  by  aiding  and  abetting  her  premature  demise 
in  order  to  terminate  her  suffering  caused  by  some  painful,  terminal 
condition.  Loving  is  not  a  purposeful  activity  with  a  definite 
beginning  and  end.  The  realisation,  the  discovery  of  being  in  love, 
is  not  planned;  frequently,  it  is  unsolicited.  Loving  cannot  be 
planned  or  worked  out  like  some  mathematical  problem.  It  is  because 
I  cannot  decide  to  love,  or  cease  to  love,  and  because  loving  is  not 
an  activity,  or  an  occurrence  over  which  I  have  control,  that  my  love 
is  unable  to  be  determined  and  predicted  at  the  will  of  another  by 
threats  or  any  other  means. 
No  particular  kind  of  behaviour  is  proof  of  love  or  will,  if  practised, 186  'W 
cause  love,  though  we  associate  certain  kinds  of  behaviour  with  expressions 
of  love,  such  as  fondling,  embracing,  kissing,  caressing,  and  the 
utterance  of  verbal  endearments.  But  a  person  might  indulge  in  any 
or  all  of  these  activities  and  be  simply  dissimulating,  experiencing 
no  feelings  of  love  at  all.  Alternatively,  he  might  do  none  of  these 
things  yet  still  be  appreciative  of  the  goodness  perceived  in  a  loved 
one  and  inwardly  experience  the  feeling  of  being  in  love.  Loving  is 
not  reducible  to  any  particular  kind  of  behaviour  in  the  same  way  as 
such  activities  as  eating,  sleeping,  or  playing  darts  obviously  are. 
There  is  no  one  particular  form  of  behaviour  that  is  characteristic  of 
any  particular  emotion  in  the  way  in  which  eating  is  characteristic  of 
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hunger.  Whereas  I  might  be  able  to  coerce  a  'person  to  swallow  and 
consequently  to  allay  his  hunger,  I  cannot  by  coercing  a  person  to 
fondle,  embrace,  kiss,  get  married,  write  letters,  speak  sweet  words, 
ensure  that  he  or  she  will  come  to  experience  the  emotion  of  love. 
This  is  so,  we  have  argued,  because  no  behaviour  is  necessary  or 
sufficient  to  guarantee  the  experience  of  loving,  for  a  variety  of 
behaviour  may  be  typical  of  any  particular  emotional  state  without 
being  logically  or  conceptually  connected  to  it.  Certain  behaviour, 
which  may  vary  a  little  from  society  to  society,  is  conventionally 
recognised  as  indicating  the  likely  presence  of  affectionate  feelings. 
We  buy  presents,  get  engaged,  and  send  flowers.  But  it  is  not  the 
case  that  should  a  person  be  coerced  into  any  of  these  activities 
that  such  behaviour  would  necessarily  be  evidence  of  the  presence  of 
love  or  that  it  would  cause  feelings  of  affection  to  develop. 
It  may  be  objected  that  it  is  in  fact  possible,  so  to  speak,  to 
force  a  person  to  make  love.  But  this  is  to  use  the  term  love  in  an 
erotic  and  sexual  sense.  It  is  conceded,  of  course,  that  an  individual 
might  be  forced  to  indulge  in  the  behavioural  techniques  associated 
with  sexual  intercourse  and,  in  this  sense,  be  forced  to  make  love. 
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loving  relationship  or  the  expression  of  love  in  its  altruistic  and 
other-regarding  sense.  Love  is  conceived  in  a  variety  of  contexts. 
We  speak  of  filial,  brotherly,  paternal,  maternal,  platonic,  as  well 
as  romantic  love.  All  of  these  share  the  altruistic,  other-regarding, 
element  that  is  associated  with  the  emotional  state  of  loving  and  with  ich 
distinguishes  these  kinds  of  loving  from  that  associated  in  common 
parlance  with  the  mechanics  of  sexual  behaviour  and  the  satisfaction  of 
selfish  lust  and  desire. 
It  may  also  be  objected  that  some  emotional  states,  other  than 
loving,  are  more  easily  induced,  that  it  is  relatively  easy  for  instance 
to  cause  a  person  to  have  good  reason  to  be  afraid  simply  by  threatening 
his  sense  of  well-being.  The  threat  of  imminent  sanctions  carefully 
chosen  will  more  often  than  not  precipitate  a  fearful  state  in  most  people. 
But  love,  it  is  sucgested,  is  not  so  predictable  an  emotion  as  fear. 
Often  a  person's  love  for  another  is  on  the  face  of  things  quite  contrary 
to  his  own  individual  well-being,  self-advancement,  career  prospects, 
happiness  and  peace  of  mind.  Many  husbands  and  wives  appear  to  retain 
considerable  affection  for  their  respective  unfaithful  and  even  unrepentant 
partners,  and  mothers  do  likewise  for  their  own  wayward  offsprings.  It 
is  simply  not  possible  to  predict  with  whom  and  when  a  person  will 
experience  feelings  of  love  for  another.  Love  is  not  rational;  it  does 
not  conform  to  preconceived  rules  or  standards  shared  in  consensus  with 
others  to  the  same  extent  as  the  emotional  state  of  being  afraid  does. 
Love,  -on  the  contrary,  is  a  unique,  individual  and  personal  experience. 
The  reasons  we  give,  for  example,  for  being  in  love  are  usually  highly 
subjective.  We  say,  'I  like  her',  or,  the  makes  me  feel  good',  or,  'she 
attracts  me'.  And  these  are  private  as  opposed  to  public  reasons  and 
follow  no  obvious  set  of  norms.  In  this  respect  love  is  more  like  a 
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matter  of  taste  than  an  evaluation  based  upon  reasoned  judgment. 
People  sometimes  seem  to  love  one  another  for  no  apparent  reason  at  all. 188 
Love  appears  at  times  to  be  totally  irrational.  It  is  conceded,  therefore, 
that  whilst  it  is  seemingly  possible  to  give  people  good  reason  or  cause 
to  be  afraid  by  threatening-them,  it  is  not  the  case  that  by  threatening 
a  person  we  will  necessarily  furnish  him  or  her  with  any  reason  or 
cause  to  love  another,  for  love  is  not  so  predictable  nor  can  it  be  so 
easily  induced  as  the  emotional  state  of  being  afraid. 
Although  it  is  not  possible  to  coerce  a  person  to  love,  or,  to  predict 
that  threats  will  precipitate  the  intended  emotion,  coercive  sanctions 
are  customarily  embodied  in  the  moral,  coventional,  and  legal  codes  of 
all  societies  and  are  enforced  by  public  consensus  in  order  to  limit, 
direct,  and  control  expressions  of  love,  and  to  limit  and  inhibit  - 
behaviour  inimical  to  it.  Young  people  are-nurtured  and  coerced  into 
appropriate  behaviour,  talk,  thought  to  be  conducive  to  the  development 
of  caring  attitudes  and  habits  from  which  it  is  hoped  love  might  ensue. 
In  these  respects  coercion  might  be  instrumental  in  the  possible  future 
development  of  loving  relationships,  but  the  fact  that  the  love  of  one 
for  another  might  sometimes  ensue  from  such  enforced  behaviour  is  purely 
fortuitous  and  incidental.  Love  cannot  be  anticipated  in  any  way  at  all. 
It  is  logically  impossible  to  coerce  a  person  to  love,  nor  is  it  possible 
to  guarantee  that  any  enforced  behaviour  will  even  help  to  initiate  or 
to  develop  the  love  of  any  individual  for  another. 
It  may  be  further  objected  that  there  is  one  particular  kind  of 
love  that  can  be  commanded,  agape  or  Christian  love.  But  in  response 
it  is  argued  that  agape  is  not  an  emotion  and  therefore  cannot  be 
cited  as  a  valid  example  of  the  emotion  that  is  called  love.  Agape 
represents  the  dutiful  attitude  that  is  universally  expected  of  all 
Christians  towards  their  fellow  human  beings.  Agape  does  not  demand 
an  appraisal  of  its  object  in  the  same  way  as  love  demands.  It  is 
possible  to  give,  to  be  charitable,  to  show  concern,  to  have  and  show 
respect,  without  necessarily  having  any  particular  feelings  of  love 
towards  the  objects  of  concern.  Agape  is  a  Christian  virtue  and  duty 189 
that  is  manifested  and  exercised  in  actions  of  kindness,  sympathy, 
concern,  tolerance,  towards  one's  fellow  men  out  of  respect  for  God 
and  in  obedience  to  His  will.  Unlike  love,  agape  can  be  deliberately 
exercised.  Individuals  may  choose  to  act  with  kindness,  charity,  or 
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sympathy  for  others  in  order  to  gain  Grace  and  Salvation.  Alternatively, 
they  may  choose  to  refrain  from  showing  agape  on  pain  of  forfeiting 
entrance  to  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven.  Agape  is  mistakenly  taken  as  being 
a  form  of  the  emotion  love  because  it  appears  to  be  altruistic  like 
love,  but  the  altruism  of  agape  arises  from  a  sense  of  duty  and 
obedience  to  God's  command  and  from  the  fear  of  occurring  God's 
displeasure,  and  not  primarily  from  the  appraisal  of  goodness  in  an 
object  of  affection.  Agape  is  not  a  paradigm  of  the  emotion  called 
love;  on  the  contrary,  it  seems  to  prompt  the  question  whether  in  fact 
a  person  can  be  coerced  to  be  moral,  a  question  which  might  now  be 
considered. 
The  institution  which  is  morality  exists  before  the  individual 
and  remains  after  him.  It  consists  of  rules,  sanctions,  to  which 
individuals  are  exposed,  with  which  they  interact,  which  they  internalise 
and  in  turn  modify.  In  sociological  language  morality  is  socially 
constructed  like  positive  law,  custom,  convention,  social  etiquette, 
but  differs  from  positive  law  in  that  its  sanctions  do  not  include  the 
threat  of  physical  force  but  rather  sentiments  of  approval  and  disapproval, 
praise  and  blame.  Morality  is  social  in  another  sense;  a  moral  judgment 
or  a  moral  point  of  view  is  essentially  other-regarding.  Prudence  is 
not  normally  considered  to  be  an  exemplar  of  moral  virtue  except  in  so 
far  as  every  individual  is  expected,  out  of  concern  for  other  people,  to 
be  respectful  of  his  own  person  and  to  look  after  himself.  It  is  not 
normally  considered  to  be  a  moral  view,  however,  that  all  individuals 
should  judge  all  acts  and  views  in  terms  of  their  own  selfish  wants 190 
and  desires. 
Philosophers  differ  in  their  views  with  regard  to  what  constitutes 
the  motive  force  of  moral  judgment  and  moral  action,  but  all  have  to 
agree  that  in  order  to  have  a  moral  view  one  must  possess  a  degree  of 
understanding.  Some  take  the  view  that  the  motive  force  of  moral  action 
is  a  kind  of  moral  sense,  say  a  sentiment  of  benevolence,  a  feeling 
of  sympathy,  or  a  desire  to  do  what  is  right  for  its  own  sake  and 
according  to  one's  conscience.  Others  stress  the  importance  of  reason 
and  individual  moral  responsibility,  and  argue  that  each  individual  must 
make  his  own  decisions  and  think  out  and  through  the  principles  upon 
which  he  makes  his  own  moral  choices.  According  to  this  view  it  is 
supposed  that  the  individual  aspires  to  a  state  of  self-determination, 
responsibility,  individual  autonomy  and  independence,  progressing  from 
a  pre-rational,  habitual  or  group  morality,  such  as  one  would  expect  of 
a  child,  towards  a  personal,  individual,  reflective  morality  characteristic 
of  adulthood.  The  implication  is  that  an  individual's  thinking  on 
moral  issues  is  in  some  sense  his  own  and  that  he  has  a  duty  and  a 
right  to  work  out  his  own  moral  position.  W.  F.  Frankena  explains  the 
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institution  of  morality  as  follows. 
"The  general  idea....  in  much  recent  social  psychology  and  moral 
philosophy  is  that  morality  starts  as  a  set  of  culturally  defined  goals 
and  of  rules  governing  achievement  of  the  goals,  which  are  more  or  less 
external  to  the  individual  and  imposed  on  him  or  inculcated  as  habits. 
These  goals  and  rules  may  and  generally  do,  at  least  to  some  extent, 
become  'internalised'  or  'interiorised',  that  is,  the  individual  takes 
them  as  his  own  and  regulates  his  own  conduct  by  them;  he  develops  a 
'conscience'  or  'superego'.  This  process  of  internalisation  may  be 
quite  irrational  but.....  it  is  typical  for  morality  to  accompany  its 
inculcations  with  at  least  a  modicum  of  reason-giving.  Thus,  we...  tend 
to  give  reasons  with  our  moral  instructions  as  soon  as  the  child  has 191 
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attained  an  age  at  which  he  is  capable  of  something  like  discretion,  and 
we  even  lead  him  to  feel  that  it  is  appropriate  to  ask  for  reasons.... 
We  may,  then,  without  leaving  the  fold,  move  from  a  rather  irrational 
kind  of  inner  direction  to  a  more  rational  one  in  which  we  achieve  an 
examined  life  and  a  kind  of  autonomy,  become  moral  agents  on  our  own, 
and  even  reach  a  point  when  we  can  criticise  the  rules  and  values  of  our 
society....  Some  find  too  much  anxiety  in  this  transition  and  try  to 
'escape  from  freedom'  in  one  way  or  another....  some  apparently  can  make 
the  transition  only  with  the  help  of  psychoanalysis,  but  for  others  it 
involves  no  major  difficulties  other  than  the  use  of  some  hard  thought...  " 
An  individual,  according  to  Frankena,  takes  a  moral  stance  or  adopts 
a  moral  point  of  view  if  and  only  if  (i)  he  is  making  normative  judgments 
about  actions,  desires,  dispositions,  intentions,  motives,  persons  or 
traits  of  character,  (ii)  he  is  willing  to  universalise  his  judgments, 
(iii)  his  reasons  for  his  judgments  consist  of  facts  about  what  the  things 
judged  do  to  the  lives  of  sentient  beings  in  terms  of  promoting  or 
distributing  non-moral  good  and  evil,  (iv)  his  reasons,  when  the  judgment 
is  about  himself  or  his  own  actions,  include  such  facts  about  what  his 
own  actions  and  dispositions  do  to  the  lives  of  other  sentient  beings  as 
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such,  if  others  are  affected.  A  person  is  presumed,  that  is  to  say, 
to  have  a  morality  only  if  he  makes  normative  judgments  according  to  this 
kind  of  moral  action  guide. 
This  represents  a  commonly  held  notion  of  what  it  is  to  have  a 
moral  view  and  how  such  a  moral  view  develops.  It  assumes  that  individuals 
aspire  to  a  state  of  autonomy  or  freedom  in  which  they  are  accredited 
with  the  ability  to  plan  their  own  lives  and  to  choose  what  to  do,  to 
think  for  themselves  and  to  form  their  own  opinions  and  views  on  moral 
issues.  This  is  a  view  of  moral  autonomy  that  might  appear  to  make 
assumptions  about  the  abilities  and  capacities  of  individuals  which  we, 
have  already  argued  ought  to  be  qualified;  it  might  seem  to  imply,  for 192 
instance,  that  individuals  are  autonomous  and  are  in  control  of  their 
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destiny  in  ways  in  which  we  have  already  argued  they  are  not.  And  this 
is  clearly  an  issue  that  is  relevant  to  any  discussion  with  regard  to 
whether  it  is  at  all  possible  to  force  individuals  to  a  moral  view,  or 
judgment,  or  to  behave  in  a  moral  way. 
If  making  a  moral  judgment  or  holding  a  moral  view  entails  working 
out  and  deciding  that  something  is  the  case,  that  something  is  right  or 
wrong,  just  or  unjust,  then  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  possible,  as  we  have 
argued,  for  individuals  to  anticipate  the  results  of  their  own  thinking, 
or  to  guarantee  their  own  understanding,  or  to  choose  their  own  beliefs, 
then  it  is  not  possible  for  them  to  be  able  to  choose  or  to  anticipate 
their  own  moral  stances  at  will,  for  they  will  not  possess  either  the 
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psychological  power  or  autonomy  of  mind  to  do  so.  That  is  to  say  that 
if  to  have  a  moral  view  means  holding  particular  attitudes,  having 
certain  feelings,  then  to  the  extent  that  our  attitudes,  feelings, 
dispositions,  are  dependent  upon  belief  and  understanding  over  which 
we  do  not  have  ultimate  control  we  cannot  be  said  to  be  empowered  to 
predict  or  to  choose  our  moral  positions  and  views. 
It  is  not,  therefore,  following  this  reasoning,  conceptually 
possible  to  imagine  that  any  individual  can  be  coerced  to  a  moral  point 
of  view  or  to  make  an  authentic  moral  judgment,  for  if  he  cannot  determine 
the  outcome  of  his  own  thinking  he  cannot  be  forced  to  hold  a  view  that  he 
cannot  decide  to  have.  Indeed,  it  is  the  case  that  people  will  sometimes 
feel  they  have  to  assume  particular  moral  positions  contrary  to  their 
own  good  reason  and  common  sense. 
If,  however,  holding  a  moral  position  is  interpreted  as  simply 
being  a  matter  of  entertaining,  adopting,  identifying  oneself  with,  but 
not  necessarily  believing  in  or  understanding,  a  particular  socially 
recognised  moral  view,  and,  if  it  is  assumed  that  we  are  free  to  choose 
and  to  try  to  engage  in  any  activity  either  mental  or  physical,  then,  it 
must  be  conceded  that  we  are  able  to  make  such  choices  for  a  variety  of 193 
reasons,  from  a  sense  of  duty,  out  of  regard  for  our  own  self-interest,  or 
from  a  professed  respect  for  some  particular  authority  residing  in  some 
particular  person,  belief  or  ideology,  or  simply  because  we  are  forced 
or  coerced.  In  other  words,  whilst  it  is  possible  to  coerce  individuals 
to  believe  and  to  act  'as  if'  moral,  it  is  not  possible  to  make  anyone 
believe  in  anything  or  to  arrive  at  any  particular  moral  position  or 
judgment,  which  is  also  their  own  authentic  choice,  if  they  do  not  have 
the  capacity  and  power  to  do  so. 
In  any  event,  it  is  not  logical  to  argue  that  a  person  may  be  coerced 
to  a  moral  view  because  a  moral  position,  qua  moral,  must  surely  be  held, 
and  a  moral  act  done,  for  the  right  reasons.  A  moral  choice,  surely  all 
but  the  short-sighted  egoist  would  readily  agree,  is  essentially  altruistic 
and  other-regarding,  not  prudential  or  self-seeking.  Consequently,  a 
view  adopted  or  an  act  done  purely  from  fear  of  harm  or  under  threat 
cannot  be  claimed  to  have  moral  value,  because  such  an  act  is  prima  facie 
done  for  selfish  reasons,  for  self-preservation  only,  and  therefore  for 
the  wrong  kind  of  reason.  Moral  reasons  are  essentially  not  reasons  of 
self-interest  but  are  derived  from  an,  intrinsic  concern  or  respect  for 
others  as  well  as  oneself:  morality  is  not  logically  identifiable  with 
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self-interest  itself. 
Furthermore,  personally  autonomous  moral  agents,  as  Franken  has 
indicated,  must,  from  a  logical  point  of  view,  be  held  to  be  responsible 
for  their  assumed  moral  positions  which,  it  is  supposed,  they  will  have 
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chosen  free  from  the  interference  of  others.  Moral  agents,  presumably, 
cannot  forsake  this  responsibility  and  remain  morally  autonomous;  they 
are  not  able,  logically  speaking,  to  subject  themselves  unconditionally 
to  any  other  authority,  be  it  another  person,  faith,  ideology,  God,  or 
the  state,  and  at  the  same  time  retain  their  freedom,  autonomy  and  moral 
status.  It  is  contradictory  to  suggest  that  it  is  possible  to  coerce 
a  person  to  a  moral  view,  for  in  so  doing  the  moral  status  of  the  victim 194 
is  denied.  Moral  autonomy  entails  that  each  individual  is  responsible 
for  working  out  his  own  moral  position,  for  making  his  own  choices,  and 
for  accepting  resonsibility  for  the  effects.  Thinking  things  out  for 
oneself  is  recognised  as  an  estimable  human  activity  which  educationalists, 
parents,  teachers,  and  those  committed  to  the  development  of  personal 
moral  autonomy  in  the  young  are  wont  to  defend.  This  is  not  to  imply 
that  one  individual's  moral  thinking  is  necessarily  just  as  good  as  any 
other  individual's  moral  thinking;  it  is  simply  intended  to  emphasize 
that  thinking  for  oneself  is  preferable  to  accepting  the  views  of  others 
without  question,  whether  such  views  are  imposed  upon  one  by  threat  or 
not,  and  with  the  best  of  intentions. 
Philosophers  differ  in  their  views  regarding  the  relation  that 
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exists  between  moral  judgment  and  moral  action.  Those  following  the 
Socratic  view  assume  that  there  is  a  tight  logical  connection  between 
the  two,  trat  a  person  who  sees  what  is  good  cannot  help  but  pursue  it, 
and  that  moral  judgment,  therefore,  determines  moral  action,  whereas 
those  of  the  Aristotelian  point  of  view  deny  such  a  relation  on  the 
grounds  that  it  is  not  substantiated  in  practice.  Instead  the  latter 
suggest  that  only  a  contingent  relation  exists  between  moral  judgment 
and  moral  action.  Neither  view  is  perfectly  satisfactory;  the  Socratic 
view  leaves  no  room  for  weakness  of  will,  whilst  the  Aristotelian  view 
ignores  the  prescriptive/obligatory  element  that  is  distinguishable  in 
moral  thought.  As  a  compromise  it  is  suggested  that  people  normally 
do  what  they  believe  they  ought  to  do  unless  they  want  something  else 
more,  in  which  case  the  sincerity  of  their  beliefs  does  not  always 
depend  upon  their  acting  in  accordance  with  them.  In  other  words, 
no  matter  how  sincere  a  person  may  be  in  his  beliefs  he  may  lack  the  will 
to  apply  them,  or,  he  may  simply  have  other  considerations  of  more 
import  to  him  uppermost  in  his  mind.  Even  if  it  were  possible,  which 
we  have  argued  it  is  not,  to  force  a  person  to  believe  in  a  particular 195 
moral  view,  there  would  be  no  guarantee  that  he  would  necessarily  choose 
to  act  in  accordance  with  it. 
If  it  is  not  possible  to  force  a  person  to  believe,  know,  think, 
understand,  then  it  is  not  possible  to  force  a  person  to  be  morally 
educated,  because  it  is  simply  not  possible  to  force  anyone  to  understand 
the  basic  concepts  of  morality,  such  as  fairness,  respect,  honesty,  if 
the  capacity  and  will  to  do  so  is  lacking.  If,  in  the  learning  process, 
the  pupil  is  not  a  curious  and  willing  agent  but  refuses  to  participate 
voluntarily,  then  no  educational  experience,  moral  or  otherwise,  can  be 
judged  to  take  place,  because  a  successful  educational  experience 
requires  that  both  participants,  pupil  and  teacher,  share  a  voluntary, 
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co-operative,  worth  while  experience,  to  their  rrutual  benefit.  Being 
educated  entails  having  a  generous  cognitive  awareness;  it  also  requires 
having  certain  attitudes,  and  being  motivated,  interested  and  curious, 
and  being  willing  to  learn.  It  is  not  proposed  that  everyone  has  to  be 
a  moral  philosopher  before  he  is  deemed  to  be  morally  educated  but  that 
a  capacity  and  willingness  to  comprehend  and  to  apply  relevant  and 
fundamental  moral  rules  and  concepts  are  the  distinguishing  marks  of  a 
morally  educated  person. 
The  potential  utility  of  coercive  procedures  employed  as  aids  in 
the  process  of  the  moral  education  and  development  of  individuals  is 
not  denied.  Coercive  measures  in  teaching  are  frequently  used  to 
establish  order,  which  is  necessary  before  the  process  of  moral  education, 
or  any  education  or  training  for  that  matter,  can  be  initiated. 
Furthermore,  we  acquire  our  moral  dispositions  partly  through  being  made 
to  follow  moral  rules  and  values  constituting  the  prevailing  moral  code 
and  partly  through  experience  gained  from  enforced  association  with 
other  individuals  in  a  social  context.  Children,  through  habits  and 
customs  imposed  upon  them,  learn  to  respect  each  other,  to  act  fairly, 
to  keep  their  promises,  and,  in  so  doing,  to  acquire  reference  points 
from  which  they  make  their  own  moral  decisions.  No  one  can  aspire  to 
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a  moral  point  of  view  in  isolation,  because  morality  does  not  develop 
in  a  vacuum.  "For  the  things  we  have  to  learn",  says  Aristotle,  "before 
we  can  do  them,  we  learn  by.  doing  them  e.  g.  men  become  builders  by 
building  and  lyre  players  by  playing  the  lyre;  so  too  we  become  just 
by  doing  just  acts,  temperate  by  doing  temperate  acts,  brave  by  doing 
brave  acts.  "  And  we  may  learn  to  be  moral  by  behaving  in  a  moral  way. 
Coerced  overt  behaviour  may,  therefore,  be  an  instrumental  factor 
in  our  moral  development;  by  being  used  to  emphasize  the  seriousness 
of  moral  rules  it  might  lead  to  the  development  of  moral  attitudes. 
This  is  not  to  suggest,  however,  that  coercion  is  a  necessary  condition 
for  being  morally  educPted  or  for  the  development  of  a  moral  Point  of 
view;  both  the  latter  can  be  realised  without  resort  to  coercive  force 
of  any  kind.  Coercive  influence  upon  an  individual's  overt  behaviour 
may  or  may  not  be  a  cause,  may  or  may  not  constitute  a  motive,  precipitating 
change  in  his  attitudes,  values,  beliefs,  but  it  will  certainly  not  in 
itself,  and  in  this  respect  it  is  morally  neutral,  provide  good  reason 
for  justifying  the  contemplation  of  any  one  belief  from  any  other,  nor 
will  it  necessarily  guarantee  the  fulfilment  of  the  coercer's  intent. 
In  swn,  there  are  arguments,  some  logical,  others  psychological, 
that  suggest  there  are  limits  to  the  contention  that  it  is  possible 
to  coerce  a  person  to  be  moral  either  in  thought  or  action,  though  it 
is  conceded  that  coercive  procedures  may  be  instrumental  in  facilitating 
the  development  of  a  moral  point  of  view  which  in  turn  might  but  need  not 
necessarily  result  in  moral  conduct  or  behaviour. 
Coercion  involves  a  clash  of  wills  in  which  the  will  of  the  coercer 
prevails  over  that  of  the  coercee.  Whereas,  however,  it  is  possible  to 
coerce  a  person  to  do  or  say,  or  not  to  do  or  say,,  something  or  other 
by  influencing  his  intent,  it  is  not  possible  to  coerce  the  will  itself 
or  to  force  an  individual  to  will  to  do  or  say,  or  not  to  do  or  say,  anything. 197 
In  other  words,  it  is  possible  to  influence  another  person's  will  and 
to  force  him  to  act  against  his  will,  but  it  is  not  possible  to  force 
him  to  will  in  any  predetezmined  way.  It  would  be  contradictory  to  the 
logic  of  the  concept  of  coercion  outlined  in  this  thesis  to  admit  to 
the  possibility  of  being  able  to  coerce  another's  will. 
We  speak  of  people  showing  strength  of  will,  making  an  effort  of 
will,  or  of  being  weak-willed  as  opposed  to  being  strong-willed  and 
resolute.  Gilbert  Ryle  explains  these  terms  an  follows.  "A  person  is 
described  as  behaving  resolutely  when  in  the  execution  of  difficult, 
protracted  or  disagreeable  tasks  he  tends  not  to  relax  his  efforts,  not 
to  to  let  his  attention  be  diverted,  not  to  grumble  and  not  to  think 
much  or  often  about  his  fatigue  or  fears.  He  does  not  shrink  from  or 
drop  things  to  which  he  has  set  his  hand.  A  weak-willed  person  is  one 
who  is  easily  distracted  or  disheartened,  apt  to  convince  himself  that 
another  time  will  be  more  suitable  or  that  the  reasons  for  undertaking 
the  task  were  not  after  all  very  strong......  A  resolute  man  may  firmly 
resist  temptations  to  abandon  or  postpone  his  task,  though  he  never 
went  through  a  prefatory  ritual  process  of  making  up  his  mind  to  complete 
it.  But  naturally  such  a  man  will  also  be  disposed  to  perform  any  vows 
which  he  has  made  to  others  or  himself.  Correspondingly,  the  irresolute 
man  will  be  likely  to  fail  to  carry  out  his  often  numerous  good  intentions 
but  his  lack  of  tenacity  of  purpose  will  be  exhibited  also  in  surrenders 
and  slacknesses  in  courses  of  action  which  were  unprefaced  by  any  private 
or  public  undertakings  to  accomplish  them. 
"Strength  of  will  is  a  propensity  the  exercise  of  which  consists 
in  sticking  to  tasks;  trat  is,  in  not  being  deterred  or  diverted.  Weakness 
of  will  is  having  too  little  of  this  propensity.  The  performances  in 
which  strength  of  will  is  exerted  may  be  performances  of  almost  any  sort, 
intellectual  or  manual,  imaginative  or  administrative.  It  is  not  a 
single-track  disposition  or,  for  that  and  other  reasons,  a  disposition 
to  execute  occult  operations  of  one  special  kind. 198 
"By  an  effort  of  will  is  meant  a  particular  exercise  of  tenacity 
of  purpose,  occurring  when  the  obstacles  are  notably  great,  or  the 
counter-temptations  notably'  strong.  Such  efforts  may,  but  need  not, 
be  accompanied  by  special  processes,  often  of  a  ritual  character,  of 
nerving  or  adjuring  oneself  to  do  what  is  required;  but  these  processes 
are  not  so  much  ways  in  which  resoluteness  is  shown  as  ways  in  which 
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fear  of  irresoluteness  manifests  itself.  " 
When  we  speak  of  a  per$on  being  strong  or  weak-willed,  resolute  or 
irresolute,  we  refer  to  the  extent  to  which  he  is  able  to  be  influenced 
by  say  threats,  rewards,  praise  or  blame.  We  do  not  i  oly  that  it  is 
possible  to  coerce  his  will,  but  rather  that  he  may  be  coerced  to  do 
things  against  his  will.  In  ordinary  discourse  we  sometimes  imply 
that  it  is  possible  to  train  the  will,  to  bring  up  our  children  to  be 
strong-willed  and  independently  minded,  which  really  means  that  we, 
recognise  that  coercive  sanctions  and  procedures  may  have  an  instrumental 
part  to  play  in  the  generation  of  behaviour  that  we  choose  to  associate 
with  the  formation  and  development  of  character. 
Traditionally  it  has  been  popular  amongst  philosophers  of  human 
action  to  characterise  human  action  in  terms  of  an  alleged  antecedent, 
namely  the  will.  J.  Austin,  the  nineteenth  century  jurisprudent,  for 
example,  wrote  as  follows.  "Certain  movements  of  our  bodies  follow 
invariably  and  immediately  our  wishes  and  desires  for  the  same  movements... 
These  antecendent  wishes  and  these  consequent  movements  are  human 
volitions  and  acts.....  Our  desires  of  these  bodily  movements  which 
immediately  follow  our  desires  for  them  are  the  only  volitions;  or...  the 
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only  acts  of  the  will.  " 
The  idea  that  human  action  is  consequent  on  or  caused  by  an  act  of 
will  or  a  volition  persisted  throughout  the  nineteenth  and  into  the 
twentieth  century,  though  nowadays  it  is  contested.  Even  supposing  it 
is  taken  as  a  valid  assumption,  the  question  whether  the  will  can  be 199 
coerced  or  not  is  still  not  resolved.  It  is  of  no  help  to  argue  that 
willing  is  an  internal  act  that  one  might  be  coerced  into,  as  one  might 
be  coerced  into  doing  any  other  kind  of  external  act,  for  even  if  this 
were  true  it  would  still  be  necessary  to  explain  the  cause  of  the  act 
of  will  itself.  Thereupon  an  inevitable  chain  of  events  can  be  envisaged 
and  an  infinite  regression  established  in  which  one  act  of  will  is 
presumably  caused  by  another  act  of  will,  and  so  on  indefinitely. 
Nowadays,  some  philosphers  argue  that  willing  is  not  an  act,  an 
event,  or  an  occurrence  measurable  in  time  and  space;  it  is  instead  an 
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experience,  something  which  just  happens  but  cannot  be  brought  about. 
In  other  words,  as  G.  Ryle  suggests,  we  are  not  fully  conscious  of 
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willing.  If  this  is  so,  then  we  do  not  have  full  control  of  our  own 
willing;  we  cannot  take  lessons  in  willing;  we  cannot  teach  willing, 
guarantee  willing,  cormand  willing,  make  ourselves  will.,  or  will  to  will. 
It  is  not  possible  to  pin  willing  down,  to  say  at  what  moment  a  person 
wills  a  certain  act,  or  to  distinguish  the  willing  of  one  act  from  the 
willing  of  another.  How,  for  instance,  can  I  distinguish  willing  to 
raise  my  a=  from  willing  to  raise  my  voice?  Willing  is  like  hearing;  it 
is  equally  impossible  to  distinguish  between  hearing  this  or  hearing 
that  as  it  is  to  distinguish  between  willing  this  or  willing  that,  unless 
one  refers  to  the-characteristics,  in  either  case,  of  the  respective 
objects  of  hearing  and  willing.  At  what  point,  asks  Ryle,  does  the 
diver  will  to  dive2  Is  it,  when  he  decides  to  climb  the  ladder,  or  when 
he  walks  onto  the  diving  board,  or  when  he  jumps? 
It  is  impossible  to  observe  the  willing  of  another.  I  can  observe 
an  act,  but  I  can  only  infer  the  volition  from  which  I  may  assume  it 
has  ensued.  I  can  only  guess  that  the  action  was  willed,  because  human 
behaviour  is  only  evidence,  not  proof,  of  a  person's  willing.  No  judge, 
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schoolmaster  or  parent,  says  Ryle,  ever  really  knows  whether  the 
actions  he  judges  really  merit  praise  or  blame.  Even  confessions, 200 
following  this  reasonung,  are  suspect.  Willing  is  not  manifested  in 
discrete  acts  of  will.  It  is  not  something  we  do  occasionally.  It  is 
not  a  discrete  series  of  deliberate  efforts.  So  long  as  we  are  conscious 
we  are  'willing  or  nilling'  something.  We  cannot  say  how  many  acts  of 
will  we  may  have  performed  in  any  particular  hour.  Willing  is  not 
something  we  engage  in  from  time  to  time.  It  is  a  continuous  feature 
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of  our  experience. 
Willing  is  a  consciousness  concept  and  is  as  indeterminate  as 
other  consciousness  concepts  that  we  have  considered  and  to  which  it 
is  related  such  as  knowing,  understanding,  believing,  thinking  and 
approving.  It  is  a  dispositional  term  implying  the  existence  of  an 
ability  or  trait  over  which  the  individual  has  limited  control.  I  might 
decide  to  be  strong-willed  but  find  it  is  not  within  my  power  to  be  so. 
Since,  therefore,  my  willing  is  not  entirely  within  my  control  it  cannot 
be  commanded  by  any  other.  No  one  can  force  me  to  do  what  I  am  quite 
unable  to  do.  It  is  not  possible  to  force  me  to  will  in  a  specific  way, 
or  even  to  will  at  all,  just  as  it  is  not  possible  to  force  me  to  think 
in  a  particular  way,  to  understand  a  particular  thing,  to  believe  in 
something,  or  to  approve  or  disapprove  of  something,  if  I  do  not  have 
the  appropriate  ability  or  inclination. 
Confusion  ensues  if  an  attempt  is  made  to  identify  willing  with 
other  things  such  as  wishing,  wanting,  desiring,  intending,  and  if  it 
is  claimed  that  it  is  possible  to  coerce  a  person  to  wish,  want,  desire, 
intend,  and  therefore  to  will.  Such  claims  may  be  rebutted  in  two  ways. 
First,  it  may  be  argued  that  these  notions  share  with  willing  the 
characteristic  of  being  indeterminate  inner  states  of  consciousness 
and  are  consequently  incapable  of  being  commanded  either  by  the  individual 
himself  or  any  other  person.  Secondly,  it  may  be  argued  that  willing 
is  not  identical  to  any  of  these  notions.  Even  if  it  were  conceded, 
for  example,  that  a  person  could  be  coerced  to  do  as  he  wanted,  it  would 201 
not  follow  that  he  would  be  doing  what  he  wanted  to  do  willingly. 
Wanting  and  willing  are  not  synonymous  terms.  I  may  want  and  desire 
all  sorts  of  things  but  not  have  the  will  tondo  anything  about  obtaining 
them.  I  may  wish  to  do  all  sorts  of  things  but  have  no  will  to  take 
any  positive  action.  I  may  have  good  intentions,  say  to  be  pleasant 
to  those  I  find  irritating  and  unattractive,  but  never  fulfil  them 
through  lack  of  will-power.  - 
An  individual's  actions  might  be  used  to  explain  his  wants  on  the 
grounds  that  he  would  be  foolish  to  do  anything  that  he  did  not  wish 
to  do.  It  may  be  tempting,  therefore,  to  assume  that  a  necessary  logical 
relation  exists  between  wanting  and  doing, 
-and 
to  c9nclude  that  people 
always  want  to  do  all  the  actions.  they  do.  Supposing.  we  assume  that 
wanting  and  doing  are  synonymous,  and  likewise  wanting  and  willing, 
though-in  fact  this  is  not  the  case,  is  it  possible  to  argue  that  we 
can  coerce  a  person  to  do  as  he  wants  and  thereby  to  will  on  the  grounds 
that  anything  he  is  forced  to  do  he  must  want  to  do  because  he  chooses 
to  do  it?  Quite  apart  from  the  fact  that  wanting  and  willing  are  not 
synonymous,  the  argument  fails  because  it  is  logically  impossible  to 
coerce  a  person  to  do  as  he  wants.  The  coercee  is  forced  to  behave 
as  his  coercer  wants  and  not  as  he  himself  would  desire. 
If  we  insist  upon  explaining  all  our  actions  in  terms  of  wants,  it 
is  not  possible  to  distinguish  between  acting  freely  and  acting  under 
constraint.  If,  for  example,  a  pistol  is  placed  at  my  head  with  the 
threat,  'Money  or  your  life',  it  is  not  the  case  that  I  automatically 
want  to  hand  over  my  wordly  possessions  though  it  is  perfectly 
understandable  that  I  may  wish  to  save  my  life.  It  is  wrong  to  suppose 
that  every  action,  even  giving  money  to  a  robber,  can  be  explained 
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simply  in  terms  of  a  want  statement.  It  is  wrong  to  suppose  that 
because  I  may  wish  to  save  my  life  I  also  wish  to  part  with  my  possessions. 
We  are  sometimes  forced  to  do  things  which,  under  different  circumstances, 202 
we  would  wish  to  do  of  our  own  free  will.  I  might,  for  instance,  be 
normally  disposed  to  give  to  a  needy  man  were  he  not  threatening  to 
kill  me.  It  is  not,  however,  a  serious  argument  that  my  will  is  coerced 
simply  by  forcing  me  to  do  something  which  it  is  assumed  I  must  want 
to  do  because  I  choose  to  do  it.  I  can  choose  to  do  all  sorts  of  things 
that  I  may  not  wish  to  do,  and,  I  am  coerced  into  doing  things  against 
my  will  and  not  in  accordance  with  it. 
In  aim,  I  may  be  able  to  influence  a  person's  willing  by  forcing 
him  to  participate  in  activities  that  he  might  otherwise  not  have  been 
inclined  to  consider,  but  I  cannot  coerce  a  person  to  will,  just  as  I 
cannot  coerce  a  person  to  understand,  believe,  or  to  think.  That  is  to 
say,  I  might  incidentally  be  able  to  cause  a  person  to  will,  but  I 
cannot  guarantee  or  predict  the  outcome  of  my  interference,  threats, 
bribes,  or  reasoning.  The  will  is  determined  by  factors  many  of  which 
are  not  obviously  identifiable.  It  is  not  possible  to  predict  with 
certainty  what  particular  factors  might  influence  or  cause  a  person  to 
will  one  way  or  another,  at  any  particular  time  or  upon  any  particular 
occasion.  My  will  is  free  in  the  sense  that  it  cannot  be  compelled, 
commanded  or  coerced.  It  is  not  free  in  the  sense  that  it  is  entirely 
inexplicable  or  uncaused  but  in  the  sense  that  it  cannot  be  predicted 
or  anticipated.  No  individual  has  complete  control  over  his  own  will, 
so  no  one  can  possibly  claim  to  be  able  to  coerce  another's  will,  though 
it  may  be  possible  by  coercive  means  to  fashion  conditions  that  might 
or  might  not  be  conducive  to  an  individual's  willing  in  the  way  one 
might  wish. 
Some  claims  made  in  relation  to  the  nature  and  scope  of  coercion 
do  not  accommodate  the  logic  of  the  concept  of  coercion  itself  and  for 
this  reason,  it  is  suggested,  must  be  classified  as  being  impossible. 203 
It  is  not  possible,  for  instance,  for  an  individual  to  coerce  himself, 
or  to  be  coerced  without  being  aware  of  it,  or  to  be  coerced  when  his 
supposed  coercer  either  does  not  intend  to  coerce  him  or  is  himself 
unaware  of  the  supposed  affect  of  his  behaviour  upon  him.  All  such 
claims  are  contrary  to  the  conditions  already  stipulated,  in  this  thesis, 
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as  being  necessary  for  coercion  to  be  judged  to  be  possible. 
If  it  is  conceded  that  coercion  is  dependent  upon  there  being  a 
relation  between  two  agents  in  which  the  will  of  one  is  imposed  upon 
that  of  the  other,  then  to  suppose  that  a  person  can  coerce  himself 
must  imply  that  individuals  have  more  than  one  self,  and  that  one  self 
is  capable  of  imposing  its  will  on  that  of  another.  This  might  be 
imagined  to  happen  when,  for  example,  an  individual  forces  himself  to 
live  up  to  a  standard  upon  the  attainment  of  which  his  own  estimation  of 
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himself,  that  is  to  say  respect  for  his  better  self,  ultimately  depends. 
The  assumption  that  a  person  may  have  more  than  one  self  discounts 
the  responsibility  of  analysing  the  nature  of  willing  and  its  relation 
to  wanting,  desiring,  feeling  and  understanding.  It  is  proposed,  therefore, 
that  a  person's  will  is  constituted  of  an  amalgam  of  the  interplay 
and  interaction  of  a  variety  of  influences  over  which  the  individual 
himself  does  not  apparently  have  full  control.  What  a  person  wills  in 
the  end  is  the  result  of  the  interaction  of  rival  wants  and  desires  with 
each  other  and  with  his  rational  consciousness.  A  person  can  only 
have  one  will,  be  it  weak  or  strong,  be  he  resolute  or  irresolute, 
which  is  the  mark  of  his  integrated  personhood.  A  person,  that  is  to 
say,  has  but  one  self  which  is  manifested  in  his  will.  If  this  is 
allowed,  then  it  is  not  possible  to  claim  that  a  person  is  able  to 
coerce  himself.  Coercion  is  not  to  be  confused  with  the  processes 
that  may  take  place  within  a  person's  mind  in  the  course  of  his  willing. 
Similarly,  it  is  proposed  that  it  is  impossible  within  the  logic 
of  coercion  to  claim  that  a  person  can  be  coerced  without  being  aware ýy. 
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of  it.  Not  all  philosophers,  however,  share  this  view.  D.  Knowles, 
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for  example,  in  a  critique  of  R.  F.  Nozick's  notion  of  coercion  proffers 
several  illustrations  and  claims  that  the  opposite  is  the  case,  that  a 
person  may  be  coerced  even  though  he  does  not  know  he  is.  Two  of 
Knowles'  examples  will  suffice  to  establish  the  illogical  nature  of  this 
claim. 
(i)  A  farmer  is  told  by  a  veterinary  to  sell  certain  animals  for 
slaughter  on  the  grounds  that  they  are  believed  to  be  diseased.  The 
farmer  subsequently  sells  at  a  loss  to  a  dealer  who,,  unknown  to  the 
fanner,  is  in  collusion  with  the  vet.  There  is  in  fact  nothing  wrong 
with  the  beasts.  Knowles  concludes  that  no  matter  whether  the  farmer 
was  warned  or  tricked  he  was  forced  to  sell  his  animals  and  therefore 
was  coerced.  In  reply,  it  is  submitted  that  the  farcier  was  not  threatened 
though  he  was  certainly  deceived.  The  veterinary  did  not  demand  anything 
from  the  farmer  who  sold  his  animals  on  what  appeared  to  him  to  be 
reasonable  and  reliable  information.  There  was  no  obvious  clash  of  will 
between  the  farmer  and  the  veterinary.  The  farmer-was  clearly  tricked, 
deceived,  or  manipulated,  but  since  he  did  not  believe  the  veterinary 
had  threatened  him  he  was  certainly  not  coerced. 
(ii)  A  person  is  administered  a  drug  and  is  then  questioned.  In  this 
case  Knowles,  who  takes  the  overall  view  that  Nozick's  analysis  of  coercion 
is  unnecessarily  narrow,  suggests  that  the  supposed  victim  is  coerced 
under  the  influence  of  the  drug  to  declare  the  details  of  his  activities. 
It  is  irrmaterial,  in  Knowles'  view,  whether  the  victim  is  aware  or  not 
of  the  drug  having  been  administered  to  him.  This  of  course  must  be 
disputed  if,  as  we  have  argued,  it  is  conceded  that  coercion  depends 
upon  the  victim's  knowing  that,  he  is  being  threatened  or  physically 
forced  to  do  or  not  to  do  something  which  is  to  his  detriment  and. 
contrary  to  his  will.  If  on  the  contrary  the  victim  is  not  conscious 
of  any  threat  having  been  made  or  physical  force  having  been  used  against fi. 
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him,  then  there  is  no  clash  of  wills  and  the  claim  that  coercion  is 
present  is  unsustainable.  In  other  words,  only  if  the  victim  is  fully 
aware  of  the  drug  being  administered  forcibly  against  his  will  or  under 
threat,  say  with  the  words  'Tell  me  or  I  shall  force  you  to  with  this 
drug',  is  he  coerced;  otherwise,  he  may  be  tricked,  manipulated  or 
deceived,  but  is  not  coerced. 
Finally,  it  is  submitted  that  it  is  not  possible  within  the  logic 
of  coercion  for  any  person  to  coerce  another  unwittingly,  although  it 
is  and  will  always  be  the  case  that  some  people  will  feel  influenced  or 
imposed  upon  at  times  by  the  unintentional  actions  of  others.  Teachers, 
when  answering  questions,  giving  information  or.  issuing  warnings,  are 
always  likely  to  exert  pressure  unintentionally  on  sensitive  pupils 
who  may  consequently  feel  threatened.  People  will  from  time  to  time 
imagine  they  are  coerced  or  threatened  when  in  fact  their  antagonist 
has  no  such  intent.  If,  however,  there  is  no  evident  clash  of  wills, 
if  neither  party  intends  to  threaten  the  other,  if  neither  party  is 
aware  of  the  other's  supposed  fears,  then  the  occurrence  of  coercion 
cannot  be  substantiated.  Following  this  reasoning,  it  is  not  possible 
to  argue  successfully  that  an  individual  can  coerce  himself,  that  a 
person  can  be  coerced  without  being  aware  of  it,  or  that  a  person  can 
coerce  another  without  being  aware  that  he  is  so  doing. 
All  the  claims  made  hitherto  with  respect  to  proposed  limits  to 
the  use  of  coercion  have  been  seemingly  claims  of  an  'a  priori'  kind, 
in  so  far  as  they  are  not  verifiable  empirically  one  way  or  another. 
That  is  to  say,  they  are  not  obviously  factual,  'a  posteriori',  empirical 
claims  based  upon  general  laws  deduced  from  the  observation  of  human 
behaviour  as  in  the  case,  for  example,  of  the  simple  deduction  that  if 
I  do  not  eat  I  shall  die.  Instead,  they  are  claims  relating  either  to 
the  logic  of  coercion  itself  or  to  presuppositions  about  the  inner  state 
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It  may  be  objected  that  these  claims  are  not  in  fact  of  an  exclusively 
'a  priori'  nature,  that  they  are  inevitably  of  a  mixed  species,  that  they 
are  ultimately  dependent  upon  interpretations  given  to  such  notions  as 
understanding,  loving,  being  moral,  willing,  threatening,  none  of  which 
can  be  interpreted  in  a  vacuum  but  which  must  be  related  to  substantive 
circumstances,  the  world  of  experience  and  the  observation  of  human 
behaviour.  They  are  therefore,  it  is  supposed,  claims  based  upon 
presuppositions  and  observations  of  both  an  'a  priori'  and  'a  posteriori' 
kind.  In  so  far  as  this  is  the  case,  the  objection  must  be  conceded. 
It  has  been  argued  that  there  are  certain  things  coercion  cannot 
make  people  do  because  individuals  themselves  do  not  have  the  required 
control  or  autonomy  to  choose  at  will  to  do  them.  A  distinction,  therefore, 
has  been  made  between  coercing  a  person  to  do  x  and  coercing  a  person  to 
behave  in  ways  that  might,  but  might  not,  faciltate  his  being  able  to  do, 
willing  to  do,  x.  It  may  be  possible  to  induce  a  person  by  coercive 
means,  and  by  other  means  such  as  bribes,  to  behave  in  ways  that  might, 
or  might  not,  trigger  off  or  precipitate  such  things  as  understanding, 
belief,  emotional  feeling,  moral  attitudes,  willing,  provided  the 
individual  concerned  has  the  basic  capacity  and  inclination.  An  enforced 
marriage,  for  instance,  might  eventually  lead  to  a  loving  relationship, 
but  need  not  necessarily  do  so.  Forcing  a  student  to  study  might  or  might 
not  increase  his  understanding.  A  strict  upbringing  will  not  necessarily 
guarantee  a  strong-willed  adult.  Enforced  behaviour  might  just  as  easily 
be  counter-productive  and  even  prohibitive  as  it  is  likely  to  be  conducive 
to  a  desired  result. 
Threats  may  constitute  a  motive,  a  reason,  or  a  cause  of  action 
but  there  is  no  guarantee  that  the  ensuing  behaviour  will  necessarily 
represent  what  the  coercer  intended.  A  person's  behaviour  under  pressure 
is  clearly  not  always  a  true  reflection  of  his  true  intent  and  may  simply 
be  meant  to  deceive.  In  fact,  it  may  be  motivated  at  times  by  reasons 207 
quite  different  from  those  ascribed  to  it  by  others.  A  man  may  be 
forced  to  marry  in  order  to  avoid  his  father  disinheriting  him,  but 
come  to  love  his  wife  not  through,  it  is  supposed,  the  enforced 
relationship  but  for  her  own  personal  qualities.  A  person  may  appear 
to  behave,  as  all  children  know,  in  the  way  desired  by  his  coercer  but 
may  in  fact  be  doing  so  fora  variety  of  quite  different  and  unrelated 
reasons.  Human  behaviour  is  so  complex  that  it  is  not  possible  to  be 
certain  that  coercion  has  really  been  the  cause  of  the  ensuing  behaviour, 
even  if  the  latter  does  tally  with  that  intended. 
It  has  been  noted  that  in  some  cases,  although  people  may  appear 
to  have  been  caused  to  behave  in  particular  ways  by  the  use  of  force, 
the  use  of  force  itself  negates  the  value  of  the  ensuing  behaviour. 
It  is  not  logically  possible,  for  instance,  to  force  a  person  to  be 
moral,  or  tolerant,  or  to  love.  A  person  who  apparently  exercises 
tolerance,  but  does  so  under  pressure  and  against  his  will,  can  hardly 
be  deemed  to  be  acting  morally.  His  act  of  tolerance  may  be  an  act  of 
pretence  or  prudence  but  not  necessarily  a  true  moral  act.  Certain 
kinds  of  behaviour  lose  their  value  if  enforced  on  pain  of  penalty. 
An  enforced,  apparent  belief  is  not  a  true  belief.  An  enforced,  apparent 
moral  act  is  not  a  true  moral  act.  Enforced  behaviour  in  these  cases 
does  not  represent  a  genuine  example  of  the  kind  it  is  intended  to  be. 
A  coerced  person  may  act  in  a  particular  way  but  if  the  act  in  question 
does  not  ensue  from  the  individual's  own  free  will,  if  it  is  enforced 
under  threat,  it  will  not  be  a  true  act  of  its  type.  People  can  be 
induced  to  do  and  to  pretend  to  do  all  sorts  of  things,  and  may  do  all 
sorts  of  things  for  all  sorts  of  reasons.  It  is  conceded  that  coercion 
might  be  usefully  employed  as  a  possible  means  of  facilitating  the 
development  of  an  individual's  inner  consciousness,  but  its  effect, 
it  is  submitted,  is  limited,  unpredictable,  and  may  be  counter-productive. 
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In  his  essay,  'on  Liberty',,  Mill  discusses  limits  to  the  use  of 
coercion  or,  more  precisely,  limits  to  the  coercive  power  that  state 
and  society  might  legitimately  exercise  over  individuals,  and  consequentially 
individuals  over  each  other.  Mill  is  not  concerned,  as  we  have  been  in 
the  previous  chapter,  with  what  is,  or  is  not,  logically  or  empirically 
possible,  but  with  what  ought  or  ought  not  to  be,  with  what  coercion 
should  or  should  not  be  made  to  do. 
In  Mill's  day,  the  straggle  for  liberty  was  traditionally  thought 
to  be  first  and  foremost  a  struggle  against  the  power  of  tyrannical 
governments  and  despotic  rulers,  whereas  Mill  argued  that  in  democratic 
societies  it  was  more  likely  to  be  the  tyranny  of  the  majority,  in  the 
form  of  state  organisations  and  public  opinion,  that  would  threaten 
the  liberty  of  individuals  in  political  and  social  life.  Mill  sought, 
therefore,  to  defend  liberty  and  to  establish  reasons  justifying  the 
limitation  of  intervention  by  the  state  or  society  in  individuals'  affairs. 
Since  there  was  an  apparent  lack  in  contemporary  thought-of  any  principle 
or  principles  recognised  as  defining  the  proper  limits  of  such  intervention, 
Mill  formulated  what  he  claimed  was  a  very  simple  principle,  that  "the 
sole  end  for  which  mankind  is  warranted  individually  or  collectively 
in  interfering  with  the  liberty  of  action  of  any  of  their  members  is 
1 
self-protection". 
This  principle,  commonly  referred  to  as  Mill's  liberty  principle, 
is  subdivided  by  Will  into  t'Ro  maxims,  (i)  "...  the  individual  is  not 
accountable  to  society  for  his  actions  in  so  far  as  these  concern  the 
interests  of  no  person  but  himself",  and  (ii)  "...  for  such  actions  as  are 
2 
prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  others  the  individual  is  accountable". 
Mich  of  the  ensuing  discourse  concerning  Mill's  liberty  principle  has 
inevitably  focused  around  the  notion  of  self-protection  because  Mill 
wrote  rather  indifferently  at  different  times  of  "self-protection", 
"prevention  of  harm  to  others",  "the  security  of  others",  and  of  "action 213  ý"TL 
damaging  and  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  others",  leaving  some 
confusion  as  to  whether  these  expressions  were  meant  to  convey  the 
same  meaning. 
Two  qualifications  regarding  Mill's  liberty  principle  must  be 
stated.  First,  it  was  Mill's  intent  that  it  should  apply  only  to  mature 
adults  sound  in  mind  and  not  to  children,  the  senile,  the  incapable,  or 
to  backward,  im  sture,  primitive  societies  which  might  be  considered  to 
be  as  it  were  in  their  nonage  or  infancy.  Secondly,  Mill  did  not 
consider  all  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  others  to  be  coercive. 
Sound  argument,  warnings,  guidance,  advice,  and  the  use  of  similar 
non-coercive  but  persuasive  rational  influences,  such  as  remonstrating 
and  entreating,  he  regarded  as  perfectly  legitimate  means  of  influencing 
people.  Such  interferences  he  believed  would,  as  in  the  case  of  coercion, 
require  justification  but  not  to  the  same  degree.  Mill  did  not  suggest 
that  individuals  are  only  free  when  they  are  absolutely  free  from  the 
interference  of  others,  because  he  clearly  recognised  that  some  interference 
is  inevitable,  is  acceptable,  and  might  even  be  encouraged. 
Mill  wished  to  establish  that  the  state  or  society  is  never  justified 
in  interfering  with  self-regarding  conduct,  which  is  of  concern  only 
to  the  individual  himself,  but  may  be  justified  in  interfering  with 
what  commentators  on  Mill  have  called  'other-regarding'  conduct  that 
affects  people  other  than  the  individual  himself.  Of  course,  if  in 
the  latter  case  the  harm  caused  by  intervention  turned  out  to  be  greater 
than  the  harm  which  it  was  intended  to  prevent,  intervention  would  not, 
in  Mill's  view,  be  justified.  Mill  did  not  claim  to  defend  his  liberty 
principle  on  grounds  of  abstract  right  but  on  grounds  of  utility. 
"I  regard  utility",  he  wrote,  "as  the  ultimate  appeal  on  all  ethical 
questions;  but  it  must  be  utility  in  the  largest  sense  grounded  on  the 
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permanent  interests  of  man  as  a  progressive  human  being.  "  Mill  wished 
to  avoid  the  danger  of  basing  moral  judgments  on  feeling,  prejudice, 
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or  intuition  rather  than  on  what  he  considered  to  be  authentic  utilitarian 
grounds.  Consequently,  his  views  are  identifiable  with  those  of  an 
ethical  naturalist  rather  than  with  those  of  an  ethical  rationalist. 
His  stance  as  a  self-declared  utilitarian,  however,  must  be  qualified 
because  he  is  committed  to  additional  basic  moral  principles  other  than 
the  principle  of  utility  itself. 
"Utility  in  the  largest  sense"  means  for  Mill  the  free  development 
of  individuality,  free  choice,  and  their  associated  pleasures.  In  the 
long  run,  according  to  Mill,  the  promotion  of  liberty  and  individuality 
leads  to  the  greater  satisfaction  of  desires  and  is,  therefore,  preferable 
to  the  imposition  of  conformity  by  coercive  means.  Traditionally  Mill 
is  regarded  as  one  of  if  not  the  most  distinguished  of  the  principal 
opponents  of  coercion.  He  sought  to  discover  reasons,  rules,  and  principles 
to  limit  its  use.  These  are  in  evidence  throughout  his  writings  and 
are  prominently  manifested  in  his  two  essays,  'On  Liberty'  and 
'Utilitarianism'.  Mill  raised  many  issues  which  are  as  relevant  today 
as  they  were  in  his  time. 
In  'On  Liberty'  Mill  asks  first  of  all  why  coercion  needs  to  be 
justified;  then,  he  endeavours  to  show  that  liberty  is  both  intrinsically 
of  value  in  itself  and  extrinsically  of  value  as  a  factor  contributing 
to  his  own  idea  of  a  person.  He  makes  two  assumptions  which  are  not 
unrelated.  First,  he  suggests  that  the  person  who  initially  decides  to 
raise  the  issue  of  justification  in  any  context  must  always  bear  the 
burden  of  establishing  the  need  to  do  so.  Secondly,  he  assumes  that 
restraint,  compulsion,  and  interference  with  another's  liberty  must 
per  se  always  be  justified  and  that  the  onus  of  justification  must  always 
be  with  he  who  chooses  to  interfere  with  another's  freedom.  Mill  presumes 
in  favour  of  liberty  or,  more  particularly,  in  favour  of  the  principle 215 
of  negative  freedom. 
makes:  "..  all  restraint,  qua  restraint,  is  an  evil",  "..  leaving  people 
to  themselves  is  always  better,  caeteris  paribus,  than  controlling  them", 
and,  "To  be  prevented  from  doing  what  one  is  inclined  to  do....  always 
5 
tends,  pro  tanto,  to  starve  the  development  of  some  portion  of  the  bodily 
6 
or  mental  faculties". 
It  is  right  that  Mill  should  assume  responsibility  for  establishing 
the  need  for  justification  because  from  a  moral  point  of  view  the  onus 
of  proof  must  rest  with  the  individual  who  chooses  to  raise  the  question 
of  justification  in  the  first  place.  If,  for  instance,  I  am  asked  by 
another  to  justify  my  behaviour,  I  may  quite  legitimately  respond  by 
enquiring  'Why  am  I  required  to  justify  myself  to  you  in  this  instance?  ' 
The  person  who  initially  raises  the  issue  of  justification  must  surely  be 
obliged  to  indicate  why  he  has  done  so.  Mill  then  goes  on  to  argue  that 
coercion  must  be  justified  because  "all  restraint,  qua  restraint,  is 
wrong",  and  that  the  burden  of  justifying  coercive  interference  in  the 
lives  of  other  people  must  rest  with  those  who  advocate  and  practise 
such  behaviour.  This  too  must  be  conceded  and  must  logically  follow  if 
restraint  is  considered  to  be  wrong;  otherwise,  we  are  obliged  to  deny 
that  evil  actions  require  to  be  justified,  which  entails  our  denying 
what  is  commonly  assumed  to  be  an  analytical  truth  and  a  basic  moral  fact. 
It  would  also  entail  denying  any  understanding  of  the  meaning  of  the 
notions  of  evil  and  justification.  Mill  argues,  therefore,  that  good 
reasons  must  be  given  for  any  attempt  to  thwart  another  person's  will  or 
to  interfere  forcibly  with  his  person,  but  he  excludes  interference  in 
the  form  of  warnings,  advice,  education,  exhortations,  and  such  like, 
which  he  believed  were  morally  legitimate  means  of  influencing  people. 
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It  may  be  objected  that  the  onus  of  justification  might  not  always 
lie  with  a  person  who  positively  interferes  with  another's  freedom  but 
This  is  apparent  from  the  various  statements  he 
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instead  with  a  person  who  refrains  from  interfering.  When  A,  for  example, 216 
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is  about  to  commit  a  serious  crime  against  B's  person,  the  onus  of 
justification  may  rest  not  only  on  A  but  also  on  C  who  may  be  judged  to 
be  in  a  position  to  stop  A  but  for  some  reason  decides  not  to  do  so.  C  will 
certainly  be  required  to  justify  his  behaviour  if  his  refusal  to  interfere 
is  universally  regarded  as  a  dereliction  of  duty.  In  other  words,  as 
Mill  indicates,  non-interference  as  well  as  interference,  omissions  as 
well  as  actions,  may  in  particular  circumstances  require  to  be  justified. 
Non-interference  in  itself,  however,  is  not  sufficient  to  require 
justification  in  every  case;  the  particular  facts  of  each  case,  as  Mill 
suggests,  must  be  taken  into  account. 
In  'On  Liberty',  in  a  discussion  concerning  possible  legitimate 
areas  for  state  intervention,  Mill  implies  that  the  statement,  "leaving 
people  to  themselves  is  always  better,  caeteris  paribus,  than  controlling 
them",  is  just  another  way  of  saying  that  "all  restraint,  qua  restraint, 
is  an  evil".  Mill  is  discussing  limits  to  'Free  Trade'  and  particularly 
the  degree  of  government  control  that  is  admissible  in  order  to  prevent 
fraud  by  adulteration  and  to  ensure  enforcement  by  employers  of  necessary 
sanitary  precautions  and  protective  measures  for  workers  employed  in 
dangerous  occupations.  These  issues,  Mill  suggests,  constitute  legitimate 
grounds  for  social  intervention:  "Such  questions  involve  considerations  of 
liberty,  only  in  so  far  as  leaving  people  to  themselves  is  always  better, 
caeteris  paribus,  than  controlling  them:  but  that  they  may  be  legitimately 
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controlled  for  these  ends  is  in  principle  undeniable.  "  What  Mill  is 
really  saying  is  that  because  restraint  is  an  evil  good  reasons  must  be 
established  to  justify  any  kind  of  interference.  Clearly  the  principal 
question  at  issue  is  whether  there  is  sufficient  evidence  to  show  that 
leaving  people  to  themselves  is  always,  all  things  being  equal,  better 
than  exerting  control  over  them.  It  is,  presumably,  insufficient 
to  simply  observe  human  nature  and  to  make  a  simple  empirical  deduction, 
without  appropriate  moral  arguments,  that  people  as  a  rule  prefer,  to  have 217 
their  privacy  respected  and  not  to  be  subjected  to  unsolicited  control 
or  interference. 
Mill  offers  a  defence  of  liberty  based  upon  a  fundamental  belief  in 
and  respect  for  human  worth  and  individual  self-realisation.  He  complains 
that  the  prevailing  thought  of  his  day  had  failed  to  recognise  the 
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intrinsic  worth  of  developing  and  exercising  individual  spontaneity. 
In  chapter  three  of  'On  Liberty'  he  objects  to  the  blind  submission  of 
individuals  to  prevailing  customs  on  the  grounds  that  they  are  not  robots 
or  machines  but  idiosyncratic  selves  requiring,  if  their  potentialities 
are  to  be  fully  realised,  not  one,  uniform,  identical  pattern  of  development 
but  a  variety  of  patterns  unique  to  each  individual  self.  In  speaking 
of  the  distinctive  endowment  of  the  human  being  Mill  recognises  not 
just  respect  for  the  generic  human  self,  that  is  what  human  beings  value 
in  themselves  as  human  beings,  but  respect  for  the  idiosyncratic  self 
10 
which  distinguishes  one  human  being  from  another.  His  argument  in 
favour  of  freedom  of  action  is  apparently  based  upon  the  assumption  that 
the  principle  of  respect  for  persons  ensures  the  free  development  of 
individuals'  potentialities,  and  that  this  in  turn  is  conducive  to  the 
development  of  an  imagined  happy  and  successful  society  in  which  individuals 
share  a  common  unity  in  their  variety.  The  main  theme  of  'On  Liberty' 
might  be  said  to  be  that  the  principle  of  non-interference  and  the  principle 
of  respect  for  persons  presuppose  one  another. 
Mill's  notion  of  individualism  includes  the  presumption  that  choosing 
is  of  value  in  itself  for  to  limit  any  individual's  choice  by  coercive 
means  is  to  deny  his  status  as  an  autonomous  human  being.  In  this  respect 
a  Kantian  perspective  is  evident  in  Mill's  thinking.  In  Kant's  view  the 
autonomy  of  the  will,  the  capacity  of  the  individual  to  create,  legislate 
and  follow  rules  governing  his  own  and  others'  behaviour,  constitutes  the 
essence  of  personality;  and,  it  is  this  capacity  for  reasoning  and  willing 
that  gives  human  personality,  according  to  Kant,  its  intrinsic  value. 
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Mill  appears  to  have  shared  these  views,  but  he  would  have  conceived  the 
notion  of  rational  will  in  a  broader  sense  than  Kant  envisaged,  and  not 
11 
as  excluding  human  feeling  and  desire. 
The  ability  to  choose  for  oneself,  free  from  the  intervention  of 
others,  is,  in  Mill's  view,  a  good  that  is  independent  of  the  wisdom  of 
what  is  chosen:  "If  a  person  possesses  any  tolerable  amount  of  common 
sense  and  experience,  his  own  mode  of  laying  out  his  existence  is  the  best, 
12 
not  because  it  is  the  best  in  itself,  but  because  it  is  his  own  mode.  " 
On  another  occasion  he  writes:  "...  it  is  the  privilege  and  proper  condition 
of  a  human  being,  arrived  at  the  maturity  of  his  faculties,  to  use  and  to 
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interpret  experience  in  his  own  way.  "  It  is  Mill's  belief  that  the 
human  faculties  of  perception,  judgment,  discriminative  feeling,  mental 
activity  and  moral  preference,  that  make  up  the  distinctive  endowment  of 
the  human  being,  are  principally  exercised  in  making  choices  free  from 
the  interference  of  other  people. 
It  is  important  to  Mill  not  only  what  men  do  but  what  manner  of 
men  they  are  that  do  it.  Men  who  are  free  and  make  choices  develop 
character,  Mill  says,  because  their  desires  and  feelings  are  then  the 
products  of  their  own  conscious  choices  rather  than  the  passively  generated 
products  of  other  external  factors.  Coercive  pressure  exercised  wisely 
and  in  moderation  would  probably  induce  weak  hearts  to  face  up  to  their 
responsibilities  and  to  be  more  decisive,  but  if  used  to  excess  it  would 
more  probably  inhibit  the  development  of  the  sort  of  ideal  person  that 
Mill  had  in  mind,  a  self-reliant,  rational,  tolerant  individual  not 
without  sympathy  for  other  people  and  other  persons'  views.  Mill's 
preoccupation  with  self-development  and  moral  progress  is  a  characteristic 
of  his  philosophy  to  which  all  else  seems  to  be  subordinate.  It  was 
important  to  Mill  not  only  what  kind  of  beliefs  men  held  but  how  they 
came  to  hold  them  and  what  manner  of  men  they  were.  Mill  did  not  go 
so  far,  therefore,  as  to  claim  that  all  freely  chosen  acts,  qua  free, 7T""￿ 
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are  good  and  valuable  in  the  sense  that  their  value,  even  if  they  are 
immoral.,  rests  entirely  in  the  fact  that  they  are  freely  chosen  and  are 
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not  the  result  of  any  other  person's  coercive  influence. 
Freedom  of  choice  is  not  considered  by  Mill  to  be  a  sufficient 
condition  for  the  realisation  of  his  notion  of  an  ideal  person.  The 
exercise  of  a  degree  of  freedom  of  choice,  however,  he  believes  to  be 
absolutely  necessary,  if  not  on  all  occasions.  He  is  willing  to  justify 
the  use  of  coercion  in  particular  circumstances  in  order,  for  example,  to 
prevent  people  having  accidents,  doing  wrong  and  making  mistakes,  or_ 
making  wrong  choices  through  being  ignorant  and  inexperienced.  He  allows 
the  use  of  coercion  to  prevent  a  person  selling  himself  into  slavery, 
because  once  a  slave  he  is  presumed  to  be  deprived  of  the  opportunity  of 
exercising  any  further  free  choices  and  thereby  developing  as  a  person. 
Following  this  reasoning,  coercion  might  be  justified  to  prevent  people 
committing  themselves  unconditionally,  absolutely  and  slavishly,  to  any 
'-ism',  religion,  or  any  dubious  ideology,  that  might  be  judged  to  be 
fatal  to  their  successful  self-development  and  continued  well-being. 
Restrictions  upon  freedom  of  choice  are  justified  in  Mill's  view  in 
order  to  preserve  the  opportunity  to  be  able  to  continue  to  make  free 
choices  in  the  future. 
There  is  a  non-contingent  and  a  contingent  aspect  to  Mill's 
reasoning  in  'On  Liberty'.  Mill  believes  in  the  intrinsic  value  of 
being  free  to  choose  and  in  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  worthy 
self-fulfilment  of  a  rational,  intellectual  and  emotionally  mature  self. 
In  this  respect  he  sees  liberty  in  an  optimistic  and  positive  sense  and 
as  being  intrinsically  good,  provided,  that  is  to  say,  the  goods  that 
result  from  it  include  true  rational  belief,  individuality,  self-fulfilment 
and  human  progress.  Liberty  is  seen  to  be,  therefore,  both  a  condition 
of  and  also  a  part  of  his  professed  notion  of  individuality. 
The  contingent  aspect  of  Mill's  reasoning  is  more-readily  illustrated 220 
in  relation  to  freedom  in  its  negative  sense.  For  Mill  the  principle 
of  non-intervention,  apart  from  the  fact  that  it  allows  individuals  to 
make  their  own  free  choices,  'has  no  intrinsic  value.  It  must  be  admitted 
there  seems  to  be  no  apparent  value  in  leaving  a  blind  man  free  to  walk 
under  a  bus  or  a  young  child  to  drown  in  a  paddling  pool.  The  value  of 
negative  freedom  for  Mill  lies  in  terms  of  the  goods  it  may  possibly 
bring  and  its  good  consequences.  He  defends  freedom  of  expression  and 
freedom  of  action,  for  example,  as  essential  conditions  for  the  emergence 
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of  truth  and  the  elimination  of  myths  and  superstitions.  The  alternatives, 
intolerance,  authoritarianism  and  censorship,  he  argues,  presume  an 
unjustified  claim  to  infallibility;  they  stifle  freedom  of  thought 
and  expression  and  deprive  people  of  true  knowledge. 
Mill's  sociological  perspective  is  clearly  organised  around  the 
basic  assumption  that  the  human  race  is  progressive,  that  freedom  from 
intervention  allows  those  traits  of  intellect  and  character  to  develop 
which  constitute  the  'Good'  for  all  human  beings  and  which  ensure  the 
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future  development  of  society.  He  argues  that  social  benefits  accrue 
to  those  who  grant  freedom  as  well  as  to  those  who  are  allowed  to  exercise 
it.  Everyone  is  pressed  to  benefit  from  the  development  of  individualism 
and  the  absence  of  coercive  influence.  Mill  has  been  accused  of  advocating 
freedom  solely  for  the  benefit  of  a  privileged,  intellectual  and  cultural 
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elite.  He  would  argue  in  reply,  however,  that  he  desired  freedom  for 
all  whilst  accepting  that  in  the  real  world  the  gifted  and  able  would 
always  and  inevitably  emerge  as  the  pace-makers  of  standards  and  values. 
Mill  did  not  advocate  that  the  ordinary  man  should  be  forced  to  accept 
the  unanimous  opinions  of  cultured  minds.  He  certainly  preferred  the 
man  of  character  and  intellect  to  the  man  who  imitatively  followed 
custom,  but,  provided  the  latter  did  no  harm  to  others,  he  did  not  hold 
18 
the  view  that  such  a  man  had  no  right  to  live  as  he  liked. 
The  'Good'  for  Mill  is  not  enjoyment  or  passive  contentment;  it  is 
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self-realisation  which  we  may  call  happiness  if  we  are  prepared  to 
interpret  happiness  in  the  Greek  sense  as  meaning  "the  exercise  of  vital 
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powers  along  lines  of  excellence  in  a  life  affording  scope".  Mill  argues 
that  social  freedom  and  personal  autonomy  are  not  just  the  means  to 
happiness  but  are  also  the  constituents  of  happiness  and  valued  for 
their  own  sake.  Actions  are  right,  says  Mill,  which  tend  to  promote 
happiness,  and  are  wrong  in  so  far  as  they  tend  to  the  opposite. 
Consequently,  Mill's  notion  of  utility  differs  from  that  of  the  classical 
Benthamite  school  of  utilitarians  which  sees  happiness  in  simplistic 
hedonistic  terms  as  a  psychological  or  mental  state  composed  of  an 
aggregate  balance  of  pleasure  over  pain. 
Although  Mill  argues  that  the  only  good  thing  is  pleasure,  he 
distinguishes  between  pleasures  in  a  qualitative  as  well  as  in  a  quantitative 
sense.  He  is,  therefore,  able  to  say  that  one  activity  is  better  than 
another  irrespective  of  the  amount  of  pleasure  it  may  produce.  It  also 
means  that  he  assumes,  contrary  to  the  Benthamite  position,  that  something 
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other  than  pleasure  is  good  in  itself.  Whereas  the  classical  utilitarian 
has  to  admit  there  may  be  cases  when  people  may  be  happier  with  less 
rather  than  more  freedom,  Mill  emphasizes  the  intrinsic  value  of  being 
able  to  choose  for  oneself  which  constitutes  a  part  of,  as  well  as  an 
enabling  condition  for,  individual  self-realisation  and  happiness. 
Happiness,  for  Mill,  is  not  something  that  can  be  obtained  through  any 
means;  it  is  attainable  only  through  the  process  of  achieving  self-realisation 
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and  being  able  to  make  one's  oven  free  choices. 
"Utility  in  the  largest  sense",  in  Mill's  language,  refers  to  the 
anticipated  development  of  particular  kinds  of  human  beings  with  particular 
kinds  of  beliefs  and  values.  Mill's  utilitarianism  is  parasitic  upon 
his  particular  notions  of  individual  and  social  progress.  He  found  the 
classical  utilitarian  calculus  of  felicity  to  be  inadequate  and  drew 
upon  additional  basic  moral  principles,  such'as  justice  and  respect  for 
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persons  to  underpin  his  own  special  notion  of  utility.  Whereas  the 
classical  utilitarian  admits  any  means  to  happiness,  Mill  is  as  particular 
about  the  means  as  he  is  about  the  kind  of  happiness  that  ensues.  Whereas 
the  classical  utilitarian  is  obliged  to  consider  coercion  as  a  means  to 
happiness  if  its  effect  in  terms  of  pleasure  outweighs  the  harm  it  causes, 
Mill  regards  coercion  as  prima  facie  morally  unacceptable  unless  good 
reasons  can  be  found  to  justify  its  use. 
Having  apportioned  the  onus  of  justification,  and  having  established 
a 
the  need  for  justification,  Mill  isolates  reasons  for  intervening  in  the 
affairs  of  others  and  for  infringing  their  freedom  in  order  to  discover, 
by  a  process  of  elimination,  occasions  when  the  use  of  coercion  is  not 
justified,  which  is  really  his  main  concern.  The  use  of  coercion,  says 
Mills  is  justified  for  a  variety  of  reasons:  "to  prevent  harm  to  others", 
"for  self-protection",  "to  benefit  others",  "because  it  is  necessary  to 
the  interests  of  society",  "because  it  is  his  (coercer's)  duty  to  do  so". 
Reasons  given  by  Mill  as  not  justifying  the  use  of  coercion  refer  specifically 
to  the  coercee  and  include:  "for  his  (coercee's)  own  good",  "because  it 
would  be  better  for  him",  "because  it  will  make  him  happier",  "because  in 
the  opinion  of  others  to  do  so  would  be  wise  or  even  right".  In  stun, 
whilst  the  welfare  of  others  and  the  coercer  might  constitute  a  good 
reason  for  the  use  of  coercion,  the  welfare  of  the  coercee  will  not. 
Mill's  professed  "very  simple  principle",  that  the  only  purpose  for 
which  power  can  be  rightfully  exercised  over  any  member  of  a  civilised 
community  against  his  will  is  to  prevent  harm  to  others,  is  not  as  simple 
as  Mill  suggests.  Furthermore,  the  concomitant  distinction  between 
self-regarding  conduct,  which,  Mill  argues,  does  not  warrant  intervention 
because  it  does  not  harm  or  concern  others,  and  conduct  that  is  said  to 
harm  others,  which  is  therefore  their  concern,  must  be  qualified. 
It  is,  it  is  presumed,  universally  agreed  that  people  may  be  coerced 223 
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to  prevent  their  harming  others,  though  we  might  wish  to  dispute  the 
meaning  and  nature  of  harm  or  hurt  in  relation  to  different  and  particular 
circumstances.  Mill  does  not  seek  to  resolve  this  problem  by  balancing 
the  pain  or  satisfaction  ensuing  to  the  coercee  through  being  coerced 
against  the  pain  or  satisfaction  caused  by  the  coercee's  actions  towards 
others,  as  an  adherent  of  classical  utilitarianism  might  be  expected  to  do; 
instead,  he  appeals  to  duty,  and  fashions  his  arguments  around  notions  of 
consideration,  rights  and  interests,  justice  and  distribution,  as  the 
following  extract  from  'On  Liberty'  indicates. 
"Though  society  is  not  founded  on  a  contract,  and  though  no  good 
purpose  is  answered  by  inventing  a  contract  in  order  to  deduce  social 
obligations  from  it,  everyone  who  receives  the  protection  of  society  owes 
a  return  for  the  benefit,  and  the  fact  of  living  in  society  renders  it 
indispensable  that  each  should  be  bound  to  observe  a  certain  line  of  conduct 
towards  the  rest.  This  conduct  consists,  first,  in  not  injuring  the 
interests  of  one  another;  or  rather  certain  interests,  which,  either  by 
express  legal  provision  or  by  tacit  understanding,,  ought  to  be  considered 
as  rights;  and  secondly,  in  each  person's  bearing  his  share  (to  be  fixed 
on  some.  equitable  principle)  of  the  labours  and  sacrifices  incurred  for 
defending  the  society  or  its  members  from  injury  and  molestation.  These 
conditions  society  is  justified  in  enforcing,  at  all  costs  to-those  who 
endeavour  to  withhold  fulfilment.  Nor  is  this-all  that  society  may  do. 
The  acts  of  an  individual  may  be  hurtful  to  others,  or  wanting  in  due 
consideration  for  their  welfare,  without  going  to  the  length  of  violating 
any  of  their  constituted  rights.  The  offender  may  then  be  justly  punished 
by  opinion,  though  not  by  law.  As  soon  as  any  part  of  a  person's  conduct 
affects  prejudicially  the  interests  of  others,  society  has  jurisdiction 
over  it,  and  the  question,  whether  the  general  welfare  will  or  will  not 
be  promoted  by  interfering  with  it,  becomes  open  to  discussion.  But  there 
is  no  room  for  entertaining  any  such  question.  when  a  person's  conduct 
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affects  the  interests  of  no  persons  besides  himself,  or  needs  not  affect 
them  unless  they  like  (all  the  persons  concerned  being  of  full  age,  and 
the  ordinary  amount  of  understanding).  In  all  such  cases,  there  should 
be  perfect  freedom,  legal  and  social,  to  do  the  action  and,  stand  the 
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consequences.  " 
When  a  person's  conduct,  no  matter  how  eccentric,  fails  to  violate 
any  specific  social  or  public  duty,  says  Mill,  it  is  self-regarding,  and 
any  consequential  inconvenience  or  annoyance  simply  represents  the  price 
the  public  has  to  pay  for  the  maintenance  of  individual  liberty.  When, 
however,  a  person's  conduct  violates  "a  distinct  and  assignable  obligation", 
it  ceases  to  be,  in  Mill'  s  view,  self-regarding,  and  may  be  justifiably 
prevented  or  punished;  "No  person  ought  to  be  punished  simply  for  being 
drunk;  but  a  soldier  or  policeman  should  be  punished  for  being  drunk  on 
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duty.  "  Like:  vise,  if  a  man,  through  weakness  of  character,  fails  to 
organise  the  payment  of  his  debts  or  fails  to  support  the  family  he  has 
undertaken  to  rear,  he  should  be  punished,  not  for  his  personal  extravagance 
but  for  the  breach  of  his  duties  to  his  family  and  his  creditors. 
Mill  distinguishes  between  duties  and  self-regarding  faults  or  vices. 
He  implies  that  not  all  vices,  nor  all  virtues  for  that  matter,  need 
necessarily  incur  a  moral  obligation.  A  vice,  defect  or  undesirable 
character  trait,  or  an  undesirable  habit  like  smoking  or  chewing  tobacco, 
might,  say  on  empirical  grounds,  be  judged  to  be  injurious  to  health, 
but  it  need  not  constitute  a  moral  vice.  IL  G.  Singer  in  an  article 
entitled  'Duties  to  Oneself'  illustrates  this  distinction  as  follows: 
"In  saying  that  a  vice  is  an  undesirable  trait,  or  habit,  we  must 
distinguish  the  interests  with  respect  to  which  it  is  undesirable,  the 
person  or  groups  of  persons  for  whom  it  is  undesirable.  If  it  is  harmful 
to  the  person  who  has  it,  then  it  is  undesirable  with  respect  to  his 
interests,  and  thus  it  is  undesirable  from  the  point  of  view  of  prudence. 
It  is,  consequently,  a  self-regarding  or  prudential  vice.  On  the  other 225 
hand  if  it  is  harmful  to  another  or  to  society,  then  it  is  undesirable 
with  respect  to  their  interests  and  is  thus  morally  undesirable.  It  is 
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consequently  a  moral  vice.  " 
A  distinction  is  drawn  by  Mill  between  morality  and  law  on  the  one 
hand  and  prudence  and  aesthetics  on  the  other;  it  is  only  when  infringements 
occur  in  the  context  of  the  former  that  intervention  is  justified  in  the 
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form  of  sanctions  and  punishment.  Self-regarding  conduct  does  not  belong 
to  the  area  of  morality  or  law  and  therefore  does  not  warrant  sanctions. 
"Self-regarding  faults",  Mill  writes,  "..  are  not  properly  immoralities, 
and  to  whatever  pitch  they  may  be  carried  do  not  constitute  wickedness. 
They  may  be  proof  of  any  amount  of  folly,  or  want  of  personal  dignity 
and  self-respect;  but  they  are  only  a  subject  of  moral  reprobation  when 
they  involve  a  breach  of  duty  to  others,  for  whose  sake  the  individual  is 
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bound  to  have  care  for  himself.  "  It  is  the  cost  to  society  that  determines 
whether  sanctions  are  justifiable,  cost  measured  in  terms  of  the  harm 
experienced  by  others.  Self-regarding  conduct  that  does  not  harm  others 
is  not  subject  to  punishment  or  sanctions,  but  Mill  acknowledges  the 
legitimate  use  of  approval  and  disapproval  and  other  forms  of  persuasive 
intervention  such  as  expostulation,  exhortation  and  entreaty.  Compulsion, 
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however,  in  any  form  is  excluded. 
If  the  notion  of  duty  is  related  solely  to  the  interests  of  others, 
it  follows,  according  to  Hill's  reasoning,  that  duties  to  oneself  are  not 
proper  duties  at  all  and  ate  not  therefore  enforceable.  An  individual 
, 
says  Mill,  is  under  no  moral  obligation  to  others  with  regard  to  the 
nature  of  his  own  respect  for  self  or  for  his  own  self-development;  for 
neither  of  these  is  anyone  accountable  to  his  fellow  creatures,  because 
it  is  not  for  the  good  of  mankind  that  any  individual  should  be  held 
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accountable  in  these  respects.  Moral  and  legal  rules  are  backed  by 
sanctions  which  make  life  in  society  possible;  they  are  grounded  in  law 
or  organised  social  disapproval  as  categorical  imperatives.  Neglect  of 
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these  kinds  of  rules  would  make  life  impossible.  Liars  are  disapproved 
of  because  widespread  lying  would  make  life  extremely  difficult.  On  the 
other  hand  prudential  rules,  'Mill  supposes,  are  merely  hypothetical 
imperatives  grounded  in  nothing  but  the  agent's  personal  interests.  In 
this  way  Mill  distinguishes  between  acts  that  are  really  wrong,  which 
infringe  a  social  duty,  and  those  merely  foolish  or  unaesthetic,  which 
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concern  only  the  individual  himself. 
Objections  have  been  raised  to  the  distinction  Mill  makes  between 
self-regarding  and  other-regarding  actions;  even  Mill  did  not  believe 
that  an  absolute  distinction  existed  between  them.  "I  fully  admit",  Mill 
writes,  "that  the  mischief  which  a  person  does  to  himself  may  seriously 
affect,  both  through  their  sympathies  and  their  interests,  those  nearly 
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connected  with  him-and  in  a  minor  degree  society  at  large.  "  Mill  refers 
to  personal  defects  of  character  that  might  affect  the  sensibilities  of 
others  and  observes  that  no  individual  exists  as  a  completely  isolated 
being.  He  insists,  however,  that  it  is  only  when  such  behaviourial  defects 
violate  a  distinct  or  distinct  assignable  obligations  owed  to  another  that 
they  cease  to  be  exclusively  self-regarding.  Critics  of  Mill  point  out 
that  it  is  only  the  most  trivial  of  actions,  such  as  blowing  one's  nose 
or  cleaning  one's  teeth,  that  can  be  considered  as  having  no  significant 
effect  on  others  and  that  even  these  might  offend  hypersensitive  onlookers. 
Mill's  view  is  that  the  effects  of  such  acts  do  not  normally  constitute 
good  enough  reasons  for  intervention  and  are  not  sufficient  to  take  them 
out  of  the  self-regarding  class,  because  they  simply  instance  differences 
in  taste  and  personal  preference  rather  than  the  infringement  of  a  social 
obligation  or  duty.  Mill  concedes  that  self-regarding  actions  may  affect 
others  adversely  but  insists  that  the  effects  must  be  of  a  particular 
kind  in  order  to  warrant  imposing  upon  another  person's  will. 
There  is  some  inconsistency  in  Mill's  reasoning.  If  duty  is,  as 
Mill  suggests,  to  be  determined  by  social  consensus  and  prevailing 
standards  and  values,  then  his  liberty  principle  becomes  relativistic 227 
and  subject  to  the  will  of  the  majority,  which  is  contrary  to  his  declared 
intent  of  limiting  the  influence  of  the  majority  and  of  protecting 
31 
individuals  from  the  tyranny.  of  values  determined  in  this  way.  To 
obviate  this  difficulty  it  has  been  suggested  that  by  self-regarding 
actions  Mill  really  means  actions  that  do  not  violate  what  ought  to  be  the 
interests  of  others,  that  is  to  say  interests  determined  not  by  the 
consensus  of  contemporary  opinion  but  by  the  principle  of  utility  in  its 
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"largest  sense"  to  which  he  subscribed.  In  this  case  Mill's  liberty 
principle  may  be  regarded  as  being  not  an  absolute  principle  but  a 
secondary  principle,  like  keeping  one's  promises,  providing  rule  of  thumb 
and  day  to  day  guidance  whilst  at  the  same  time  being  ultimately  justified 
by  the  principle  of  utility.  Following  this  reasoning,  the  observance 
of  the  liberty  principle,  it  is  supposed,  will,  in  the  majority  of  cases 
and  as  a  general  rule,  maximize  happiness  though  there  may  be  some  times 
when  it  may  not,  and  Mill  is  represented  as  an  adherent  of  rule-utilitarianism. 
It  was  impossible  for  Mill  to  embrace  unconditionally  classical 
utilitarianism  and  at  the  same  time  to  maintain  the  distinction  he  made 
between  self-regarding  and  other-regarding  conduct.  As  a  classical 
utilitarian  he  would  not  have  been  able  to  exclude  from  his  calculation 
of  the  greatest  good  for  the  greatest  number  any  effects  at  all  of 
self-regarding  actions.  All  felt  pleasures,  desires,  pains  and  frustrations, 
of  whatever  kind  and  of  all  individuals,  must  collectively  be  included  in 
the  felicific  calculation  and  consequently  make  possible  the  justification 
of  behaviour  of  the  most  immoral  and  unjust  kind.  Supposing  we  assume, 
for  example,  that  in  Hitler's  Germany  all  the  Nazis,  who  outnumbered  the 
Jews,  wanted  all  Jews  to  be  exterminated,  then  the  avoidance  of  death 
by  one  solitary  innocent  Jew  would  be  sufficient  to  frustrate  the  will 
and  harm  the  intent  of  the  Nazi  majority.  The  more  fanatical  the  Nazis 
are  imagined  to  be,  the  more  they  will  feel  harmed  and  justified  in 
sending  the  innocent  Jew  to  his  death.  In  accordance  with  the  logic  of 228 
the  felicific  calculus  any  fanatical  group,  should  their  sensibilities 
be  harmed  by  the  innocent  behaviour  of  a  supposed  offending  minority, 
might  feel  justified  in  imposing  its  will  upon  its  supposed  antagonists. 
All  pleasures,  including  pleasures  of  malevolence,  must  be  included 
in  the  felicific  calculation.  For  this  reason,  Mill  did  not  find 
utilitarianism  in  its  traditional  form  to  be  capable  of  providing  an  - 
adequate  moral  basis  for  his  defence  of  freedom.  Pleasures  of  malevolence, 
that  is  to  say  pleasures  derived  from  pain  caused  to  others,  if  shared 
by  a  majority  may  lead  to  tyranny;  if  it  is  pleasing  to  the  majority  to 
see  Jews  punished,  then,  in  accord  with  the  felicific  calculus,  it  follows 
that  legislation  to  this  end  is  justified.  In  other  words,  if  the 
pleasures  derived  from  feelings  of  hatred  and  revenge  happen  to  outweigh 
the  anticipated  pain  likely  to  be  caused  to  those  coerced,  then  those 
pleasures  may  be  legitimately  enjoyed  and  sustained.  -Clearly,  a  strict 
interpretation  of  utilitarianism  along  these  lines  fails  to  provide  an 
adequate  means  of  distinguishing  between  right  and  wrong.  Immoral  acts, 
such  as  deliberately  surrendering  one  hostage's  life  to  save  the  lives 
of  several  others  or  sacrificing  the  life  of  one  patient  in  order  to  use 
his  organs  to  preserve  several  other  lives,  may,  following  this  kind  of 
reasoning,  be  judged  to  be  expedient  in  terms  of  enhancing  the  greatest 
good  of  the  greatest  number.  Mill's  distinction,  on  the  other  hand, 
between  self-regarding  and  other-regarding  conduct  is  dependent  upon  a 
qualitative  rather  than  a  crude  quantitative  interpretation  of  the 
principle  of  utility.  Consequently,  his  liberty  principle  is  only 
applicable  to  societies  that  have  already  reached  a  qualitative  stage  of 
moral  development.  - 
Mill's  notion  of  moral  wrongness  is  not  based  upon  and  is  quite 
independent  of  any  simple  utilitarian  calculation.  However,  once  he 
has  established  upon  moral  grounds  the  prima  facie  right  to  use  coercion, 
he  resorts  to  classical  utilitarian  arguments  to  justify  its  execution 229 
on  grounds  of  expediency,  whereupon  such  arguments  become  overriding. 
"If  anyone",  says  Mill,  "does  an  act  hurtful  to  others,  there  is  a  prima 
facie  case  for  punishing  him'by  law,  or,  where  legal  penalties  are  not 
safely  applicable,  by  general  disapprobation.  "  He  then  continues:  "There 
are  often  good  reasons  for  not  holding  him  to  the  responsibility;  but 
these  reasons  must  arise  from  the  special  expediencies  of  the  case:  either 
because  it  is  a  kind  of  case  in  which  he  is  likely  on  the  whole  to  act 
better,  when  left  to  his  own  discretion,  than  when  controlled  in  any  way 
in  which  society  have  it  in  their  power  to  control  him;  or  because  the 
attempt  to  exercise  control  would  produce  other  evils,  greater  than  those 
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which  it  would  prevent.  "  Neither  utility  in  its  classical  sense  nor 
Mill's  principle  of  obligation  is  individually  sufficient  to  justify  the 
use  of  coercion,  although  they  are  complementary  to  one  another.  Inexpedient 
acts  are  not  necessarily  morally  wrong,  nor  are  expedient  acts  necessarily 
morally  right,  and  Mill  is  not  willing  to  go  so  far  as  to  admit  a  morally 
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wrong  act  on  grounds  of  expediency  alone. 
Mill  states  a  preference  for  one  act  rather  than  another  on  the  grounds 
that  it  promotes  greater  utility,  maximizes  happiness,  and  is  in  this 
respect  expedient.  He  considers  an  act  inexpedient  if  it  fails  to 
maximize  utility,  but  he  does  not  confuse  inexpedient  acts  with  wrong  acts. 
Initially  Mill  decides  upon  moral  grounds  whether  coercion  is  appropriate, 
then  he  decides  whether  it  is  expedient  to  put  it  into  practice.  He  writes: 
"In  many  cases,  an  individual,  in  pursuing  a  legitimate  object,  necessarily 
and  therefore  legitimately  causes  pain  or  loss  to  others,  or  intercepts 
a  good  which  they  had  a  reasonable  hope  of  obtaining  .......  Whoever 
succeeds  in  an  overcrowded  profession,  or  in  a  competitive  examination; 
whoever  is  preferred  to  another  in  any  contest  for  an  object  which  both 
desire,  reaps  benefit  from  the  loss  of  others,  from  their  wasted  exertion 
and  their  disappointment.  But  it  is,  by  common  admission,  better  for 
the  general  interest  of  mankind,  that  persons  should  pursue  their  objects -77  7 
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undeterred  by  this  sort  of  consequences.  In  other  words,  society  admits 
no  right,  either  legal  or  moral,  in  the  disappointed  competitors  to 
immunity  from  this  kind  of  suffering;  and  feels  called  upon  to  interfere, 
only  when  means  of  success  have  been  employed  which  it  is  contrary  to 
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the  general  interest  to  permit  -  namely,  fraud  or  treachery,  and  force.  " 
Normal  competition  is  morally  acceptable,  in  Mill's  view,  though  it  may 
cause  pain  to  some,  but  trickery,  fraud,  and  treachery  are  never  morally 
acceptable  even  though  at  times  they  may  be  judged  to  be  expedient.  It 
is  the  moral  status  of  the  behaviour  in  question  which  determines  for 
Mill  whether  coercive  interference  is  justified,  not  a  simple  calculation 
of  consequences  in  terms  of  pleasure  and  pain. 
The  distinction  that  Mill  draws  between  self-regarding  and  other- 
regarding  conduct  is  at  variance  with  assumptions  that  philosophers 
usually  make  with  regard  to  the  nature  of  and  the  relation  between  what 
may  be  called  the  public  and  private  domains  of  morality.  Private 
morality,  it  is  normally  assumed,  is  based,  like  all  morality,  on  the 
Kantian  notion  of  respect  for  persons,  but  more  particularly  upon  the 
narrower  notion  of  the  individual's  respect  for  his  own  particular 
person  as  a  human  being.  Private  morality  is,  in  other  words,  "that 
aspect  of  morality  which  is  concerned  with  a  person's  duties  to  behave 
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as  a  human  being  regardless  of  the  utilities  of  acting  in  such  a  way". 
A  person  might  be  expected,  in  normal  circumstances,  to  show  respect 
for  the  distinctive  human  trait  of  rationality,  and  accordingly  to  act 
prudently  and  rationally,  and  thereby  morally,  taking  prudence  as  a 
moral  virtue. 
As  a  general  rule,  in  most  societies,  as  Mill  readily  admits, 
individual  members  are  not  usually  indifferent  to  the  kind  of  people 
their  fellow  citizens  may  become.  They  do  not  necessarily  draw  such 
a  sharp  distinction  between  public  and  private  life,  as  Mill  does,  nor 
do  they  always  regard  duty  as  explicable  only  in  terms  of  social 
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obligations  owed  to  others.  It  is  debatable  whether  duties  have  to  be 
regarded  as  being  essentially  social  and  therefore  enforceable  as  Mill 
suggests.  It  is  debatable  whether  duties  need  to  give  rise  in  all  cases 
to  reciprocal  rights.  It  is  possible,  for  example,  that  I  may  feel  I 
have  a  duty  to  give  to  the  needy  without  anyone  necessarily  having  the 
right,  legal  or  moral,  to  enforce  me  to  do  so.  Also,  I  may  feel  that 
I  have  a  duty  to  respect  my  own  person,  that  is  to  say  a  duty  concerning 
myself  rather  than  to  myself,  which  is  not  necessarily  enforceable  by 
any  other  person.  And  sometimes  these  duties  concerning  oneself  may 
conflict  with  and  even  override  duties  that  one  may  feel  towards  other 
people.  Such  would  be  the  facts  in  the  case  of  the  only  daughter  who 
feels  she  has  to  decide  in  favour  of  her  own  career  rather  than  the 
possibility  of  having  to  devote  her  whole  life  to  looking  after  an  aged 
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parent.  In  summ,  we  may  have  duties  concerning  ourselves  which  we  may 
feel  must  override  duties  and  feelings  of  obligation  to  others,  and  vice 
versa,  and  we  may  have  duties  both  to  others  and  concerning  ourselves 
that  are  not.  enforceable.  Mill's  distinction  between  self-regarding  and 
other-regarding  conduct,  which  is  based  upon  a  narrow  conception  of  the 
notion  of  duty,  seems  to  neglect  these  ways  in  which,  it  is  suggested, 
the  term  duty  might  be  quite  legitimately  and  properly  understood. 
brill  argues  that  no  self-regarding  fault  can  properly  be  called 
immoral,  which  implies,  of  course,  that  no  self-regarding  virtue  can 
properly  be  called  moral,  such  as  prudence  for  example,  and  that  a  person's 
private  conduct  cannot  be  subject  to  moral  praise  or  blame.  It  is  not 
Mill's  intent,  however,  that  such  conduct  should  pass  unheeded.  In  the 
fourth  chapter  of  'On  Liberty'  Mill  suggests  that  self-regarding  faults, 
such  as  rashness,  obstinacy,  self-conceit,  the  pursuit  of  animal 
pleasures  at  the  expense  of  those  of  feeling  and  intellect,  though  only 
of  concern  to  the  individual  himself,  and  not  seriously  or  directly 
affecting  others,  may  nevertheless  be  judged.  A  person,  for  instance, 
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might  be  called  a  fool,  or  he  might  be  told  that  he  is  not  up  to  scratch 
or  at  fault,  or  he  might  be  ignored.  "In  these  various  modes",  says  Mill, 
"a  person  may  suffer  very  severe  penalties  at  the  hands  of  others  for 
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faults  which  directly  concern  only  himself".  But  these  penalties,  says 
Mill,  are  "natural"  penalties  or  "the  spontaneous  consequences  of  the 
faults  themselves"  which  do  not  warrant  punishment  or  the  enforced 
sanctions  of  organised  coercion  expressed  through  the  agencies  of  law, 
government,  or  society.  What  are  called  "duties  to  ourselves",  says 
Mill,  are  not  socially  obligatory  unless  circumstances  render  them  at 
the  same  time  duties  to  others. 
Mill's  argument  in  'On  Liberty'  is  initially  anarchistic.  He 
assumes  that  individuals  are  perfectly  able  on  their  own  to  achieve 
self-fulfilment,  to  determine  right  and  wrong,  and  to  achieve  self-realisation 
within  an  ideal,  free  and  progressive  society.  He  is  not,  however,  fully 
confident  in  the  ability  of  human  beings  to  follow  what  he  believes  to  be 
their  true  destiny  and  introduces  the  harm  principle  to  isolate  the  sort 
of  behaviour  that  regrettably  requires  to  be  monitored  with  the  aid  of 
coercive  sanctions  and  punishment.  Mill  argues  that  only  harm  to  others 
is  sufficient  to  warrant  coercive  intervention;  it  is  necessary  therefore 
to  establish  what  harm  really  is  and  what  Mill  understands  by  a  breach  of 
duty  and  the  observance  of  social  obligations. 
Nowhere  in  'On  Liberty'  does  Mill  attempt  to  defend  or  to  justify 
his  harm  principle;  he  simply  makes  reference  to  it,  uses  it,  and  offers 
various  illustrations.  He  specifically  refers  to  actions  that  directly 
affect  others,  which  he  claims  are  harmful,  and  distinguishes  them  from 
actions  that  affect  others  only  indirectly,  which  he  argues  are  not 
harmful.  The  effects  of  the  former  are  considered  to  be  contingent  and 
the  effects  of  the  latter  remote.  In  Mill's  view,  self-regarding  actions 
affect  others  only  indirectly  and  therefore  do  not  warrant  coercive 233 
intervention,  because  they  are  not  considered  to  constitute  a  sufficient 
degree  of  haha.  Mill's  harm  principle  is  presented  in  a  variety  of  ways 
and  is  deserving  of  attention  if  only  because  the  terms  he  uses,  namely 
rights  and  interests,  to  explain  the  nature  of  harm  are  not  themselves 
without  ambiguity. 
Mill  suggests  that  it  is  the  infringement  of  assignable  rights  and 
interests  that  constitutes  the  kind  of  harm  that  is  sufficient  to  justify 
a  prima  facie  case  for  coercive  intervention.  It  is  only  when  a  person 
violates  a  distinct  and  assignable  obligation  owed  to  another,  says  Mill, 
that  the  case  is  taken  out  of  the  self-regarding  class  and  becomes  subject 
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to  moral  disapprobation.  Mill  is  loath  to  subscribe,  out  of  respect  for 
individual  liberty,  to  a  wide  concept  of  harm  which  might  entail  seeing 
interests  in  terms  of  any  felt  desire  or  frustration;  for  then  he  would 
have  to  concede  that  any  political  or  religious  fanatic,  or  any  eccentric 
for  that  matter,  whose  interests,  however  outrageous  or  trivial,  happen 
to  be  denied,  is  thereby  harmed  and  deserving  of  protection  by  the  state 
and  society. 
The  concept  of  right  and  the  concept  of  interest  are  related,  but 
they  are  not  synonymous.  A  right  is  not  necessarily  entailed  by  an 
interest;  it  is  perfectly  possible  for  a  person  to  have  an  interest  in 
something  without  necessarily  having  a  right  to  it.  Mill  does  not  say 
specifically  that  he  considers  rights  and  interests  to  be  identical,  but 
he  seems  to  assume  that  a  relation  of  sorts  does  exist  between  them.  He 
does  not  specify  how  he  is  using  the  term  interest,  but  there  is  nothing 
to  suggest  that  he  is  using  the  team  in  any  particularly  unique  or  special 
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way.  In  normal  parlance,  'having  an  interest'  suggests  that  a  person 
has  some  sort  of  claim,  proprietary  right,  title,  or  share  in  something, 
which  is  recognised  as  valid  and  valuable  or  at  least  worthy  of  consideration 
and  protection.  Not  all  interests,  however,  are  legal,  nor  are  they 
necessarily  related  to  rights  or  claims  in  either  a  legal  or  moral  sense. TIT, 
234 
We  say  things  are  of  interest  to  people  and  that  people  are  interested 
in  things.  People  are  said  to  have  interests  in  the  sense  of  being 
interested  in  something  or  other,  which  interests  may  be  of  a  variety  of 
kinds,  aesthetic,  technical,  academic,  leisure,  long  term,  short  term, 
and  so  on.  People  are  sometimes  said  to  have  vested  interests  in  their 
interests  in  so  far  as  they  may  have  devoted  a  considerable  portion  of 
their  personal  resources  to  them.  In  no  sense,  however,  are  interests 
such  as  these  necessarily  related  to  the  notion  of  a  proprietary  right 
or  claim  against  another  person.  The  term  interests  may  imply  tastes, 
attitudes,  wants,  desires,  whims,  fancies,  or  arbitrary  wishes. 
Mill's  notion  of  interest  is  seemingly  grounded  in  the  assumption 
that  there  are  certain  goods  that  may  be  conceived  as  interests  in  a 
proprietary  sense  giving  rise  to  claims  of  a  legal  and/or  moral  kind. 
Such  goods  include  institutionalised  rules,  such  as  rules  of  possession, 
rules  of  freedom  of  thought  and  action,  and  the  consequential  rights 
and  duties.  These  goods,  according  to  Mill,  are  essential  for  the 
well-being  of  individuals  and  the  stability  of  society  and  for  these 
reasons  are  worthy  of  protection.  This  notion  of  the  infringement  of 
rules,  rules  of  property,  rules  regulating  the  distribution  of  power 
and  influence  in  society,  rules  of  contract,  fair  trading  and  just 
competition,  all  of  which  are  considered  to  be  necessary  for  the  survival 
of  a  good  and  progressive  society,  is  central  to  Mill's  concept  of  harm. 
The  idea  of  interest,  for  Mill,  includes  all  that  society  thinks  is  good 
for  its  individual  members  and  for  society  as  a  whole.  The  basic  interest 
is  of  course  liberty,  from  which  other  interests  are  derived  and  which 
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itself,  like  all  other  interests,  must  be  protected. 
To  conceive  the  notion  of  interest  in  terms  of  a  claim  or  right, 
whether  legal  and/or  moral,  and  harm  as  an  invasion  of  such  an  interest 
has  the  advantage  of  enabling  the  appraisal  of  different  kinds  of  harms 
to  be  made  by  distinguishing  different  kinds  of  interests.  In  other ý'  ýý 
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words,  whilst  some  interests  might  be  considered  important  enough  to 
merit  various  degrees  of  social  or  state  intervention  other  'interests' 
might  be  considered  so  trivial  as  to  warrant  neither.  The  latter, 
giving  rise  to  no  proprietary  claim  whatsoever,  are  regarded  by  Mill  as 
constituting  no  kind  of  harm  at  all.  Mill  discusses  the  sort  of  behaviour 
that  he  considers  to  be  particularly  injurious  and  harmful  to  others  and 
makes  reference  to  serious  moral  vices,  and  dispositions  tending  towards 
the  same,  and  more  especially  to  malice,  ill-nature,  envy,  dissimulation, 
insincerity,  and  "pride  which  derives  gratification  from  the  abasement  of 
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others.  " 
The  notion  of  interest  is  clearly  related  in  Mill's  thought  to  the 
notion  of  obligation  and  the  concept  of  duty.  Mill  admits  of  no  specific 
contract  in  society,  but  he  does  recognise  that  when  anyone  receives 
protection  from  society  he  morally  owes  some  return  for  the  benefit. 
He  suggests,  for  instance,  that  society  is  justified  in  enforcing  three 
main  obligations,  namely,  obedience  to  accepted  rules  of  conduct,  an 
undertaking  not  to  injure  each  others'  interests,  and  an  obligation  to 
share  the  burden  of  protecting  and  defending  society.  Hurt  or  harm  to 
other  peoples'  interests  may,  he  explains,  be  caused  by  omissions  which, 
presumably,  may  be  conceived  either  as  a  case  of  overt  physical  inaction 
or  more  positively  as  a  mental  act  or  decision  not  to  take  physical  action. 
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omissions,  says  Mill,  may  constitute  a  dereliction  of  duty.  He  argues 
that  there  are  certain  positive  acts  for  the  benefit  of  others'  interests 
which  individuals  may  rightfully  be  compelled  to  perform,  such  as  giving 
evidence  in  court,  defending  one's  country,  saving  another  person's  life, 
and  interposing  to  protect  the  defenceless  against  ill  usage.  This  does 
not  imply  that  Mill  is  advocating  that  people  should  be  coerced  to  act 
for  the  positive,  gratuitous  benefit  of  others  indiscriminately, 
_but 
that  he  is  advocating  the  prevention  of  anticipated  harm  by  the  justified 
use  of  coercion.  Under  positive  acts  for  the  benefit  of  others  Mill 236 
includes  acts  of  co-operation  and  also  'good  Samaritan  acts'  which  are 
clearly  meant  to  prevent  or  to  limit  harm  rather  than  to  positively  promote 
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additional  benefits.  In  other  words,  following  Mill's  reasoning,  I  may 
be  required  to  come  to  the  aid  of  another  to  prevent  further  harm  accruing 
to  him  on  the  grounds  that  he  will  surely  suffer  should  I  fail  to  help 
him  when  I  can,  even  though  I  am  not  responsible  in  any  way  for  his 
original  predicament.  This  would  be  the  case,  for  example,  were  I 
accidentally  to  stumble  upon  a  swimmer  in  difficulty  who  might  drown 
without  my  immediate  assistance  being  given. 
Mill  is  vague  with  regard  to  the  extent  to  which  the  duty  to  prevent  harm 
should  be  pursued.  He  appears  to  want  to  limit  the  implications  that 
the  harm  principle  might  have  in  this  respect.  He  writes:  "A  person 
may  cause  evil  to  others  not  only  by  his  actions  but  by  his  inaction, 
and  in  either  case  he  is  justly  accountable  to  them  for  the  injury.  The 
latter  case,  it  is  true,  requires  a  much  more  cautious  exercise  of 
compulsion  than  the  former.  To  make  anyone  answerable  for  doing  evil  to 
others  is  the  rule;  to  make  him  answerable  for  not  preventing  evil  is, 
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comparatively  speaking,  the  exception.  "  Mill  hesitates  to  conflate 
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failing  to  prevent  harm  into  causing  harm  as  a  general  principle. 
Logically,  he  may  have  extended  the  application  of  the  harm  principle 
to  include  a  variety  of  compulsory  collective  actions  including,  for 
example,  the  enforced  payment  of  taxes  to  provide  social  benefits  or 
goods  without  which  members  of  society  might  be  judged  to  be  deprived. 
Inadequate  medical  or  educational  facilities,  the  lack  of  provision  for 
basic  needs  such  as  food  and  shelter,  denial  of  the  fundamental  necessities 
of  a  civilised  life,  may  all,  it  is  suggested,  be  quite  legitimately 
regarded  as  harmful  to  the  interests  of  those  deprived  in  these  ways  and 
may  be  considered  to  constitute  sufficient  grounds  for  the  organisation 
of  collective  measures  for  their  prevention  supported,  if  necessary,  by 
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the  use  of  coercive  sanctions. 
"  Mill  was  apparently  conscious  of  the  difference  between  claiming 237 
that  people  have  the  right  to  stop  others  harming  them  and  claiming 
the  right  to  punish  all  omissions  of  conduct.  He  was  also  presumably 
aware  of  the  distinction  between  conduct  that  is  claimed  to  be  right  and 
conduct  that  is  obligatory  because  others  are  deemed  to  have  a  right 
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against  a  person  that  is  enforceable.  It  is  presumably  right  to  give 
to  the  needy  and,  all  things  considered,  it  is  presumably  right  to  try 
to  rescue  a  drowning  man,  but  it  is  debatable  whether  the  needy  have 
a  right  to  expect  charity  or  whether  a  drowning  man  has  the  right  to 
expect  others  to  risk  their  lives  and  to  act  beyond  the  course  of  duty, 
say  as  saints  or  heroes  or  even  fools,  in  attempting  to  save  him.  Mill 
can  be  accused  of  confusing  conduct  that  is  right  with  conduct  that  is 
obligator,  when  he  argues  that  a  man  may  be  punished  for  not  saving 
another  man's  life  or  for  not  defending  his  country,  leaving  aside  a  man's 
right  to  be  a  conscientious  objector.  Mill  may  have  been  conscious  of 
some  ambiguity  in  his  argument  which  might  explain  why  he  refrains  from 
stipulating  absolutely  that  society  has  the  right  to  punish  all  omissions 
of  conduct  whatsoever.  To  have  taken  such  a  view  would,  of  course,  have 
jeopardized  his  declared  coiraitment  to  freedom  and  individual  liberty. 
It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,.  that  he  hesitates  to  claim  that,  as  a 
general  rule,  a  person  is  answerable  for  not  preventing  evil.  On  the 
contrary,  Mill  insists  that  in  normal  circumstances  intent  and  knowledge 
are  essential  before  punishment  may  be  justified  and  that  a  person  must 
be  aware  of  his  wrongdoing  or  of  the  effects  of  his  inaction  on  others. 
This  is  in  keeping  with  Mill's  moral  stance  and  his  liberty  principle 
v&  ich  are  both  opposed  to  the  harm  principle  being  interpreted  as  a  rule 
of  strict  liability. 
Certain  adverse  but  indirect  effects  upon  other  people,  such  as 
offence  to  their  beliefs,  prejudices,  tastes  and  preferences,  causing 
feelings  of  repugnance,  outrage  or  disgust,  are  in  Mill's  view  trivial,, 
and  do  not  in  themselves  constitute  sufficient  evidence  of  harm  as  to 238 
warrant  coercive  intervention  to  prevent  them.  They  do  not,  according 
-  to  Mill,  amount  to  harm  in  terms  of  the  invasion  of  any  publicly 
recognised  claim  or  right.  Conduct  giving  rise  to  such  effects  Mill 
classifies  as  self-regarding  and  as  not  directly  affecting  in  any 
proprietary  sense  the  interests  of  others  because  it  does  not  obviously 
breach  any  recognised  assignable  obligation.  Mill  writes:  "There  are 
many  who  consider  as  an  injury  to  themselves  any  conduct  which  they  have  a 
distaste  for,  and  resent  it  as  an  outrage  to  their  feelings;  -as  a  religious 
bigot,  when  charged  with  disregarding  the  religious  feelings  of  others, 
has  been  known  to  retort  that  they  disregard  his  feelings,  by  persisting 
in  their  abominable  worship  or  creed.  But  there  is  no  parity  between 
the  feeling  of  a  person  for  his  own  opinion,  and  the  feeling*  of  another 
who  is  offended  at  his  holding  it;  no  more  than  between-the  desire  of  a 
thief  to  take  a  purse,  and  the  desire  of  the'right  owner  to  keep  it. 
And  a  person's  taste  is  as  much  his  own  peculiar  concern  as-his  opinion 
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or  his  purse.  " 
Mill  suggests  that  we'might  find  it  unjust  if,  being  in  a  minority, 
the  majority  disapproved  of  our  beliefs  and  arbitrarily  prohibited  them. 
Like.  7ise,  he  suggests  that,  were  wein  a  majority,  we  would  have  no 
grounds  for  prohibiting  other  people'  s'  conduct  merely  because  it  offended 
us,  or  caused  us  displeasure.  Mill  prefers  to  rely  upon  knowledge, 
understanding'  and  education  as  determinants  of  moral  judgment  rather 
than  instinct,  intuition,  emotion,  superstition  and  gut  reactions. 
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Assuming  this  is  Mill's  position,  as  some  philosophers  suggest,  the 
effects  may  at  first  seem  to  be  disturbing.  It  is  implied,  for  instance, 
that  no  intervention  by  the  state  or  society,  using  coercive  measures, 
is  justified  on  the  grounds  of  distress  being  caused  to  oneself  or  offence 
to  one's  moral  values  on  the  following  occasions:  the  desecration  of 
the  Sabbath  by  Sunday  revellers,  the  use  of  property  in  one's  neighbourhood 
by  known  homosexuals  and  prostitutes,  distasteful  behaviour  by  anti-Jewish 239 
fanatics  holding  a  rally  before  a  memorial  to  Jewish  war  dead,  an 
insensitive  and  provocative  demonstration  or  march  deliberately  organised 
to  denigrate  and  antagonise  some  minority  immigrant  group. 
It  is  not  just  a  matter  of  individual  liberty  but  the  role  of 
feeling  in  the  constitution  of  moral  judgments  that  is  in  question,  whether 
in  fact  the  state  or  society  is  ever  justified  in  intervening  to  protect 
an  individual's  values  or  feelings.  Some  philosophers  stress  the 
significance  of  feeling,  experience  and  intuition  in  the  formation  and 
expression  of  a  person's  moral  sense.  Dame  Mary  Warnock,  for  example, 
argues  that  during  the  course  of  pregnancy  it  is  of  paramount  importance 
that  the  personal  feelings  of  the  prospective  mother  should  at  all  times 
be  heeded  and  respected,  and  that  she  should  always  be  consulted  before 
any  decision  is  taken  to  interfere  with  the  foetus  growing  within  her 
body.  It  is  not  sufficient,  Warnock  argues,  to  simply  rely  upon  a 
computative,  utilitarian  calculation  and  to  conclude  that  such  interference 
is  justified  on  the  grounds  that  future  benefits  may  outweigh  the 
disadvantages,  that  such  a  move  would  be  better  for  the  woman's  health, 
her  future  life,  or  for  medical  research  in  general  and  for  future 
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generations.  In  other  words  there  are  occasions  when  a  person's  feelings 
may  have  to  be  respected  and  if  necessary  protected  by  society  or  the 
state. 
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The  notion  of  morality  related  harm,  that  is  to  say  harm  caused 
by  offence  to  a  person's  moral  sense  or  feelings,  is  illustrative  of  the 
difficulties  involved  in  determining  the  nature  and  degree  of  harm 
required  to  justify  the  use  of  coercion  on  the  grounds  of  the  infringement 
of  people's  interests.  Mill  is  aware  that  the  reactions  of  individuals 
vary  and  that  observers  in  turn  will  differ  in  their  estimation  of  the 
reactions  they  observe  and  whether  they  are  reasonable  and  justify  the 
use  of  coercive  measures.  Mill's  opinion  is  that  the  liberty  of 
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individuals  should  not  be  limited  by  the  likings  and  dislikings  of  others 
and  that  a  person's  distaste  or  displeasure  should  not  constitute 240 
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harm  sufficient  to  warrant  intervention.  This  of  course  is  in  accord 
with  Mill's  fundamental  suspicion  of  the  irrational  nature  of  certain 
human  feelings,  prejudices,  opinions,  intuitions  and  preferences,  especially 
if  they  should  lead  to  certain  people  imposing  their  views  in  an 
authoritarian  way  upon  others.  This  could  happen,  says  Mill,  if  Muslims, 
offended  by  the  eating  of  pork,  prevented  the  eating  of  pork  by  everyone 
else,  or  if  a  Roman  Catholic  majority  prohibited  all  other  forms  of 
worship  that  they  disliked,  or  if  a  Calvinist  majority  banned  all 
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amusements  that  they  considered  frivolous.  The  offence  caused  by  the 
activities  instanced  in  these  three  cases  does  not,  in  Mill's  view, 
justify  interference  by  those  who  claim  to  be  offended  to  prohibit  them; 
on  the  contrary,  Mill  thinks  the  maintenance  of  freedom  of  action,  thought 
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and  expression  in  these  three  particular  cases  to  be  far  more  important. 
These  three  examples  suggest  that  Mill  regards  morality  dependent  harm 
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as  irrelevant  within  the  context  of  his  concept  of  the  harm  principle. 
Of  course,  aesthetically,  in  the  exercise  of  good  manners,  we 
customarily  respect  the  idiosyncratic  likings,  dislikings  and  tastes  of 
other  people.  We  politely  ask  people  whether  they  mind  if  we  smoke, 
turn  the  television  on,  play  the  drums,  and  so  on,  because  we  are 
presumably  conscious  of  the  distress  or  offence  our  actions  might  possibly 
cause  them.  In  this  respect  we  take  account  of  their  feelings,  sometimes 
but  not  all  the  time,  but  from  an  exclusively  aesthetic  point  of  view. 
There  are  several  occasions  when  Mill  apprears  to  make  a  move 
towards  recognition  of  the  notion  of  morality  dependent  harm  and  to 
recognise  offended  feelings  as  justifying  a  course  of  action  against 
others  in  order  to  eradicate  their  cause.  He  suggests  that  speech  that 
is  offensive  to  people's  feelings  should  be  open  to  social  and  moral 
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censure,  though  not  open  to  legal  interference.  He  admits  to  the 
possibility  of  intervention  when  a  man  "fails  in  the  consideration 
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generally  due  to  the  interests  and  feelings  of  others...  "  He  rejects 241 
the  notion  that  individuals  have  the  right  to  pursue  courses  of  action 
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regardless  of  their  effects.  On  the  weight  of  evidence  in  'On  Liberty', 
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however,  as  T.  Honderich  suggests,  Mill  never  seems  to  actually  question 
specifically  whether  morality  dependent  harm  as  such  should  be  ignored 
in  all  cases  whatever  the  effects.  We  must  therefore  conclude  that 
morality  dependent  harm  is  not  one  of  Mill's  basic  beliefs. 
Mill's  estimation  of  the  status  of  feeling  as  a  basis  of  moral 
judgment  and  as  a  factor  establishing  the  presence  of  harm  is  based 
upon  a  qualitative  judgment  of  the  nature  of  the  feelings  concerned. 
Some  feelings,  those  of  an  intellectual,  rational  and  socially  recognised 
kind,  he  is  prepared  to  consider,  others  of  a  basic,  'felt',  personal 
and  instinctive  nature  he  rejects.  He  recognises  that  feelings  of  the 
former  kind  may  be  adversely  affected  by  the  actions  of  others  and  that 
this  should  be  noted  out  of  respect  for  the  person  as  an  individual  and 
a  human  being.  Feelings  of  revulsion,  anger,  outrage,  and  feelings 
arising  from  offence  caused  to  a  person's  aesthetic  sensibilities,  on 
the  grounds  of  their  being  in  all  probability  of  a  trivial,  personal  and 
subjective  nature,  Mill  suggests,  are  preferably  better  just  lived  with 
or  even  ignored.  In  terms  of  expediency  alone  Mill  argues  that  in  the 
majority  of  cases,  when  such  feelings  are  aroused,  the  cost  of  eradicating 
the  cause  is  frequently  greater  than  the  cost  of  bearing  the  inconvenience 
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caused  by  the  offence  itself. 
Mill  allows  one  exception  to  this  rule.  If  the  conduct  that  is 
claimed  to  give  rise  to  such  feelings  of  disgust  or  rage  is  judged  also 
to  be  a  breach  of  a  public  duty,  say  a  breach  of  the  peace,  as  well  as 
an  offence  to  people's  aesthetic  sensibilities,  then  in  Mill's  view  it 
is  an  offence  amounting  to  a  public  nuisance,  such  as  indecent  behaviour 
in  a  public  place,  and  the  state  is  justified  in  intervening  to  prevent 
its  occurring.  Mill  unfortunately  does  not  choose  to  elaborate  on  this 
issue;  he  dismisses  the  question  of  public  nuisances  in  one  small  passage: 242 
"Again,  there  are  many  acts  which,  being  directly  injurious  only  to  the 
agents  themselves,  ought  not  to  be  legally  interdicted,  but  which,  if 
done  publicly,  are  a  violation  of  good  manners,  and  coming  thus  within 
the  category  of  offences  against  others,  may  rightly  be  prohibited.  Of 
this  kind  are  offences  against  decency;  on  which  it  is  unnecessary  to 
dwell,  the  rather  as  they  are  only  connected  indirectly  with  our  subject, 
the  objection  to  publicity  being  equally  strong  in  the  case  of  many  actions 
63 
not  in  themselves  condemnable,  nor  supposed  to  be  so.  " 
Mill  does  not  base  his  case  for  the  limitation  of  state  intervention 
in  the  affairs  of  men  upon  one  absolute  principle  such  as  the  right  of  all 
individuals  to  be  free  from  state  interference,  nor  on  a  simple  quantitative 
utilitarian  calculation.  He  appeals  to  several  fundamental  moral 
principles  such  as  justice  and  respect  for  persons,  as  well  as  a  qualitative 
assessment  of  what  he  regards  as  a  good  life  within  a  good  society.  He 
excludes  certain  feelings  as  being  relevant  and  as  providing  sufficient 
reason  to  justify  the  state  being  obliged  to  intervene  to  restrain  the 
conduct  of  those  who  give  rise  to  them.  When,  however,  a  public  duty  is 
broken  Mill  argues  that  a  good  and  relevant  reason  exists  for  the  state 
to  enforce  it,  if  necessary  by  coercive  means.  In  Mill's  view  society 
will  always  be  expected  to  have  to  put  up  with  some  disrespectful,  impolite, 
offensive  behaviour,  even  in  public  places,  so  long  as  the  cost  of 
exercising  such  forbearance  is  less  than  the  cost  of  intervening.  Mill 
rules  out  banning  the  sale  of  pornographic  literature  on  the  sole  grounds 
that  it  offends  people's  sensibilities;  but,  if  its  continued  publication 
is  likely  to  lead  to  the  moral  degeneration  of  society  or  increased 
sexual  licence,  then  he  would  consider  state  intervention  to  prohibit 
publication  to  be  justified  for  these  additional  reasons.  So  far  as  Mill 
is  concerned  moral  issues  are  clearly  matters  of  fact  rather  than  matters 
of  taste,  and  should  be  determined  by  reason  rather  than  passion. 243 
Philosophers  dispute  the  basis  of  moral  judgment.  Some  argue  that 
morality  is  based  on  reason  and  some  that  it  is  based  upon  a  supernatural 
force,  such  as  the  will  of  God,  whilst  others  stress  the  role  of  intuition 
and  feeling  and,  like  Hume,  claim  that  morality  is  "more  properly  felt 
than  judged  of".  In  Hume's  view  our  moral  sense  arises  from  impressions 
formed  in  the  mind;  that  is  to  say,  we  sense  a  certain  satisfaction,  some 
pleasure,  from  the  contemplation  of  a  character  which  we  perceive  is 
virtuous.  We  feel  that  the  object  of  our  attention  is  virtuous  and  are 
aware  that  feelings  can  only  be  felt  and  not  deduced  from  any  other  source. 
Morality,  in  other  words,  is  caught  rather  than  taught,  and  is  intuitively 
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expressed  in  a  person's  feelings.  But  Mill  sees  interests  in  terms  of 
rights,  not  feelings,  and  is  not  committed  to  an  analysis  of  feeling  as 
a  basis  of  moral  judgment.  Mill  sees  moral  judgments  as  statements  of 
fact  with  objectivity  grounded  in  the  consensus  of  reasonably  intelligent 
human  beings.  Only  in  so  far  as  an  individual's  feelings  or  beliefs 
accord  with  this  consensus  are  they  recognised  by  Mill  as  having  any 
moral  status,  as  being  capable  of  being  harmed,  and  as  being  worthy  of 
protection. 
Mill  distinguishes  interests  which  are  important,  the  infringement 
of  which  breaks  a  moral  or  legal  rule  and  which  are  deserving  of  protection, 
from  other  interests  of  a  more  trivial  kind  which  may  warrant  disapproval 
but  which  it  is  often  better  to  ignore.  He  does  not  regard  all  interests 
as  identical  to  rights,  but  by  linking  the  concept  of  interest  with  the 
concept  of  right  he  gives  the  notion  of  interest  a  proprietary  meaning 
that  suggests  a  sort  of  claim  or  entitlement.  In  'Utilitarianism'  he 
writes:  "Then  we  call  anything  a  person's  right,  we  mean  that  he  has  a 
valid  claim  on  society  to  protect  him  in  the  possession  of  it,  either  by 
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the  force  of  law,  or  by  that  of  education  and  opinion.  "  And  he  continues: 
"To  have  a  right,  then,  is,  I  conceive,  to  have  something  which  society 
ought  to  defend  me  in  the  possession  of.  "  Rights  and  interests  are  not 244 
synonymous,  and  Mill  does  not  regard  them  as  such.  He  refers  to  the  notion 
of  rights  to  illustrate  the  kinds  of  interests  he  has  in  mind.  In  'On 
Liberty'  it  is  principally  legal  interests  worthy  of  protection  by  law 
rather  than  by  opinion  that  he  is  concerned  with.  He  recognises  that  there 
are  other  kinds  of  'interests'  that  do  not  require  legal  protection,  and 
he  does  not  exclude  the  possibility  of  these  'interests'  being  related 
to  'rights'  but  not  rights  of  a  legally  constituted  kind.  Mill's  notion 
of  interest  in  the  context  of  the  ha=  principle  is  essentially  narrow 
in  scope,  but  it  is  is  keeping  with  his  notion  of  morality  and  social 
obligation. 
Whereas  Mill  qualifies  the  limits  which  he  proposes  should  be 
imposed  upon  the  use  of  coercion  by  the  state  and  society  to  prevent 
harm  caused  by  other-regarding  conduct,  his  proposed  prohibition  of  the 
coercion  of  another  person  for  that  person's  own  good  is  absolute.  Mill 
rejects  paternalism  in  the  case  of  mature  adults  in  full  control  of 
their  faculties.  Self-protection,  in  Mill's  view,  is  never  a  sufficient 
or  good  enough  reason  to  justify  coercing  any  person,  even  if  it  is  claimed 
to  be  for  his  own  good:  "His  own  good,  either  physical  or  moral,  is  not 
a  sufficient  warrant.  He  cannot  rightfully  be  compelled  to  do  or  forbear 
because  it  will  be  better  for  him  to  do  so,  because  it  will  make  him 
happier,  because,  in  the  opinions  of  others,  to  do  so  would  be  wise,  or 
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even  right.  " 
Mill's  firm  stance  on  this  issue  is  contrary  to  the  usual,  qualified 
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admonitions  he  offers  on  other  moral  issues,  and  is  out  of  keeping  with 
what  might  be  expected  of  him  as  an  empirically  minded  utilitarian.  In 
discussing  a  prohibition  against  lying  in  'Utilitarianism',  for  example., 
Mill  is  tentative  and  aware  of  exceptions  to  the  rule:  "Yet  that  even 
this  rule,  sacred  as  it  is,  admits  of  possible  exceptions,  is  acknowledged 
by  all  moralists;  the  chief  of  which  is  when  the  withholding  of  some 245  -I 
fact  (as  of  information  from  a  malefactor,  or  of  bad  news  from  a  person 
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dangerously  ill)  would  save  an  individual...  from  great  and  unmerited  evil..  " 
And  a  similar  approach  is  evident  in  his  discussion  of  justice:  "..  it  is 
confessedly  unjust  to  break  faith  with  any  one:  to  violate  an  engagement, 
either  express  or  implied,  or  disappoint  expectations  raised  by  our  own 
conduct,  at  least  if  we  have  raised  those  expectations  knowingly  and 
voluntarily.  Like  the  other  obligations  of  justice  already  spoken  of, 
this  one  is  not  regarded  as  absolute,  but  as  capable  of  being  overruled 
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by  a  stronger  obligation  of  justice  on  the  other  side...  " 
Mill's  case  against  paternalism  is  clear  enough.  Since  the  conduct 
in  question  is  of  the  self-regarding  kind  it  is  not  possible  to  appeal  to 
the  protection  of  the  interests  of  others  as  a  reason  for  intervention, 
so  reasons  must  be  sought  in  the  anticipated  enhancement  of  the  victim's 
own  interests,  his  own  good,  his  'happiness  and  welfare.  Mill's  conclusion 
is  that  it  is  not  possible  to  improve  a  person's  interests  by  compulsion, 
force,  or  by  coercing  him,  to  attempt  to  do  so  precipitates  evils  greater 
than  the  good  intended.  Mill  argues  that  normally  a  person  knows  his 
own  interests  best,  and  stresses  the  unique  status  of  the  individual  as 
judge  of  his  own  interests  and  welfare:  "If  a  person  possesses  any 
tolerable  amount  of  commonsense  and  experience,  his  own  mode  of  laying  out 
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his  existence  is  best...  because  it  is  his  own  mode.  " 
An  authodox  utilitarian  can  only  argue  against  paternalism  on  the 
grounds  that  it  does  not  maximize  the  good,  and  may  be  refuted  if 
empirical  evidence  is  found  to  prove  the  opposite,  in  which  case  no  moral 
objection  to  paternalism  can  be  sustained.  Mill  avoids  this  dilemma,  by 
resorting  to  transcendental  arguments,  based  on  the  assumed  intrinsic 
value  of  a  rationally  developed  personhood,  which  present  his  liberty 
principle  as  a  basic  moral  rule.  Mill  endeavours  to  show  that  his 
liberty  principle  is  essential  if  moral  discourse  is  to  exist  at  all, 
because  moral  discussion  is  based  upon  the  assumption  that  rational, 246 
autonomous  beings  seek  to  determine  and  to  regulate  their  actions  and 
relationships  free  from  violence,  force  and  threats.  Mill  assumes  that 
as  a  rule  people  are  best  left  alone  and  must  be  left  alone  if  they  are 
to  be  allowed  to  make  their  own  mistakes  and  to  learn  from  them. 
It  may  be  objected  that  the  pursuit  of  indiscriminate  individualism 
could  be  counter-productive  and  that  a  degree  of  paternalistic  intervention 
might  even  help  rather  than  hinder  the  development  of  the  kind  of  person 
and  the  kind  of  society  that  Mill  has  in  mind.  To  this  Mill  retorts 
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that  if  a  person  puts  such  a  high  value  on  what  he  does,  then  the  risk  of 
grave  harm  or  even  death  is  worth  taking:  "Nevertheless,  when  there  is 
not  a  certainty,  but  only  a  danger  of  mischief,  no  one  but  the  person 
himself  can  judge  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  motive  which  may  prompt  him 
to  incur  the  risk:  in  this  case...  he  ought,  I  conceive,  to  be  only  warned 
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of  the  danger;  not  forcibly  prevented  from  exposing  himself  to  it.  " 
In  the  case  of  the  sale  of  poisons,  for  example,  Mill  advises  that 
regulations  are  in  order  to  record  the  sale  in  order  to  discourage  their 
abuse,  and  he  suggests  that  the  public  should  be  warned  of  the  dangers 
involved,  but  he  does  not  think  that  the  state  should  deprive  citizens 
of  access  to  them. 
It  might  be  objected  that  there  is  some  inconsistency  in  Mill's 
reasoning.  Whilst  he  is  opposed  to  the  elimination  of  the  individual's 
choice  by  a  contract  of  slavery,  he  is  apparently  willing  to  allow  a 
person  to  risk  his  life  to  a  point  where  there  is  no  choice  left  to  him, 
if,  for  instance,  he  should  succeed  in  poisoning  himself  or  in  becoming 
fatally  addicted  to  drugs.  In  both  these  cases  the  indivichial  forfeits 
his  autonomy  and  freedom  of  choice,  as  indeed  he  does  in  entering  a 
contract  of  slavery.  In  cases  such  as  these  we  might  wish  to  argue  for 
the  justified  use  of  paternalistic  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  others 
in  their  own  interests.  It  is  one  thing  to  allow  people  to  fly,  climb 
mountains  and  take  part  in  hazardous  sports  so  long  as  they  are  fully 247 
aware  of  the  possible  consequences  and  dangers,  but  it  is  something  else 
to  allow  free  access  to  narcotics,  because  once  addicted  an  individual 
is  not  free  to  exercise  responsible  choice  and  death  may  swiftly  follow. 
It  was,  of  course,  Mill's  concern  to  limit  the  coercive  imposition  of 
one  person's  values  upon  another.  It  is  true  that  when  we  disapprove  of 
another  person's  activity,  'or  find  we  cannot  appreciate  it,  we  tend  to 
think  the  individual  in  question  is  deriving  little  or  no  benefit  from  it, 
and  therefore  feel  justified  in  imposing  our  values  upon  him  for  his  own 
good.  It  is  this  very  thing,  of  course,  that  Mill  specifically  wishes 
to  avoid. 
Some  commentators  share  the  view  that  Mill  acknowledges  a  weaker 
form  of  paternalism  in  situations  in  which  individuals  are  unable  to 
exercise  free  responsible  judgment  for  one  reason  or  another,  say  through 
ignorance,  inexperience,  immaturity  or  lack  of  years,  health,  senility  or 
some  other  incapacity,  or  through  undue  influence  being  exerted  upon  them. 
That  is  to  say,  it  is  suggested  that  Mill  recognises  certain  excusing 
conditions  as  justifying  the  intrusion  of  paternalism  for  the  individual's 
own  good,  the  assumption  being  that  were  such  people  in  their  right  senses 
they  would  readily  approve  of  such  sympathetic  and  benevolently  intended 
interference  in  their  affairs.  Mill,  in  fact,  does  not  insist  upon  the 
certainty  of  subsequent  consent  as  a  necessary  pre-condition  for  paternalistic 
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intervention  in  these  circumstances.  Mill  argues,  for  example,  that  a 
person  may  be  prevented,  in  his  own  interests,  from  crossing  a  dangerous 
bridge  which  he  does  not  know  is  dangerous,  on  the  grounds  that  were  he  in 
his  right  senses  he  would  in  all  probability  not  wish  to  risk  his  life  and, 
it  is  assumed,  would  appreciate  being  prevented  from  doing  so.  But  if 
on  the  other  hand  the  person  is  warned  of  the  dangerous  state  of  the 
bridge,  and  is  therefore  no  longer  ignorant,  yet  still  insists  on  crossing 
it,  say  for  a  dare  or  for  the  thrill  of  taking  the  risk  or  as  a  personal 
challenge,  then  Mill  argues  that  he  should  be  left  free  to  do  so,  for  to 
interfere  with  his  intent  when  he  is  fully  aware  of  all  the  circumstances 248 
would  be  wrong,  there  being  no  longer  any  excusing  conditions  justifying 
intervention. 
In  all  cases  of  weak  paternalism  the  test  for  Mill  is  to  determine 
whether  the  choice  being  made  is  the  person's  own  choice;  it  is  not  to 
assess  the  wisdom  or  worthiness  of  the  individual's  choice  according  to 
the  predelections  of  others.  Will  concedes  that  the  state  has  the  right 
to  prevent  self-regarding  conduct  in  the  interests  of  the  person  concerned 
when  such  conduct  is  substantially  non-voluntary,  or  when  temporary 
intervention  is  necessary  to  establish  whether  such  conduct  is  voluntary 
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or  not.  There  may  be  grounds,  for  example,  for  restraining  for  his  own 
good  a  patient  who  in  ignorance  attempts  to  obtain  drugs,  which  his 
doctor  following  sound  medical  practice  refuses  to  supply  to  him,  lest 
they  do  him  serious  harm.  Similarly,  a  person  contemplating  suicide  might 
following  Mill's  reasoning,  be  restrained  on  the  grounds  that  no  one  in 
full  control  of  his  faculties  would  in  the  circumstances  contemplate 
doing  such  an  act. 
It  may  be  objected  that  a  person  of  good  sense  might  quite  rationally 
decide  to  terminate  his  life  for  what  appear  to  be  good  reasons,  say  to 
avoid  abnormal  and  unavoidable  pain  and  suffering  arising  from  some 
tezminable  condition  which  is  destined  eventually  to  destroy  the  quality 
of  his  life.  Likewise,  in  similar  circumstances,  a  person  might  wish 
to  make  an  agreement  with  his  doctor  that  his  life  be  terminated.  It  is 
also  conceivable  that  a  person  might  feel  that  he  has  good  reasons  for 
refusing  to  wear  a  car  seat  belt  for  fear  of  being  trapped  should  his 
car  suddenly  catch  fire  or  plunge  into  water.  Mill  might  have  found  it 
difficult  to  condone  the  enforced  wearing  of  seat  belts  had  the  problem 
arisen  in  his  time.  Presumably  a  warning  concerning  the  dangers  of  not 
wearing  them  would  have  been  sufficient.  However,  he  would,  no  doubt, 
have  supported  the  compulsory  wearing  of  seat  belts  were  it  proved  to  his 
satisfaction  that  to  do  otherwise  would  be  harmful  to  society,  say  in T  F, 
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terms  of  the  cost  in  lives  and  hospital  treatment  for  example.  In  such 
a  case  the  refusal  to  conform  to  the  compulsory  wearing  of  seat  belts 
would  have  been  deemed  by  Kill  to  be  an  infringement  of  a  public  duty, 
and  therefore  other-regarding,  affecting  the  interests  of  society  and 
other  individuals. 
Mill's  objection  to  paternalism  is  subject  to  two  main  exceptions, 
namely,  his  refusal  to  recognise  contracts  of  servitude  and  his  argument 
that  the  state  should  make  adequate  provision  for  the  education  of  its 
citizens.  He  writes:  "The  principle  of  freedom  cannot  require  that  he 
(any  individual)  should  be  free  not  to  be  free.  It  is  not  freedom  to  be 
74 
allowed  to  alienate  his  freedom.  "  Mill's  objection  to  contracts  of 
servitude  might  appear  to  be  out  of  context  in  so  far  as  he  is  obviously 
not  adverse  to  people  giving  up  part  of  their  freedom  for  desirable 
benefits  in  the  course  of  making  normal  contractual  arrangements,  say  to 
obtain  additional  material  comforts  or  a  higher  income.  He  argues,  for 
example,  against  intervention  to  prevent  polygamy  amongst  Mormons  on  the 
grounds  that  the  marriage  arrangement  is  voluntary  and  some  women  may 
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prefer  to  be  one  of  several  wives  to  not  being  a  wife  at  all.  But  a 
contract  of  servitude,  says  Mill,  is  different;  it  is  irrevocable. 
. 
The 
freedom  that  is  relinquished  is  permanent  and  complete,  and  the  contract 
excludes  any  possibility  of  the  individual  concerned  ever  exercising  his 
freedom  again.  It  is  different  from  the  ordinary  run  of  contracts  which 
normally  allow  parties  the  facility  in  the  future  of  withdrawing  under 
agreed  conditions,  as  presumably  the  participants  in  a  polygamous 
marriage  contract  would  be  able  to  do,  if  they  so  wished. 
It  has  been  suggested  that  Mill,  might  have  invoked  the  doctrine  of 
multiple  selves  which  assumes  that  individuals  have  different  identities.. 
that  is  to  say  they  may.  be  conceived  as  being  different  people  or  persons 
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at  different  periods  of  time  in  their  lives.  Assuming  that  this  is 
plausible,  then  the  self  that  enters  the  contract  of  servitude  may  be 
imagined  as  possibly  affecting  detrimentally  the  interests  of  a  later 250 
self  which  might  not  wish  to  be  so  enslaved,  but  on  the  contrary  prefer 
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to  be  free.  This  is  of  course  a  singularly  impractical  and  unrealistic 
theory.  Were  it  universally  'adopted,  it  would  be  impossible  to  maintain 
or  to  guarantee  any  contract  whatsoever,  because  it  would  be  impossible 
to  rely  upon  the  parties  to  any  contract  maintaining  their  commitments 
for  any  length  of  time. 
Since  a  person  who  enters  a  contract  of  servitude  in  full  control 
of  his  faculties  and  free  from  the  interference  of  others  must  do  so 
voluntarily,  Mill's  objection  to  freely  negotiated  contracts  of  servitude 
is,  in  this  respect,  contrary  to  his  declared  belief  that  the  individual 
always  knows  best  how  to  pursue  his  own  interests.  However,  it  is,  on 
the  other  hand,  also  in  accord  with  another  of  his  beliefs,  namely  that 
it  is  necessary  to  preserve  at  all  costs  the  liberty  of  the  individual  to 
make  free  and  responsible  future  choices.  Mill  obviously  prefers  a 
society  of  free,  autonomous  individuals  to  a  society  of  slaves.  It 
would  be  illogical,  Mill  would  argue,  for  him  to  condone  a  contract  that 
is  intended  to  deprive  a  person  of  the  very  individuality  and  autonomy 
which  he  wishes  to  preserve. 
Mill  admits  that  coercion  may  be  legitimately  exercised  in  order  to 
ensure  that  every  person  obtains  a  proper  education:  "Education  is  one 
of  those  things  which  it  is  admissible  in  principle  that  a  government 
should  provide  for  the  people.  The  case  is  one  to  which  the  reasons  of 
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the  non-interference  principle  do  not  necessarily  extend.  "  It  is  Mill's 
view  that  the  state  should  insist  that  children  are  educated  but  that  it 
should  not  itself  provide  the  schools  or  the  curriculum:  "A  general  State 
education  is  a  mere  contrivance  for  moulding  people  to  be  exactly  like 
one  another:  and  as  the  mould  in  which  it  casts  them  is  that  which  pleases 
the  predominant  power  in  the  goverment,  whether  this  be  a  monarch,  a 
priesthood,  an  aristocracy,  or  the  majority  of  the  existing  generation; 
in  proportion  as  it  is  efficient  and  successful,  it  establishes  a  despotism 251 
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over  the  mind,  leading  by  natural  tendency  to  one  over  the  body.  "  mill 
advocates  compulsion  in  education  but  not  centralization.  He  leaves  open 
such  questions  as  to  who  should  control  the  curriculum  or  whether  censorship 
should  be  applied  but  insists  that  with  respect  to  the  education  of' 
children  the  opinions  of  parents  may  at  times  be  legitimately  overruled. 
He  adopts  a  positive  concept  of  liberty  and  assumes  that  the  state  knows 
what  is  best  and  is  therefore  empowered  to  liberate  children  from  the 
control  of  inadequate  parents.  Mill  temporarily  lays  aside  the  notion 
that  people,  in  this  case  parents  in  relation  to  their  children,  are  as  a 
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rule  the  best  judges  of  their  own  interests. 
Mill's  concession  to  paternalism,  in  the  case  of  the  education  of 
children,  may  be  explained  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  one  might  suppose 
that  the  failure  to  provide  a  proper  education  for  one's  children  is  an 
omission  of  a  duty  which  is  harmful  to  the  child,  to  other  individuals, 
and  to  society  as  a  whole,  and  for  these  reasons,  according  to  Mill's 
thinking,  must  warrant  state  intervention.  '  Secondly,  one  might  argue 
that  Mill  saw  education  not  as  a  means  of  inculcating  doctrines  and  dogma  but 
rather  as  a  process  of  training  individuals  to  think  for  themselves  and 
of  enabling  them  by  their  own  endeavours  to  choose  what  is  right.  Apparently 
it  was  Mill's  view,  in  accord  with  his  commitment  to  free  expression  and 
free  discussion,  that  should  his  principles  not  stand  up  to  enquiry  then 
they  should  be  discarded.  Whilst  some  commentators  are  inclined  to  accuse 
Mill  of  assuming  the  role  of  a  benevolent,  intellectual,  Victorian 
paternalist,  others  prefer  to  argue  that  his  justification  for  intervening 
in  the  education  of  children  and  in  respect  of  contracts  of  servitude 
is  grounded  in  his  fundamental  belief  in  freedom  and  in  the  development 
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of  the  individual's  potentiality  to  think  and  to  choose  for  himself. 
Mill's  concession  to  paternalism,  in  respect  of  the  education  of  children, 
clearly  does  not  extend  to  the  view  attributed  to  Fichte,  and  later 
adopted  by  Communists  and  Roman  Catholics,  namely  that  it  is  the  task  of 252  ', 
the  state  to  destroy  the  individual  child's  free  will  on  the  dubious 
premise  that  it  is  a  nonsense  to  speak  of  desiring  freedom  to  choose 
what  is,  wrong.  Following  this  reasoning,  all  children  ought  to  be 
forced  to  develop  an  inner  compulsion  to  automatically  choose  what  is 
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right. 
Mill's  discussion  of  limits  to  the  legitimate  use  of  coercion 
constitutes  a  normative  view  of  occasions  when  coercion  may  or  may  not 
be  used.  In  Mill's  view  coercion  is  primarily  an  ethical  category.  It 
is  not  a  morally  neutral  concept.  It  is  undesirable  because  it  interferes 
with  another  person's  freedom.  In  :  fill's  view  the  use  of  coercion  can 
only  be  justified  by  good  and  relevant  reasons.  Meta-ethical  issues 
may  be  raised  regarding  the  nature  of  'good'  and  the  meaning  of  'relevance' 
debated.  It  is  questionable,  however,  whether  the  moral  philosopher  will 
ever  be  capable  of  providing  a  definitive  and  categorical  solution  to 
the  problem  of  the  justified  use  of  coercion  and  whether  in  fact  there 
will  ever  be  one  simple  moral  theory  capable  of  fulfilling  this  supposed 
need. 
Mill  was  unable  to  derive  a  satisfactory  justification  for  the  use 
of  coercion  from  the  classical  utilitarian  tradition  which  he  inherited. 
Utilitarianism,.  being  a  monistic,  teleological  theory,  is  unable  to  provide 
an  adequate  basis  for  a  sound  moral  theory.  Mill's  moral  stance  against 
coercion  is  inevitably  both  deontological,  concerned  with  obligations, 
and  utilitarian  or  consequentialist,  concerned  with  ends.  In  other  words, 
Mill's  position  is  illustrative  of  the  fact  that  any  genuine  theory  of 
morality  must  take  note  of  both  perspectives  and  must  refer  to  obligations 
and  duties  as  well  as  values  and  ends.  It  is  not  sufficient  just  to 
establish  ends  and  values,  because  it  is  necessary  that  we  feel  obliged 
to  pursue  them.  Likewise,  it  is  a  nonsense  to  express  a  feeling  of 
obligation  without  specifying  the  ends  we  feel  obliged  to  strive  for. 253 
Promise-keeping  is  only  of  value  so  long  as  there  exists  a  sense  of  duty 
to  pursue  such  an  end.  As  a  rule  values  commit  us  to  the  view  that  we 
ought  to  aspire  to  them,  and  normally  we  do  not  feel  we  ought  to  do  things 
unless  we  consider  them  to  be  worth  while. 
Even  Kant's  theory  of  obligation  is  not  purely  deontological.  When 
Sant  considers  particular  duties  he  appeals  to  other  things  as  well.  He 
assumes  that  the  outcomes  or  consequences  are  for  the  general  good.  He 
regards  rationality  as  the  supreme  value  and  to  be  the  basis  of  morality 
itself.  He  does  not  assume  that  it  is  self-evident  that  a  promise  must 
be  kept,  rather  he  shows  that  false-promising  is  irrational  and  likely  to 
have  unthinkable  consequences  if  projected  upon  a  universal  scale. 
Promise-keeping,  so  far  as  Kant  is  concerned,  is  reasonable  and  of  value 
because  it  has  desirable  consequences. 
Philosophers  sometimes  emphasize  either  a  deontological  or  consequentialist 
perspective  but  usually  recognise  that  both  perspectives  are  essential  to 
an  acceptable  moral  theory.  Neither  Kant,  whose  main  concern  was  the 
nature  of  duty,  nor  Mill,  who  was  primarily  concerned  with  the  greatest 
good,  was  able  to  ignore  the  main  concern  of  the  other.  Kant  did  not 
ignore  consequences,  nor  did  Mill  ignore  the  notion  of  duty.  Since  it  is 
not  possible  to  have  a  satisfactory  moral  theory  based  upon  one  or  the 
other  perspective,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Mill  felt  obliged  to  incorporate 
both  into  his  reasoning. 
Mill  was  preoccupied  with  the  need  to  limit  the  exercise  of  coercion 
with  the  result  that  he  gives  a  less  than  adequate  account  of  occasions 
when  the  use  of  coercion  might  possibly  be  justified.  Several  issues 
are  raised  by  Mill  which  he  chooses  not  to  develop,  for  example:  the  extent 
of  the  state's  responsibility  to  protect  individuals'  feelings,  moral 
views  and  sentiments,  the  need  to  protect  the  shared  moral  consciousness 
of  society  without  which  society  might  not  survive,  the  need  to  protect 
people  from  harming  themselves,  the  need  to  force  people  to  contribute 254 
towards  the  general  welfare  for  the  benefit  of  all,  the  need  to  delineate 
more  precisely  the  extent  to  which  the  state  and  society  ought  to  intervene 
to  prevent  harm  to  others.  In  the  latter  case,  for  example,  all  the 
illustrations  given  by  Mill  are  confined  to  cases  in  which  the  cost  to 
the  coercee  is  assumed  to  be  slight  compared  to  the  grave  harm,  say  loss 
of  life,  which  it  is  anticipated  will  accrue  to  others  and  which  the  use 
of  coercion  is  intended  to  prevent.  Mill  does  not  refer  to  any  cases 
in  which  the  weight  of  harm  is  reversed,  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  coercee. 
Mill's  arguments  against  coercion  are,  nevertheless,  as  relevant 
today  as  they  have  ever  been  in  view  of  the  progressive  depersonalisation 
of  society  resulting  from  the  adoption  of  bureaucratic,  technological 
and  managerial  perspectives  in  all  walks  of  life  and  the  current  propensity 
to  elevate  means,  such  as  efficiency  and  cost-effectiveness,  to  the 
status  of  ultimate  ends.  The  position  that  Mill  assumes  is  most  approximate 
nowadays  to  those  who  advocate  theories  of  the  minimal  state.  Mill  has, 
for  instance,  very  little  to  say  about  needs  apart  from  his  reference 
to  education  in  which  he  is  obliged  to  admit  that  the  state  ought  to 
intervene  to  ensure  proper  educational  provision  for  every  child.  This 
Mill  had  to  do,  for  otherwise  some  members  of  society  would  have  been 
prevented  from  achieving  the  self-fulfilment  which  was  the  focal  point  of 
his  own  particular  theory  of  utility. 
Two  matters  require  further  clarification  if  a  justification  of 
coercion  is  to  be  substantiated,  namely,  the  theoretical  basis  upon 
which  coercion  may  be  justified,  if  at  all,  and  an  evaluation  of  practical 
instances  in  everyday  life  that  might  justify  its  use.  It  is  to  these 
issues  that  we  may  now  turn. 255 
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Coercion,  it  is  proposed,  can  not  be  regarded  as  a  morally  neutral 
concept  because  it  infringes  the  principle  of  liberty  which  is  one  of  a 
number  of  basic  moral  principles,  there  being  no  one  universally  recognised 
and  overriding  moral  principle  to  which  all  other  principles  may  be 
reduced  and  upon  which  all  philosophers  are  able  to  agree.  At  no  level 
of  ethical  reasoning  is  there  a  semblance  of  universal  agreement  amongst 
philosophers.  The  possibility  of  disagreement  exists  at  all  levels  of 
ethical  reasoning,  which  is  not  surprising  if  it  is  conceded  that  every 
individual's  thinking  reflects  the  views  he  takes  of  human  nature,  of 
the  human  condition,  and  of  human  reasoning,  and  that  such  viewvs  are  not 
entirely  value  free  but  are  pre-determined  in  some  measure  by  the 
individual's  character,  the  kind  of  person  he  is,  and  the  kind  of 
experiences  he  has  had.  Philosophers  no  less  than  any  other  men  are 
influenced  by  the  tines  in  which  they  live,  just  as  their  views  are 
undoubtedly  influenced  by  the  kind  of  men  they  are. 
Three  levels  of  ethical  reasoning  can  be  distinguished.  "Re  enter 
morality",  says  J.  McCloskey,  "when  we  make  or  accept  moral  judgments. 
We  move  from  simply  holding  a  morality,  having  moral  beliefs,  and  making 
moral  judgments,  by  developing  a  normative  ethic,  when  we  reflect  about  our 
moral  beliefs  and  seek  their  justification  and  explanation.  This  usually 
leads  to  the  formulation  of  a  general  theory,  e.  g.  hedonism,  utilitarianism, 
which  gives  order  and  coherence  to  our  moral  judgments,  and  by  reference 
to  which  we  seek  to  justify  them.  We  enter  the  sphere  of  meta-ethics 
when  we  reflect  about  what  we  are  doing  when  we  make  a  moral  judgment, 
for  instance,  whether  we  are  reporting  on  the  nature  of  certain  moral 
facts,  or  simply  expressing  our  feelings,  or  reporting  what  we  believe 
I 
to  be  willed  by  God  etc.  "  Since  there  is  no  apparent  possibility-of 
formulating  an  entirely  value  free,  neutral  and  universally  recognised 
ethical  theory  at  any  level  of  ethical  reasoning,  then  philosophers  must 262 
be  especially  vigilant  lest  their  judgments  are  misinterpreted  or 
misrepresented  as  fact,  'is'  being  substituted  in  effect  for  'what  ought 
2 
to  be'. 
The  justification  of  coercion,  it  is  proposed  to  arge,  must 
ultimately  be  dependent  upon  the  relation  between  and  the  interpretation 
given  to  particular  basic  moral  principles  that  are  recognised  by  a  number 
of  like  minded  morally  knowledgeable  people  and  are  therefore  representative 
of  some  degree  of  consensus  and  objectivity.  When  these  principles  and 
the  variety  of  sub-principles  and  values  that  may  be  derived  from  them 
are  applied  to  particular  circumstances  and  are  given  content  and 
substance  by  different  people,  the  possibility  of  moral  disagreement 
occurring  increases.  This  must  be  so  for  general  principles  and  the 
values  derived  from  them  may,  it  is  supposed,  be  interpreted  and  weighted 
in  different  ways  by  different  people,  and  in  different  ways  by  even  the 
same  people,  when  applied  to  apparently  similar  circumstances.  Nevertheless, 
a  sufficient  consensus  exists,  it  is  suggested,  to  support  the  view  that 
coercion  might  be  used,  though  not  without  qualification,  in  three 
respects,  namely,  when  it  is  used  to  ensure  the  welfare  of  others  or 
is  for  the  benefit  of  others,  secondly  when  it  is  intended  to  protect, 
preserve  and  maintain  the  assumed  shared  moral  values  of  society,  and 
thirdly,  when  it  is  used  for  the  particular  benefit  of  the  coercee  himself. 
Firstly,  however,  we  will  establish  the  status  of  coercion  as  an 
ethical  category,  and  we  will  indicate  grounds  upon  which  both  the  status 
and  use  of  coercion  may  be  justified.  Finally,  two  notions  of  morality, 
public  and  private,  will  be  distinguished  and  discussed  in  relation  to 
the  limits  to  which  the  justified  use  of  coercion  might  proceed. 
Philosophers  discuss  whether  coercion  is  an  ethical  category  or 
whether  it  is  an  ethically  neutral  and  purely  descriptive  concept,  and 
those  who  deny  that  it  is  an  ethical  category  do  not  always  do  so  for  the 263 
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same  reasons.  To  call  an  act  coercive  is  not  equivalent  to  calling  it 
wrong  because  a  coercive  act  may  be  deemed  to  be  fit  and  proper  in 
particular  circumstances.  The  justification  of  the  moral.  status  of 
coercion,  therefore,  must  be  distinguished  from  justifying  its  use.  We 
can  and  do  say  that  coercion  is  wrong  in  a  similar  way  as  we  say  stealing 
is  wrong,  implying  in  the  latter  case  that-it  is  wrong,  say  unjust,  to 
infringe  another  person's  right  to  possession  and  in  the  former  case  that 
it  is  wrong  to  infringe  an  individual's  freedom.  Just  as  a  person,  it  is 
supposed,  is  presumed  to  have  rightful  possession  of  his  own  property,  so 
every  individual  is  presumed  to  have  the  right  to  be  free  from  the 
interference  of  others.  In  normal  parlance  we  do  not  as  a  rule  regard 
coercion  as  a  morally  neutral  concept  in  the  same  way  as,  for  instance,  we 
regard  walking,  speaking,  fishing,  drawing,  jogging  or  swimming.  Coercing, 
like  stealing  or  promise-breaking,  is  generally  considered  to  be  undesirable 
because  it  indicates  a  lack  of  respect  for  the  victim  or  ccercee,  though- 
there  may  be  occasions  when  like  stealing  or  promise-breaking  it  might 
with  justification  be  used.  If  we  concede  that  coercion,  qua  coercion, 
is  intrinsically  undesirable,  then  its  use  will  need  to  be  justified 
extrinsically  in  terms  of  intent  and  consequences  in  each  particular 
instance. 
Some  philosophers  take  the  view  that  fundamental  moral  principles 
are  essential  and  necessarf  if  moral  discourse  is  to  take  place  at  all. 
Accordingly,  the  existence  of  ultimate  moral  principles,  it  is  claimed, 
can  be  shown  to  be  objectively  true  if  it  can  be  established  that  the 
form  of  discourse  of  which  they  are  an  example  is  impossible  without 
4 
presupposing  their  existence.  Moral  discourse,  the  recognition  of  a 
moral  point  of  view  and  of  a  moral  way  of  life,  must  all  depend  upon  the 
recognition  ofa  basic  moral  principle  of  liberty,  for  the  existence  and 
continuation  of  a  moral  way  of  life  must  surely  presuppose  a  society  of 
free,  independent  and  autonomous  participants  rather  than  a  society  of 
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slaves  or  robots.  Similarly,  other  basic  moral  principles,  such  as 
benevolence  and  impartiality,  may  be  identified  which,  given  substance 
and  applied  to  particular  circumstances,  will  rival  and  contest  the  claims 
5 
of  liberty  and  of  each  other. 
These  basic  moral  principles  are  not  sufficient  in  the  sense  that 
they  will  not  enable  us  to  resolve  all  our  moral  problems,  but  they  are 
certainly  necessary  in  the  sense  that  they  are  responsible  for  us  having 
any  moral  problems  in  the  first  place.  From  these  basic  principles  we 
derive  subsidiary  principles  and  values  of  varying  degrees  of  generality 
and  specificity  which  inevitably  generates  the  possibility  of  discovering 
further  moral  problems  and  further  moral  disagreement;  for  the  interpretation 
of  even  basic  principles  like  benevolence,  impartiality  and  freedom  in 
relation  to  circumstances  will  vary  in  different  contexts  in  different 
societies,  though  the  principles  themselves,  it  is  presumed,  will  be 
universally  recognised  by  all  rational  moral  beings.  In  other  words,  an 
act  might  be  recognised  as  just,  or  free,  or  benevolent,  in  one  society 
but  not  in  another.  Both  societies  may  recognise  the  principles  of 
justice,  benevolence  and  freedom,  but  it  is  possible  they  may  interpret 
them  in  different  ways. 
If  the  principle  of  liberty  implies  minimally  that  no  One  should 
im?  ose  upon  another  rational  being  conditions  inhibiting  his  own  chosen 
courses  of  action,  then'coercion  must  be  considered  to  be  undesirable 
and  not  a  good  to  be  valued.  Of  course  coercion  might  seem  to  be 
desirable  were  it  the  case  that-all  human  wishes  and  desires  were  judged 
to  be  intrinsically  wicked,  in  which  case  the  impairment  of  a  (wicked) 
person's  autonomy  by  coercive  means  might  be  seen  to  be  worth  while. 
This  argument,  however,  'is  clearly  self-defeating,  for  if  everybody's 
wishes  were  to  be  regarded  as  wicked  then  those  of  the  coercer  would  have 
to  be  included  in  the  same  category.  In  all  cases  of  coercion  some  loss 
of  freedom  inevitably  ensues;  it  is  for  this  reason,  it  is  suggested,  that 265 
coercion  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  morally  neutral  concept. 
It  is  a  fact,  based  upon  plain  observation,  that  we  do  not  withhold 
the  application  of  the  tern  coercion  when  a  law  officer,  in  the  course  of 
his  lawful  duties,  forces  a  thief  to  desist  from  his  criminal  activities 
any  more  than  we  do  when  the  robber  unfairly  and  unlawfully  forces  his 
victim  to  surrender  his  valuable  possessions.  We  do  not,  however,  deduce 
from  this  fact  that  coercion  is  morally  neutral,  because  the  moral  status 
of  the  notion  of  coercion,  as  opposed  to  the  moral  use  of  coercion,  is 
not  established  by  the  uses  to  which  coercion  is  put  but  on  the  principle 
that  it  denies  the  individual  his  freedom,  which  is  a  good  that  is  valued 
for  all  sorts  of  reasons:  because  people  as  a  rule  are  not  happy  if  their 
desires  and  interests  are  restricted,  because  as  Mill  suggests  it  is  useful 
to  society,  because  we  believe  that  individuals  ought  rationally  to  be 
allowed  to  do  what  they  have  good  reasons  for  doing.  The  use  of  coercion, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  justified  by  the  intent  of  the  coercer  and  the 
consequences  of  the  coercive  act.  It  is  because  coercion  qua  coercion  is 
wrong  that  its  use  must  be  justified  either  by  invoking  a  positive  concept 
of  freedom  or  by  invoking  another  fundamental  moral  principle  in  order 
to  override  the  infringement  of  the  principle  of  liberty. 
Philosophers  differ  in  their  accounts  of  the  grounds  upon  which  the 
use  of  coercion  might  be  justified.  Mill  argues  that  coercion  is 
justified  in  order  to  prevent  the  infringement  of  the  rights  and  interests 
of  others  and  sometimes  to  promote  the  good  of  others  but  never  to  promote 
6 
the  good  of  the  person  coerced.  J.  Fitzjames  Stephen,  Mill's  celebrated 
critic,  argued  that  coercion  is  justified  whenever  it  promotes  a  desirable 
end  at  not  too  great  a  cost,  it  being  of  no  consequence  whether  the  end 
to  be  promoted  is  the  welfare  of  others  or  that  of  the  person  coerced. 
7 
According  to  S.  I.  Benn  and  R.  S.  Peters  restraint  is  not  justifiable  if 
(i)  in  the  case  of  a  particular  application  of  restraint....  the  act  in 
question  infringes  no  rule,  (ii)  in  the  case  of  a  general  application  of 
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restraint  by  a  rule,  (a) 
...  the  object  of  the  rule  is  bad,  (b) 
...  while 
the  object  of  the  rule  is  good,  the  means  proposed  cannot  reasonably  be 
expected  to  attain  it,  (c) 
...  though  the  object  is  good,  and  the  proposed 
means  would  secure  it,  it  is  not  of  sufficient  importance  to  warrant  the 
degree  of  restraint  proposed.  "  There  is  apparently  no  restriction  upon 
the  nature  of  the  values  and  goods  that  may  be  subsumed  under  different 
moral  principles  and  which  might  be  promoted  and  protected  by  the  deliberate 
restriction  of  liberty  by  coercive  means.  Liberty  apparently  might  be 
justifiably  restricted  to  promote  or  to  maintain  security,  equality, 
physical  well-being,  happiness,  privacy,  a  person's  reputation,  a  greater 
liberty,  or  whatever. 
Some  philosophers  may  be  inclined  to  insist  that  stricter  limits 
should  be  imposed  upon  the  values  that  might  be  realised  or  protected  by 
the  justified  use  of  coercion.  C.  Bay,  for  example,  has  suggested  that 
coercion  is  justified  only  when  it  is  instr  rental  in  preventing  greater 
or  worse  coercion:  "The  rule  I  propose  in  the  area  of  social  freedom 
is  that  some  types  of  deliberate  coercion  may  be  justified  but  only  if 
this  serves  to  reduce  the  amount  or  effectiveness  of  other  and  definitely 
worse  types  of  coercion.....  Coercion  to  extend  freedom  in  any  sense  other 
than  'reduced  coercion'  may  be  justified  only  exceptionally,  and  the 
principal  exception  I  have  in  mind  concerns  children  and  very  young 
8 
people.  "  Bay's  argument,  however,  is  unsatisfactory  because  the  rule 
it  implies  excludes  the  use  of  coercion  in  areas  or  cases  where  it  would 
seem  to  be  ,  though  for  other  reasons,  particularly  justifiable.  It 
would  not,  for  instance,  allow  for  the  use  of  coercion  to  prevent  stealing, 
or  breach  of  contract,  or  non-payment  of  taxes,  or  the  refusal  to  wear 
seat-belts,  or  the  adulteration  of  food,  or  the  pollution  of  the 
environment,  for  doing  any  of  these  things,  and  many  others  besides, 
9 
would  not  necessarily  involve  acting  coercively  in  the  first  place. 
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If  it  were  possible,  which  it  is  not,  'to  regard  liberty  as  the 
most  basic  of  all  moral  values  to  which  all  other  moral  values  and 
principles  could  be  reduced,  then  it  would  be  feasible  to  argue  that 
liberty  could  only  be  justifiably  infringed  in  order  to  preserve  or  to 
promote  a  greater  liberty.  This  is  not  possible  because  there  are 
other  equally  important  moral  principles  which  are  not  reducible  to 
the  principle  of  liberty  and  which  may  be  appealed  to  in  order  to 
contest  the  claims  of  liberty.  A  corrnitment  to  liberty  without  a  sense 
of  justice  or  a  sympathetic  concern  for  the  welfare  and  happiness  of 
others  would  not,  it  is  supposed,  constitute  a  satisfactory  foundation 
for  a  proper  moral  way  of  life.  The  use  of  coercion,  therefore,  must 
be  justified  in  relation  to  a  variety  of  potentially  conflicting 
principles,  sub-principles,  goods  and  values.  If  this  is  the  case, 
then  there  are  of  course  limits  to  the  extent  to  which  philosophical 
enquiry  can  help  to  resolve  our  practical  everyday  problems  or  to  find 
for  any  individual  specific  and  precise  answers  to  the  two  main  questions 
that  were  the  concern  of  Socrates,  namely,  how  one  should  live  and  what 
one  should  do.  Although  the  activity  of  philosophizing  cannot  be  expected 
to  provide  precise  solutions  to  practical  problems,  it  aids  our 
understanding  by  helping  to  clarify  and  to  explain  them  for  us.  -and  for 
this  reason  is  important. 
Since  philosphers  have  different  theories  regarding  the  justification 
of  what  is  morally  right  or  morally  wrong  and  cannot  collectively  offer 
an  uncontested  ethical  theory  against  which  the  status  and  use  of  coercion 
may  be  judged,  it  is  relevant  to  indicate  why  a  transcendentalist 
argument  is  preferred  as  a  basis  for  the  justification  of  basic  moral 
principles  rather  than  an  argument  based  on  either  a  naturalistic  or 
intuitionist  ethical  theory. 268  1r,  IT 
Philosophers  who  prefer  naturalistic  meta-ethical  theories  seek 
to  establish  objectivity  in  ethics  in  terms  of  facts  which  are  external 
to  morality  itself  and  which  are  grounded  in  the  nature  of  things  as 
revealed  either  by  empirical  enquiry,  say  by  psychological  or  sociological 
explanations  of  the  nature  of  man,  or  alternatively  in  metaphysical 
constructions  or  theories  of  divine  revelation.  Ethical  principles, 
according  to  this  way  of  thinking,  are  justified  not  in  terms  of  the 
characteristics  of  morality  itself  but  in  terns  of  the  methodology  and 
content  of  the  particular  empirical,  metaphysical,  or  theological  theory 
concerned;  consequently,  the  special  features  of  morality,  as  a  separate 
fora  of  knowledge  distinguishable  from  say  religious  knowledge  or  scientific 
knowledge,  are  ignored. 
Another  interpretation  of  naturalism  must  be  distinguished.  It  is 
that  which  recognises  the  comonsensical  and  empirical  observation  that 
ethics  has  to  be  understood  in  worldly  terms,  without  reference  to  God  or 
any  other  transcendental  authority,  and  that  it  must  be  grounded  in  the 
assumption  that  men  are  part  of  nature.  According  to  this  view  the 
majority  of  modern  ethical  theories  could  be  deemed  to  be  basically 
naturalistic  in  so  far  as  they  follow  an  empiricist  tradition  associated 
with  Aristotelian  ethical  theory,  evident  also  in  ,  dill,  and  presently 
enjoying  a  revival  in  philosophical  thinking.  Its  present  popularity  is 
attributed  to  a  reaction  against  the  failure  of  philosophers  to  provide 
a  satisfactory  substitute  for  religion  which  itself  failed  to  fill  the 
gap  left  by  the  demise  of  Greek  ethical  thought  which  coincided  with  the 
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disappearance  of  the  Greek  polis.  It  is  not  this  view  of  naturalism 
that  is  contested  but  that  which  regards  as  naturalistic  all  kinds  of 
definist  theories  of  justification  whether  they  be  reportative,  where 
justification  'is  interpreted  say  in  terms  of  normal  usage,  or  reformative, 
or  prescriptive,  or  coiendatory. 
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A  meta-ethical  theory  is  considered  to  be  naturalistic  if  it  reduces 
moral  judgments  to  some  other  kind  of  judgment  and  in  so  doing  denies  the 
autonomy  of  ethics  as  a  separate  body  of  thought,  in  which  case  moral 
knowledge  becomes  a  branch  of  some  other  kind  of  knowledge.  The  problem 
of  the  justification  of  moral  principles  cannot,  it  is  suggested,  be 
resolved  in  this  way,  for  in  accord  with  the  open  question  argument  it 
is  always  possible  to  ask  of  any  explanation  given  in  terms  of  any 
other  form  of  knowledge  whether  the  latter  itself  is  ethically  justifiable; 
and  this  process  presumably  may  continue  and  be  repeated  ad  infinitum. 
Intuitionism,  an  the  other  hand,  seeks  an  objective  basis  for  ethics 
in  a  sort  of  sixth  sense,  or  faculty  of  seeing,  and  assumes  the  existence 
of  some  pre-existing,  objective  order  of  values  which  are  irreducible 
and  not  justifiable  by  empirical  observation  or  any  form  of  metaphysical 
reasoning;  they  are  simply  self-evident,  intuited,  existing  as  synthetic 
a  priori  truths.  The  assumption  is  that  we  intuit  the  intrinsic  goodness, 
rightness,  obligatoriness  of  certain  activities,  and  that  our  intuitions 
are  equivalent  to  ethical  principles  that  are  not  deduced  from  the  nature 
of  things  because  they  exist  independently  of  facts  about  man  and  the 
world.  In  mathematics,  for  example,  we  begin  with  distinct  perceptions 
of  mathematical  relationships,  so  in  ethics  it  is  supposed  that  we  begin 
with  perceived,  pre-existing,  universal  relationships  between  what  is 
right  and  fitting  in  relation  to  certain  states  of  affairs. 
Intuitionism,  like  naturalistic  meta-ethical  theories,  fails  to 
provide  a  satisfactory  foundation  for  the  justification  of  basic  ethical 
principles  against  which  the  status  of  coercion  and  its  use  might  be 
judged.  Like  naturalism,  intuitionism  denies  the  autonomy  of  ethics 
as  a  distinct  body  of  knowledge  in  its  own  right,  as  well  as  the  notion 
and  status  of  the  autonomous  moral,  rational  agent  who  reasons  out  the 
moral  law  which  he  wills  for  himself  and  others.  Intuitionism  also  ignores 
the  problem  of  moral  disagreement,  for  it  recognises  that  no  one  man's 270 
intuition  is  any  better  or  any  worse  than  that  of  any  other.  Furthermore, 
it  is  surely  questionable  whether  a  given  principle  or  insight  can  be 
assumed  to  be  justified  by  a  method  by  which  conflicting  principles  are 
equally  justified  and  by  which  truth  emerges  in  a  variety  of  guises, 
being  intuited  in  different  ways  by  different  people  at  different  times. 
The  i  olication  is  that  moral  discourse  is  reducible  to  an  enunciation  of 
different  intuitions  instead  of  being  recognised  as  a  purposeful  disputation 
and  a  rational,  co-operative  exercise  in  search  of  truth  that  might  be 
discovered  in  a  degree  of  compromise.  It  is  conceded,  however,  that 
ethical  intuitionists  may  be  disinclined  to  favour  the  use  of  coercion 
and  to  impose  their  beliefs  upon  others.  Mill's  argument  for  utility, 
for  exa  ple,  is  seemingly  underpinned  by  a  kind  of  ethical  objectivism 
of  an  intuitive  kind,  for  21±11  assumes  that  we  all  might  at  some  time 
be  mistaken  in  our  ethical  beliefs  and  therefore  have  no  right  to  coerce 
others  into  possible  error  by  imposing  our  own  beliefs  upon  them. 
Theories  founded  troop  beliefs  in  self-evident  truths  cannot  be 
sustained  as  satisfactory  bases  for  the  justification  of  basic  moral 
principles  because  they  allow  no  room  for  the  exercise  of  rational 
argument;  they  recognise  only  the  possibility  of  persuasion  or  of  agreeing 
to  differ.  Ethical  judgments,  it  is  suggested,  are  not  based  simply 
upon  property  ascribing  statements,  whether  natural  or  non-natural,  but 
reflect  individuals'  attitudes,  dispositions,  ways  of  life,  characters 
and  feelings.  So  as  two  senses  of  naturalism  may  be  distinguished,  the 
meta-ethical  and  the  commonsensical,  likewise  two  senses  of  intuitionism 
may  also  be  distinguished.  Whilst  intuitionism  as  a  meta-ethical  theory 
is  considered  to  be  inappropriate  as  a  basis  for  the  justification  of 
ultimate  moral  principles,  it  is  conceded-that  an  individual's  intuits  or 
spontaneous  convictions  arising  out  of  his  nature,  way  of  life,  character 
and  experience  must  be  respected  as  being  indicative  of  his  personal  moral 
stance  and  his  moral  point  of  vie,  v.  Whilst  the  notion  of  intuitionism  as 271 
a  faculty  of  the  mind  is  rejected,  an  individual's  intuitions,  reflecting 
his  experiences  and  consciousness,  must  be  accepted  as  part  of  the  process 
of  moral  reasoning. 
Kant  was  aware  of  the  tension  between  the  notions  of  objectivity 
and  autonomy  in  ethics.  His  solution  was  to  seek  an  account  of  the 
justification  of  moral  principles  that  would  avoid  either  an  infinite 
regress  or  any  arbitrarily  imposed  stopping  point.  He  sought,  therefore, 
principles  that  might  be  regarded  as  morally  fundamental  and  valid  for 
all  human  beings  but  which,  at  the  same  time,  could  not  be  deduced  from 
any  set  of  premises-which  themselves  contained  no  moral  judgment  or  principle. 
If  moral  principles  are  not  to  be  justified  by  considerations  outside 
themselves  yet  are  to  be  regarded  as  objectively  justifiable,  then  they 
must  presumably  be  determined  by  the  formal  character  of  morality  itself; 
that  is  to  say,  certain  moral  principles  must  be  regarded  as  correct  if 
moral  discourse  and  a  moral  way  of  life  are  to  be  conceived  as  being  at 
all  possible,  and  if  moral  discourse  is  to  be  conceived  as  an  autonomous 
and  objective  form  of  reasoning. 
It  is  proposed,  therefore,  to  take  the  view  that  a  basic  moral 
principle  is  shown  to  be  true  without  appealing  to  factors  outside  itself 
provided  it  can  be  established  that  the  form  of  discourse  of  which  the 
principle  is  an  example  is  impossible  without  presupposing  the  principle 
itself.  There  are  limits,  however,  to  the  kind  of  principles  that  may 
be  so  conceived  as  basic  moral  principles.  They  must,  of  course,  be 
capable  of  being  rationally  applied  and  of  being  judged  to  be  compatible 
with  what  are  considered  to  be  the  principal  characteristics  of  moral 
reasoning;  they  must  be  practical,  universalisable,  autonomous  and  objective. 
They  must  be  practical  in  the  sense  that  they  can  be  related  to  action 
and  what  people  ought  to  do  in  practical  situations.  They  must  be 
universalisable,  first  in  the  sense  that  they  are  applicable  to  all  rational 
beings  in  similar  circumstances,  and  secondly  in  respect  of  their 272  _..,  a 
association  with  and  inclusion  in  most  if  not  all  moral  codes.  They 
must  be  autonomous  in  the  sense  that  they  represent  an  independent  form 
of  knowledge,  and  also  in  the  sense  that  they  accommodate  the  autonomy  of 
each  moral  agent's  rational  will.  They  must  be  objective  in  the  sense 
that  they  override  a  person's  personal  desires,  hopes  and  idiosyncrasies, 
secondly  in  the  sense  that  they  represent  the  views  of  an  unbiased  mind 
which  is  appraised  of  the  facts  and  which  is  reasonable  rather  than 
arbitrary,  and  thirdly  in  the  sense  that  they  recognise  the  consistency 
and  coherence  of  morality  and  are  valid  for  all  individuals.  It  is 
conceded,  of  course,  that  the  stipulation  of  such  conditions  implies  a 
value  judgment,  but  we  have  already  noted  that  it  is  impossible  to  offer 
a  completely  value  free  and  neutral  notion  of  morality. 
A  solution  to  the  problem  of  identifying  and  justifying  basic 
ethical  principles,  in  accord  with  which  the  status  and  use  of  coercion 
may  be  judged,  is  to  be  found  in  any  of  several  presuarotive  theories 
which  assu.  Tie  that  ultimate  moral  principles,  from  which  sudsidiary 
principles  and  values  ray  be  deduced,  are  presupposed  by  the  way  in 
which  ordinarr+  moral  judgments  are  made  and  identified  in  society. 
A.  P.  Griffiths,  for  example,  argues  that  the  nature  of  moral  discourse 
presupposes  the  ultimate  moral  principles  of  benevolence,  i  partiality, 
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and  liberty.  R.  S.  Peters  argues  that  moral  discourse  presupposes  the 
basic  moral  principle  of  respect  for  persons  to  which  other  less  basic 
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moral  principles  such  as  equality  and  justice  may  be  reduced.  R.  S.  Downie 
and  E.  Telfer,  whilst  sharing  the  view  that  certain  moral  principles 
such  as  equality,  liberty,  and  utility  are  reducible  to  the  fundamental 
moral  principle  of  respect  for  persons,  dispute  the  notion  that  moral 
discourse  presupposes  that  individuals  participating  in  such  discourse 
need  to  respect  all  human  beings,  or  even  those  with  whom  moral  discourse 
is  practised.  Their  ardent  is  that  the  basic  principle  of  respect 
for  persons  is  presupposed  not  by  the  nature  of  moral  discourse  as  such 273 
but  by  the  content  of  morality  and  the  nature  of  ordinary  moral 
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judgments  commonly  made  in  society.  It  is  not  intended  to  qualify 
the  particular  arguments  of  these  individual  theories  but  simply  to 
indicate  how  ultimate  moral  principles  may  be  identified  and  justified, 
for  it  is  by  reference  to  such  basic  moral  principles  as  impartiality, 
benevolence,  liberty,  utility,  and  respect  for  persons  that  the  status 
of  coercion  and  its  use  in  particular  circumstances  may,  it  is  proposed, 
be  judged. 
Whether  the  state  in  fact  is  justified  in  making  provision  for 
public  welfare  or  public  benefits  and  consequently  in  forcing  citizens 
to  contribute  towards  the  cost  is  a  matter  of  much  interest  to  political 
and  moral  philosphers,  as  well  as  to  economists  and  social  scientists. 
Much  of  the  ensuing  philosophical  discourse  has  been  related  to  the 
clarification  of  relevant  concepts  such  as  freedom,  justice,  benevolence, 
rights,  duties,  and  needs;  and  the  philosopher  of  course,  as  opposed 
say  to  the  scientist,  has  no  universally  acknowledged  way  or  means  of 
resolving  disputes  concerning  these  things,  either  absolutely  or 
uncontroversially. 
The  concept  of  need  is  central  to  any  understanding  of  the  nature 
and  justification  of  state  welfare  provision.  The  satisfaction  of  needs 
is  clearly  the  goal  of  all  social  scientists,  though  the  determination 
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needs  is  not  just  a  simple  empirical  exercise.  If,  indeed,  needs 
could  be  empirically  determined,  there  would  be  far  less  disputation 
regarding  the  compulsory  provision  of  social  welfare  services,  and  there 
would  certainly  be  far  more  agreement,  for  example,  upon  the  content  of 
school  curricula.  Other  issues,  of  course,  are  equally  contestable, 
for  example:  whether  welfare  is  a  benefit  to  which  all  citizens  have 
a  right,  whether  this  right,  assuming  it  exists,  is  a  moral  right 
presupposing  a  duty  or  obligation  on  others  entailing  a  right  of 274 
enforcement  by  those  who  lay  claim  to  it,  whether  it  is  morally 
justifiable  that  individuals  should,  be  coerced  to  contribute  towards 
the  provision  of  welfare,  whether  the  provision  of  welfare  should  be 
regarded  as  a  voluntary  act  of  charity.  If  welfare  is  regarded  as  a 
gift,  then  the  moral  philosopher  might  argue  that  as  a  general  rule 
there  may  be  a  duty  to  be  benevolent  to  one  another  but  that  there 
need  not  be  a  strict  duty  to  be  benevolent  in  every  particular  case. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  supposed  that  individuals  have  a  basic 
right  to  welfare  provision,  then  society  or  the  government  will  presumably 
be  obliged  to  take  this  into  account  and  not  to  leave  it  to  the  idiosyncratic 
charitable,  whims  of  individuals  or  individual  expressions  of  goodwill. 
Some  philosophers  will  argue,  for  example,  that  health  care  is  a  basic 
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human  right  for  which  organised  provision  should  be  made  by  society. 
And  it  is  possible  to  argue  that  people  have  a  right  to  access  to  legal 
justice  and  to  appropriate  educational  opportunities. 
It  is  not  possible  to  identify  needs  in  a  morally  neutral  way 
because  they  are  related  to  ends  through  which  they  are  justified. 
I  alight,  for  instance,  be  deemed  to  need  poison  to  kill  weeds  or  to  hold 
as  an  antidote  to  possible  exposure  to  nerve  gas  but  not  to  kill  my  wife, 
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neighbours,  or  their  pets.  Needs  cannot  be  identified  with  wants, 
except  in  the  case  of  an  individual's  personally  'felt'  needs,  for  wants 
express  a  person's  subjective  feelings  or  desires  whereas  needs  are  usually 
ascribed  to  a  person  by  other  people.  It  is  pertinent  to  ask  whether 
it  is  possible  to  identify  certain  basic  human  needs  that  are  dependent 
upon  ends  and  goals  to  which  all  individuals  are  committed,  and  to  the 
satisfaction  of  which  everyone  is  entitled  as  of  right.  If  such  needs 
are  identifiable,  then  their  satisfaction  presumably  ought  to  be  the 
proper  concern  of  politicians  and  social  reformers,  and  to  deprive  pemle 
of  the  means  of  satisfying  them  could  be  interpreted  as  being  an  omission 
causing  harm  to  those  concerned.  One  basic  primitive  need,  namely 
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survival,  can  be  ir=ediately  identified,  for  its  satisfaction  is  a 
necessary  pre-condition  for  the  continued  existence  of  moral  life, 
since  without  autonomous  moral  beings  there  can  pres  ably  be  no  moral 
codes.  It  must  be  assured,  therefore,  that  all  individuals  have  a  basic 
moral  duty  to  help  one  another  to  survive  and  to  preserve  life;  'and  a 
right  must  surely  follow,  for  it  would  seem  very  odd  and  inconsistent 
to  claim  that  a  duty  to  preser"ie  life  existed  but  that  no  one  had  the 
right  to  live. 
The  presence  of  a  need  is  distinguished  by  the  notion  of  harn  which 
is  itself  contestable.  Even  the  most  easily  and  obviously  identifiable 
kind  of  harm,  say  physical  harm,  may  be  seen  as  a  benefit.  This  might 
be  the  case  when  a  philosopher,  for  instance,  chooses  to  regard  his 
sudden  blindness  as  a  benefit  rather  than  an  affliction  because  it 
decreases  the  nunber  of  distractions  which  inevitably  interfered  with 
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his  philosophizing  when  he  could  see.  Anyone  to  whom  a  need  is  ascribed 
on  the  grounds  that  he  is  supposed  to  lack  some  desired  satisfaction 
may  reject  such  an  assertion.  In  all  cases  in  which  harm  is  ascribed 
a  norm  of  harm,  is  assumed  which  may  be  contested  both  externally,  by 
other  observers,  and  internally,  by  those  to  whom  it  is  attributed.  It  is, 
of  course,  much  easier  to  agree  in  principle  upon  the  existence  of  certain 
basic  needs,  such  as  suxvrival,  than  it  is  to  agree  upon  the  ascription 
of  harn  and  the  existence  of  particular  needs  in  particular  circumstances. 
There  is  a  further  complication  in  relation  to  the  determination 
of  needs;  the  satisfaction  of  one  need  might  jeopardise  the  satisfaction 
of  others.  Policies  intended  to  meet  the  need  for  survival  could  inhibit 
individual  freedom  and  autonomy  which,  like  the  need  for  survival,  may 
be  regarded  as  necessary  conditions  for  the  continued  preservation  of 
a  moral  way  of  life.  The  moral  limitations  inherent  in  the  pursuit,  in 
the  name  of  freedom,  of  an  unrestricted  policy  of  free  competition  are 
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development,  but  it  might  also  lead,  hinan  nature  being  as  it  is,  to 
a  diminution  in  the  respect  shown  by  some  individuals  to  others.  -  The 
successful  satisfaction  of  one  need  may  merely  create  another  need  in 
its  place. 
It  is  problematical  how  far  the  enforced  provision  of  welfare 
services  might  compensate  for  the  imperfections  of  free  competition. 
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out  of  respect  for  human  nature  and  the  principle  of  justice,  Nevertheless 
a  case  must  exist  for  the  state  to  provide  equality  of  access  to  as  many 
opportunities  as  possible  to  enable  every  individual  to  aspire  to 
self-fulfilment.  It  is  conceded,  however,  that  such  a  policy  need  not 
necessarily  result  in  equality  of  achievement  or  equality  of  satisfaction 
in  any  egalitarian  sense;  on  the  contrary,  it  could  precipitate  increased 
individual  differences,  leading  to  even  greater  inequalities  which 
themselves  might  require  a  further  degree  of  state  interrention,  together 
with  a  policy  of  positive  discrimination,  to  prevent  the  weaker  members 
of  society  being  unduly  exploited.  -  A  commonsensical  vier  of  history 
and  human  nature  appears  to  indicate  that  it  is  not  possible  to  persuade 
or  to  educate  people  to  be  at  all  times  socially  minded,  generous  and 
charitable  without  some  degree  of  force  and  political  coercion.  This  is 
apparently  recognised,  for  the  principal  contentious  issue  between 
political  philosophers  seems  to  be  not  whether  the  use  of  coercion  is 
justified  as  such  but  whether  political  coercion  is  justified  only  to 
prevent  one  person  harming  another  or  whether  its  use  is  justified  to 
force  people  to  contribute  towards  the  benefit  of  others.  Either  argument, 
of  course,  whether  coercion  is  justified  merely  to  prevent  harn  or  to 
force  people  to  provide  benefits,  if  pursued  to  the  extreme  would  be 
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ecually  counter-productive. 
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John  Rawls  is  representative  of  those  who  favour  a  collective 
moral  ethic  and  prefer  to  argue  that  the  state  is  justified  in  assuming 
a  positive  role.  Rejecting  both  utilitarianism  and  intuitionism  as 
T" 
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adequate  ethical  theories  by  which  state  intervention  might  be  justified, 
Rawls  proposes  an  equally  contentious  contractual  theory  of  justice 
based  on  -  an  hypothetical  account  of  'free  and  rational  choice'  which  is 
devoid  of  all  personal  values.  He  requires  that  we  imagine  hypothetical 
man  abstracted  from  his  social  context  and  in  a  state  of  enforced 
impartiality,  free  from  bias,  prejudice  or  ambition,  deciding  upon  the 
most  desirable  social  order.  It  may  be  objected,  of  course,  that  Rawls  is 
not  justified  in  making  such  idealistic  and  formal  assuxmations,  and 
that  he  is  even  less  justified  in  basing  a  practical  theory  of  justice 
upon  them.  The  true  value  of  Rawls'  contribution  lies  in  his  statement 
of  belief  in  the  possibility  of  reaching  some  agreement  about  ends  and 
goals.  This  belief  is  shared  by  all  those  who  believe  in  social  and 
distributive  justice  and  distinguishes  those  who  are  disposed  to  support 
Rawls  from  others  like  Nozick  who  take  an  opposite  point  of  view. 
Rawls  argues:  "The  natural  distribution  is  neither  just  nor  unjust, 
nor  is  it  unjust  that  men  are  born  into  society  at  some  particular 
position.  - 
These  are  simply  natural  facts.  ,  That  is  just  and  unjust  is 
the  way  that  institutions  deal  with  these  facts....  the  social  system 
is  not  an  unchangeable  order  beyond  human  control  but  a  pattern  of 
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human  action.  "  He  identifies  basic  needs,  which  he  calls  'primary 
goods',  as  the  basic  concern  of  social  policy  and  recognises  the  need  for 
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the  state  to  intervene  in  order  to  ensure  a  degree  of  justice  for  all. 
Rawls'  concern  is  to  justify  the  distribution  of  social  goods,  such  as 
rights,  liberties,  opportunities,  power,.  income,  wealth,  self-respect, 
in  accord  with  a  simple  basic  principle  of  justice  which  states  that  they 
should  be  distributed  equally  unless  an  unequal  distribution  would  be  to 
the  adtantage  of  the  least  favoured.  This  he  calls  his  maxrmim  principle 
which  he  supposes  will  guarantee  the  largest  possible  share  to  each 
individual.  In  other  words,  Rawls  is  willing  to  accept  entrepreneurial 
society  provided  the  harsher  aspects  of  competitive  individualism  are 
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mitigated  by  equalising  as  far  as  possible  the  starting  point  of  such 
competition  as  a  basic  condition  of  fairness. 
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R.  Nozick,  in  'Anarchy,  State  and  Utopia',  his  critique  of  the 
basis  for  state  inter7ention  in  social  life,  takes  an  opposing  and 
different  view.  Nozic?  c  recognises  that  it  is  the  satisfaction  of  needs, 
which  is  the  principal  goal  of  scientists  and  politicians,  that  distinguishes 
welfare  programmes  from  ordinary  market  transactions,  but  denies  that 
needs  can  be  determined  in  a  morally  neutral  way.  In  his  view,  it  is 
essentially  a  normative  concept  of  need  that  is  used  to  justify  social 
policies.  Nozick  denies  that  the  state  should  be  obliged  or  even 
permitted  to  force  others  to  contribute  towards  the  satisfaction  of 
needs.  To  do  so,  he  thinks,  would  amount  to  treating  the  coercees  not 
as  ends  in  themselves  but  as  a  means  for  the  benefit  of  others,  which 
would  infringe  the  principle  of  respect  for  persons. 
There  seems  to  be-some  inconsistency  in  :  Tozick's  argument.  He  is 
quite  willing  to  allow  the  state  powers  to  prevent  people  from  harming 
others  even  though  it  might  imply  the  infringement  of  some  other  individuals' 
autonomy  and  their  being  treated  as  a  means  to  preserve  the  position  of 
others.  A  commitment  to  Kant's  categorical  imperative  in  the  form  of 
respect  for  persons  could  just  as  easily  lead  to  a  state  of  affairs 
approaching  anarchy  in  which  the  state  has  no  role  at  all  rather  than 
to  Nozick's  conclusion  that  the  state  may  exercise  only  a  minimal  and 
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preventive  role.  Nozick  hesitates  to  go  so  far.  He  recognises  the 
state's  right  to  interfere  with  the  rights  of  individuals  in  a  limited 
sense;  he  proposes  a  policy  of  'rectification',  allowing  a  limited 
redistribution  to  the  needy,  particularly  to  those  who  are  deemed  to  be 
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the  most  seriously  deprived. 
There  is  clearly  a  difference  of  enphasis  between  Rawls  and  Nozick. 
Rawls  argues  that  competitive  individualism  can  only  be  fully  realised 
if  all  individuals  are  given  a  fair  start.  Nozick  is  of  the  opinion 279 
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that  giving  priority  to  the  maximization  of  the  position  of  the  least 
well  off  would  stifle  rather  than  enable  individual  fulfilment  to 
flourish.  For  Rawls,  welfare  is  the  right  of  each  individual,  and  its 
provision  is  a  duty.  For  Nozick,  -welfare  is  primarily  a  gift,  not  a 
right;  it  is  an  act  of  benevolence,  an  imperfect  rather  than  a  perfect 
duty  imposed  upon  members  of  society.  Whether  welfare  ought  to  be 
regarded  as  a  right  giving  rise  to  a  duty  or  as  a  voluntary  act  of 
charity  is  the  question-at  issue.  Fill,  of  course,  was  in  no  doubt, 
sharing  views  similar  to  those  of  Nozick  which  are  revealed  in  his 
discussion  of  the  distinction  between  the  imperfect  duty  of  benevolence 
and  the  perfect  duty  of  justice:  "Justice  implies  something  which  it 
is  not  only  right  to  do  and  wrong  not  to  do  but  which  some  individual 
person  can  claim  from  us  as  his  moral  right.  No  one  has  a  moral  right 
to  our  generosity  or  beneficence  because  we  are  not  morally  bound  to 
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practise  those  virtues  towards  any  individual.  "  If  welfare  is  judged 
to  be  a  right,  then  state  action  to  secure  and  to  maintain  such  rights 
may  presumably  be  legitimised;  but  if,  on  the  other  hand,  welfare  is 
judged  to  be  a  gift  of  charity,  then  no  government  presumably  can  be 
judged  to  have  the  right  to  coerce  individuals  to  make  contributions, 
say  through  compulsory  taxation,  towards  the  provision  of  welfare  services. 
Various  a  guments,  all  of  which,  it  is  suggested,  fail,  have  been 
proposed  denying  that  welfare  is  a  right.  Some  will  argue  that  since 
injustices  can  only  arise  from  the  deliberate  actions  of  people, 
deprivations  arising  from  accidents  of  birth,  whether  genetic  or  economic 
or  environmental,  are  just  facts  of  life  giving  rise  to  no  moral  obligation 
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upon  those  who  are  more  fortunate.  The  assumption  is  that  if  no  one  is 
responsible  for  creating  such  inequalities,  then  no  one  can  be  blamed 
and  those  suffering  such  deprivations  have  no  moral  basis  for  a  claim 
on  others.  Welfare,  therefore,  must  be  regarded  as  a  gift  not  as  a  right, 
and  no  one,  it  is  assumed,  has  the  right  to  a  gift.  This  kind  of 280 
reasoning  is  apparently  based  on  the  epistemological  assumption  that 
knowledge  is  always  incomplete  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  reach  any 
firm  agreement  on  ends  or  on  any  real  purpose  for  society.  Instead, 
society  is  conceived  as  being  accidental  and  beyond  human  control, 
composed  of  individuals  all  pursuing  their  own  individualistic  ends, 
leaving  the  notion  of  justice  as  irrelevant.  This,  it  is  suggested,  is 
a  singularly  negative,  defeatist,  and  unproductive  point  of  view  and 
is  unworthy  of  serious  consideration. 
Other  philosophers  who  choose  not  to  recognise  welfare  as  a  right 
seek  to  show  that  welfare  provision  cannot  be  satisfactorily  justified 
in  terms  of  justice  because  the  notion  of  just  distribution  is  logically 
tied  to  the  notions  of  desert  and  merit  rather  than  the  notion  of  need. 
In  the  context  of  welfare  provision  this  implies  that  only  those  who 
are  deserving  and  earn  help  should  be  entitled  to  it.  So,  those  who 
already  have  get  more  whilst  those  who  are  really  in  need,  who  cannot 
help  themselves,  are  deprived,  and  are  not  therefore  judged  to  be 
deserving,  such  as  drunks  and  drug  addicts,  and  are  not  considered  to  merit 
any  help  at  all.  To  each  according  to  his  desert  is  a  rule  of  justice 
in  positive  law  and  a  principal  characteristic  of  the  criminal  code. 
In  other  words,  in  law,  an  individual  is  considered  to  be  responsible 
for  his  misdirected  behaviour  and  his  lack  of  effort  in  society.  This 
criterion  of  assessment,  however,  is  of  little  help  in  distinguishing 
between  the  deserving  and  the  undeserving  in  the  context  of  welfare 
provision,  for  no  man  can  be  said  to  be  responsible  for  or  to  deserve 
his  natural,  genetic  attributes  or  inadequacies,  or  the  conditions  of 
his  birth,  or  the  social  or  economic  circumstances  in  which  he  may  find 
himself  as  a  result  of  factors  outside  his  control.  An  analysis  of  the 
principle  of  justice  reveals  a  variety  of  sub-principles  including 
distribution  by  merit  and  desert  as  well  as  by  need,  but  no  one  of  these 
is  always  predominant  when  the  principle  of  justice  is  given  substance 281 
and  is  related  to  practical  circumstances  in  everyday  life. 
A  further  argument  that  is  used  to  refute  the  claim  that  welfare  is 
a  right  is  based  upon  drawing  a  distinction  between  human  rights  and 
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social  or  economic  rights.  If  a  human  right  to  welfare  is  established, 
then  presumably  there  is  a  strict  obligation  to  provide  welfare  benefits 
and  the  state  is  justified  in  coercing  citizens  to  make  a  positive  con- 
tribution  towards  the  benefit  of  others.  Cranston,  however,  argues  that 
welfare  rights  are  in  a  different  category  from  established  human  rights 
to  freedom,  to  life,  and  to  free  speech.  ;  Yhereas  human'rights  are 
practical,  relating  to  duties,  and  universal,  applying  to  all  regardless 
of  their  social  or  economic  role  or  status,  and  are  important,  relating 
to  the  basic  requirements  of  life,  social  rights  on  the  other  hand,  says 
Cranston,  fail  all-these  tests.  Established  human  rights,  it  is  claimed, 
are  rights  of  forbearance  depending  upon  the  negative  principle  of  non- 
interference  and  the  Kantian  argument  that  'I  ought  implies  I  can',,  and 
all  gover  rents,  however  poor,  are  deemed  able  to  fulfil  these  obligations 
to  some  degree.  Social  rights,  on  the  other  hand,  make  a  demand  on  resources 
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and  therefore,  it  is  supposed,  are  in  a  different  categorf.  But  these 
tests  imposed  by  Cranston  may  be  challenged,  If,  for  example,  it  is 
conceded  that  rights  of  forbearance  might  also  require  the  expenditure 
of  resources,  then  the  charge  of  impracticability  made  against  social 
rights  is  weakened;  if  it  can  be  conceded  that  social  rights  may  be 
universally  attributed  to  all  people  in  certain  particular  circumstances 
or  roles  in  which  such-rights  arise,  then  the  test  of  universalizability 
is  satisfied;  and,  if  it  is  acknowledged  that  one  cannot  survive  without 
being  healthy  and  educated,  then  even  social  rights  may  be  regarded  as 
being  of  paramount  importance. 
Nozick  interprets  Kant's  second  formulation  of  the  categorical 
imperative  as  meaning  that  individuals  have  the  right  not  to  be  treated 
as  a  means  without  their  consent.  The  enforced  restriction  of  their 282Tý} 
property,  therefore,  for  the  benefit  of  others,  in  Nozickts  view,  is 
likely  to  violate  their  autonomy.  But  it  is  problematical  whether 
Nozick's  view  can  be  sustained.  In  the  long  run,  for  an  individual  to 
will  such  a  rule  might  be  detrimental  to  his  own  interests,  for  at  some 
time  in  the  future  he  might  himself  be  in  need  of  the  help  of  others 
in  order  to  realise  his  own  ambitions  and  it  would  not  be  forthcoming. 
'. Thetzer  Kant  saw  helping  others  as  a  right  or  a  claim  is  not  particularly 
relevant  for  it  is,  in  any  case,  possible  to  interpret  Kant  as  implying 
that  help  is  a  right  and  a  duty.  In  other  words,  to  respect  the  ends 
of  another  may  be  interpreted  as  implying  that  we  should  tx-y  as  far  as 
possible  to  facilitate  the  efforts  of  others  to  achieve  their  ends. 
Kant  writes:  "For  the  ends  of  a  subject  who  is  an  end  in  himself  must 
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also  be  as  far  as  possible  my  ends.  "  'fie  may  conclude  therefore,  contrary 
to  Nozick,  that  the  basic  moral  principle  of  respect  for  persons  does 
in  fact  allow  the  notion-of  need  satisfaction  to  be  conceived  both  as 
a  right  and  a  duty,  and  that  the  community  ought  to  feel  obliged  to 
attend  to  the  basic  needs  of  its  members  in  accord  with  the  principles 
of  justice  and  respect  for  persons. 
It  is  one  thing  to  justify  the  existence  of  a  right,  it  is  another 
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thing  to  justify  a  further  right  of  enforcement.  On  a  one  to  one 
individual  basis,  for  example,  a  promise  made  to  me  does  not  automatically 
give  me  an  unconditional  right  to  enforce  its  implementation.  I  simply 
do  not  have  the  right  to  go  around  punching  people  on  the  nose  because 
they  refuse  to  honour  the  promises  they  have  made  to  me.  I  may  have  the 
right  to  ask  for  an  explanation,  assuming  that  a  promise  must  give  me 
some  kind  of  right  and  especially  if  I  have  acted  upon  it  in  good  faith, 
but  I  do  not  have  an  unconditional  right  of  enforcement.  There  may  be 
a  variety  of  good  reasons  why  a  promisor  chooses  at  the  time  not  to 
implement  a  particular  promise.  I  may  believe  I  have  a  right  to  live, 
but  this  does  not  mean  I  have  the  right  to  expect  unconditional  help -17 
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from  anyone  who  happens  to  be  around  when  I  find  that  my  life  is  at  risk, 
for  people  are  not  expected  to  be  saints  or  heroes,  or  to  act  beyond 
what  might  be  reasonably  expected  of  them  in  the  circumstances.  Similarly, 
I  may  believe  I  have  the  right  to  welfare  against  the  state,  and  that  the 
state  has  the  right  to  provide  welfare  ser'rices,  but  in  neither  case 
will  the  right  of  enforcement  be  unconditional. 
To  argue  that  the  state  has  the  right,,  albeit  a  qualified  one,  to 
force  its  citizens  to  contribute  towards  the  provision  of  welfare  services 
for  the  benefit  of  everybody  and  that  all  citizens  have  the  qualified 
right  to  force  the  state  to  help  them  when  in  need  is  to  presume  that 
the  state  has  the  capacity  to  act  as  a  moral  agent.  Nozick,  as  we  have 
noted  in  the  first  two  chapters  of  this  thesis,  is  loath  to  make  this 
concession;  instead,  he  significantly  limits  his  analysis  of  coercion 
to  a  relation  between  individuals  and  ignores  the  possibility  of  any 
entity,  other  than  the  individual,  being  capable  of  coercing  or  of  being 
coerced.  Nozick  is  suspicious  of  the  notion  of  a  collective  community 
acting  as  a  moral  agent  and  exercising  a  common  will,  and  is  fearful 
lest  the  acceptance  of  such  an  idea  should  lead  to  the  suppression  of 
freedom  and  individuality  which  he  thinks  should  be  inviolable.  He 
does  not,  however,  press  his  thesis  to  the  extreme  for  he  introduces 
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the  notion  of  'partial  communities'. 
Nozick  believes  that  if  individuals  are  inviolable,  then  it  is 
morally  wrong  to  force  them  into  any  community  that  fails  to  express 
their  interests  or  to  produce  the  means  for  the  realisation  of  their 
desires.  Since  human  nature  is  complex,  he  suggests  that  one  form  of 
comminity,  say  the  state,  is  unlikely  to  meet  every  individual's  needs 
and  therefore  a  variety  of  communities  is  required,  not  just  one  all- 
embracing,  homogeneous,  state  community.  Nozick  envisages  a  variety  of 
groups  or  'partial  coin  pities'  within  society,  some  of  which  may  be 
concerned  with  welfare,  but  he  wishes  to  leave  room  within  the  greater 284 
society  for  the  free  expression  of  the  moral  virtues  of  benevolence  and 
altruism  together  with  the  opportunity  to  choose  for  oneself.  So, 
Nozick  advises  a  minimal  role  for  the  state,  leaving  the  provision  of 
services,  including  welfare,  to  voluntary  effort.  In  Nozick'  s  view, 
the  right  to  enforce  the  state  to  provide  welfare  services  and  the  right 
of  the  state  to  force  its  citizens  to  contribute  towards  such  provision 
does  not  arise  because  the  provision  of  welfare  is  regarded  as  a  gift 
freely  and  voluntarily  given. 
We  have  argued,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  state,  like  any  other 
corporate  body,  may  be  imagined  as  reflecting  the  will  of  its  members 
and  may  be  regarded,  like  any  individual,  as  a  legal  and  moral  agent 
with  rights  and  duties.  So,  the  state,  charged  With-the  responsibility 
of  caring  for  its  members,  must  have  a  moral  and  presumably  a  legal  duty 
to  meet  this  obligation.  Furthermore,  if,  as  is  often  the  case,  the 
needs  of  its  citizens  have  in  fact  arisen  as  a  result  of  state  policies, 
then  the  state  is  presumably  blameworthy  and  morally  bound  to  remedy 
matters.  Undoubtedly  a  fair  proportion  of  the  needs  of  people  in  modern 
society,  in  education,  housing,  health,  employment,  and  security,  arise 
and  have  arisen  in  the  past  as  a  direct  consequence  of  national  negligence 
and  mismanagement  on  the  part  of  state  officials. 
Likewise,  if  members  of  society  collectively  agree  that  their 
representatives  should  tend  to  the  well-being  of  all  citizens,  then 
ethical  consistency  must  require  that  everyone  should  contribute 
towards  providing  the  means.  Whilst  citizens  have  the  moral  right  to 
force  the  state  to  fulfil  its  responsibilities,  the  state  surely  has 
the  right  to  force  its  subjects  to  meet  theirs,  though  not  without 
qualification  for  there  must  be  limits  to  the  charges  that  may  be  made 
against  any  individual's  property  and  person.  Whilst  for  instance  a 
compulsory  contribution  towards  welfare  might  be  justified  as  a  valid 
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of  course,  to  suggest  that  the  state  should  have  the  right  to  force  an 
individual  to  surrender  his  bodily  organs  or  even  his  blood  for  the 
benefit  of  others.  Such  a  policy  might  be  justified  on  utilitarian 
grounds,  as  being  to  the  advantage  of  the  greatest  mmiber  or  for  the 
benefit  of  the  connminity  as  a  whole,  but  would  nevertheless  be  regarded 
as  morally  unacceptable  and  as  breaching  the  basic  moral  principle  of 
respect  for  persons. 
It  is  easier  to-justify  the  satisfaction  of  a  need  than  the  conferring 
of  a  benefit,  though  it  is  not  always  easy  to  distinguish  the  one  from 
the  other  because  one  man's  meat,  so  to  speak,  may  be  another  man's 
poison.  Without  the  authority  and  organising  power  of  the  state  many 
public  benefits,  amenities,  facilities,  would  not  materialize.  Advocates 
of  perfect  competition,  laissez-faire,  free  markets,  privatisation,  who 
favour  minimal  state  intervention  in  human  affairs,  offer  no  panacea. 
It  is  not,  for  example,  in  the  obvious  interests  of  competing  entrepreneurs, 
and  it  is  certainly  contrary  to  the  immediate  maximisation  of  their 
profits,  to  have  to  meet  extra  costs  involved  in  satisfying  the  needs  of 
their  workforces  or  the  costs  of  preserving  the  natural  environment  say 
by  preventing  pollution.  The  avoidance  of  pollution  is  no  doubt  in 
everybody's  interest  in  the  long  run  but  it  could  'be  immediately  suicidal 
for  one  industrialist  to  take  the  initiative  and  to  dissipate  all  his 
profits  on  schemes  to  avoid  pollution  instead  of  using  them  to  undercut 
the  efforts  of  his  business  rivals.  Only  the  state,  through  means  of 
a  charge  on  all  offenders,  is  able  to  enforce  such  things  as  anti-pollution 
policies  equitably  for  the  benefit  of  society  as  a  whole.  It  is  inevitable, 
in  any  system  of  mandatory  contributions,  that  some  injustices  will  ensue, 
and  that  some  people  will  feel  they  are  being  coerced.  Childless 
families  are  taxed  Willy  nilly  to  pay  for  schools  and  non-drivers  are 
required  to  contribute  in  their  taxes  towards  the  upkeep  of  the  roads. 
The  alternative  to  compulsory  taxation  is  either  a  voluntary  policy  or 
simply  no  policy  at  all. 286 
The  logic  of  free  enterprise  and  unrestricted  individualism  taken 
to  the  extreme  is,  like  the  logic  of  collectivism,  self-defeating. 
It  is  in  the  interests  of  all  competitors,  even  in  a  free  market 
economy,  that  restrictions  are  imposed  from  time  to  time  by  the  state 
on  the  output  and  quality  of  goods  in  order  to  maintain  minimum  standards. 
Likewise,  the  state  is  prima  facie  justified  on  utilitarian  grounds 
and  in  the  just  interests  of  all  its  citizens  to  provide  public  welfare 
facilities  and  public  benefits,  and  to  force  citizens  to  contribute 
towards  the  expense,  provided  in  every  case  the  final  decision  is  made 
in  accord  with  established  basic  moral  principles. 
Liberty  limiting  principles  presume  that  there  are  good  reasons 
for  the  use  of  coercion  and  the  ensuing  restriction  of  people's  freedom. 
The  justified  use  of  state  coercion  to  provide  public-  welfare  facilities 
and  public  benefits  is  one  such  principle.  Another,  not  unrelated  to  it, 
is  that  which  proposes  the  use  of  coercion  by  the  state  to  maintain  the 
moral  values  of  society  which,  it  is  assumed,  all  citizens  share,  and 
which  are  considered  to  be  essential  to  society's  well-being.  Three 
aspects  of  this  principle  may  be  distinguished:  the  suggestion  that  the 
state  may  use  coercion  to  maintain  the  valued  and  established  institutions 
of  society  that  are  in  the  public  interest,  the  suggestion  that  it  is 
justifiable  for  the  state  to  punish  and  to  forcibly  prohibit  iranoral 
behaviour  because  it  is  i:  -moral,  and  the  suggestion  that  the  state  is 
justified  in  using  coercion  to  prevent  breaches  of  the  moral  code  that 
cause  offence  to  other  members  of  society. 
It  has  been  a  popular  criticism  of  Mill's  liberty  principle  that  it 
fails  to  take  sufficient  account  of  the  social  structures,  the  shared 
values  and,  institutions  that  society  should  protect,  if  necessary  even 
by  coercive  means,  against  individuals  and  agencies  within  society  which 287 
threaten  to  destroy  them.  In  Mill's  defence,  however,  it  must  be  stated 
that  he  recognised  the  desirability  of  maintaining  a  stable  society 
but  not  at  all  costs,  for  he.  realised  that  not  all  stable  societies  are 
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necessarily  good.  It  was  not  Mill's  intent  to  advocate  change  for 
change's  sake  to  the-detriment  of  all  proven  values,  but  he  realised  that 
a  good  society  was  simply  more  than  just  a  static  one.  Liberty  entails, 
he  argues,  an  element  of  instability  and  indivic:  ualism  which  are  both 
essential  for  the  continuance  of  a  valued  and  progressive  social  life. 
Much  of  the  discussion  that  has  ensued  regarding  the  state's  right  to 
enforce  the  supposed  shared  values  of  society  has  centred  around  the 
notion  of  morals  offences. 
Offences  against  morality  and  decency  are  in  law  distinguished  as 
a  separate  class  distinct  from  offences  against  the  person  or  against 
property.  They  are  usually  taken  to  refer  to  sexual  offences  such  as 
adultery,  fornication,  sodomy,  incest,  prostitution,  though  non-sexual 
offences  against  people's  feelings  and  presumed  moral  consciousness, 
including  indescriminate  or  deliberate,  cruelty  to  animals,  violation  of 
the  dead,  the  desecration,  of  venerable  and  sacred  beliefs  and  artefacts, 
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are  also  included.  The  distinguishing  characteristic  of  such  offences 
is  that  whilst  their  perpetration  might  harn  some  individuals,  even 
willing  participants,  they  do  not.  necessarily  result  in  as  serious  a 
threat  to  public  security  as  say  murder  does,  unless  of  course  they  are 
committed  deliberately  in  full  public  view,  in  which  case  they  may  be 
deemed  to  amount  to  a  public  nuisance  and  banned  as  threatening  to  cause 
a  breach  of  the  peace.  The  problem  posed  is  whether  such  offences,  even 
if  committed  in  private  in  the  presence  of  consenting  adults,  should  be 
coercively  prohibited  by  the  state  on  the  grounds  that  they  are  in  any 
event  detrimental  to  the  maintenance  of  the  well-being  of  society  and 
its  presumed  shared  values  and  standards. 
A  utilitarian  might  point  to  the  anticipated  unwelcome  cost  of  state 288 
intervention  in  this  area,  as  Mill  did,  and  to  the  difficulties  involved 
in  preventing  such  behaviour  taking  place  and  the  opportunities  that  might 
arise  for  blackmail  and  corruption  in  the  process  of  detecting  and 
gathering  evidence  of  it.  An  alternative  view  is  to  argue  that  the 
prevention  of  harm  involves  not  merely  harm  to  individuals  but  to  society 
as  a  whole,  to  its  institutions  and  shared  moral  values  which,  it  is 
assumed,  bind  individuals  together  collectively  and  responsibly.  According 
to  this  view,  the  infringement  of  society's  moral  code  even  by  consenting 
individuals  in  private  is  considered  to  be  detrimental  to  the  well-being 
of  society,  the  maintenance  of  its  standards,  its  stability,  and  likely 
to  lead  to  the  proliferation  of  undesirable  attitudes  and  practices 
calculated  to  subvert  it. 
In  recent  years  the  principal  protagonist  of  such  arguments,  which' 
represent  a  public  rather  than  a  private  interpretation  of  the  harm 
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principle,  has  been  Patrick  Devlin.  Devlin  objected  to  the  conclusions 
of  the  Wolf  enden  Committee  which,  guided  by  Mill's  arguments  in 
$on  Liberty',  recommended  that  homosexual  practices  between  consenting 
adults  should  not  be  a  crime  and  that  prostitution  should  not  be  made 
illegal  but  legislated  against  on  the  grounds  that  it  perpetrates  an 
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offensive  nuisance  to  ordinary  citizens.  Devlin  argues  that  the 
maintenance  of  a  shared  moral  code  is  a  necessary  condition  for  the 
health  and  survival  of  society.  In  Devlin's  view,  says  H.  L.  A.  Hart,  the 
shared  moral  convictions  of  society's  members  act  like  invisible  bonds 
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unifying  the  moral  life  of  society  in  a  'seamless  Webb',  which  if 
damaged  in  any  particular  is  considered  to  be  weakened  in  its  entirety. 
As  Devlin  himself  says:  "...  for  most  people  morality  is  a  webb  of  beliefs 
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rather  than  a  number  of  unconnected  ones.  "  So..  Devlin  concludes  that 
the  state  can  no  more  tolerate  moral  diversion,  even  if  committed  in 
private  and  by-willing  parties,  any  more  than  it  can  tolerate  political 
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subversion  or  treason.  Devlin's  case  is  questioned  and  particularly  the 289 
two  basic  doctrines  upon  which  it  is  based,  namely,  the  disintegration 
thesis  which  assumes  that  morality  holds  society  together  and  therefore 
is  indispensible,  and  the  conservative  thesis  which  assumes  that  the 
majority  in  any  society  has  the  right  to  follow  its  moral  convictions 
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and  feelings  and  to  defend  them  at  all  costs. 
Devlin  distinguishes  two  kinds  of  harn,  tangible  harm  and  intangible 
harm,  both  of  which  he  claims  result  from  individual  violations  of  a 
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society's  shared  morality.  Tangible  harm  is  established  empirically 
and  consists  in  the  diminution  of  the  physical  well-being  of  society 
which,  it  is  assured,  will  result  if  unrestricted  individual  infringements 
of  society's  moral  standards  are  tolerated  to  excess,  enabling  a  vicious 
minority  to  diminish  the  physical  health  of  individual  members  of  society 
and  of  society  as  a  whole.  The  assumption  is  that  immorality,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  transmission  of  infectious  sexual  diseases  and  the  perpetration 
of  incestuous  liaisons,  weakens  the  moral  standards  of  society-as  well 
as  the  health  of  its  members.  It  is  not  always  easy  to  establish 
tangible  harm  in  every  case.  In  the  case  of  cruelty  to  animals  perpetrated 
in  private  the  harm  is  sustained  by  the  participating  individuals  and 
may  not  be  physically  obvious.  Also,  it  is  not  clear  whether  Devlin  is 
convinced  that  a  shared  morality  is  determined  simply  by  the  numbers 
supporting  it  or  whether  its  content  or  quality  is  also  significant;  he 
observes  without  comment  that  celibacy  no  less  than  sexual  promiscuity, 
if  pursued  to  excess  by  a  majority,  is  just  as  likely  to  be  detrimental 
to  society's  well-being. 
Intangible  harm,  according  to  Devlin,  consists  in  the  weakness  of 
coon  ionly  held  moral  beliefs  which,  he  argues,  will  ensue  if  the 
indiscriminate  practice  of  immoral  behaviour  in  private  is  tolerated  on 
a  significant  scale.  Here  Devlin  appears  to  move  from  the  notion  that 
some  shared  morality  is  essential  to  the  existence  of  society  to  the 
unacceptable  position,  which  he  seemingly  assumes  as  an  a  priori  truth 290 
and  for  which  he  offers  no  explanation,  that  a  society  can  be  actually 
identified  with  its  morality.  This  entails  the  unlikely  assumption 
that  any  change  in  society's  morality  is  tantamount  to  the  substitution 
of  one  society  by  another.  This  ignores  the  possibility  of  the  continuity 
of  society  and  the  possibility  of  societies  developing  and  changing.  It 
also  denies  the  possibility  of  there  being  a  distinction  between  public 
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and  private  morality.  Devlin  also  chooses  to  ignore  other  factors, 
other  than  a  shared  morality,  that  are  commonly  recognised  as  being 
significant  in  maintaining  the  stability  of  societies,  things  such  as 
a  common  history  of  shared  experiences,  a  common  language,  a  genetic 
identity,  the  need  for  security  and  economic  survival,  not  to  mention 
shared  values  other  than  moral  ones  such  as  an  aesthetic  regard  for 
ceremonies  and  rituals  and  for  a  common  culture. 
Despite  evident  shortcomings  in  Devlin's  arguments  many  will  support 
the  commonsensical  utilitarian  pres=ption  that  a  shared  moral  code  of 
S=e  kind  is  essential  for  the  continued  existence  of  any  society,  for 
it  is  inconceivable  to  imagine  any  society  without  a  body  of  shared 
moral  values  foi  ing  part  of  its  coranon  culture.  This  is  not  to  claim 
that  the  preservation  of  society  requires  the  coercive  enforcement  of 
its  morality  as  such  and  as  of  right  according  to  majority  opinion.  It 
is,  however,  possible  to  establish  unequivocably  by  empirical  observation 
that  some  morals  offences  do  in  fact  lead  to  the  physical  deterioration 
of  society  if  pursued  to  excess,  or  even  if  pursued  to  any  degree  at  all. 
And  it  would  seem  to  be  quite  wrong  to  suppose  that  the  absence  of  a 
shared  sexual  morality  would  be  no  more  disruptive  to  society  than  say 
an  absence  of  a  fondness  for  the  same  kind  of  food.  The  arrival  of  AIDS 
has  undoubtedly  added  weight  to  Devlin's  argument  that  tangible  physical 
harm  both  to  individuals  and  society  can  result  from  the  practice  of 
sexual  promiscuity  and  deviant  sexual  behaviour  between  consenting  adults. 291 
Where  harn  is  established  empirically  and  the  survival  of  society  is  in 
question  there  would  seem  to  be  a  case,  in  accord  with  the  principle 
of  utility,  for  coercive  intervention  by  the  state,  even  if  it  is  at 
the  expense  of  freedom  and  respect  for  individual  liberty,  for  if  people 
do  not  survive  there  will  be  no  society  and  no  morality  to  speak  about 
anyway. 
The  justification  of  state  intervention  upon  grounds  of  intangible 
harm  amounting  to  an  anticipated  weakening  of  the  moral  fabric  of 
society  is  more  problematical.  Thereas  e  irical  evidence  furnishes 
a  justification  in  terms  of  consequences  for  the  enforcement  of  a 
shared  morality,  the  justification  of  state  intervention  on  the  grounds 
of  the  anticipated  or  threatened  disintegration  of  society  is  questionable, 
for  such  harm  is  difficult  to'  establish  being  related  in  Devlin's 
argument  to  the  notion  that  Loral  acts  co=itted  in  private  represent 
a  weakening  of  society  itself,  which  is  based  on  the  dubious  assttion 
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that  society  and  its  moral  well-being  are  one  and  the  same  thing. 
So,  any  breach  of  the  moral  code,  even  if  committed  in  private  with  no 
apparent  affect  upon  any  other,  is  deemed  to  be  -prima  facie  wrong  and  to 
warrant  state  intervention.  In  effect,  the  enforcement  of  morality 
becomes  an  end  in  itself. 
If  it  is  supposed  that  at  any  given  moment  of  time  society  is 
identical  with  its  moral  values,  then  it  must  be  assumed  that  any 
change  in  its  values  registers  the  end  of  one  society  and  the  beginning 
of  another,  which  is  a  very  odd  presumption  because  it  precludes  the 
possibility  of  ever  imagining  the  moral  values  of  any  society  changing. 
It  also  presumes  the  enforcement  of  a  static,  fixed  morality  and  a 
uniform  pattern  of  life  on  all  citizens,  and  the  right  of  the  state  to 
enforce  the  maintenance  of  existing  institutions  in  perpetuum,  if  the 
present  society  is  to  be  preserred.  Hart  is  justly  critical  of  this 
kind  of  argument  and  writes:  "The  attribution  of  value  to  mere  conforming 292 
behaviour  in  abstraction  from  both  motive  and  consequences  belongs 
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not  to  morality  but  taboo.  " 
Forcing  people  to  conform  to  an  imposed  and  inflexible  code  of 
moral  values  is  clearly  likely  to  be  counter-productive.  Individuals 
are  deprived  of  their  freedom  to  make  rational  choices,  of  their  sense 
responsibility,  and  of  opportunities  to  develop  and  to  exercise  their 
autonomy;  instead,  they  are  conraitted  to  an  enforced  policy  of  fallible 
authoritarianism.  It  has  been  suggested  that  Devlin  does  not  intend 
such  extreme  consequences,  for  he  does  in  fact  admit  that  a  shared 
morality  can  be  changed,  though  only  by  taking  the  risk  of  defying  the 
law  and  proving  by  a  kind  of  trial  by  ordeal  that  the  proposed  change 
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is  itself  worthy  of  the  law's  protection.  There  is,  it  is  suggested, 
sufficient  inconsistency  in  Devlin's  argument,  quite  apart  from  its 
neglect  of  certain  basic  moral  principles,  to  deny  his  attempt  to 
justify  the  state's  use  of  coercion  to  enforce  a  strict  policy  of 
moral  conformity  in  both  public  and  private  life. 
Devlin's  argument-that  the  preservation  of  the  existing  morality 
of  society  is  itself  of  value  and  therefore  justifies  the  use  of  coercion 
by  the  state  to  preserve  it  must  be  distinguished  from  another  of  his 
propositions  to  which  it  is  related,  namely,  that  it  is  justifiable  for 
the  state  to  prohibit  behaviour  that  is  offensive  to  the  feelings  of 
others.  It  is  a  constituent  part  of  what  Hart  calls  Devlin's  conservative 
thesis  that  it  is  the  state's  duty  to  preserve  any  institutions  of  society 
as  essential  institutions,  if  the  ordinary  man  feels  strongly  enough 
that  it  is  important  to  do  so,  on  the  grounds  that  in  the  final  analysis 
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the  will  of  the  people  must  prevail. 
It  may  be  objected  that  an  appeal  to  the  will  of  the  people  could 
involve  an  appeal  to  the  ordinary  man's  feelings  of  intolerance,  disgust, 
indignation  and  prejudice,  or  to  whatever  is  taken  to  represent  the  will 
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of  the  prevailing  majority.  It  follows  that  should  the  majority  be 293 
offended  by  the  thought  of  sexual  deviations  taking  place  in  society, 
even  in  private,  then  state  suppression  of  all  ex-Pressions  of  deviant 
behaviour  in  sexual  matters  is  justified.  Devlin  presents  this  argent 
as  an  appeal  to  democracy,  instead  of  appealing  as  Mill  would  do  to  an 
imagined  morally  conscious  and  educated  elite.  But  again  Devlin  is 
inconsistent  when  he  makes  the  observation  that  an  energetic  minority 
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might  possibly  carry  greater  weight  than  the  majority  and  suggests 
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that  the  task  of  the  state  is  not  sinnly  one  of  counting  heads.  Indeed, 
if  the  latter  were  the  case,  then  any  popular  desaotism  would  be  deemed 
to  be  democratic  so  long  as  it  was  approved  by  popular  acclamation.  This 
of  course  was  what  Mill  was  afraid  of. 
There  are  good  reasons  for  rejecting  the  offense  principle,  in  the 
form  proposed  by  Devlin,  as  a  liberty  limiting  principle.  People  are 
fickle  in  their  tastes  and  preferences  and  may  be  offended  quite  irrationally 
by  harmless  activities.  It  is  because  'being  offended'  is  such  a  subjective 
reaction  that  the  miniarm  requirement  for  even  entertaining  the  possibility 
of  the  cause  of  the  offence  being  justifiably  prevented  by  the  state  must 
surely  be  the  satisfaction  of  the  test  of  universalisability.  In  other 
words,  the  particular  offense  in  question  must  be  expected  to  be  registered 
by  any  one  individual  selected  at  random  from  the  population  concerned. 
This  really  must  be  the  case,  for  recognition  of  the  principle  of  liberty 
requires  that  individuals  are  free  from  restrictions  imposed  upon  them 
by  the  irrational  tastes  and  preferences  of  their  neighbours,  unless 
additional  reasons  are  forthcoming  and  the  claims  of  other  moral  principles 
are  judged  to  be  in  the  circumstances  more  important  than  respect  for  the 
principle  of  liberty  itself. 
The  use  of  coercion  by  the  state  to  ensure  the  continued  well-being 
of  society  may  be  justified  in  terns  of  consequences  in  accord  with  the 
principle  of  utility,  particularly  when  the  health  and  security  of  society 
are  at  stake.  But  the  right  of  the  state  to  intervene  in  the  affairs  of T5  Tr  294 
individuals  must  not  be  conceded  without  qualification,  or  without 
recourse  to  alternative  moral  principles  that  might  override  even  the 
the  claims  of  utility.  Devlin's  contention  that  the  state  should  be 
entitled  to  enforce  the  shared  moral  values  of  society  either  as  of  right 
or  as  long  as  the  majority  so  determine  must  be  questioned:  firstly, 
because  Devlin  is  not  consistent  in  his  arguments,  secondly  because  the 
assuýaotions  upon  which  his  arguments  are  based  are  antithetical  to  an 
empirical  and  commonsensical  view  of  the  nature  of  change  and  development 
in  societies,  and  thirdly  because  he  ignores  the  relevance  of  other 
basic  moral  principles  such  as  liberty  and  justice  which  in  certain 
particular  circumstances  might  be  judged  to  be  paramount. 
The  enforcement  by  the`  state  of  the  shared  values  of  society  might 
be  justified  on  paternalistic  grounds,  that  is  to  say  on  the  basis  that 
it  is  in  the  individual's  own  interest,  whether  the  individual  thinks  it 
is  or  not,  rather  than  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  just  deemed  to  be  right, 
or  because  it  is  for  the  benefit  of  society,  or  because  the  abuse  of 
such  values  is  offensive  to  others.  Mill  was  obviously  aware  of  the 
difference  between  these  two  approaches  when  in  the  first  chapter  of 
'On  Liberty',  whilst  considering  what  he  believed  to  be  inadequate  grounds 
for  coercing  an  individual  against  his  will,  he  makes  a  distinction 
between  interfering  "because  it  will  be  better  for  him"  or  "because  it 
will  make  him  happier"  from  "because  in  the  opinion  of  others  it  would 
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be  right".  Nowadays,  whenever  the  state  undertakes  to  protect  individuals 
for  their  own  good,  or  say  from  self-inflicted  harm,  the  action  of  the 
state  is  normally  legitmised  by  law,  irrespective  of  whether  the  action 
of  the  state  is  morally  justified  or  not,  and  irrespective  of  whether 
the  individual  welcomes  the  protection  of  the  state  or  not. 
Crudely  put,  paternalism,  which  need  not  always  be  coercive,  to  lie 295 
in  order  to  protect  somebody  for  example  is  not  to  coerce  them,  is  a 
preposterous  doctrine.  If  adults  are  treated  like  children,  they  will 
presumably  become  like  children,  and  if  children  are  always  treated  as 
children  and  are  deprived  of  opportunities  of  choosing  for  themselves, 
they  will  presumably  remain  as  children  and  their  individual  personal 
development  will  be  arrested.  All  this  was  evident  to  Mill  when  he 
rejected  the  use  of  coercion  for  achieving  paternalistic  ends.  For  Mill, 
as  for  all  individualists,  the  preservation  of  free,  voluntary  choice 
for  every  human  being  of  mature  years  in  matters  directly  affecting  his 
own  interests  is  so  essential  that  no  one,  not  even  the  state,  is 
recognised  as  being  justified  in  claiming  a  right  to  interfere  with  it 
simply  on  the  grounds  that  such  interference  is  for  the  individual's  own 
good  and  that  the  state  or  whoever  Immvs  best. 
It  is  not  aossible,  however,  to  reject  paternalism  outright  or  to 
deny  that  a  person's  own  good  is  ever  a  valid  reason  for  coercing  him, 
for  to  do  so  would  be  to  ignore  the  dictates  of  sound  coanonsense  and 
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the  evidence  of  long  established  practice.  Subject  to  certain  exceptions 
such  as  rape  the  criminal  law  has  never  admitted  the  consent  of  the 
victim  as  a  defence.  The  consent  of  the  victim  is  never  admitted  as  a 
defence  to  charges  of  homicide,  or  to  the  charge  of  murder,  deliberate 
assault,  euthanasia  or  mercy  killing.  Likewise,  the  state  refuses  to 
permit  anyone  to  consent  to  his  own  debasement  or  demise.  In  contract 
one  cannot  consent  to  sell  oneself  into  slavery,  nor  can  one  contract  to 
become  a  person's  mistress  or  second  wife.  One  is  not  allowed  by  law  to 
purchase  certain  drugs  without  a  prescription.  Ordinar9  citizens  may 
legally  use  reasonable  force  to  prevent  an  individual  mutilating  himself 
or  cocnitting  suicide.  The  rationale  behind  such  rulings  is  simply  that 
beatings,  mutilations,  death,  conct.  ibinage,  slavery,  biganr  are  considered 
to  be  detrimental  to  an  individual'  s  welfare,  whether  he  himself  realises  it 
at  the  time  or  not,  and  that  antibiotics  are  too  dangerous  for  any 296 
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non-expert,  and  drugs  for  anyone  at  all,  to  take  on  his  own  initiative. 
The  concessions  Mill  makes  to  the  use  of  coercion  for  paternalistic 
reasons  are-limited.  They  are  determined  in  part  by  his  own  idea  of  how 
a  normal  person  is  expected  to  behave,  partly  by  his  notion  of  voluntary 
and  non-voluntary  behaviour,  and  partly  by  the  degree  of  harm  that  might 
be  avoided.  He  is  criticised  for  optimistically  accrediting  the  ordinary 
individual  with  all  the  wisdom  of  a  mature  middle-aged  adult.  He  concedes 
that  paternalism  is  justified  in  the  case  of  people  who  are  judged  to  be 
less  than  normal.  This  includes  those  suffering  from  some  defect  of 
reason  caused,  for  example,  by  some  congenital  handicap,  or  by  age,  or 
by  some  incapacity,  accident  or  illness  not  of  their  own  causing,  or 
by  lack  of  knowledge  or  information  amounting  to  ignorance,  or  by  some 
temporary  incapacity  of  their  own  causing  such  as  drunkeness. 
It  may  be  objected  that  Mill  sets  his  standards  too  high.  He  would 
not,  for  example,  prohibit  the  sale  of  drags  but  rely  instead  upon  the 
notmal  person  being  able  to  read  and  to  understand  appropriate  warnings 
and  to  decide  sensibly  for  himself  whether  he  should  use  them  or  not. 
This,  of  course,  is  the  policy  presently  pursued  by  most  governments 
with  regard  to  smoking,  although  it  is  plainly  obvious  that  individuals 
are  perfectly  capable  of  convincing  themselves  quite  irrationally  that 
the  warnings  exhibited  are  not  relevant  to  their  own  particular  situation. 
Mill  appears  to  attribute  to  ordinary  people  far  more  good  sense  than  can 
reasonably  be  expected  of  even  highly  educated  and  intelligent  people. 
In  the  special  case  of  drugs,  for  example,  he  not  only  fails  to  take  account 
of  the  lethal  effects  and  addictive  qualities  of  certain  drugs  but  also 
of  the  possible  occurrence  of  weakness  of  will  in  all  sections  of  the 
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population  regardless  of  their  intellectual  competence. 
Following  ?.  Till's  reasoning,  it  is  traditionally  presumed  that  coercive, 
paternalistic  interference  in  another  person's  affairs  is  more  easily 
justified  when  the  behaviour  of  the  victim  is  non-voluntary,  though  it 297 
is  not  always  possible  to  determine  precisely  the  point  at  -which 
non-voluntary  behaviour  ceases  and  becomes  voluntary.  A  similar  difficulty 
emerges  in  relation  to  the  assessment  of  the  degree  of  harm  that  might  be 
prevented  and  which  might  justify  paternalistic  interference.  In  some 
cases  the  degree  to  which  actions  are  harmful  need  not  necessarily  vary 
with  age.  The  harm  caused  by  glue-sniffing,  for  example,  is  ultimately 
the  same  for  everyone.  But  the  degree  of  maturation,  normality  and 
voluntariness  expected  of  any  individual  is  in  some  measure  related  to 
his  age  and  experience.  This  is  why  we  normally  take  for  granted  the 
increasing  inappropriateness  of  coercive,  paternalistic  intervention  in 
another  person's  affairs  in  proportion  to  his  age,  unless  of  course  through 
age  he  has  become  incapable.  Generally  speaking,  the  older  a  person  is 
the  more  we  expect  him  to  be  responsible  for  his  own  choices. 
It  is  sometimes  suggested  that  the  fiction  of  inferred  consent 
should  first  be  established  before  coercive,  paternalistic  interference 
can  be  justified  in  terms  of  being  for  the  victim's  own  good  or  future 
benefit.  The  assumption  is  that  if  the  victim's  consent  is  inferred, 
the  restriction  upon  his  liberty  which  is  imposed  by  coercion  is  only 
temporary.  So,  following  this  reasoning,  it  is  necessary  to  be  able  to 
anticipate  the  possible  consent  of  the  victim,  and  it  is  assumed  that  no 
normal,  sensible  person  would  wish  to  do  anything  to  his  awn  detriment 
and  would  therefore  approve  of  anyone  else  trying  to  stop  him  if  he  did. 
This  is  the  position  that  parents  and  teachers  find  themselves  in  with 
regard  to  their  respective  offspring  and  charges,  and  it  is  the  basis 
upon  which  they  justify  their  use  of  coercion  to  persuade  the  younger 
generation  to  adopt  appropriate  and  socially  acceptable  habits,  tastes, 
attitudes  and  values.  That  is  to  say,  children  are  constantly  coerced, 
contrary  to  their  immediate  desires,  because  it  is  presumed  by  their 
guardians  that  were  they  adults,  as  they  will  be  one  day,  they  would 
approve  of  the  present  action  of  their  mentors. 298  "' 
It  is  not  suggested  that  it  is  possible  for  a  person  to  consent 
tobe  coerced.  Such  a  proposition  would  seem  to  be  self-contradictory, 
for  it  is  not  possible  to  do-something  against  one's  will  yet  at  the 
same  time  will  to  do  it.  It  is  the  case  that  we  do  from  time  to  time 
submit  ourselves  to  the  authority  of  others  and  to  institutionalised 
rules  and  procedures  associated  with  society  and  groups  within  society 
to  which  we  belong.  This  happens  when  people  join  a  tennis  club  and 
agree  to  abide  by  the  rules  which  are  for  the  benefit  of  all  members 
including  themselves,  though  they  may  realise  that  sometimes  they  will 
not  always  want  to  agree  with  all  the  rules  and  that  new  rules  might  be 
forthcoming  to  which  they  might  wish  to  object.  Similarly,  as  subjects 
of  a  state  we  agree  to  legislation  empowering  the  state  to  regulate 
our  lives  even  to  the  extent  of  protecting  us  from  our  own  weaknesses 
and  moral  lapses,  say  from  stealing  or  assaulting  others  or  from  not 
paying  our  debts.  If  a  majority  of  subjects  want  heroin  to  be  banned 
because  they  fear  they  might  in  their  weakness  other%Pise  yield  to  the 
temptation,  then  one  might  argue  that  the  state  is  justified  in  assuming 
a  paternalistic  role  in  this  respect.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that 
the  majority  in  question  has  agreed  to  be  coerced.  Should  any  change 
their  minds  and  decide  to  use  heroin,  or  should  the  minority  persist  in 
their  opposition  to  state  interference  in  their  lives  in  this  respect, 
then  both  respectively  will  feel  coerced  and  will  be  coerced.  In  other 
words,  it  is  possible  to  agree  to  a  paternalistic  relationship  within 
which  one  might  be  coerced  from  time  to  time,  but,  logically  speaking, 
it  is  not  possible  to  agree  or  to  consent  to  be  coerced.  Coercion 
cannot  be  justified  on  the  grounds  that  the  coercee  has  given  his  consent. 
People  in  various  ways  become  involved  in  paternalistic  relationships 
giving  others  control  over  them.  I  may,  for  instance,  being  aware  of  my 
own  extravagance,  arrange  with  a  friend  to  keep  a  portion  of  my  wages 
and  save  it  for  me.  I  may  ask  a  companion  at  a  party  to  insist  upon 299  it 
driving  me  home  should  he  think  I  am  becoming  incapable  of  driving, 
or,  being  a  compulsive  gambler,  that  he  should  lead  me  away  from  the 
tables  should  he  think  my  loses  are  threatening  to  become  excessive.  In 
situations  like  this,  should  I  choose  to  resist  the  actions  of  my 
appointed  protector  when  he  insists  upon  doing  his  duty,  I  will  be 
coerced,  in  so  far  as  in  the  present  circumstances  I  will  be  forced  to 
act  against  my  will.  Paternalism,  in  other  words,  is  not  equivalent  to 
coercion  but  may  become  -coercive.,  Once  an  agreed  paternalistic  relationship 
moves  from  relying  upon  rational  persuasion  and  consent  to  reliance 
upon  the  use  of  threats  and  physical  force  it  becomes  coercive  and  will 
tend  to  deny  the  victim's  status  as  a  human  being  and  his  capacity  to 
act  as  a  moral  agent.  If  taken  to  the  extreme,  paternalism  degenerates 
into  bondage  and  contravenes  the  basic  moral  principles  of  liberty, 
justice  and  respect  for  persons. 
If  the  use  of  coercion  is  to  be  justified  in  terms  of  paternalism, 
then  the  ends  of  paternalisn  must  at  least  be  those  which  a  rational 
individual,  in  the  particular  circumstances  concerned,  could  be  expected 
to  agree  to  as  a  realistic  protection  against  his  own  irrational  and 
non-voluntary  propensities  and  ignorance.  There  are  basic  needs  which 
every  individual  requires  to  be  satisfied  if,  that  is,  he  is  to  aspire 
to  a  life  and  condition  of  well-being  in  the  Aristotelian  sense.  He 
must  enjoy  access  to  certain  goods  such  as  health,  education,  friendship, 
and  the  opportunity  to  fulfil  a  satisfying  role  and  function  in  society. 
The  judicious  use  of  coercion  to  induce  and  to  encourage  individuals  to 
appreciate  and  to  benefit  from  the  satisfaction  of  such  needs  may  in 
particular  circumstances,  it  is  suggested,  be  justified. 
As  a  standard  of  reference,  Mill's  position  regarding  the  notion  of 
paternalism  is  useful.  Mill  opposes,  as  being  contrary  to  the  principle 
of  negative  liberty,  strong  paternalism,  or  interference  with  another 
individual's  life  for  his  own  benefit  when  he  is  quite  capable  of  thinking 300  qF 
and  acting  for  himself;  but,  he  allows  for  the  qualified  justification 
of  weak  paternalism  in  circumstances  when  the  individual  is  judged  to 
be  less  than  fully  capable  of  making  his  own  decisions.  'Whereas  in  the 
case  of  strong  paternalism  the  victim's  rationally  expressed  views  and 
values  are  ignored  and  are  imposed  upon,  in  the  case  of  weak  paternalism 
every  effort  is  presumably  made  to  anticipate  his  future  interests  and 
desires.  There  are,  however,  limits  to  paternalism  per  se  because,  whilst 
it  is  acceptable  that  in  a  positive  sense  an  individual's  freedom  might 
be  enhanced  by  entering  arrangements  which  temporarily  curtail  his  freedom 
of  action,  thought  and  choice,  it  is  not  acceptable  to  follow  those  who, 
like  Rousseau,  Marx,  and  various  divines,  claim  it  is  possible  to  give 
up  one's  freedom  yet  at  the  same  time  to  attain  a  greater  freedom  than 
before.  In  sum,  it  is  proposed  that  the  notion  of  paternalistic  coercion 
is  only  justifiable  in  circumstances  in  which  it  is  used  to  preserve  or 
to  enhance  the  victim's  ability  in  the  future  to  develop  as  a  rational 
and  autonomous  moral  agent. 
The  justification  of  the  use  of  coercion  depends  upon  the  recognition 
of  certain  basic  moral  principles  the  interpretation  of  which  will  vary 
according  to  whether  they  are  applied  to  circ-istances  in  the  respective 
a.  omains  of  public  life  and  public  morality  or  private  life  and  private 
morality.  Private  morality  is  that  which  exists  between  individuals  as 
such,  whereas  public  morality  embodies  the  values  that  are  recognised 
between  bureaucracies,  corporate  bodies  of  all  kinds,  religious  and  economic, 
between  political  entities  such  as  states,  and  between  individuals  when 
representing  such  organisations  in  an  official  capacity.  Nozick  proposes 
an  analysis  of  coercion  based  upon  private  morality  and  values  governing 
interpersonal  relationships  between  individuals,  whereas  in  this  thesis 
it  is  argued  that  groups  of  individuals  and  corporate  bodies  may  quite 301 
properly  be  regarded  as  moral  and  legal  personalities  representing  the 
collective  will  of  their  members,  capable  of  coercing  other  groups  of 
individuals,  and  capable  also  of  being  coerced  themselves.  Nozick  is, 
nevertheless,  right  to  indicate  the  threat  to  individual  freedom  that 
may  arise  from  attributing  excessive  powers  to  corporate  organisations 
such  as  the  state  and  no  doubt  wishes  to  preserve  the  values  associated 
with  a  society  of  free,  autonomous,  moral  beings.  He  recommends,  therefore, 
that  state  interference  in  the  lives  of  individuals  should  be  minimal. 
In  effect,  he  is  concerned  lest  the  values  associated  with  public  morality 
override  the  values  recognised  bet.  veen  individuals  in  their  private 
capacities,  to  the  detriment  of  the  latter. 
In  private  life,  moral  values  are  acquired  much  like  good  manners 
in  so  far  as  they  are  internalised  through  the  experience  of  a  shared 
way  of  life  and  become  part  of  each  individual's  personality  and,  moral 
disposition.  When  we  express  moral  judgments  by  action  or  word,  we  do 
not  reason  like  the  pocket  calculator  or  the  computer  but  as  human  beings 
reflecting  all  our  feelings,  character,  nature  and  experience.  We  explain 
our  behaviour  with  reasons  distilled  from  an  amalgam  of  memories,  experience, 
feelings,  impressions,  and  intellectual  contemplation,  comprising  a  sort  of 
intuitive  selection  reflecting  the  complex  nature  of  our  individual  human 
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minds  and  personalities.  Even  our  most  deliberative  and  premeditated 
thoughts  are  based  upon  this  kind  of  intuitive,  selective  process  that 
reflects  the  complexity  of  the  human  mind  and  human  reasoning.  This  is 
presumably  why  Hume,  argued  that  morality  is  more  felt  than  judged  of  and 
that  it  cannot  be  explained  in  terms  of  demonstrative  reason  alone. 
In  the  sphere  of  private  morality,  therefore,  less  explicitness  can 
be  expected  in  the  reasons  given  for  moral  judgnents  than  say  in  the  sphere 
of  public  morality,  yet  it  is  inmerative  that  due  respect  is  accorded  to 
each  individual's  sincerely  held  feelings  and  beliefs.  It  is  important, 
for  instance,  that  respect  is  shown  for  the  views  of  individuals  such  as 3C2 
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the  Catholic  wife  who  prefers  not  to  be  coerced  into  having  an  abortion 
merely  to  reduce  the  risk  to  her  own  life,  and  the  Christian  Scientist 
who  chooses  to  risk  an  early  demise  rather  than  to  be  forced  to  have  a 
blood  transfusion,  and  the  expectant  mother  who  wishes  to  have  a  natural 
delivery  and  to  preserve  the  inviolability  of  her  ow-n  body  against  medical 
interference.,  regardless  of  how  beneficial  and  useful  such  interference 
may  be  judged  to  be  in  terms  of  the  values  of  public  morality  either  for 
herself  or  for  medical  science  and  future  generations. 
In  public  life  different  moral  standards  prevail.  Institutions  and 
corporate  bodies,  whether  political,  economic,  religious,  bureaucratic  or 
whatever,  are  more  impersonal  in  their  relations  with  each  other  and  also 
with  indivictials  in  their  private  capacity  with  whom  they  come  into  contact. 
Success  in  public  life  is  judged  in  texas  of  consequences,  in  terms  of 
results,  effectiveness,  profit  and  efficiency.  Since  Machiavelli  the 
relation  between  public  expediency  and  the  preservation  of  a  minimum 
acceptable  moral  code  in  keeping  with  human  dignity  and  decency  has  been 
a  matter  of  concern  to  political  and  social  philosophers.  Machiavelli 
believed  it  was  wrong  to  apply  to  states  the  moral  standards  appropriate 
to  private  life,  such  as  justice,  friendship  and  honesty,  because  any  state 
which  refused  to  be  ruthless  in  pursuit  of  its  objectives  or  refused  to 
resort  to  deceit  and  guile  if  necessary  would,  in  his  view,  at  least 
jeopardise  if  not  forfeit  its  capacity  and  ability  to  protect  its  subjects 
effectively.  Violence,  threats,  sanctions  and  force  are  normal  instruments 
of  state  practice.  Historians  have  traditionally  valued  a  state's  success 
in  terms  of  the  power,  prestige  and  prosperity  it  has  achieved  at  the 
expense  of  others. 
Between  states  and  similarly  between  other  bureaucratic  political 
and  economic  institutions  consequential  and  utilitarian  considerations 
are  the  normal  standards  of  reference,  and  the  ends  that  are  sought  tend  to 
determine  and  to  justify  the  means.  Pursued  to  their  logical  conclusion mr 
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such  considerations  are  used  to  justify  torture  and  even  genocide  when 
states  seek  interests  which  they  consider  to  be  especially  important. 
The  justification  of  the  use  of  coercion  in  the  sphere  of  public  morality 
is  related  to'values  that  are  quite  different  from  those  that  prevail  in 
the  sphere  of  private  morality,  though  both  sets  of  values  are  derived 
from  the  same  basic  moral  principles.  Whereas  the  state,  for  example, 
may  feel  justified  in  coercing  its  subjects  to  enlist  in  order  to  vent  its 
spleen  on  an  offending  neighbour,  no  individual  in  private  life  would  be 
justified  in  doing  the  same  were  his  neighbour  to  affront  his  dignity  and 
cause  him  harm.  In  human  affairs  a  commitment  to  efficiency,  expediency, 
cost-effectiveness  and  similar  values  seems  to  increase  proportionately 
with  a  commitment  to  power  and  success.  Coercion  on  a  grand  scale  has 
always  been  more  easily  justified  in  terms  of  the  values  of  public  morality. 
The  experience  of  history  indicates  that  it  is  the  imoersolalised  political 
and  economic  institutions  of  society  which,  acting  as  agents  of  coercion, 
precipitate  and  perpetrate  the  worst  kinds  of  exploitation  and  the  worst 
kinds  of  crimes  against  human  beings. 
Problems  arise  when  the  two  moralities,  public  and  private,  conflict. 
It  would  be  naive  and  foolish,  for  instance,  for  an  individual  in  his  role 
as  head  of  state  or  as  principal  of  a  large  industrial  enterprise  to  expect 
to  be  able  to  conduct  his  public  responsibilities  in  accord  with  the  rules 
and  values  of  private  morality.  Most  people,  of  course,  operate  in  two 
moralities  relating  respectively  to  their  public  and  private  roles  in 
society.  Some  groups  in  society,  particularly  amongst  the  professions, 
like  teachers,  lawyers,  doctors  and  even  some  financial  advisers  and 
stockbrokers,  attest  to  relate  the  two  moralities  by  jealously  guarding 
their  professional,  ethical  codes  of  conduct  regulating  their  relations 
with  their  clients  and  between  themselves.  On  the  other  hand,  businessmen 
and  politicians  as  a  rule  have  no  such  arrangements  and  show  no  such  concern. 
In  the  case  of  entrepreneurs  and  politicians,  the  desire  for  power,  the  will 
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to  succeed.,  their  competitiveness  and  determination  to  profit  at  someone 
else's  expense  preclude  much  of  the  altruism  that  is  characteristic  of 
relationships  betiveen  individuals  in  their  private  lives.  State  officials, 
for  exar  le,  are  able  to  levy  the  most  crippling  taxes  and  to  force 
citizens  to  co=it  horrific  crimes  against  their  fellow  men,  but  no  such 
demands  can  be  made  by  one  individual  upon  another  in  their  private 
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capacities. 
Justification  of  the  use  of  coercion  is  ultimately  dependent  upon 
the  interpretation  given  to  rules  and  values  which  are  derived  from 
universally  recognised  basic  moral  principles.  The  values,  however, 
may  differ  in  private  and  public  life.  What  is  accepted  as  being  just 
between  individuals  in  their  private  lives  may  not  coincide  with  what  is 
accepted  as  being  just  between  political  and  economic  institutions  in 
public  life.  When  the  values  of  public  and  private  morality  clash,  it 
is  essential,  Nozick  argues,  that  the  latter  should  be  regarded  as 
being  prima  facie  paramount  and  the  fundamental  moral  principle  of 
respect  for  persons  recognised,  if  morality  in  any  respect  is  to  survive. 
There  must  be  limits  to  which  expedient,  consequentialist  and  utilitarian 
considerations  may  be  allowed  to  justify  actions  allegedly  pursued  in  say 
the  national  interest,  or  for  the  good  of  the  firm,  or  for  the  benefit  of 
some  particular  group.  That  is  to  say,  the  values  of  private  morality 
must  ultimately  be  recognised  as  a  restraining  or  limiting  factor  upon 
the  conduct  of  public  officials  and  public  institutions  and  of  individuals 
acting  in  a  public  role. 
In  normal,  practice,  public_  officials  are  expected  to  treat  private 
individuals  impartially,  and  are  expected  to  be  seen  to  do  so.  It  would 
in  any  case,  of  course,  be  difficult  for  them  to  be  partial  and  loyal  to 
their  own  organisation  or  institution  whilst  at  the  same  time  acting 
partially  to  individual  clients.  People  in  public  life  are  accountable 
to  public  opinion  and  are  expected  to  conduct  their  lives  and  to  carry 3o5,  ' 
out  their  responsibilities  within  recognised  principles  of  justice  and 
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fairness,  and  to  give  explicit  reasons  for  their  actions.  If,  unhappily, 
in  the  course  of  their  work,  they  happen  to  subvert  ordinary  moral 
decencies,  contrary  to  the  natural  sentiments  and  intentions  of  the  people 
at  large,  then  their  policies  may  be  judged  to  be  morally  unworthy  if  not 
in  all  cases  to  be  wrong. 
Within  both  moralities,  public  and  private,  there  are  limits,  basic 
prohibitions  or  barriers  to  action,  which  are  recognised  as  being 
unsurmountable  except  in  very  exceptional  circumstances.  Any  individual, 
for  example,  who  chose  in  his  private  life  to  take  an  equivocal  view  of 
friendship,  or  of  loyalty  to  family,  would  be  considered  to  be  abnormal. 
Likewise,  in  public  life,  a  politician  who  chose  to  entirely  disregard 
the  value  of  human  life  and  recognised  rules  of  justice  would  be  discredited. 
The  assumption  is  that  if  such  barriers  are  breached,  then  anything  goes. 
It  is  this  thought  that  generates  respect  for  moral  standards  and  the 
will  to  resist  the  slippery  slope  leading  to  a  state  of  nature  such  as 
Hobbes  described. 
These  ultimate  prohibitions,  which  encompass  rules  regulating  the 
taking  of  human  life,  the  conduct  of  sexual  relationships,  the  distribution 
of  justice,  rights  and  duties  in  relation  to  property,  family  duties  and 
friendship,  normally  refer  to  activities  that  are  recognised  within  a  way  of 
life,  or  within  a  society,  as  being  intrinsically  unworthy,  inhuman,  and 
contrary  to  basic  moral  values.  The  use  of  coercion,  even  in  the  sphere 
of  public  morality  is  not  justified  on  consequential  grounds  alone,  for 
these  prohibitions  represent  a  basic  respect  for  human  nature  and  for 
individual  human  beings  as  free,  autonomous,  moral  agents.  Any  professed 
justification  of  the  use  of  coercion,  in  either  the  public  of  private 
domains  of  morality,  must  take  account  of  such  considerations  and  the 
ultimate  moral  principles  upon  which  they  are  based. 306 
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